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Abstract 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, and in response to increasing global condemnation, the 
mining industry adopted sustainable development (SD) principles and standards 
through corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This approach not only 
proposed a dramatic change in the operating practices of large mining houses, but 
also suggested a grand vision for the industry as a long term catalyser of local 
economic growth. This research now investigates the effect that mining enterprises 
which operate under these principles have on sub-national economic development. In 
doing so, it undertakes multiple case-study analysis, focussing on a single firm, Rio 
Tinto, and covers three of its subsidiary companies at various stages of development. 
Consistent with claims by mining advocates, this work confirms the frequently 
striking importance that large mines have for sub-national economies. However, this 
investigation disagrees with the emphasis typically attributed to each stream of 
benefits and brings attention back to the use that mining cash flows are put to. More 
generally, the study argues that the potential for large mining firms to trigger 
endogenous growth has been underestimated. On the one hand, these enterprises can 
contribute distinctly to local capital accumulation; on the other, under certain 
circumstances, they can also help sustain increases in local productivity 
endogenously. Indeed; while local preconditions will determine socioeconomic 
outcomes to a significant degree, mining companies can play a critical part in 
economic planning and the building of innovative institutions, which could, in turn, 
help increase the underlying local rate of technological absorption, human capital and 
overall capacity for economic governance. This entails a drastic (and controversial) 
change from the role previously assumed by companies. Yet, this study also 
concludes that, in some other cases, SD has promoted unattainable economic 
expectations. In these cases, minimising the local impact of mining would be a more 
advisable economic strategy. 
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This research aims to investigate the effect that mining enterprises which operate 
under the principles of sustainable development (SD) have on economic development 
at the local and regional level. As such, this work refers to mining as the group of 
individual industries covering all mining extractions with the exception of oil and gas, 
including the initial smelting and processing of minerals. This combination of mineral 
extraction and initial processing is often referred to by mining practitioners as mining 
and primary metals. In addition, this study refers to economic development as an 
indication of all the measures of economic growth and socio economic welfare found 
in the relevant literature, including the level of per capita income along with its 
growth; the incidence of poverty and the alleviation of poverty over time; the 
distribution of income and changes in its distribution; trends in employment and 
unemployment, as well as indicators such as literacy, infant mortality, life expectancy 
and others.  
   
For half a century, theorists have argued that mining has repeatedly undermined 
economic development. In exploring why, the literature has devoted countless 
volumes to examining the effect of natural resource specialisation on trade, exchange 
rates, government revenues, economic linkages with other economic sectors, and the 
alleged propensity of the industry to diverge the interests of different economic 
agents. These analyses have been leveraged at the macroeconomic level to the largest 
extent, and consolidated under the framework of the so-called Resource Curse 
Theory. More recently, however, academia has come to recognise that in other cases 
mining has been positive for the economy – and has thus started to consider under 
which conditions each outcome is more likely. This shift has been underpinned by 
remarkable breakthroughs in the economic development discipline more generally, 
which over the last twenty years has started to emphasise the importance of 
technological absorption and human capital in long term economic growth; explored 
the microeconomic foundations of economic governance; and taken on the task of 
consolidating into theory a number of spontaneous reactions to local duress from 
unconstrained globalisation.  
 
Alongside this conceptual reshaping, the SD agenda has consolidated globally. The 
notion of sustainable development was actually born as an answer to global concerns 
over the exhaustion of natural resources whilst acknowledging the need to improve 
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living standards, especially in the poorest regions of the world. With time, the 
corporate world across the spectrum appropriated the concept as a voluntary response 
to discontent from the disappointing socioeconomic and environmental performance 
of multinational firms. In mining more particularly, SD galvanised the ongoing 
debate around economic development, and brought with it a new sense of purpose to 
an industry that had been singled out as a ‘bad citizen’ by an increasingly vocal 
international community. There was an obvious obstacle confronting this proposition 
though: how can mining, essentially a finite economic activity, ever be sustainable?  
In solving this conundrum, the industry adopted the notion of ‘soft’ sustainability. To 
some degree, this view assumes the substitutability of human capital for natural 
capital, and as such, it recognises that the benefits flowing from a mine could be 
sustained in time if they are properly invested into alternative sources of wealth. This 
research builds on this assumption, and focuses in particular on economic 
sustainability. For this reason, purely environmental concerns have been excluded 
from this analysis. 
 
This research also focuses on the region and the locality, as opposed to the nation. On 
the face of it, the wealth generated by mining could have been broadly expected to 
give rise to regional economic development; after all, many successful regions around 
the world had grown richer on the back of large mining operations. As with national 
economies, however, some research suggested that this was not the case. Yet, due to 
the strong bias towards the macro level of the debate, the localised implications of 
mining had been much less explored than those affecting national states. Sustainable 
development shifted the focus towards the sub-national level and made apparent that 
the most evident consequences of mining activities were taking place in the vicinities 
of the mines. As a result, large corporations redirected efforts nearer their operations; 
endeavoured to build up better relationships with host communities and to establish 
close links with local governments; studied their impacts on the immediate 
environments; and designed and implemented programs to minimise the negative 
effects of their businesses and to maximise their economic opportunities. 
Furthermore, the SD model not only proposed a dramatic change in the operating 
practices of large mining houses, but it also suggested a grand vision for the industry 
as a long term catalyser of local economic growth. 
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It has been over a decade since the industry decided to take this route. It is now time 
to investigate whether the conditions that lead to the embracing of sustainable 
development have been successfully addressed, and whether mining companies have 
overcome the problems associated with their legacy, as condemned by the literature 
in the past. An initial approach should look at the relative scale, and features, of the 
most direct economic contributions flowing from the mines to the communities. In 
this regard, a first group of questions should start asking whether the different streams 
of cash from mining are actually of relevance to the region; whether the resulting jobs 
benefit locals; whether mining corporations pass their improvements in productivity 
on to local entrepreneurs; whether the supply chains of these firms help develop local 
businesses; whether the mineral rent is distributed equitably among local 
stakeholders; whether companies now consult with communities and local 
governments; or whether, under sustainable development, companies gave up their 
old paternalistic ways in favour of longer term and more sustainable approaches. 
Essentially, it should be established whether the operating practices of large mining 
multinationals have indeed changed as pledged, and if so, whether the prospects for 
local development improved accordingly.       
 
While some commentators have started to look at these questions in the exclusive 
realm of mining companies, they have largely ignored how the affected regions have 
coped with the stimulus brought in by these operations, or how able have local 
communities been to respond to the changes posed by the industry more generally. 
For instance, it has usually been granted that large mines are significant contributors 
of capital, both in the form of fixed assets and recurrent cash injections into the 
economy. If so, can local economies take advantage of this thrust and sustain 
improvements in technological absorption and human capital, in line with the 
recommendations from modern growth theory, so as to achieve long term economic 
growth? Similarly, mining has long been seen as a disruption and local promoter of 
conflict and social tension. Can mining companies under SD change that image and, 
in turn, help improve local standards of economic governance?  Or, at a more 
conceptual level, could the sustainable development movement, effectively a 
voluntary approach, ensure the durability and further applicability of corporate 
initiatives that may not be necessarily related to the essence of mining activities?  
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Moreover, should the policy objective of local economic growth be pursued in all 
cases? 
 
In short, this research poses two fundamental questions: under the SD framework, 
what is the economic effect of a large mining company at the local and regional level; 
and can a large scale mine operating under the principles of sustainable development 
became a catalyser of local economic growth?  In structuring this research two 
hypotheses are proposed. The first suggests that large mining operations can indeed 
have a positive economic effect at the local and regional level, and become catalyser 
entities for economic development. It is recognised, however, that this statement may 
accommodate an alternative view; one in which, for instance, mining operations are 
positively associated with some, but not all, measures of economic development. 
Nonetheless, a second hypothesis, complementary to the first, puts forward that 
realising the full economic potential from large mining operations would require 
proactive economic management at different levels of the local administration, 
including not only governments, but critically, the private sector. Again, an 
alternative view may suggest that realising the full development potential from 
mining actually depends on factors complementary to the level and efficiency of local 
economic management.    
  
The soundness of this affirmative vision should rest on the existence of a thorough 
body of research looking at mining companies and their effect on the local and 
regional economies in which they operate, as well as on a methodical examination of 
the current policy wisdom in this regard. This debate calls for a set of comprehensive 
studies exploring, in particular, the interface between mining firms and these 
economies, so that contributions may be made to the formation of more consistent 
policy recommendations. Yet, the specialised literature has increasingly pointed to the 
futility of one-size-fits-all approaches to economic development. As most of the 
concerns expressed above are, in actual fact, specific to each location, a range of 
different situations would need to be considered for conclusions to remain widely 
relevant. Up until this point, such research has remained sparse. While some initial 
analyses have begun to emerge, it still falls short of a coherent body of theory. To 
begin to fill this gap is, in effect, the aspiration of this study.  
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In doing so, this work undertakes multiple case study analysis. The investigation 
focuses on a single company, Rio Tinto, one of the largest diversified mining 
multinational corporations, and covers several of its projects at various stages of 
development. This work is organised in the following way: chapter 1 explores the 
conceptual background put forward by the proponents of the Resource Curse Theory 
and argues that the relevant research question has now changed. It also looks at key 
developments in modern growth theory over the last fifty years and proposes a new 
linkage between these and the mining industry. Chapter 2 explains how to determine 
economic contributions from mining companies; investigates the evolution of mining 
and its role in economic development over time; introduces the concept of sustainable 
development and soft sustainability, and tells the story of how mining came to 
embrace this so categorically only just over a decade ago. Chapter 3, in particular, 
follows Rio Tinto’s pathway along this process and introduces the case studies that 
constitute the core of this investigation. Research methodology is also discussed in 
this chapter.   
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 cover one case study each. While all cases are structured in 
similar ways, each has singular characteristics that added to the particularities of each 
study. As such, this work aims to identify and examine both the communalities and 
specificities coming up from these analyses. That said, the case studies have been 
conceived as stand alone pieces. For that reason, chapter 7 brings them all together; 
extracts the fundamental lessons coming up from each; and readdresses the main 
research questions of this work. It also goes back to the specialised literature 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2 and compares the conclusions from this work to the 
relevant propositions previously made by theorists and commentators in this 
discipline. A short synopsis including the overall conclusion from this research is 
presented in final chapter 8.      
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1.1. Redefining the policy question 
 
It could be assumed that countries with large mineral deposits should consider 
themselves fortunate. Minerals, like any other asset, are part of the natural capital of a 
nation and therefore should contribute to wealthier economies. In that view, mining 
activities are those that can extract economic value from latent wealth in the form of 
underground mineral deposits, so it could be converted into businesses, education, 
infrastructure, and other forms of capital that directly contribute to economic 
development. Likewise, at the local and regional level, it has often been accepted that 
economic development would be a natural by-product of mining activities, as the east 
coast of the United States testifies, together with Western Australia and Victoria in 
Australia or Johannesburg in South Africa, among many others (Eggert 2001). 
 
Yet, over the second half of last century, empirical evidence has questioned the 
positive relationship between natural resources and economic development, and has 
argued that large natural resource endowments delay, rather than accelerate growth, 
promote social distress, and also bring in extensive local disruptions.  Based on case 
studies of individual countries, and then on more comprehensive comparisons among 
countries from cross-country analyses, a growing number of commentators have 
reported a negative correlation between the economic specialisation on the 
exploitation of natural resources and economic development (Auty 1993, 1997, Sachs 
and Warner 1995, 1999, 1999b, Ross 2001), which has been since commonly referred 
to as ‘The Resource Curse Theory’ (RCT) – or ‘The Mining Curse Theory’ (MCT), 
when referring to mining specifically. Attempts to explain the allegedly disappointing 
performance of some mineral producing countries have been numerous and of a 
varied nature (Davis and Tilton 2002), though they can be synthesised in the five 
points below:   
  
1. The declining terms of trade. The prices of primary products may be perpetually 
falling relative to those of manufactured goods. The implication of this is that 
countries specialising in primary goods would have to export ever-increasing 
quantities of these products in order to acquire a given basket of imported 
manufactures (Prebisch 1950, Singer 1950).  This may be explained, at least 
partially, by the highly competitive nature of commodity markets.  While cost 
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reductions in primary products are often passed on directly to consumers in the 
form of lower prices, the producers of many manufactured products enjoy some 
market power, which allows them to divert the benefits of falling costs to 
shareholders and workers in the form of greater dividends and better salaries. 
This means that the basket of goods imported by natural resource producer 
countries from abroad that is available for consumption at any given level of 
domestic output will decline over time.  
 
2.  The high volatility of commodity markets.  The short-term volatility of primary 
commodity markets causes substantial fluctuations in government revenues and 
foreign exchange earnings in mineral dependent countries, which may hamper 
economic development (Sachs and Warner 1995, World Bank 2000).  The 
markets for primary products are known for their instability, often showing 
violent fluctuations in prices over short periods of time. For mineral 
commodities, this volatility arises because of significant fluctuations of demand 
for minerals and metals over the business cycle, following shifts in demand in the 
end-use sectors that consume most mineral commodities:  prices are down when 
demand is down, and vice versa. This means that profits – and thus taxes on 
profits- are particularly volatile. This makes it difficult for developing countries 
to count on revenues from the mineral sector, and hampers the effective planning 
needed for economic development.  
 
3. The Dutch Disease.  Mineral booms cause labour and capital to flow from 
agriculture and manufacturing to the mining sector. Once the mineral boom has 
passed, countries may find it difficult to regain their competitiveness in the 
traditional export sectors (Auty 1993, 1997, Caves et al 1996, Sachs and Warner 
1999, ODI 2006). This macroeconomic phenomenon owes its name to a mineral 
boom following the expansion of the natural gas sector in the Netherlands during 
the 1970s, triggering important adjustments in the economy. Typically, these 
adjustments involve the rise of domestic wages, as the booming mineral industry 
attracts labour away from agriculture and manufacturing.  Further, rising mineral 
exports cause the domestic currency to appreciate. These developments hamper 
the more traditional export industries, which have to compete with overseas 
producers.   
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4. Mining as an enclave industry. Mining in some instances provides few benefits to 
mineral producing countries, other than the share of the economic profits or rents 
captured through taxation (Seers 1964, Baldwin 1966, Ross 2001, WBEIR 2003). 
The argument here is that mining is detrimental to an economy simply because it 
has a lower potential for long-term economic growth than alternative activities. 
This lower-growth potential occurs because production of primary commodities 
has fewer beneficial backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy 
than, say, manufacturing. Another critique of the mining sector is that whilst it 
creates environmental and social problems at the local level, the communities 
affected do not share in the wealth created, which flows largely to the central 
government or abroad. Supplies are often imported, and little value added is 
carried out domestically.  In addition, mining employs few workers, many of 
which are new to the region. As a result, the host economy gets little from mining 
besides its share of the profits or economic rents.   
  
5. The use of mineral rent.  The profits and rents from mining activities are 
geographically concentrated, which may promote rent seeking (efforts by groups 
of individuals or organisations to increase their share of the available profits) at 
the expense of rent creation (efforts that increase the total profits or wealth 
available for distribution) (among many others, Sachs and Warner 1999b, 
WBEIR 2003, Friends of the Earth, undated). Building from Krueger’s (1974) 
work on the social costs of agents seeking to capture monopoly rents, some 
commentators have argued that large levels of natural resources relative to 
income generate inefficient economic behaviours and hamper productive 
economic activities (Khan 2005). Therefore, mining may in cases accentuate the 
income disparities frequently evident in developing countries. Even worse, 
conflicts with the distribution of mineral rents may promote corruption, civil 
unrest, and wars.   
 
These views have impacted vigorously on mainstream development theory, and led in 
some cases to policy propositions such as the Import Substitution Industrialisation 
(ISI), which became a widely spread development paradigm after WWII, and is now 
widely criticised. At present, a new strong policy proposition flowing from this 
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debate can be found in the recommendations by the independent World Bank 
Extractive Industries Review, which in 2003 concluded that international 
organisations should be discouraging, rather than encouraging, mining in the 
developing world (WBEIR 2003).  
 
All of these views have not come without strong dissent, however, and numerous 
commentators have challenged both the empirical evidence itself as well as the causal 
relationships referred to above linking mining to poor development performances 
(Davis 1998, Eggert 2001, Hadass and Williamson 2001, Lederman and Maloney 
2002, World Bank 2002, Davis and Tilton 2002). More precisely, they have argued 
that: 
  
1. Whether or not the terms of trade of countries specialising in primary products 
are declining, the effect of this on their long-term growth appears to be negligible 
(e.g. Hadass and Williamson 2001). Moreover, what really matter are margins, 
rather than absolute prices. If costs of production fall faster than commodity 
prices – note, for instance, the significant increases of productivity in the mining 
industry over the last decades –, the benefits flowing to the country from such 
commodity may be actually rising. Davis and Tilton (2002) cite the case of 
copper in Chile in the last fifteen years as an example. 
 
2. The volatility experienced by commodity markets is actually not entirely 
detrimental for economic development. While it does make planning more 
difficult, downturns in the commodity cycle often force needed changes in the 
public sector that would not occur under less stressful conditions.  Similarly, 
market slumps provide mining companies with strong incentives to improve their 
productivity and reduce their operating costs (Eggert 2001). The World Bank 
(2000) finds that, during the 1990s, high commodity price volatility did not affect 
the growth prospects for exporters of agricultural and mineral commodities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, governments could always mitigate these 
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fluctuations by putting their mineral revenues into stabilization funds or other 
similar instruments1.   
   
3. The Dutch disease need not be a disease – and may well be seen as beneficial to 
countries. It simply reflects the mechanism by which a country can benefit from 
its newly found mineral wealth by encouraging resources to flow from other 
sectors of the economy to the booming sector. Market economies evolve and 
change, and some sectors and companies rise while others are in decline (ODI 
2006). The Dutch disease represents a change in the structure of a national 
economy during a period of economic expansion induced by a commodity boom. 
Davis (1995) argues that this mechanism would only become a disease if (a) 
there is stress associated with adjusting to change, (b) if governments respond to 
political pressure and intervene to protect the industries hurt by the structural 
change, or (c) if the boom in mineral exports is temporary, and it is difficult to 
restart the traditional export industries once the boom has passed. 
 
4. The argument that mining is typically an enclave industry –i.e. mining has fewer 
beneficial backward and forward linkages than, for instance, manufacturing-, is 
far from settled.  Existing estimates of the magnitude of the linkages available 
from a number of input-output and computable general equilibrium models 
actually suggest that mining is not necessarily disengaged from the rest of the 
economy, and that the degree of interaction can go from enclave to very well 
integrated, depending on the maturity and scale of the mining sector in the 
country and broader economy (e.g. Porter 1984, Stilwell et al 2000). Other 
commentators (Davis 1998) see no problem with the proposition that mining 
contributions are mostly in the form of money or rents, as this can support 
education, public health, infrastructure developments, and other investments that 
stimulate development. Economic growth requires the creation of wealth; 
policies that attempt to move away from mining by, for instance, subsidizing 
industries that would otherwise lose money, destroy wealth.   
  
                                                 
1
 Administrations such as Alaska, Canada, Chile, Ghana, Norway, Papua New Guinea and Venezuela 
have used stabilization funds in the past, with different degrees of success. 
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5. Good governance can prevent corruption and minimise the internal frictions that 
breed war and violence.  It can also prevent the economic incentives that give 
rise to rent seeking behaviour, and ensure that mining rents are re-invested in 
human capital and other assets that promote economic development. Sachs and 
Warner (1999) find that resource-rich nations are more likely to have particularly 
low scores on international measures of bureaucratic efficiency and institutional 
quality, but also find that there is nothing inevitable about this correlation. 
 
Generally, mining advocates have also claimed that in light of the urgent, but 
ambitious, development targets set by the international community (e.g. the UN 
Millennium Development Goals), the renunciation of such a substantial source of 
wealth by developing countries appears rather short sighted (ICMM 2003, ODI 
2006). 
 
More recently, while the Resource Curse Theory has continued to frame the 
discussion over mining’s contribution to long-term national economic development, a 
shift in focus has become apparent. As understanding of the macroeconomic effects 
of mining improved, so the debate moved to the microeconomic level (Humphreys 
2000b, 2002). Specifically, it has started to address questions around the longer 
impact of large individual mining operations, or groups of them, on the local and 
regional economies where they operate. In fact, it is precisely the effect of mining 
enterprises at this sub-national level, rather than then national viewpoint, that 
constitutes the core of this research. Furthermore, while the issue of whether mining 
represents an intrinsically detrimental path for advancing development still is, in most 
respects, an open debate, there is an emerging recognition that mineral deposits offer 
opportunities, which in some cases have been used judiciously to promote 
development, and in others they have been misused, impairing development (for 
example, Sachs & Rodriguez 1999b, Humphreys 2000b, Acemoglu 2001, Aroca 
2001, Davis and Tilton 2002, Czelousta and Wright 2003, ODI 2006).   
 
It is therefore necessary to change the focus of the policy question, from one that asks 
whether mining is fundamentally good or bad for the economy, to one that asks what 
can be done to maximise the positive contributions to economic development from 
the sector while neutralising its potential negative externalities (Davis and Tilton 
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2005). Or, to put it differently, to explore under which circumstances mining 
companies can become a catalyser of regional economic growth. While regional 
economic development theory made important breakthroughs in the second half of 
the previous century, this has so far been rarely linked to mineral economies 
specifically. In addressing this shortcoming, sections two, three and four introduce the 
fundamental elements of the new development literature, while section five returns to 
mining and proposes an uncharted link between this body of literature and the 
activities of large mining corporations.  
  
 
1.2. New developments in growth theory 
 
Labour productivity2 in large mines has increased enormously over the last twenty 
years.  US statistics between 1987 and 1997 indicate that productivity growth in the 
mining industry was the fastest growing among all sectors in the economy3. In 
particular, Humphreys (2000) points out to a shift in the emphasis of productivity 
growth in mining from being driven almost exclusively by capital to being driven by 
technology and improved work practices during the 1990s. A steady increase in 
productivity has been good news for the industry, although its meaning for the local 
and regional economies is not always clear-cut. While these economies would benefit 
if increases in mining productivity helped improve the efficiency of factor input 
utilisation more broadly, there is no clear evidence to believe that this would always 
be the case (Di Boscio and Humpreys 2004). Within this context, the Endogenous 
Growth Theory provides good principles for thinking about the relationship between 
changes in technology and human capital, economic governance, and growth. This 
section discusses key concepts emerging from this view that are set to play a 
fundamental role in understanding the potential and challenges that mining economies 
face at the local and regional level. 
 
Economic development theory has largely assumed that long term economic growth 
is determined by both factor input accumulation – i.e. quantity of capital, labour, land, 
energy and so on- and technical progress, also regarded as total factor productivity. 
                                                 
2
 Usually measured as tonnes of rock treated by employee 
3
 Data from Triplett J. and Bosworth B. 2000, appeared in The Economist, 23rd of September 2000 
 26
The relative weight attributed to these two components has dominated the evolution 
of growth theory since the end of WWII. Most post-war growth theories heavily 
stressed the importance of investment (capital) in economic growth4. Worldwide 
development strategies focused on filling the financial gap existing between 
investment needs and financial availability (e.g. through aid) so that developing 
economies could increase their capital stock, assumed to be the main necessary 
ingredient for triggering the development process.  Thus, long-established policy 
responses have often focussed on top-down supply-side initiatives such as the 
provision of basic transport infrastructure, the construction of businesses’ facilities or 
proposals alike, expected to prompt the economic development process.  Results were 
rather poor.  Subsequent research indicated that the relative weight of the two main 
components of the equation (factor input accumulation and total factor productivity) 
were incorrect (Easterly 2001).  To better comprehend this, it is useful to examine it 
in the form of a production function. 
 
Y = Aeµt f (K L) 
 
The production function shows the maximum output that can be produced using 
specified quantities of inputs, given the existing technical knowledge. The factor 
inputs are notably capital K and labour L (land is also important in an agricultural 
context, but relatively unimportant in modern economies). In the equation above, the 
variable input capital K and labour L combine at any given time to produce a given 
output f (K, L). The function f shows how much is obtained with specified quantities 
of the inputs. The term A, total factor productivity (TFP), is a constant reflecting the 
efficiency with which factor inputs are utilised, which is assumed to reflect 
technological capacity, knowledge, organisation routines etc. Finally, eµ represents 
the rate at which TFP evolves. For instance, as technical progress takes place, more 
output is obtained from given inputs. According to the neoclassical theory, eµ is 
exogenously (i.e. market) driven and is therefore assumed that free markets will most 
efficiently determine long-term growth. 
 
                                                 
4
 The best-known and most applied theory in this respect was the so-called Harrold-Domar Model, 
developed in the mid 1940s.  
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In this equation, if input factors are increased together, total output will follow, 
gaining constant returns to scale (economies of scale). In contrast, increasing one 
input factor independently (say capital) will result in decreasing returns to scale. 
When increasing machines relative to workers, the return to each additional machine 
will get lower and lower; if a worker already operates a machine, providing a second 
machine to the same worker will not double production. In other words, adding more 
and more capital per worker, k, will increase output per worker, y, but with 
diminishing returns to capital. This means that there is a limit to how much capital 
accumulation can add to output per capita. The focus is then on production per 
worker, also called labour productivity. Whilst investment is a very important 
determinant of change in economic growth, increasing levels of capital cannot alone 
ensure long-term steady state economic growth. Instead, the return on capital can be 
sustained if the capital stock increases while total factor productivity rises as well, 
avoiding diminishing returns in capital through savings on labour5. Each worker 
becomes more and more efficient, and thus the effective number of workers keeps up 
with the increasing number of machines (Solow 1956, De Long 1996, Begg et al 
2000, Easterly 2001). As suggested above, however, the neoclassical theory left the 
rate of change in total factor productivity fundamentally unexplained (Pack 1994). 
 
The essence of the endogenous growth theory6 can be expressed as Y = AK, where A 
still represents factors affecting technical capacity, while K now includes both human 
and physical capital. In this case, there are no diminishing returns to capital.  
Investment in physical or human capital leads to an increase in productivity that 
exceeds the private gain, and sustained growth can then be achieved due to the 
existence of external economies (Romer 1986, 1990 and 1994, Lucas 1988, Pack 
1994, Barro 1991). While some endogenous growth theorists have focussed on the 
importance of ever increasing human capital in sustaining growth (Lucas 1988), 
others have concentrated on the quality of machinery or intermediate inputs as a way 
of offsetting the propensity for diminishing returns (Romer 1990, Grossman and 
Helpman 1991). But the central issue is that K now also represents the variety and 
                                                 
5
 The notion of diminishing returns to capital and the relative importance of factor productivity for 
long-run growth come from Nobel laureate Robert Solow, who published his theory between 1956 
and 1957. 
6
 First developments of the endogenous growth theory are owed to Paul Romer of Chicago University 
and go back to the beginning of the 1990’s. 
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quality of inputs; in the endogenous growth theory, different types of investment hold 
different development potentials. 
 
The concept of endogenous growth rediscovered the notion of positive externalities 
arising from improvements in economic interaction otherwise underestimated by 
local economic agents7 and places great importance on its co-ordination. No firm, 
acting in isolation, would wish to raise its capital without limit. Since diminishing 
returns to capital hold at the firm level, economists had always assumed that it held 
also for the aggregated economy. But when all firms expand together, the economy as 
a whole may face constant returns to aggregate capital, since capital invested in one 
firm has the potential to increase the productivity in other firms too – e.g. when 
communication companies invest in better equipment, other firms can do things that 
were impossible before. This also applies to human capital – e.g. training by one firm 
has beneficial externalities for others and the economy as a whole. Individual firms 
often neglect the fact that, in raising their own capital, they also increase the 
productivity of others’ capital (this phenomenon is regarded as positive externalities 
from capital accumulation).    
 
A major rationale behind this theory is that the pace of change in total factor 
productivity is indeed subject to different variables that can be influenced 
endogenously, for instance, by governments and other local actors (Pack 1996). This 
brings with it different policy implications. Neoclassical theory provides policy 
advice that is assumed to be relevant to all economies at all times, based on the 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics.  Simply, they state that perfectly 
competitive equilibrium is an optimal equilibrium in which it is impossible to make 
someone better off without making someone else worse off.  In other words, 
competitive equilibrium maximises the sum of producers and consumers’ surpluses.  
Failure to achieve a Pareto equilibrium is called a market failure, and the sources of 
market failures are assumed to be market imperfections. Hence, the policy advice 
aims at removing all sources of market failure in the hope that this will move the 
economy closer to a Pareto optimum (Lipsey, 2000). This has typically been 
                                                 
7
 This has its origins in the late 1800’s Marshallian notion of industrial districts. 
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attempted through top-down approaches to development, characterised by 
standardised, incentive-based and state-driven elements, 
  
In contrast, the endogenous approach emphasises that, in the real world, the optimal 
allocation of resources is unachievable8 and thus the lineal logic of removing 
impediments to achieving that optimum is not well grounded. Instead, policies should 
aim at consolidating increases in aggregated factor productivity endogenously. 
Although the endogenous growth theory does not offer settled directives and a fixed 
set of policies, it is clear that its axioms contrast sharply with those of the policy 
orthodoxy, and tends to favour region-specific, bottom-up, long-term and multiple-
actor based policy actions9. General recommendations frequently include: 
 
- Investment in research and development (R&D) and innovation; 
- Great attention is given to the quality of human capital and thus to education and 
training, as well as the promotion of skilled labour more widely; 
- Intensive incorporation of technology, for instance, through trade;  
- Intensive support for information flows;  
- Creation of local networks and cluster formation;  
- Promotion of entrepreneurship; 
- Development and consolidation of economic linkages to the local economy  
  
The endogenous approach brings in two concepts of particular importance for local 
and regional economies under the influence of large mines. First, as suggested earlier, 
if local actors can influence changes in total factor productivity endogenously, the 
issue of economic governance and economic institutions must acquire marked 
importance. However, the failure of highly directed economies recalls the inability of 
central governments to ensure long-run growth after an initial push from higher 
investment, and has suggested the need for alternative institutional arrangements. 
                                                 
8
 ‘Second Best’ theory (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) argues that when there are many constraints that 
prevent to achieve a Pareto equilibrium, the removal of any one constraint may affect welfare or 
efficiency either by raising it, lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged. There is no presumption that 
removing one market imperfection will raise welfare. 
9
 Liepsey (2000) points out, however, that the policy implications flowing from these ideas should be 
seen both as powerful and risky. Powerful because they suggest a way to go far beyond the generic 
classical advice, but dangerous because they could easily be used to justify ignoring key market 
oriented policies and abuse of government interventionism. The extent to which governments should 
intervene in long-run growth is subject of debate.  
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Increasingly, policymakers seems to favour the idea that central action should focus 
on delivering macroeconomic stability, on the one hand, and ensuring further 
decentralisation and enlarged participation, on the other (Amin and Robins 1990, 
Oates 1991, Cremer, Estache and Seabright 1996, Hart, Schleifer and Vischny 1997) 
 
Second is the notion that the most advanced forces of capitalism are localised and 
territorially specific. Geography is no longer conceived solely as a physical support 
for productive activities but rather a complex and dynamic element of potential 
economic expansion. The importance of proximity was revived, together with the role 
of ‘trust’ in economic transactions, thus promoting the sub-national level to the 
position of a highly relevant economic factor. Flowing from the endogenous growth 
theory, these two concepts are foundational to two other approaches in economic 
development, which are explored in more detail below: the Institutional Economics 
Theory and the Local Economic Development (LED) initiatives. 
  
 
1.3. The institutional view  
 
Institutional Economics focuses on understanding the institutional constructs 
favouring – or otherwise precluding - fluent economic interactions from taking place.  
Institutional economists emphasise that economic and political activities take place 
within an institutional framework.  Institutions constrain individuals and define the 
strategies with which they pursue their self-maximising interests in a rational fashion. 
A dominant branch of Institutional Economics concentrates on the role of transaction 
costs and the theory of imperfect information, looking at the underlying rationale of 
institutional arrangements in terms of asymmetric information between the different 
parties involved in economic transactions (Coase 1960, 1988, Casson 1982, 
Williamson 1985, North 1990, Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Some theoretical roots 
for the vast development literature on this can be found in the propositions made by 
economist John Nash in the early 1950s, in a field known as Strategic Interactions, or 
The Game Theory (Kreps 1990, Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). Against standard 
economic analysis, which assumes a single participant (monopoly) or an infinity of 
them (perfect competition), this is based on transactions involving few participants, 
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for example oligopolies, joint ventures, relationships between one public authority 
and one firm, relationships between few firms, trade between buyers and sellers etc.  
 
In this context, a ‘game’ is a situation in which one attempts to predict the outcome, 
based on the information structure (who knows what), the timing (who is acting 
when), and the payoffs (who is getting what when some action has been played). The 
main assumption is that of rational behaviour. The best-known example to illustrate 
this is ‘the prisoners’ dilemma’.  In the prisoners’ dilemma, a judge interviews two 
suspects independently. He has a strong hunch that they have committed a crime but 
has no hard evidence to prove it. If both deny their involvement, both will receive a 
light sentence. If both admit their involvement, they will both receive a moderate 
sentence. If one admits and the other denies guilt, he who confessed will be released 
whereas the other will be sentenced heavily. The best situation would be for the 
prisoners to both deny their guilt, but each one knows the other has an incentive to 
confess, and so they both confess10. This situation in which the strategy of player one 
is the best response to the strategy of player two, and the strategy of player two is the 
best response to the strategy of player one, is known as the Nash-equilibrium. In the 
Nash-equilibrium neither has an incentive to deviate. Note that this can lead to 
inefficiencies.   
 
The conditions change when the ‘games’ are played repeatedly, without certain end. 
Player one conjectures that player two will co-operate, in order for both to be better 
off, as long as he/she co-operates. Then, player one can either co-operate or not. This 
will depend on the expected benefits of each co-operation, assuming this game is 
perpetuated, against the one-time benefit of defecting. Thus, players may trust each 
other when the game has no certain end and when the ‘discount rate’ (benefit of each 
time one co-operates) is not too low. A key rationale emerging from this work is that, 
under rational behaviour, trust and cooperation among agents will take place when 
the benefits of future co-operation exceed the short-term gains of non-cooperation.  In 
a real economy, it is also possible to conjecture that one will co-operate with anyone 
who has co-operated in the past (reputation). The focus is both on frequent 
                                                 
10
 The fact that the suspects are interviewed independently is to say that they play simultaneously, and 
so they have to ‘guess’ the other player’s move. The interdependence of the payoffs is such that the 
preferred action of player one depends on what player two does and vice versa.  
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interactions and also on the circulation of information and social learning. From a 
policy perspective, promoting co-operation and trust can be achieved either by: a) 
changing the payoff in the game (through direct action, like taxation), or b) changing 
the way the game is played (for instance by promoting frequent interactions between 
the players, changing the information structure through better information flows, etc)  
 
Theorists have subsequently focussed on how these interactions are structured in 
practice. Ronald Coase (1960) first argued that all economic transactions are costly, 
even in competitive markets, and thus the most efficient institutional arrangement for 
carrying out a particular transaction would be the one that minimised its associated 
costs.  Building on Coase, economist Douglas North put forward that institutions 
significantly affect economic productivity and thereafter long term growth prospects. 
In his definition, institutions are the basic rules in an economy, and they include both 
formal systems, such as laws, taxation and market regulations, as well as informal 
behaviour, such as habits, customs, and ideologies (North 1990, 2001). Flowing from 
transaction cost theory, Williamson (1985) then explored the rationale underpinning 
the existence of different types of economic institutions. For instance, producing and 
enforcing contracts that take into account every possible eventuality is unfeasible, and 
thus in certain circumstances it makes more sense to internalise transactions within a 
single legal entity11 rather than carrying out these commercial operations on the 
market.  
 
Overall, this field of analysis has provided major insight into the micro-foundations 
of institutional arrangements in developing countries and in the understanding of 
underdevelopment as institutional and political failure. A significant number of 
empirical studies have shown a statistical relationship between economic 
performance and the quality of institutions and governance structures12 (Mehlum et al 
2002, Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian 2003, Robinson et al 2003, Korhonen 2004, to 
name just a few).  Similarly, for the case of mining, Acemoglu et al (2001) have 
argued that the differences in income across natural resource abundant countries can 
be explained by the effectiveness of their institutions. The policy concerns drawn 
                                                 
11
 For instance, by internalising transactions within a firm – i.e. integrating parts of the supply chain 
12
 Measures for the quality of institutions and governance structures have typically followed the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators (Kaufmann and Kraay 2003) or the Database on Political Institutions 
(Thorsten et al 2001). 
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from institutional economics have asked which institutional settings are best suited to 
deliver the most efficient socio economic outcomes. This has prompted a reform 
agenda that focuses on introducing the ‘optimal’ institutions as a necessary step to 
foster economic growth. The bold assumption has been that institutions that have 
proved efficient in one context will also be appropriate for others. 
 
Yet, institutional economists also underline the possibility of multiple equilibriums as 
a result of strategic interactions. Historical conditions and cultural beliefs that 
coordinate agents’ expectations influence the selection of a particular equilibrium 
over another. For instance, Bardhan (2000a, 2000b) notes that institutional 
economists are unclear about which type of institutional configurations affect the 
development process and how they do so. Moreover, North (1990) sees political 
systems and bargaining processes over who bears the costs and who gains the benefits 
as crucial if societies are to achieve institutional configurations that are conducive to 
economic growth. Institutions are not simply the result of efforts to lower the 
transaction costs of market exchange, but are also a function of political and social 
interests and differences in the allocation of power. Accordingly, Rodrik (2002, 2003) 
concludes that whilst the quality of institutions is key in advancing economic 
development, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all answer, and that acquiring good 
institutions often requires experimentation and the willingness to depart from 
orthodoxy, paying particular attention to local conditions. North (2001), Bates (2001) 
and Acemoglu (2003) have argued along similar lines. 
 
Based on the growing understanding of the economic benefits of co-operation and 
consensus among local actors, institutions at the local and regional level are 
becoming increasingly recognised as the most adequate for responding effectively 
and efficiently to global duress regionally. Local and regional institutions have the 
potential to reduce market failures by facilitating greater access to information, 
encouraging partnerships, detecting existing or potential clusters and so on because 
they have the advantage of physical and cultural proximity, and with this, better 
information. A lack of participation and representation may inhibit the evolution of a 
dense network of vertical and horizontal channels for interaction, and may also harm 
trust. Such a lack of trust not only prevents active knowledge sharing and innovation, 
but also may trigger a need for expensive, time-consuming, contractual transactions 
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(transaction costs).  The involvement by the widest range of the social basis in the 
decision-making process can rebuild the confidence and capability of local actors (for 
example, Atkinson and Stiglitz 1986, Storper 1997).   
 
In short, the institutional economics approach takes from the endogenous growth 
theory the notion that the issue of governance is critical in defining long-term 
economic patterns.  In this context, the concept of ‘governance’ includes 
governments, but is not confined to them.  Vazques Barquero (1999) argues that 
guiding alert and adaptive economies requires a co-ordinated organisation of local 
governance. This is not simply a structure of government, rules or regulations, but 
instead a structure of supported and collective goals agreed upon by a critical mass of 
those concerned with successful local economic development.  In particular at the 
local and regional level, new institutional arrangements such as partnerships, 
development agencies, industrial associations, foundations, chambers of commerce, 
development corporations and so on have the potential to generate innovative spaces 
for economic interaction, with the active participation of the private and public 
sectors and the community, as an expanded approach to governance.   
 
The private sector activities can be a lever for the creation of more effective 
governance structures, which in turn can improve private sector coordination 
therefore leading to more sustainable economic growth (Pratt and Toterdill 1992, 
Peck and Tickell 1994, Amin and Thomas 1996). Skrowronek (1982) has noted that 
various case studies provide rich evidence of how dynamic interactions between 
different stakeholders in a given institutional and political context have led to the 
development and adoption of more efficient institutions and governance structures. 
More specifically, Skrowronek has pointed out that in numerous developed countries 
the mining sector has featured highly at earlier stages of development for state 
building processes. Acemoglu et al. (2003) claim that the experiences of the most 
successful natural resource rich developing countries point in the same direction 
(Acemoglu et al 2003) 
 
The recent shift in focus back to the local and regional level, however, has unveiled 
the evidence of various failed stories where the strong initial investment push by large 
enterprises failed to anchor further economic activity.  Of particular interest to this 
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analysis, the local economic development (LED) approach provides a clear way of 
thinking about the broader interaction of different local economic agents, the potential 
synergies between large and small enterprises, the consolidation of networks, trust 
and collaboration, and long term local and regional economic growth.  The LED 
approach first emerged as a spontaneous reaction to local stress due to extensive 
global changes in the last decades, and has consolidated since as an alternative view 
to that of the mainstream policy orthodoxy on (regional) economic development.   
 
 
1.4. Down to the local and regional level 
 
During the last twenty years, deep changes in technology and increasing demand for 
specialised and differentiated goods facilitated a shift from the old mass system of 
production to a leaner, more flexible one. This allowed for a greater disassociation of 
industrial plants and subsidiaries from head offices. This broad reorganisation of the 
production chain was accompanied by the growing speed of communications and 
lower costs of transportation.  Distances have become irrelevant for many industries. 
Mining corporations, for instance, have established operations in places previously 
out of scope, and smelting and refining plants have become divorced from mining, in 
search of the best economic conditions for each activity – i.e. better skills, access to 
markets, cheaper energy etc (Radetzki 1994). Better information and greater mobility 
of capital have also increased the likelihood of some firms to choose new locations 
according to their risk and cost structure (Porter 1990, Rodriguez Pose 1994, Vazques 
Barquero 1999)   
 
On the political arena, backed by supra-national organisations like the World Bank 
and the IMF, central governments have tended to focus on macroeconomic policy – 
principally aiming at opening the economy to global markets, curving inflation, and 
reducing fiscal deficits and debt (Williamson 2004).  As an illustration, Lipsey (2000) 
notes that the so-called Washington consensus represented a broad acceptance of the 
beneficial role played by competition as a defender of the public interest and as a 
stimulus to growth-creating innovation, which came together with the understanding 
of the harmful role of monopolies, either in private firms, communications media, 
government institutions, or state owned industries. These realisations followed the 
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negative experiences of the highly directed economies in the Soviet bloc and the also 
disappointing results of interventionist models such as the Import Substitution 
Industrialisation. The ultimate implication was that wealth-creating activities should 
be located in the private sector, and that governments should concentrate on ensuring 
that the economic fundamentals to allow for efficient market competition were in 
place – i.e. well-defined property rights, no arbitrary confiscation of property, 
security of contracts, etc. As a result, numerous central governments assumed a 
reduced role regionally, which has in cases supported moves toward increased 
federalism and political and fiscal decentralisation.  
 
Some commentators have suggested that this increased flexibility of systems of 
production, together with the ongoing processes of decentralisation can explain, at 
least partially, a rising numbers of relocating enterprises, which in turn have fuelled 
competition between territories offering different location-specific advantages. These 
advantages include the so-called soft factors of economic development – i.e. business 
environment, entrepreneurship, networks and contacts, and so on-, which constitute 
region-specific assets in production, and are now identified as a central form of 
scarcity in contemporary capitalism, and hence a central form of geographical 
differentiation (Amin 1990, Rodriguez-Pose 1994, Vazquez Barquero 1999, 
Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix 2001).  As a consequence, Amin (1990) has argued that 
the management of the economic development strategy was, in cases, transferred to 
the sub-national levels.  
 
Rodriguez-Pose (2002) identifies three main categories for the successful regions 
engaged in territorial competition: (a) large metropolitan areas, (b) intermediate 
industrial regions, and (c) tourist regions. However, these areas are hardly the norm. 
For most regional and local economies, these changes have represented enormous 
stress for adapting to a new reality under the risk of becoming isolated and being 
unable to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the new global order.  
Numerous regions and localities struggle to adapt to these conditions, which in turn 
have contributed to greater territorial inequalities. Improvements in technology and 
information technology are also delocalising industrial and agricultural production, 
while the services sector is frequently related to the evolution of economic activity in 
other sectors. Thus, the competitive advantage that certain territories enjoyed in the 
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past is being watered down.  Many regions without a clear comparative advantage are 
struggling to even maintain their current market positions. Recently, the policy debate 
has started to ask whether the fact that territorial specificity has gained relevance 
represents an overall transfer of manoeuvre capacity to the sub-national level – or 
does this merely represent a transfer of responsibilities with no empowerment (Amin 
1999). Lovering (1999) has argued that the use of geographical arguments can be 
easily used to legitimise dismantling national re-distributive structures. His argument 
is that ‘[…] there is nothing in the structure of the paradigm to guarantee that it will 
tend to be interpreted in a socially progressive manner’ (Lovering 1999, p392)  
 
In any case, the challenges generated by globalisation, together with the failure of 
traditional top-down policies discussed earlier, led to the re-thinking of practical 
economic development strategies feeding from the endogenous view on growth and 
more specifically from the lessons provided by some successful experiences over the 
last fifteen years, to compile a group of innovative bottom-up development policies 
which has since become known as Local Economic Development.  This may have 
important connotations for mining, as this new view proposes development models 
that differ from the old pole of development growth theories based on major 
companies (as often mining is) and their spill over effects, and places instead greater 
attention on local organization and management (Amin and Robins 1990, Rodriguez-
Pose 1994, Vazquez Barquero 1990, 1999, Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix 2001). LED 
strategies are defined by their key characteristics, often presented as contrast to 
traditional top-down development policies.  Rodriguez-Pose (2002) summarises the 
main differences between these two approaches to development in five main domains, 
presented in table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 - Traditional top-down policies and bottom-up LED approaches 
Source: Rodriguez-Pose 2002 
 
 Traditional Development Policies   Local Economic Development 
    
1. Top-down approach in which decisions about 
the areas where intervention is needed are 
taken in the centre 
1. Promotion of development in all 
territories with the initiative often coming 
from below 
2. Managed by the central administration 2. Decentralised, vertical cooperation 
between different tiers of government and 
horizontal cooperation between public and 
private bodies 
3. Sectoral approach to development 3. Territorial approach to development 
(locality, mileau) 
4. Development of large industrial projects to 
stimulate other economic activity 
4. Maximising the development potential of 
each area to stimulate a progressive 
adjustment of the local economic system 
to the changing economic environment 
5. Financial support, incentives and subsidies as 
the main factor attracting economic activity 
5. Provision of key conditions for the 
development of economic activity 
 
 
In this view, long-term economic growth can be based on any type of economic 
activity (primary, secondary or services) as long as the productive units reach high 
competitive market standards. Essentially, while production becomes increasingly 
flexible, productive units can be effectively organised in various different forms 
which, in turn, explain different outcomes. In effect, the local development literature 
has recently highlighted successful regional growth experiences going from highly 
specialised clusters (e.g. Silicon Valley, Cité Scientifique of Paris etc) or systems of 
vertical and horizontal integration based on large companies and linked suppliers (e.g. 
the German car industry in Baden Wurttemberg etc); to the flexible specialisation of 
the furniture and textile small-business-based industry in Emilia Romagna, Italy, or 
the bottom-up associative development in rural Spain (Best 1989, Amin & Robins 
1990, Geddes 1992, Cooke and Morgan 1994, Rodriguez-Pose 1994) 
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1.4.1 Large firms and local economic development 
 
The predominance of the growth pole model of development during the 1960s and 
1970s represents a good illustration of the importance attributed to large firms in the 
classical (exogenous) approach to regional development. The concept behind this is 
that attracting one key, large company to a deprived area would generate a cascade 
effect on the surrounding enterprises and broader economy, which would benefit from 
a trickle down effect through transmission channels such as the redistribution of 
taxation, the supply chain, increases in human capital and so on (Perroux 1955, 
1988). Pinpointing key sectors and firms, and attracting them into the region became 
the main strategy for regional development.   In doing this, policies relied on the use 
of territorial incentives, such as export processing zones, subsidies, direct investment 
in infrastructure, and even on direct investment by public companies. 
 
Overall outcomes were disappointing. It was discussed earlier that exogenous growth 
policies often failed to deliver sustained growth after an initial push from new 
investment. Typically, the old pole growth model promoted limited interaction 
between large companies and local supplies; local outsourcing remained sparse or 
concentrated in basic services, and local agents remained distant from strategic 
decisions. There has frequently been little investment on research and development 
locally and thus the supply of new techniques and technology has largely been 
imported into the regions in a systematic basis (Vazquez Barquero 1999). All these 
leakages tended to limit the start up and growth of local small and medium 
enterprises. The full local economic development potential was rarely captured. 
 
The LED view argues that the increasing flexibility in the production systems favours 
a greater integration between the subsidiaries of large corporations and the local 
productive structure. Rather than breaking from, LED initiatives tend to build on the 
old growth pole strategy. When there is evidence of convergence between the 
localisation strategies of large companies and the economic development strategies by 
local governments, results frequently lead to large synergies that have the potential to 
improve local competitiveness greatly (Vazquez Barquero 1999). According to 
Vazquez Barquero, the local economic development dynamic could, in effect, be 
conceptualised as the interaction between the development strategies by regions and 
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those by the firms. The LED view is that there are two convergent and 
complementary elements in the development process: first, the firm becomes a 
catalyser of economic development. Attracted by local and regional characteristics, it 
contributes its innovation capacity, its technology, and its managerial ability, 
improving the organisation and the learning dynamic locally. In turn, the local 
development strategy triggers the potential for endogenous growth latent within the 
region. In these circumstances, there is large possibility for the nurturing of synergies 
between the firm and the region. 
 
This new approach has been facilitated by the tendency that large corporations have 
had, over the last few decades, to increase in size and improve their organisation, 
driven less by cost cutting practices than by the need to improve the efficiency of 
their production, procurement and transport systems, in order to gain global 
competitiveness (Porter 1990). New flexible systems of production, together with 
technological and managerial changes, allowed these global firms to reduce 
transaction costs significantly and benefit from expanded economies of scale. Porter 
argues that these companies have increasingly become more flexible organisation, 
and have adopted strategies to benefit from more fluid relationships between different 
units in the firm; among the firm, its contractors and clients; and thus, from closer 
links with local enterprises and institutions. Some firms also started to look for 
potential sources of competitive advantages in the territoriality. Amin and Tomaney 
(1997) suggest that from the 1980s an increasing number of networks of increasingly 
independent subsidiaries have become more integrated with the territories in which 
they operate. While cost cutting practices continue to guide the strategy of some 
companies, in many cases, strengthening their relationship with local enterprises and 
institutions have become a foundational objective of corporate strategy. Moreover; in 
some situations, these relationships can favour the formation of industrial clusters and 
generate economies of agglomeration, structure the territory, and confer enormous 
advantages to the firms choosing to operate in these locations (Storper 1997) 
 
How does mining fit into this scheme?  Storper (1997) makes a clear distinction 
between regions and localities with specific resources that can be attractive to global 
companies, and those without them. Likewise, he distinguishes between economic 
activities that are highly territorialized and those that are not. Territorialized 
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economic development is based on activities that depend on the specific resources 
existing in one place, like manufactures with high technological content, or 
differentiated goods that target a very specific sector of the market, like high end 
consumer goods. Storper focuses his analysis on how to make production more 
efficient as a result of proximity and market interactions, for instance, through 
innovative organisation structures that can be ingrained in the local productive 
system. However, he also includes as territorialized economic growth those activities, 
like mining, requiring more tangible assets and based on more direct comparative 
advantages – i.e. the existence of an economically viable ore body. 
 
In sum, Vazquez Barquero (1999) concludes that when the strategies of large firms 
and those of regions are able to converge, this can ignite a process of endogenous 
local economic development. In his view, the most sophisticated elements of the old 
growth-pole strategy could be recuperated and reconsidered within a different 
context. It is possible to think of an integrated planning process capable of 
coordinating the specific strategic objectives of both large firms and regions, which 
would demand the definition of precise mechanisms for design, implementation, 
control and evaluation. While the largest capacity for job creation and dynamism in 
the economy would be determined by the level of interlinked systems of small and 
medium enterprises, large firms have the potential, under the circumstances discussed 
here, to trigger a process of sustainable economic development. Finally, depending on 
the specific technical and institutional relationships established between the different 
firms and the local productive system the resulting level of synergies and forms of 
cooperation would vary significantly. This, in turn, would determine different 
dynamics of local economic development. 
 
 
1.5. Bringing mining back in: large mines and the region  
  
The beginning of this chapter noted that the Resource Curse Theory has concentrated 
more fiercely on the macroeconomic elements of the debate in order to explain the 
supposedly negative correlation between mineral rich economies and economic 
growth (Auty 1993, 1997, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999, 1999b). Numerous studies 
have since questioned the grounds for these allegations and insisted that the 
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propositions put forward by the RCT are still an open debate (for instance, Hadass 
and Williamson 2001, Lederman and Maloney 2002).  Some consensus has started to 
build, however, based on the recognition that many mining economies have dodged 
the threats allegedly posed by the exploitation of mineral resources; have obtained 
significant benefits from it; and have since triggered long-term processes of economic 
development (Davis 1998, Eggert 2001, World Bank 2002, Davis and Tilton 2002).  
It has also been recognised that, when this happened, strong governance structures 
have often underpinned the process. The policy question starting to consolidate is not 
if, but rather under which circumstances is mining beneficial – or detrimental- to 
economic development.    
 
This, together with a revival of territoriality as a determinant of economic 
development has favoured a shift in focus towards the regional and local economic 
aspects of mining (e.g. local sourcing and labour, the contribution of mineral 
revenues to local administrations etc), which has, in turn, put larger mining 
companies on the spot.  More broadly, economic development theory has also 
redirected attention to the sub-national levels.  In this sense, Vazquez Barquero 
(1999) argues that the most successful experiences of local economic development 
are usually structured around three pillars: 1) infrastructure, or the most tangible 
elements of economic development, 2) the intangible elements of economic 
development, and 3) governance and the organisation of the development process.   
 
The first pillar involves many elements common to the exogenous, top-down 
approach to regional economic development, such as the provision of regional 
infrastructure.  In the neo-classic approach, lack of infrastructure precludes economic 
interaction and competition and thus is understood as a market imperfection that 
needs fixing. In this sense, the old pole of development growth theory also saw in the 
provision of infrastructure a draw for large companies into a region (Perroux 1955, 
1988), and so a cost-benefit analysis would eventually determine whether the 
expected level of private investment justifies the expenditure, often undertaken by the 
central administration. Initiatives in this respect include the construction of buildings 
such as schools, hospitals or business centres, transport infrastructure, 
communications systems and so on. Instead, the new views on growth subordinate the 
provision of infrastructure to a pre-existing wide-ranging regional economic strategy.  
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For this reason, the second pillar implies the consolidation of a comprehensive mid 
and long-term economic development plan. The objective here is to define and 
implement a strategy to enable the region to fulfil its economic potential, making full 
utilisation of its comparative advantages, and overcoming its main restrictions to 
economic growth. According to Rodriguez-Pose (2002), these strategies are typically 
articulated around four areas: (a) the competitiveness of local firms, (b) the attraction 
of inward investment, (c) the upgrading of human capital or labour skills, and (d) the 
provision of more specific infrastructure. Critically, these strategies should not be 
perceived as a compilation of single responses to these different areas, but a balanced 
and comprehensive plan that enables the economic activity to root in the territory. 
Efforts in one area need to be matched by the others. Training programs, inward 
investment strategies, specific infrastructure and business support ought to be 
synchronised and planned jointly.   
   
Finally, this process not only needs to identify key comparative and competitive 
advantages, and to reflect these in sound mid- and long-term strategies, but it is also 
essential that this strategy be implemented into action and the many elements 
involved be coordinated into the process. The third pillar refers to the organisation 
(institutionalisation) of economic development. The public sector is not always the 
best-suited actor to fulfil this role. The development of a territory is organised 
through the individual decisions taken by public and private agents. Successful 
interventions can only be achieved by the systematic involvement of a representative 
number of local actors. Vazquez Barquero acknowledges that some key players often 
catalyse the emergence of regional economic policies, but he also argues that it is 
essential that these policies count with the explicit or implicit support of, and be 
appropriated by, the majority of the local society (Vazquez Barquero 1999).  
  
Can large mines contribute to this threefold approach?  In contrast to most other 
industries, the quintessence of the localisation strategy of mining companies is the 
presence of an economically feasible ore body. While mining benefits largely from 
the existence of good infrastructure; the proximity of well-developed suppliers; a 
high-skilled labour force; and strong local governance, the first determinant of 
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investment is the existence and quality of the underground commodity. World-class 
ore bodies are increasingly found in remote and isolated areas, often served by poor 
infrastructure and usually far from urban districts. All too often basic economic 
fundamentals are not in place; local markets lack the critical scale for businesses to 
flourish, commercial credit is repressed, and qualified human capital is in poor supply 
(e.g. Citigroup 2006). These are difficult conditions for development. What are the 
opportunities and challenges that mining brings with it in these dire circumstances? 
  
1. A large sized mine mobilises millions of tonnes of rock annually, which almost 
inevitably needs to go through basic processing to extract the economically useful 
ore, which is ultimately transported to the markets or to industrial plants for further 
transformation (Crawson 1998). Although the importance and scale of the 
transport infrastructure in a mining operation depends on the commodity – i.e. the 
value per tonne of industrial minerals tends to be much smaller than that of, say, 
precious metals or diamonds-, it is an intrinsic element in the mining industry and, 
in many cases, its engineering is far more complicated and sophisticated than that 
required to separate the ore from the rock. Companies need to ensure that this 
infrastructure is in place ahead of inception, and large disbursements are often 
contemplated for this. In general, this includes the provision of roads, rail and/or 
ports. In order to operate, mining also needs to ensure the provision of power, 
potable water, sewage systems, communication, and often too local clinics and 
training centres. While the industry has generally devised and executed this 
investment driven by its specific technical requirements, it would also be possible 
to plan this infrastructure to accommodate economic requisites more broadly and 
thus help maximise the local economic potential (MMSD 2002).  This would 
demand conducting comprehensive diagnoses and producing regional economic 
plans prior to the investment.   
 
2. A refocus on the regional dimension calls for exploring the industry’s potential to 
anchor business activities in the local environment, and thus its capacity to 
generate wealth over the long term. However, some commentators have noted that 
the development agenda of regional mining economies is palpably divided into 
elements that have always been, to greater or lesser extent, within the industry’s 
mandate and area of expertise (i.e. those related to the companies’ inputs into 
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production), and those elements beyond this boundary, but without which the 
endogenous virtuous cycle proposed by the LED approach cannot be achieved (for 
example, small and medium enterprise development outside the mining supply-
chain, the effectiveness of the local financial sector, etc) Economic diversification, 
as a means of avoiding dependence on mining, requires addressing issues of 
economic restructuring more broadly (Di Boscio 2004, ICMM 2006). For instance, 
the absence of balanced and comprehensive development strategies may put too 
much emphasis on the direct investment from mining and thus increase the 
dependence of an area on external players. Similarly, concentrating efforts on 
training activities by a firm without improving the local business environment may 
lead to a mismatch between the supply and demand of the labour force within the 
local economy.   
 
3. Does mining have intrinsically limited potential to promote economic development 
at the regional level, or are negative experiences a result of local economic 
governance and institutional failure? Mining often operates in very difficult 
environments for economic development, where governments are often under-
funded and civil society is disorganised or lacking the necessary skills and 
managerial capabilities to put forward and consolidate new structures of 
governance more conductive to growth (ODI 2006). In these places, large mining 
companies are frequently the single most important economic agent, and regularly 
too the most cohesive institutional organisation in place. The question remains 
whether these enterprises can legitimately contribute to the formation of local 
institutional arrangements that are capable of defining a broader strategy for the 
local economy and lead the development process without infringing on 
governments’ sovereignty or undermining the industry’s capacity to maximise the 
mineral rent available for distribution.      
 
While there appears to be numerous mutual benefits from greater institutional 
coordination between large mines, civil society and local and regional governments, 
synergies may not simply materialise (Di Boscio and Humphreys 2002). Davis (1998) 
notes that too often, governments prefer to operate as a patron and dispenser of 
favours rather than an organiser of productive synergies. Similarly, mining companies 
have historically tended to respond to community pressures in a way that follows the 
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strategies of central governments, and have often been involved in the direct 
provision of services like education and health, direct monetary transfers in the form 
of donations, or sometimes through decentralised institutions such as foundations. 
More recently, as the mining industry embraced sustainable development, companies 
have established a new set of priorities and redirected their efforts to identify and 
mitigate social and environmental costs, and endeavoured to maximise the local 
economic spin-offs from their activities. Accordingly, most large mining firms in the 
industry now produce regular social and environmental reports of mixed quality, 
covering policy approaches, targets and performance in aspects as diverse as safety, 
environment, water utilisation, energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, waste 
management, communities and, more recently, economic contributions flowing from 
their operations (for instance, websites of Anglo American, BHP Billiton, Placer 
Dome; Rio Tinto 2005).  
 
The first reactions to these initiatives were varied. Many still saw these responses as 
an overall distraction from the core mandate of these companies (i.e. the 
maximisation of shareholder value), on the one hand, or as merely reactive to 
Corporate Social Responsibility pressures, and largely philanthropic and thus short 
lived, on the other. In the socioeconomic arena, these contrasting views have been 
fuelled by a poor understanding of the situation on the ground. While the industry has 
increasingly endeavoured to capture and communicate direct economic benefits from 
the mines, as well as the efforts by corporations in these regards (Prescott 2009), there 
have only been sporadic attempts to understand the actual effect of these corporate 
initiatives on the local economies (e.g. McMahon and Remy 2001, IESR 2002, 
Khumalo et al 2002, ICMM 2006) – and no rigorous work linking the lessons from 
modern growth theory to the long-term management of local mineral wealth. 
Essentially, while the early responses put in place by large mining companies have 
recognised some of the negative connotations of their investments, they had typically 
paid little attention to the complexity and long-term implications for local economic 
development discussed above.  
   
Feeding from modern growth literature, however, an emerging approach has started 
to envision the modern mining sector as a catalyser of local and regional 
development, conceiving large mines as agents of change and capacity building 
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(Humphreys 2002, Walker and Jourdan 2003, ICMM 2003, 2006). To test this 
proposition is, in effect, the aim of this research. In doing so, this work has put 
forward two main hypotheses: first, that large mining enterprises can indeed help 
achieve this, on the one hand, by maximising the most direct contributions from 
mining activities (including the provision of mining infrastructure, as well as the 
optimisation of the local supply chain, direct and indirect employment, vocational 
training, and so on), and on the other hand, by capitalising on the industry’s potential 
to mobilise other economic agents and to leverage expertise and capital from third 
parties (e.g. governments, civil society, private agents, international organisations etc) 
thus contributing to consolidating a stronger institutional foundation locally. The 
second hypothesis, however, suggests that this affirmative vision will hardly 
materialise by default, and that proactive economic management would thus be 
required from a broad spectrum of economic players. In moving the investigation 
forward, the next chapter reverts to the critical features of the mining industry and to 
the emergence of the sustainable development movement. 
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2.1. Localisation of mining companies and the concept of soft sustainability 
 
Why does mining take place where it does?  Perhaps the key difference in the 
location strategy of this industry, as opposed to most of the other industries, is that 
mining will only occur in places where mineral deposits are found. These deposits are 
not evenly distributed throughout the world, and even when some deposits are 
naturally clustered by regions13, they are not very frequently economically exploitable 
with the current technology.  As these deposits are immobile, it is the mining inputs 
that have to move where the ore body is. There are also other determinants of 
localisation in the mining industry. Out of two deposits of identical characteristics, 
whether one deposit is developed into a mine would depend on various other factors 
(Eggert 2001). One of these factors is access to, and cost of, inputs of production, 
including tangible elements such as land, labour and capital. Mining is frequently an 
energy intensive industry, and thus power is generally a critical input. Depending on 
the operation, water and supplies such as mechanical parts, chemicals and gases are 
also of significant importance. In addition, intangibles such as risks of expropriation 
and political and social turmoil are of decisive importance for large and long-life 
mines. 
 
A key element in evaluating the viability of mining is also the availability and cost of 
transport infrastructure – usually including harbours, roads, railroads and airports - to 
allow for the transportation of inputs into the mine, as well as the mining production 
to the markets.  Many large mining ventures have to consider the construction of 
heavy infrastructure into their financial analysis, although the up-front cost of this 
expenditure can jeopardise the profitability of projects altogether. The total cost of 
transportation is generally seen as a function of distance; for a remote deposit to be 
developed it has to have better geological characteristics than any less-remote 
alternative; in essence, remote deposits should have sufficiently low unit costs of 
production to offset the penalty paid in the form of higher transportation costs. The 
way in which distance to markets has influenced mineral economies has changed over 
time and will be explored in detail later in this chapter.   
                                                 
13
 For instance, a relatively small country like Chile accounts for around 35% of the world production 
of copper.  In turn, this production is concentrated in a relatively small area in a northern region of the 
country (Antofagasta). 
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Eggert (2001) also identifies agglomeration economies as a potential factor 
influencing the location of mining activity. There are cost savings to individual firms 
that result from being located close to other similar enterprises (Marshall 1920, 
Krugman 1991). Any type of agglomeration economy is a pooled market for workers 
with specialised skills. In an increasingly specialised industry like mining, firms 
benefit from having a larger pool of potential workers to choose from, while workers 
benefit from having the opportunity to change jobs within the same location. As 
information flows more easily locally than over large distances, technological (or 
knowledge) spillovers constitute another agglomeration economy (Krugman 1991). 
Mining companies benefit from the knowledge spillages from competitors located 
nearby. A further agglomeration economy is greater availability of specialised 
intermediate inputs. A mining cluster can support the development of specialised 
supplies, from large, heavy, and sophisticated equipment, to a flexible system of 
services to mining.  
 
Of course, there are also historical reasons helping determine the location of big 
mines (Krugman 1985). Indeed, the relative influence of all these factors on the 
investment decisions by mining companies has changed over time, and it is 
substantially different today than it has been throughout the twentieth century. Closer 
examination, in fact,  shows how mining itself has transformed its system of 
production dramatically, following changes in technology, the global system of 
industrial production, the global balance between demand and supply of minerals and 
metals and, more recently, the revolution in communication systems (Radetzki 1982, 
1994). Furthermore, the ways in which these investments have impacted on economic 
development have changed as well, and the emerging patterns of development 
evidenced in mineral economies appear to be widely disparate. More generally, 
however, both industry and governments have been increasingly promoting the 
sustainable development (SD) model as the new policy panacea for these regions. 
While the SD model started to influence the mining industry more notably towards 
the end of the 1990s, most assessments so far have been carried out by either the 
industry (Anglo American, 2005; BHPB, 2005; Rio Tinto, 2005 etc) or activist NGOs 
(Ross, 2001; FoE, undated, to name just a few)   
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SD had been around for some time before that, but was rarely applied to the mining 
industry. The concept of SD was actually born as response to the international 
concern over the exhaustion of natural resources and the negative impact of 
development on the environment. The 1972 Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNEP 1972) first called for an international effort to preserve non-renewable 
resources from their exhaustion for the benefit of future generations. However, the 
idea of constraining development raised concerns too, particularly when applied to 
developing nations. The World Commission on Environment and Development 
addressed this tension between different interests and defined SD as development that 
‘[…] meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987, p43). The joining of development 
and environment was further crystallised in the UN Conference on the Environment 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which reflected the interests of developing economies by 
reaffirming the principle of the sovereign right of countries to develop and exploit 
their own natural resources and by declaring the eradication of poverty as an 
indispensable requirement for SD (UNCED 1992).  
 
This dichotomy between the preservation of the environment and economic 
development led to the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sustainability. In essence, 
the two approaches weigh the scarcity of natural capital in different ways (Van Pelt et 
al 1995). While the former rejects the concept of substitutability of human activity for 
natural capital, the latter accepts it to some extent. The proponents of hard 
sustainability believe that the limiting element for development is not man-made 
capital but rather the continuing existence of natural capital. The concept of soft 
sustainability, instead, accepts the view that man-made and natural capital can, in 
cases, be substitutes (Costanza 1991, Braat and Steelkamp 1991, Becker 1997). For 
instance, this view would accept that the depletion of a mineral deposit can be 
legitimately sustainable if this natural capital is properly transformed into other forms 
of capital that can generate long term sources of wealth. This is mostly the conception 
of sustainability adopted by the mining industry (Davis 2000, Humphreys 2000, 
2000b) – interpretation that is frequently referred to in this research. 
 
For the purpose of this work, in fact, the definition of sustainability is narrowed down 
to the notion of pure economic sustainability. Environmental concerns, therefore, 
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have been excluded from this analysis14. More specifically, an independent attempt to 
review the regional economic implications of this stance on SD would need to build 
simultaneously upon (a) an objective perspective of the singular characteristics of 
today’s mining and (b) a deep understanding of the economies in which mining takes 
place. The central subject of analysis of this chapter is the first of these two focus 
areas: the mining industry, in particular the distinctive characteristics of its 
contributions to, and effects on, sub-national economies over time. This examination 
is carried out in two parts. Section 2 starts with an overview of how to think about the 
economic effects of any economic activity, with a focus on the mining industry. It 
also discusses the concept of economic rent, crucial to the understanding of the 
industry’s contribution to development and the extent to which this can be sustained 
over time. These basic concepts are applied to specific mining operations in later 
chapters. Section 3 examines the three main paradigms for post-industrial 
development in the mineral sector, and reviews the differentiated roles played by 
mining in regional development, and how these changed over time.    
 
 
2.2. Identifying the economic contribution of mining companies 
 
A common approach to understanding the full economic impact of a company is to 
look at its total revenue, which is made up of value added and bought-in factors.  
While this is appropriate at the company level, summing up total revenues across 
different industries in a national economy will inevitably count some outputs more 
than once – for instance, the bauxite that goes into alumina, the alumina that goes into 
aluminium, the aluminium that goes into a radiator, the radiator that goes into a car. 
For this reason, any economic activity is more accurately measured in terms of its 
value added. In an economic context, the value added by a firm refers to the 
difference between its total revenue and the cost of bought-in materials, services and 
components (also referred to as payments to suppliers). It therefore represents a 
measure of the value which a firm has ‘added’ to these bought-in factors. Equally, 
value added can also be calculated as the sum of all labour payments, the taxes and 
                                                 
14
 While this approach facilitated the exploration of the economic rationale behind mining policies 
based on principles of economic sustainability, results from this work should only be seen in the light 
of this narrow interpretation of SD. It should be acknowledged, therefore, that this definition reflects a 
limited interpretation of an otherwise complex concept.   
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royalties disbursed to governments and others, plus all returns to capital – including 
interest payments, profits paid out to shareholders, as well as money retained in the 
business for future investment and to replace depreciated assets.  The sum of value 
added across all public and private enterprises in a country should equal the widely 
recognised measure of an economy’s size, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)15 , 16 
(Begg et al 2000, De Grauwe & Camerman 2002).  
 
Modern mining is a high value added sector, which means that each mineworker adds 
larger amounts of value than the employees of most other industries, notably 
manufacturing (conversely, high value added sectors are those requiring a relatively 
low value of supplies to operate).  In some high value added industries, value added 
per worker is greater because inputs such as capital or skills are particularly 
prominent. In the case of mining, this is primarily because of the intensity of capital 
required to operate – for capital intensive industries to earn a normal return on large 
investments, they must charge prices that are larger in relation to labour costs than 
labour intensive industries (Krugman 1995, De Grauwe and Camerman 2002). 
Annually, this capital intensity is reflected in items such as the interest payments for 
money previously borrowed, repayments to shareholders for their provision of capital, 
and money retained in the business to finance future investments and to allow for the 
replacement of depreciated assets.   
 
Although not included in the calculation of value added, payments to suppliers (i.e. 
materials, facilities and services purchased by a company) constitute a strong 
                                                 
15
 Summing up value added across all enterprises in a country should equal GDP, or Gross National 
Product (GNP) when coverage is extended to include cross-border transactions. 
16
 Value added can be calculated either by adding together individual elements of value added as they 
are distributed or by subtracting relevant costs from total revenues.  The main conceptual issue in the 
calculation of value added is where to include depreciation.  If depreciation is included in the estimate 
of value added this gives ‘gross value added’.  This does not include an adjustment for the consumption 
of fixed capital but the estimated figure is then comparable to GDP/GNP data.  If depreciation is 
excluded this gives ‘net value added’.  This is possibly a truer indication of the actual economic value 
of economic activity, but it is comparable to net national product rather than the more widely 
understood and used GDP/GNP.   
A secondary complication can occur due to the impact of taxes and subsidies on input prices and 
revenue. These distortions can affect the calculation of the true value added.  Aggregate GDP/GNP can 
be simply adjusted from a ‘market price’ basis to a ‘factor cost’ basis by deducting total taxes on 
expenditure and adding in subsidies.  However, at the firm level, where the interaction between 
expenditure taxes, subsidies and input and product costs is more complex – and depends upon the way 
in which payments are allocated in the company accounts – it is more difficult to make such an 
adjustment and it is not generally attempted. 
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additional benefit to the economy, generating employment and creating wealth in 
other sectors. The level of sourcing (payments to suppliers) from within a given 
economy is the most commonly used proxy for backward linkages (UN 2001). In 
other words, the higher the participation of intermediate consumption in total output, 
the higher the potential to develop linkages to the economy. Backward linkages are of 
particular significance to developing economies because they provide opportunities 
for production and employment by domestic suppliers in the small enterprise sector – 
believed to be a key player in economic development (for instance, Teitz 1987). More 
importantly, they constitute a direct channel for knowledge diffusion that can assist in 
upgrading domestic suppliers, with spillover effects to the rest of the economy. Such 
knowledge diffusion is especially important for domestic firms that have to catch up 
with internationally competitive practices. These are frequently referred to as indirect 
contributions from economic activity. 
 
It is generally easier to source externally when the technology is divisible into 
separate stages and services than when it is a continuous process. The manufacturing 
sector has a broad range of linkage-intensive activities, though there are still large 
variations by industry. Large scale food processing involves high ratios of 
intermediate inputs to total production and extensive backward linkages between 
foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers of raw and packaging materials. In contrast, 
textiles and clothing show relatively weak linkages, since the textile industry needs 
considerable sophistication and scale to provide the variety and quality of fabrics 
needed by large companies (UN 2001). In the primary commodities sector, however, 
the scope for linkages between large companies and local suppliers is often limited, as 
production processes tend to be continuous. This has led some to argue that, for local 
and regional economies, linkage promoter sectors (i.e. some manufacturing 
industries) are a better development choice than mining (Ross 2001).   
 
High levels of intermediate consumption, however, do not necessarily mean more 
linkages locally. A firm in any location has three options for obtaining inputs. It can 
purchase them from local suppliers, produce them in-house, or import them from 
another region or country. Sourcing locally depends on the cost, quality, reliability 
and flexibility of local suppliers relative to the other alternatives. Proximity does 
matter in all sourcing choices. Being near suppliers can make procurement more 
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flexible and easier to manage and monitor and may be essential where much 
information is required for efficiency. Where the input is a constantly used service, 
again, it is likely to be more efficient to have the provider nearby. An efficient 
network of suppliers allows companies to reduce the risk of disruptions in input 
supply and to adjust capacity utilisation more readily to market conditions. Trust, 
which plays an important role in all transactions, is easier to develop with face-to-face 
interaction (UN 2001; Di Boscio and Humphreys 2004).  
 
Conversely, there are also costs with buying locally. Local external suppliers have to 
be identified, negotiated with, and, most likely, upgraded and closely monitored. 
Often, multinational corporations find it more efficient and convenient to import 
inputs from well-established sources elsewhere rather than to buy locally or to 
organise their own production. In particular, where technical requirements are 
rigorous, as in specialised manufacturing or complex machinery, the availability of 
good quality local subcontractors in developing regions will tend to be limited. Davis 
(1998) argues that the drivers of comparative advantage in mining are not necessarily 
the drivers of comparative advantages in other sectors.  Success in manufacturing 
generally requires local suppliers, access to markets, educated workforces, good 
infrastructure etc, conditions that most developing regions lack.   
 
In mining, the forward linkage is much more extended than the backward, as the 
sector is at the beginning of the productive chain. The products from the mine 
commonly have to undergo several transformations before final consumption, 
including smelting, refining and fabricating, which can constitute an important further 
contribution to the economy. Forward linkages to the local and regional economy, 
however, also carry the risk of becoming value-subtracting activities (i.e. low 
productivity, need for subsidies, etc) if they are not driven by genuine comparative 
advantage.  Nowadays, the steady decline in transport and communication costs made 
it possible to move raw materials over long distances to the most competitive centres 
for processing (Radetzki 1994). Once again, what makes for comparative advantage 
in minerals extraction is not necessarily the same as in the smelting and refining of 
minerals, and so regions rich in mineral resources that succeed in attracting mining 
companies may well fall short of the conditions to attract the investment necessary to 
benefit from forward linkages.  
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The full economic benefit of mining, (as well as any economic activity), is frequently 
larger than the calculation of its direct and indirect contributions once secondary, or 
‘multiplier’, effects on the rest of the economy are considered. These provide an idea 
of the gross economic activity generated by any given sector and, as such, are 
commonly used to measure the size of linkages. Essentially, multipliers reflect direct 
and indirect gains from the activities of suppliers, and the economic activity induced 
by workers spending their wages, as well as that occurring from the circulation of 
taxes and profits.  In effect, they are measures of the impact on the aggregate 
economy per unit increase in the sector, whether this unit increase is in income, 
output or employment (Davis 1990; Begg et all 2000). However, multipliers only 
provide a relative estimate. If total output value in a sector is large enough (as often 
happens with mining), a sector with a smaller multiplier can have a much bigger net 
effect on the region than a sector with a larger multiplier and smaller output value. 
The evidence suggests, however, that there are no common multipliers for any given 
industry, and that multipliers are highly regionally specific (McMahon and Remy, 
2002).  
 
Later chapters apply these concepts in practice. Yet, there are also wider effects to 
think about when considering the economic impact of mining.  Positive spin-offs 
include the generation of employment, investment spending, the provision of 
infrastructure, and training and education.  In addition to the direct taxes, 
governments also generate an income stream through payroll and indirect taxes on 
purchased inputs as well as taxes related to the activities of suppliers, consumption 
taxes raised when employees spend their wages and from the further taxation of 
economic activity indirectly dependent on a firm’s operation. The spread of skills and 
knowledge can be of particular social importance for regions that would otherwise 
experience underemployment. At the national level there is also a positive impact 
from the production and export of raw materials on the balance of payments account, 
allowing the importation and consumption of foreign goods and services. The point 
was made earlier that the focus of this research is the economic effect of mining at the 
local and regional level. It is worth noting, however, that the industry has been 
blamed for having a damaging effect in the political and environmental arenas, and 
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thus these should also be considered when looking at the all-encompassing impact of 
mining.  
  
 
2.2.1 Economic rent 
 
The concept of economic surplus, or rent, is crucial to the understanding of mining 
contributions to economic development (in particular to government revenues) and 
the extent to which this can be sustained in time. It is also critical for assessing the 
economic impact of single mines, and it is thus referred to later on in this research. 
Economic rent is just a technical economic concept, and differs from both value 
added and profit. As discussed above, the former is a measure of the contribution of 
any economic activity to GDP, and is in essence the reward to all factors of 
production, (land, labour and capital). Profit is instead the reward to one factor of 
production in particular, capital, and is therefore part of value added. Economic rent 
is that portion of value added that exceeds the costs of all factors of production 
(Crowson 2003) 
 
David Ricardo was one of the first economists to apply the concept of rent, back in 
the early 19th century. He pointed out that agricultural land could be separated into 
different classes according to its fertility. To better understand this, it is useful to look 
at it graphically, as shown in figure 2.1. The best land, represented by rectangle A, 
can produce food at the lowest cost (OCa). The next best parcel (rectangle B), has 
somewhat higher costs (OCb) and so on. When the population is small, all of the best 
land exceeds the demand for it; the price of food (P1) equals its production costs 
(OCa); and landowners receive no rent. 
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Figure 2.1 – Economic Rent 
Source: Tilton 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As population and the demand for food expand, eventually all the best land is 
cultivated, and it becomes necessary for producers to start using land with lower 
fertility. This causes the production cost, and in turn, the price of food, to rise. When 
the land of quality G is needed to feed the increases in population, the cost of 
producing food on this land raises its price to P2, as shown in the graph above. 
Farmers at this price are willing to pay the owners of better land a rent, often referred 
to as Ricardian rent, which price depends on the gap between the market price and the 
production cost. In figure 2.1, this is the rectangle that extends from the production 
costs for each type of land to the market price (Tilton 2004). 
 
Like parcels of land, mineral deposits have different quality and different production 
costs. It is thus easy to imagine that the diverse classes of land in figure 2.1 can also 
portray different mines, while the horizontal axis can measure mine capacity rather 
than hectares of agricultural land. Mine A has the lowest production costs, thanks to 
its rich ore body and other factors. Mine B has the next lowest production costs, and 
so on. The area for each mine under the price line and above its costs reflects its 
Ricardian rent. Both the quality of mineral deposits and the efficiency with which any 
operation exploits them vary widely, even within single countries. Therefore, while 
mineral prices fluctuate in step with changes in the balance between demand and 
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supply, the profitability of different mines also varies widely at any given product 
price (Tilton 2004).  
 
In fact, economic rent will accrue over the lifetime of a worked ore deposit, until all 
the economically usable ore has been extracted. For long-lived mines, annual rents 
often accrue unevenly between different generations. For instance, after mining and 
processing have finished, good practice determines that costs will be incurred in 
rehabilitating the site and restoring it for other uses. These costs should also be 
properly included with all other costs of working the property before the calculation 
of any economic rent. The changing incidence of rent over time means that all 
calculations of its magnitude are more accurately made in terms of net present values 
(NPV), using an appropriate discount rate. Some mines will never create economic 
rent – and may not even cover all their costs of production -; others, in contrast, may 
generate a large rent. Some mines are highly profitable throughout their lives; others 
will always be marginal. The growth of demand in minerals and metals, and hence the 
need for new mines, will be affected by the changing pace and locality of economic 
activity, changes in technology, governmental regulation and so on. As the techniques 
to explore, mine, extract and process minerals and metals improve, previously 
marginal deposits may also become more profitable (Crawson 1998).    
 
In short, the calculation of mineral rent is not independent of prevailing conditions. 
Ore bodies are worthless until they are discovered. Their full value can only be 
realised when mines and processing plants have been developed to exploit them. Just 
as the technical and managerial capabilities of mining companies can vary widely, so 
can their capacities to maximise the potential rent from individual ore deposits. 
Incompetent management can dissipate rent, as can inappropriate government policies 
towards mining (Crawson 1998, Eggert 2001). Thus, the opportunity cost for each 
project will vary from each prospective investor, as different investors will require 
different risk premiums in different places, determined by their risk perceptions about 
the host country over the longer term. All this means that rents, as the residual after 
all necessary costs (including a required return on capital) will be partly subjectively 
determined. Also, any estimate will always carry a wide, and probably fluctuating, 
margin of error. In this sense, an arbitrary upfront distribution of the rent generated by 
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a mineral enterprise can also put at risk the creation of that rent altogether (Peck, 
Landsberg and Tilton 1992). 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Optimal allocation of the economic rent 
 
Economic rent is the surplus from which governments can raise revenues through 
taxes, over and above those which are treated as the normal costs of doing business.  
Hence, there is a twofold risk that governments fail to capture a large enough 
proportion of the mineral rent, on the one hand, and that governments attempt to 
capture a larger proportion of the rent that is optimal, on the other. In a cyclical 
business, if all rents are taxed away when prices are high, without allowances for 
losses incurred when prices are low, investors’ rates of return could drop below their 
opportunity costs of capital. New investment will be discouraged, not only in new 
projects, but also in sustaining capital to maximise future value added from existing 
operations as well. Hence, national tax policies greatly influence the mining 
industry’s long term global sustainability. Crowson (2003) argues that tax rates need 
to leave mine operators with a sufficient share of economic rent when times are good 
to compensate, at least partially, for the bad times. Efficient tax policy for the mineral 
sector should be primarily concerned with ensuring that potential economic rents are 
realised, and then that the bulk of them are captured through taxation without 
affecting negatively on future rent generation. Mining theorist have thus argued that 
the focus of public policy should be on maximising the net present value of the social 
benefits from the mineral sector over time – or the stream of revenues flowing from 
it, if the focus is on government receipts (Otto 2002, Tilton 2004).    
 
Flowing from this debate is the discussion regarding the broader distribution of 
benefits from mineral developments.  Until now, the prevalent view has been that 
defining the optimal allocation of economic rent is primarily a government mandate, 
which should be accomplished through direct taxation and thereafter redistributed 
through fiscal policy, according to the government’s priorities.  More recently, 
however, different commentators have argued for an expanding commitment from the 
different players involved in the creation of mineral rent in defining its optimal 
distribution, underlining that a consensual sharing of mineral revenues has the 
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potential to benefit the industry as well as the government (Cawood and Minnitt 
2002).  This view calls for a more proactive role of the private sector in reaching an 
agreement.  As Cawood and Minnitt put it,  
 
“The potential for conflict may be reduced considerably when all legitimate 
beneficiaries are identified, the hierarchy of claims understood by all and 
consensus is reached on sharing ratios before mining commences. This implies 
that the distribution of benefits is no longer the sole responsibility of the host 
government, with the mineral developer playing a more important role in this 
regard.  It is in the investor’s interest that all stakeholders have fair 
representation during the distribution process as it will considerably reduce 
political risk.” (2002 p295) 
  
Up to this point, this chapter has introduced a snapshot of the key elements necessary 
to understand the economic contribution of an industry to the economy, in particular 
mining.  One of the objectives of the present research is to look in detail at each of 
these elements, making use of some of the mechanisms and techniques available for 
quantifying the different types of direct and indirect contributions mentioned so far. 
More specifically, Davis (1990) argued that the focus of regional economic impact 
analysis should be on the interface between these contributions and the dynamics of 
host economies.  Yet, the characteristics of this interaction in mining have followed 
notable changing patterns over time, depending on a variety of issues, including the 
level of technology, the prevalent type of organisation in the global system of 
production, as well as the social awareness and preferences with respect to business 
ethics and the role of government and the private sector in economic development.  
Accordingly, the industry has responded to the new challenges raised by these 
changes in different ways.  All of this is discussed in detail in the next section.   
 
 
2.3. The role of mining in regional development over time        
 
Three main paradigms for post-industrial mineral development are usually 
recognised.  Radetzki (1982, 1994) identified two of these models and described the 
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differentiated roles played by mining in regional development, and how this changed 
over time.  These are frequently referred to as the Regional and Global models of 
mineral development.  Later, other commentators (Auty 1994; Strongman 1998; 
Eggert 2001; Humphreys 2000, 2000b, 2002; MMSD 2002, 2003, 2006; Davis and 
Tilton, undated) have pointed out to the consolidation of a newer paradigm, which 
has emerged as a reaction to the alleged disappointing industry performances in the 
field of development. This has since become known as the Sustainable Development 
(SD) model of mineral development. The models described here are simplifications of 
reality; a thin line defines the boundaries between each one, and blanket 
interpretations to describe otherwise complex and region specific developments 
should be taken with care. For each model, exceptions can be pointed out. 
Nevertheless, these explanations of the evolution of mining and the way in which it 
has impacted on the economy over time are helpful to understand the current 
challenges and opportunities facing local and regional mineral economies. 
  
 
2.3.1 The Regional model (or the strong local-linkage model) 
 
Until the 1970s, most mineral ventures were relatively small and not too complex, 
usually aimed at satisfying regional demand17, and thus concentrated in the 
industrialised world to a large extent. The machinery and equipment needed for 
construction and operation were not particularly sophisticated, and thus the capital 
costs represented a relatively low proportion of total revenues. This, together with a 
fairly large demand for mineworkers, meant that labour inputs were proportionally 
much higher than are nowadays. Consequently, most inputs were normally satisfied 
from within the region. The equipment needed during construction was generally 
procured locally, either from existing companies or from suppliers set specifically to 
source the mining industry in the area. The preponderance of local beneficiation from 
upward linkages was supported by the high cost of transportation, and also by the 
relative simplicity of the goods and services required (Radetzki 1982, 1994; Eggert 
2001, Studwell 2009).   
 
                                                 
17
 This, for instance, was the typical mine supplying commodities to the European industrial city of the 
late 19th century. 
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Downstream beneficiation followed a similar pattern. High transportation costs meant 
it made more sense to ship high-value semi-finished or finished products than bulky, 
low-value ore. The ore was then processed near the industrial centres, in some cases 
also manufactured, and sometimes even sold to consumers nearby. As markets were 
in close proximity, transportation tended to be minimised. Most processing was done 
in the region of the mine.  Radetzki (1982) suggests that while mineral production 
was attracted to regions with mineral deposits, the development of mineral deposits 
was also stimulated by proximity to industrial and urban districts. He argues that 
exploration activities often focussed on the vicinities of industrial centres precisely 
because there was a market for the mineral. In other cases, it was the discovery of 
minerals and metals what favour the emergence and consolidation of urban districts – 
as an example, consider the importance of the discovery of large deposits of coal and 
iron in the emergence of the heavy industry area of Pennsylvania, US (Eggert 2001).  
 
In essence, the establishment of a mine was encouraged by the need for minerals 
locally; then, the mine not only satisfied this demand but also became a pole of 
regional development through the expansion of the supply chain, on the one hand, 
and further forward processing, on the other.  The mining industry – often 
encapsulating manufacturing on its way downstream – was predominately regional in 
scope, rather than global.  It is noteworthy that the Regional model had different 
implications for ‘the colonized periphery’, or those countries exclusively providing 
natural resources to the ‘core’, or rapidly industrialising nations.  Here, rather than 
expanding the local industrial base, mining primarily served the colonial powers that 
established remote operations to secure the supply of scarce natural resources critical 
to their own industrial growth (Prebisch 1950, Rostow 1952, Sunkel 1989). However, 
even in a colonial model that held back local downstream production, economic 
rationale supported the development of backward linkages. With slow, hazardous, 
and thus unreliable communications, mining companies would have had to wait for 
overseas equipment and basic services. Instead, they sought to strengthen local 
supplies, which in turn led to the development of ancillary industries, particularly for 
repairs and maintenance (Crowson 2009, 2009b)  
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2.3.1.1 The industry’s response 
 
Regional economic benefits from mining were thus assumed to take place naturally.  
As with any other economic activity, broader economic opportunities would spill over 
to the rest of the economy supporting employment and income generation in other 
industries as well.  Most commentators were inclined to think of mineral wealth as a 
self-evident good, and as a blessing from nature.  The industrial revolution was able 
to take place in Britain partly because of the local availability of the necessary raw 
materials, and very few have questioned that the mineral wealth of the US played a 
major part in its growth to world economic power.  Consequently, as Humphreys 
(2000) points out, mining companies did not need to persuade the public about the 
economic benefits of their activities, since the income they generated, the 
employment they created, and the taxes they paid were all plainly visible, at least as 
far as their mines remained in operation. 
 
 
2.3.2 The Global model (or the weak local-linkage model) 
 
The scientific literature on socio-economic restructuring has emphasised that the shift 
from a mass production ‘Fordist’ structure, to a lean and flexible organisation of 
production in the ‘post-Fordist’ era, has not only produced substantial changes in the 
whole organisation of the global economy, but also brought with it new geographical 
patterns of economic development (for example, Vazquez Barquero 1990, Rodriguez-
Pose 1994, Storper 1997). These changes helped transform the old paradigm of 
mineral production too, and contributed to shaping a new model of mineral 
development. By 1970, mining was a different industry from the one that helped 
consolidate the Fordist model of industrialisation in the US and Europe. For the 
mining industry, Radetzki (1982, 1994) highlights the following key changes: 
 
1. There has been an unprecedented reduction in transport costs18; 
2. The efficient size of mineral ventures has increased considerably; 
                                                 
18
 According to Radetzki (1982), freight costs per ton of wheat between New York and Liverpool went 
down from $12.6 in 1990 to $5.5 in1962 (constant 1962 dollars). Freight costs per ton of grain from the 
US/Canada to the Netherlands went down from $31 in 1955 to $8 in 1979 (constant 1980 dollars).   
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3. Mining is now a very capital intensive industry, both in absolute and relative 
terms; 
4. Hence, the capital requirements to finance a new mine has increased 
dramatically;    
5. The supply chain has become highly sophisticated and requires scale economies;  
6. Due to scale and new technologies, the industry has grown environment-
intensive19;  
7. The location of the mines has become more marginal with respect to industrial 
centres20; 
8. Central governments have appropriated increasing shares of the benefits by the 
mines. 
   
Transportation costs, especially long-distance sea transport of bulk materials, had 
fallen significantly by the mid 1960 (Manners 1971, Lundren 1996, Studwell 2009), 
which allowed for mines to be located far from mineral processing and 
manufacturing, and these, far from final consumers.  The equipment needed to build 
the mine, as well as the supplies required for its operation, is now sophisticated and 
specialised. With lower transportation costs, local suppliers, when they exist, cannot 
compete with global manufacturers for the provision of these products, and so they 
are imported from outside the region. A similar phenomenon occurs in the 
downstream processing of minerals and metals. Once basic processing takes place 
nearby the mine, very little of the output remains in the area, which follows instead 
the new market logic for the localisation of industrial plants, primarily driven by the 
pre-existence of manufacturing capacity, low energy costs, skilled labour and, to a 
lesser extent now, vicinity to markets. At this point, the typical mineral enterprise is a 
huge, complex and capital-intensive operation, generally located away from urban 
centres or heavily populated areas, and it supplies the entire world market.    
  
The capital, as well as the managerial and technical skills required to run these 
enterprises, is rarely found outside large multinational corporations. These enterprises 
                                                 
19
 This is in relation to air and water pollution per unit of mineral output.  The trend has reverted after 
the 70’s. 
20
 This is because (a) there has been a relative depletion of rich mineral resources located close to major 
consumption centres; (b) far-away locations have become less disadvantageous due to falling transport 
costs, and (c) negative environmental impacts have increased the opposition to projects in highly 
populated areas. 
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are no longer labour intensive, and although the ever-shrinking requirements for 
unskilled labour can frequently be supplied locally, in most cases the senior 
management needs to be brought from abroad due to the specialisation and expertise 
now required for the job. Also, in times of centralised governance, little of the fiscal 
revenue from mining goes back to the region, which instead bears most of the 
environmental consequences of the mineral extraction process. There is little 
interaction with local communities and the main reference for mining companies is 
the central government. Regional infrastructure developed by mining companies is 
exclusively motivated by the needs of the mine and often provides little extra benefit 
to the broader community (Eggert 2001). These developments recalled the idea of 
dual economies and unequal trade epitomised in the writing of Prebisch (1950) and 
the ECLAC21 (also see Rostow 1952, Palma 1987, Quijano 1989, Sunkel 1989, Cueva 
1993). This prompted many commentators to argue that the global model of mineral 
development could also be referred to as the ‘enclave model’, as it is in fact a model 
dominated by mining, which prevents economic diversification due to reduced local 
upstream and downstream linkages, and leads to dependency on mining activities 
(e.g. Auty 1993).  
 
The new model is typified by the following characteristics: 
 
1. Negotiations and agreements are held by the central government and the mining 
companies exclusively; 
2. Typically, taxes and royalties are paid to the central administration; 
3. Mining companies deal with single persons individually regarding compensations 
for eventual negative externalities; 
4. Training is designed by the mining companies to address their skills requirements 
exclusively;  
5. Infrastructure provision is designed by the mining companies to address their 
infrastructure requirements exclusively; 
6. Supplies are typically sourced from outside the community 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.  
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2.3.2.1 The industry’s response - a paternalistic approach 
 
The spontaneous response by the mining industry to these new challenges was to 
compensate directly for the eventual negative externalities arising as a consequence 
of mineral production.  As a rule of thumb, such compensation first attempted to 
address concerns of ecological nature, though this rapidly expanded to cover social, 
and later economic, matters.  Once the negative externalities were identified, the 
companies tended to engage in direct negotiations with those affected most directly 
and to settle the conditions for the compensation, which often involved direct 
transfers to the communities in the form of donations. Consequently, this model was 
characterised by companies adopting a paternalistic approach to local communities.  
 
Mining companies, particularly those operating in remote locations, tended to 
function as closed systems, largely insulated from the influence of organised public 
opinion.  Harvey and Brereton (2005) argue that their typical attitude is epitomised by 
the purpose-built mining town, where the corporation was the dominant employer, 
which owned and provided most of the services (including housing), and managed the 
town as an essential element of the mine’s production system.  In this capacity they 
not only run public utilities – such as water, sewage, power and even housing –, but 
often also assumed responsibility for the provision of education and health.  In some 
cases, given their size, financial and managerial capacity, companies have performed 
these public functions formally and have been recognised as acting local government, 
creating financial and political dependency, which often had alarming consequences 
the day after closure (Eggert 2001).   
  
Some companies have preferred to decentralise their community investment into ad 
hoc local institutions such as trusts, funds and/or foundations22. Companies would 
normally agree to a pre-established percentage of the companies’ revenue as financial 
contribution, which would often constitute the core of the institutions’ income.  In 
some cases, these organisations would also seek external, complementary finance. 
They would invest in the activities defined in their statute, which would typically 
include vocational training and further education for the broader community, but 
could also encompass health, recreation and sports. The scope of these initiatives has 
                                                 
22
 See, for instance, the Rio Tinto’s Rössing Foundation in Namibia http://www.rf.org.na/  
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generally started as local to the mine but, with time, it has often expanded beyond 
these limits to cover, in some cases, all national territory (Kunanayagam 2003, 
Yakovleva and Alabaster 2004).    
 
Despite these initiatives, this is the period in which a vast amount of empirical 
evidence linking mining to poor economic development started to emerge, and 
commentators began pointing out a negative correlation between mining and 
economic growth (Auty 1993, Sachs and Warner 1995, Ross 2001, among many 
others). During the 1990’s, a number of notorious industry mismanagements and 
unsound business operations made their way to the front pages of newspapers around 
the world and jeopardised the reputation of the industry worldwide.  It soon became 
apparent that the dramatic shift in paradigm discussed above required more than a 
compensation approach on behalf of the industry. As Radetzki put it:  
 
“In the absence of very forceful policy directives, the new mining regions are 
unlikely to succeed in building up a diversified structure similar to those which 
exist in many areas of old mineral exploitation”  (1982 p199)  
 
 
2.3.3 The Sustainable Development model in mining 
 
As the increasing local distress in mining economies was noted by academia, pressure 
on the industry started to mount. Gradually, the idea that mining had failed to foster 
sustainable development altogether (and particularly to alleviate poverty in 
developing regions) spilled over to the rest of the international community. The 
consolidation of the NGO or ‘third’ sector, supported by the information revolution of 
the 1990s, gave these concerns a global dimension.  A consolidating view went as far 
as to recommend that countries avoid mining entirely (Ross 2001; WBEIR 2003, 
Friends of the Earth, undated).  As opposed to the previous models, Eggert (2001) 
notes that the subsequent changes were chiefly triggered by social pressure to cope 
with negative externalities, and were thus driven by local demands to a large extent. 
 
Although the SD movement in mining first concentrated on the ecological and social 
dimensions of these problems, the focus in mining gradually changed towards the 
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economy.  It soon became apparent that whereas it is possible to sustain growth while 
moving fast away from sustainable development, it is impossible to have SD without 
a feasible economy to underpin it. Sustainable development is referred to as an intra-
generational concept and as such it spins round the notion of lasting benefits and 
opportunities in contrast to a limited-term wealth endowment (WCED 1987). 
Similarly, novel physics laureate Murray Gell-Mann defined sustainability as living 
on nature’s income, rather than capital (Brigg 2000). Can, then, a feasible and lasting 
economy that paves the path to SD emerge from mining? Initially, mining would 
seem to be essentially unsustainable. Individual mines have finite deposits which, 
once exploited, are depleted forever. Yet, earlier this chapter discussed the industry’s 
proposed approach to sustainability, claiming that even when a mine itself is not 
unlimited, the economic benefits created by mining can be sustained over time 
through proper investment, creating wealth long after mining ceases. In other words, 
proper management should be able to convert a depleting mineral resource into a 
sustainable source of human well-being (Davis 2000; Humphreys 2000, 2000b).  
 
For Eggert (2001), the fact that mining regions were perceived as (i) bearing a 
disproportionate share of the costs of minerals development for which they do not 
seem to be compensated adequately; (ii) receiving an inadequately small share of the 
benefits, and (iii) not participating appropriately in the decision making that leads to 
mine construction, has led to a number of efforts aimed at rectifying this situation and 
enhancing the contributions of mining to local communities and regions, which has 
became known as the SD model in mining. In this model, negotiations and 
agreements should include communities and regional authorities; central government 
shares taxes and royalties with the regional administration; compensations are 
negotiated with the broader community; training is designed to benefit the community 
as well as the industry; the infrastructure development aims at addressing both the 
requirements of the mining industry as well as the broader economy, and supplies are 
increasingly provided by the local and regional economies.  In essence, Stongman 
(1998) defines the SD model in mineral economies by contrasting it with the previous 
enclave model.  Table 2.1 summarises the key differences.   
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Global model SD model
1 Regional policy determined by central government 1 Descentralisation of political power.  Devolution
2 Starting to aknowledge environmental imperatives 2 Integrate environmental concerns in decision making
3 Benign neglect regarding social impacts 3 Awakening/learning regarding social impact
4 Communities largely ignored 4 Increasing preasure for consultation
5 Bottom line' dictated by cost competitiveness 5 Pressure to respond to environmental & social issues too
6 Revenue generation 6 Distribution
7 Legalistic 7 Collaborative
8 Competition is the dominant economic model 8 Development of public/private partnerships
9 Project-based development 9 Integrated regional development
10 Special skills dominated by engineers and geologists 10 Multidisciplinary approach
Table 2.1 – the Global & SD models - features for resource-based economies 
Source: Based on Strongman (1998) and Humphreys (2002) 
 
 
 
 
As opposed to the previous model, companies need to operate increasingly as open 
systems. There are several reasons for this change in focus, including higher 
community expectations, the dramatic increase in global scrutiny and the seemingly 
demise of the traditional mining town. Harvey and Brereton (2005) argue that under a 
SD model, communities have become active participants in the governance process, 
which is now referred to as the ‘triple bottom line’ (i.e. governments, companies and 
communities). In this emerging tri-polar governance landscape, communities 
frequently represent themselves when dealing with businesses, whether through 
public forums, delegate bodies or the agency of NGOs. In turn, corporate entities are 
now obliged to develop direct relationships with local communities and governments. 
Thus, the notion of SD suggested a shift in power and responsibility to the sub-
national level. Humphreys (2002) argues that the old enclave model gave primacy to 
national economic objectives. In essence, it emphasised mining’s contribution to 
national income, export earnings, employment and other aggregate economic 
variables. Consistent with the notion of mineral deposits as the embodiment of 
patrimonial wealth, the economic surplus from mining was essentially for central 
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government to dispose of in what it deemed to be the collective national interest. The 
focus of the SD model, by contrast, is on optimising the regional impacts of mining 
and on ensuring that a significant part of the economic benefits from the industry is 
retained in the region in which the rent is generated. 
 
 
2.3.3.1 The industry’s response – Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
The industry has increasingly come to believe that the consolidation of this new 
paradigm is not a matter that can be left to national authorities alone.  Even at the risk 
of being seen as impinging on government sovereignty, many companies have 
determined that they need to take an active part in ensuring that the regions in which 
they are operating receive a reasonable share of the economic benefits from mining, 
and to lay down the basis for sustainable economic activity after they have gone.  
Humphreys (2000) argues that this is not entirely altruistic behaviour.  He claims that 
it is rooted in the industry’s late understanding that communities which are convinced 
of the economic value of mining to them are more likely to be publicly supportive of 
mining and to be advocates of mining in national capitals.   
 
For Harvey and Brereton (2005), the primary business drivers for this enhanced 
involvement are the desire to better manage social risks and to achieve competitive 
advantage through self-regulation, community and employee endorsement, and 
reduced financial volatility.  Companies increasingly strive for competitive advantage 
in the community arena as well, with the aim of becoming the ‘developer of choice’ 
for communities and governments, improving the corporate risk profile and securing 
access to capital on more favourable terms.  Moreover, in order to manage the risk of 
losing access to land for exploration and developing mines, companies need to take 
some decisions about expenditure beyond the technical scope of projects. While in 
the past this was restricted to well-defined taxation and royalty payments to 
governments, the SD approach may involve negotiated contracts with other 
stakeholders to gain endorsement.   
 
More broadly, this resurgent preoccupation with business ethics and the social 
dimension of business activity consolidated under the concept of Corporate Social 
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Responsibility (CSR) back in the early 1990s (Henderson 2000, The Economist 
2005).  While these concerns have been around for a long time, Fabig and Boele 
(1999) argue that this debate is now conducted at the intersection of development, 
environment and human rights, and are more global in outlook than ever before.  The 
development in global corporate communication that has enabled corporations to 
control production activities on a global scale has also facilitated the international 
transmission of information about conditions in overseas operations, contributing to 
increased public awareness and facilitating campaigning activities (Jenkins 2004) 
  
Meanwhile, the main multilateral agencies (MLAs) saw in the CSR agenda an 
opportunity to rely on large firms to promote development in accordance with their 
mandates.  The UN leaped on to the CSR movement with the creation of the Global 
Compact in 2000 (Global Compact website 2005).  In 2001, the European 
Commission (EC) defined CSR as ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis’ (EC 2001 p8).  The World Bank, too, actively 
promotes CSR through its CSR Practice and its training arm, the WB Institute (WB 
website 2005).  The DFID (website 2005) argues that the growth generated by the 
private sector has the potential to be more inclusive, equitable and poverty reducing 
when companies adhere to the CSR framework.   
 
In the beginning, CSR had not explicitly dealt with the economic implications of 
business activities and their impacts on poverty.  This omission led some 
commentators to call for a shift to a more development-oriented approach, integrating 
economic concerns to the pre-existing social and environmental spheres (Fox 2002), 
which, in the mining industry, lead to the embracing of the SD agenda (ICMM 2002, 
2003, 2006).  A large number of cooperative industry initiatives and bodies have been 
established in recent years with the objective of consolidating this new approach at 
the industry level; the most influential of them being the Global Mining Initiative 
(GMI); the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD); the 
International Council for Metals and Minerals (ICMM); the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).   
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The GMI brought together many of the world's largest mining companies to ensure 
that the sector as a whole was being responsive to these global needs and challenges. 
This initiative had three main components: (i) an independent analysis of the key 
issues facing these industries; (ii) the creation of an industry association that could 
focus on sustainable development in the mining, metals and minerals industry; and 
(iii) a global conference on mining, metals and sustainable development, held in May 
200223. The objective of all three components was to reach a clearer understanding of 
the role the industry can play in making the transition to sustainable patterns of 
economic development. In May 2002, following the publication of the final report of 
the MMSD project, the establishment of the ICMM, and the close of the global 
conference, the GMI ceased to exist as a separate entity (ICMM website 2005) 
 
The MMSD was an independent two-year process of consultation and research with 
the objective of understanding how to maximise the contribution of the sector to SD 
at the global, national, regional and local levels. The Project began in April 2000 and 
was designed to contribute a consistent body of research (final report published in 
2002) and to establish a dialogue process to be carried forward into the future. The 
MMSD proposed an agenda for global change in the minerals sector based on 
participatory analysis including governments, communities and the industry (MMSD 
2002). The following were the key general objectives of MMSD24:   
 
- First, to assess global mining contribution to economic prosperity, human well-
being and ecosystem health, as well as the track record of past practice; 
- Second, to identify how the services provided by the minerals system can be 
delivered in accordance with the SD model in the future; 
- Third, to propose key elements of an action plan for improving the minerals 
system; 
- Fourth, to build platforms of analysis and engagement for ongoing cooperation and 
networking among all stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
23
 The conference itself contributed to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 
in the fall of 2002, which marked the 10th anniversary of the Rio Earth Summit.  
24
 As defined in the MMSD Scoping Report produced by the International Institute for Environment 
and Development (IIED), which was commissioned by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) in 1999 
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The ICMM is an industry association whose main purpose is to focus on sustainable 
development in the mining, metals and minerals industry.  In essence, the ICMM 
provides a common platform for the industry to share challenges and responsibilities 
and to engage with key constituencies on issues of common concern at the 
international level.  The council’s chief objective is to achieve continuous 
improvements in sustainable development performance in the industry.  More 
specifically, the ICMM aims to (directly from ICMM website):  
 
- Offer strategic leadership to achieve improved sustainable development 
performance in the mining, minerals and metals industry; 
- Represent the views and interests of its members and serve as a principal point of 
engagement with the industry's key constituencies in the international arena; 
- Promote science-based regulations and material-choice decisions that encourage 
market access and the safe production, use, reuse, and recycling of metals and 
minerals; 
- Identify and advocate the use of good practices to address sustainable development 
issues within the industry. 
 
The EITI is a coalition of governments, civil society groups, companies, investors and 
international organisations with a common purpose to improve governance in 
resource-rich countries. It aims at improving transparency and accountability in the 
extractive sector by verifying and publicizing company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining. The ultimate purpose of this initiative is to 
increase the likelihood that the revenues generated by natural resources in developing 
countries will be used in an efficient and equitable manner, while significantly 
reducing the risk of misappropriation of these funds. The EITI is a voluntary initiative 
and countries need to endorse the EITI criteria25 to become eligible members. There 
                                                 
25
 The EITI Criteria (EITI website, visited November 2005): 
a) Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments by companies to governments 
(‘payments’) and all material revenues received by governments from oil, gas and mining 
companies (‘revenues’) to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and 
comprehensible manner; 
b) Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues are the subject of a credible, 
independent audit, applying international auditing standards; 
c) Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent administrator, applying 
international auditing standards and with publication of the administrator’s opinion regarding that 
reconciliation including discrepancies, should any be identified;  
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is a close link between this initiative and the World Bank Group. In addition to 
administering a multi-donor EITI trust fund, the Bank is committed to pushing the 
EITI agenda in member countries and to supporting governments with its 
implementation. By 2006, over thirty countries had either endorsed or were actively 
implementing EITI across the world (EITI website, 2006).  
 
Finally, the GRI is a multi-stakeholder process and independent institution with a 
mission to develop and to disseminate Sustainability Reporting Guidelines around the 
world. These are non-compulsory guidelines for voluntary use by organisations for 
reporting on the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of their activities, 
products, and services. The GRI incorporates representatives and feedback from 
business, accountancy, investment, environmental and human rights researchers and 
labour organisations globally. It was set up in 1997, and it has since continued as an 
official collaborating centre of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 
In 2005, GRI and the ICMM released the pilot version of the Mining and Metals 
Sector Supplement, which provides specific guidance on reporting against the GRI 
guidelines for companies in the mining industry specifically. The supplement 
provides detailed direction to mining firms as to produce meaningful and comparable 
reports (GRI website).  
 
At the firm level, most large firms in the mining industry today claim to have 
embraced the principles of SD and to have spent fairly significant sums to identify 
and mitigate the social and environmental costs from their activities at the local and 
regional level. More particularly, they have frequently assisted host communities to 
take advantage of the opportunities for economic development that these enterprises 
claim to create where they operate, including, for instance, the local sourcing of 
labour, or the demand for local goods and services. Several compilations and reviews 
of these initiatives in these and other areas have been typically produced and 
published by either mining companies or industry bodies (Prescott 2009). In terms of 
                                                                                                                                            
d) This approach is extended to all companies including state-owned enterprises; 
e) Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and evaluation of this 
process and contributes towards public debate;  
f) A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is developed by the host government, 
with assistance from the international financial institutions where required, including measurable 
targets, a timetable for implementation, and an assessment of potential capacity constraints.  
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corporate governance, the overarching commitment to these principles is generally 
articulated in publicly available documents stating the organisations’ strategy with 
regards to SD, and often too, their key targets and performance indicators (for 
instance, Anglo American website, BHP Billiton website, Placer Dome website, Rio 
Tinto 2005). Notwithstanding these global frameworks, sustainable development 
initiatives are essentially region specific and thus the industry has often asserted that 
their design as well as justification would necessarily respond to local and regional 
drivers, which will in turn reflect different corporate cultures. 
   
Consider the following example: ways of supporting the development of local 
suppliers has been a typical SD focus area, where different companies have adopted 
different strategies. Responses to the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) schemes 
in South Africa serve as illustration. BHP Billiton tackled this challenge directly by 
implementing a new company procurement policy, and by establishing a central BEE 
supply unit within the firm. Developmental assistance encompasses the provision of 
training in tendering processes; help with negotiating financing arrangements with 
banks; splitting contracts into smaller components to provide more opportunities for 
Black suppliers; and support in acquiring materials or facilitating working capital in 
the form of soft loans (BHP Billiton website). Similarly, Richards Bay Minerals, a 
Rio Tinto managed business in South Africa, has also followed a centralised 
approach, though it claims to go as far as to identify promising small businesses 
directly, to which they would provide proactive mentoring (Rio Tinto 2005). Zimele, 
instead, is the decentralised enterprise development unit of Anglo American, which 
targets all company operations in South Africa. Its assistance takes the form of equity 
and loans. Business development officers help putting business plans forward for 
approval. If the venture is viable, the organisation takes a minority equity stake and 
provides finance (Anglo American website). 
 
Guided by these principles, mining firms have also continued to promote 
development initiatives largely disconnected from their systems of production. For 
instance, supporting the development of small enterprises outside the industry’s 
supply chain would not necessarily improve the operability of these companies, and 
thus it has been in the past more frequently associated with development agencies 
than with corporations. Mining houses have often preferred to address these 
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challenges through multi stakeholder partnerships including NGOs, development 
institutions, academia, government, and civil society groups. In the socioeconomic 
arena, these associations have frequently focussed their work on business 
development, poverty alleviation, and social investments in education and health 
(Prescott 2009). A key question remains: to which extent can these mining-sponsored 
associations ensure the durability and further applicability of development initiatives 
that are not, in a pure sense, mining-related?    
 
 
2.3.3.2 Did it work? 
 
This chapter explained why mineral-based economies face quite distinct challenges. It 
also noted that these challenges are today fundamentally different from those in the 
past (Davis 1990). Incarnating the industry’s interpretation of the SD movement, CSR 
consolidated in mining as an attempt to respond to these challenges on a voluntary 
basis. Companies came to believe that they now needed to play a more proactive role 
in regional economic development if they wanted to maintain their ‘social licence to 
operate’, and even perhaps reposition themselves as leaders in a new area seen as 
possible source of competitive advantage. While elsewhere the notion of SD had been 
around for years, it only gained momentum in mining towards the end of the 
millennium. It is currently difficult to find a mining corporation that does not claim to 
embrace SD as part of the way they operate.  
 
Many in the industry have claimed that SD should be seen as a new way of operating 
mines, so that economic, social and environmental principles integrate into business 
management (Clifford 2005). Essentially, companies have argued that this new 
framework can align business needs with those now articulated by the broader 
community, and that it proposes a change in the way managers approach business 
altogether – particularly their relationship with local and regional stakeholders. 
Moreover, some policy makers have identified these voluntary approaches as a 
stepping-stone towards legal codification (for instance, the World Bank website).  
Where there is a strong system of governance, they might be a way of extending 
company accountability without the need for a new legislation; a complementary 
approach encouraging businesses to act responsibly but not an alternative to the rule 
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of law.  Where the rule of law is weak, voluntary approaches can encourage 
multinational companies to introduce higher levels of performance than those 
required for local legal compliance.    
 
This new approach did not come without dissent. Most criticism to the new agenda 
falls into two groups. The first, which could be characterised as the ‘CSR is bad for 
capitalism’ school, echoes Friedman’s famous claim that a company’s overriding 
social obligation lies in creating wealth for the society by operating profitable 
businesses and thus creating employment opportunities; moreover, that the whole 
issue of SD is a distraction from its core function. According to this view, CSR is 
inherently misguided in principle. By pursuing social and environmental objectives, 
firms may ultimately hurt shareholders by generating lower profits than otherwise 
possible (Friedman 1962; Henderson 2002). Some commentators have recently 
argued, nonetheless, that this argument applies best where mining companies are 
operating in mature, developed economies; where markets work well; where 
governments are responsive and effective, and where, as a result of all these things, 
the environmental and social externalities of mining are largely reflected in a 
company’s costs through existing regulation and taxation. Within the current pattern 
of mineral production, these conditions rarely apply in developed countries – and 
effectively never in developing countries (Humphreys 2002)  
 
The second branch of criticism argues that companies should assume full 
responsibility for the broader impact of their business activity, far beyond current 
CSR or SD practices.  According to this view, planning and implementation of social 
programs by firms is simply inadequate and insufficient.  Many of these critics 
consider that the delivery of economic development programmes should be the 
domain of the state regulators or argue that, at a minimum, the state has an obligation 
to monitor corporate social programs.  In the absence of state involvement, SD 
initiatives such as corporate codes of conduct or ad hoc community investment 
initiatives tend to lack efficiency as well as coordination across firms and industries, 
and that there are few, if any, sanctions for non-compliance (Waddell 2000).  Further, 
Margolis and Walsh (2003) illustrate this misalignment by pointing out that much of 
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the research on CSR these days focuses on its potential contributions to companies’ 
profitability, rather than on its impact on development26.   
 
Have the industry’s interpretation of the SD model promoted a new type of interface 
between mining enterprises and the local and regional economies where they take 
place?  If so, has this new type of interaction phased out the disadvantages allegedly 
suffered by mineral economies in the past, or, to put it differently, has mining under 
these principles contributed positively toward regional economic development? As 
this voluntary approach claims to respond to criticism largely leveraged at sub-
national levels, the answers to these questions need to be found at the local and 
regional levels principally. As these concerns are essentially specific to each location, 
a range of different situations need to be considered for conclusions to remain widely 
relevant. Consequently, this research took a deep insight into three different cases; 
three large mining operations majority-owned and managed by Rio Tinto, one of the 
largest mining corporations in the world. A first description of these cases, as well as 
the rationale for this selection, is introduced in the next chapter.  
                                                 
26
 Two other, more radical critical schools should be acknowledged: one that disputes that capitalism 
can make any contribution to the social or environmental cause at all (Kelly 2001 ), and another that 
views CSR as nothing more than good capitalism and therefore not worth thinking about in its own 
right (Sorell and Hendry 1994, Freeman 2004) 
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Chapter 3 
 
Defining the study object: Rio Tinto and its three subsidiaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92
3.1. Rio Tinto and the industry structure  
 
The end of the last millennium has seen an acceleration in the consolidation of the 
mining sector following a series of corporate events that have helped reshape the 
industry, such as a number of significant mergers and acquisitions. The net result has 
been a dramatic increase in the proportion of industry value represented by the largest 
companies: in 2004 the top five corporations represented 59% of the MSCI Global 
Mining Index27, up from 33% in 1995 (Thomson Financial DataStream, 2005).  
Significant M&A activity has, in fact, continued throughout the commodity boom. A 
second notable feature of the industry’s evolution in the last decade has been the 
continued emergence of a tier of new players, primarily composed of former state-
owned companies and commercially-oriented state-owned enterprises, like the 
Chilean Codelco, the Brazilian CVRD, the Russian Norilsk and Rusal, and a number 
of Chinese firms including Shenhua and Chalco. Freed from many of the traditional 
restrictions of national ownership, these firms have been improving the efficiency of 
their operations, consolidating the industry in their home countries, and many of them 
have started a process of international expansion (Humphreys 2003). 
 
In addition, the effect of the impressive growth of the Chinese economy on the 
worldwide demand of minerals and metals has continued to consolidate. It is now also 
widely accepted that this effect will continue to shape the industry in the short- and 
mid-term, and that the Chinese import-and-export profile of minerals and metals is set 
to have a permanent effect on the economics and attractiveness of the different 
commodities for mining corporations. Similar effects are coming evident from other 
developing nations, particularly in India, Brazil and some other countries of the 
former Soviet Union, where the need for modern infrastructure is accentuating the 
demand for basic materials. Many of these countries are going through a phase of 
growth which is particularly materials intensive. Across developing countries as a 
whole, a percentage growth in GDP is typically twice as mineral intensive as a 
percentage growth in GDP in developed countries (The Mining Journal 2004, 2005). 
As part of the transition undergone by the world’s most developed nations towards 
the services sector and away from basic industry, during the 1990s, mining companies 
                                                 
27
 Morgan Stanley Capital International 
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became less attractive to investors in overall terms. The commodity boom of the 
2000s brought with it a reversal of that trend. Some analysts have argue that this, 
together with the increase consolidation evident in industry, means that company size 
will become more important to some investors; that large institutional investors may 
limit the number of mining companies they follow; and that this will also increase 
shareholder expectations for growth (Crowson 2004). As the global mining sector 
combined into fewer, larger companies, there has been an increasing realisation that 
these larger companies were also those setting the industry’s benchmarks for the 
mining and sustainable development (SD) agenda too (ICMM 2003).   
   
Within this context, Rio Tinto is one of the largest mining corporations in the world; 
in fact, in 2004 it was the largest pure-mining company measured in terms of total 
market capitalisation28. With headquarters in the UK, Rio Tinto is a dual listed 
corporation combining Rio Tinto plc, a London listed public company, and Rio Tinto 
Limited, which is listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (Rio Tinto 2006b). 
Functionally, however, it operates as a single entity structured in five product groups 
– Iron Ore; Energy; Aluminium; Copper & Gold; and Diamonds & Industrial 
Minerals –, investing in mining businesses and operating subsidiaries in more than 20 
countries29, 30 (Figure 3.1).  Although Rio Tinto has long been active in the 
developing world, its operations are heavily oriented to Australia and North America, 
which contributed around 85% of total revenue in 2004 (Rio Tinto 2005b). This 
brought with it obvious benefits to the corporation in the form of a lower risk 
premium during the commercial evaluation of investments. However, as the 
remaining unexploited high-quality ore bodies is frequently assumed to be in less 
accessible and thus less explored regions, all too often within underdeveloped 
economies (The Mining Journal, various issues 2004), some analysts have identified 
Rio Tinto’s geographical bias as a potential weakness looking into the future 
(Citigroup 2006) 
                                                 
28
 The market capitalisation of BHPB continued to be larger than Rio Tinto's (US$100 billion and 
US$79 Billion in 2005, respectively), although BHPB derived large part of its value from its oil and 
gas division. The value of Rio Tinto and its competitors fluctuated significantly following the Global 
economic swings of the late 2000s. 
29
 The Rio Tinto Board reshuffled the company structure in 2009, reflecting a new balance and relative 
importance of the different commodities produced. This move followed the acquisition of Alcan 
(bauxite, alumina and aluminium) and the surge in iron ore production, among other reasons.  
30
 These increased dramatically with Rio Tinto’s acquisition of Alcan. By 2009, the Group had business 
interests in more than 50 countries.  
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Rio Tinto has started to expand the range of investment locations that it considers for 
value potential.  Good examples of this are the assessment of deposits in non-
traditional prospective areas such as Guinea, Iran, India, Madagascar, Mongolia and 
Russia, among others (Rio Tinto 2006).  Increased flexibility in Rio Tinto’s approach 
to the location of its assets will provide a greater range of development opportunities 
for the company, but will also bring with it an increasing need to understand and 
manage the more complex risks involved in these environments (Citigroup 2006). 
Access to these resources, as well as keeping a ‘social license to operate’ them, shall 
require constantly reviewing the business approach to issues of sustainable 
development in general – and regional economic development in particular. The next 
section discusses the economic significance of Rio Tinto and the company’s role in 
leading the transition from the Global Model of development to the SD movement. 
Section three explains the methodology for this research and introduces the three Rio 
Tinto subsidiaries that constitute the study subjects of this investigation.  Final 
remarks and conclusions take place in section four.     
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3.2. Rio Tinto’s quest for regional economic sustainability 
 
3.2.1 The economic contribution of Rio Tinto 
 
How big is the aggregate economic activity of Rio Tinto?  Chapter 2 discussed that 
one way of understanding the size of a company’s economic activities is to look at its 
gross turnover. In 2004 Rio Tinto’s gross turnover was US$14 billion. However, 
while this interpretation is appropriate at a company level, when the focus is on the 
broader economy, we saw that it is more accurate to measure economic contributions 
in terms of companies’ value added. Value added is calculated as the difference 
between a firm’s gross turnover and its payments to suppliers.  Summing up value 
added across all enterprises in a country should equal GDP/GNP31 (for instance, Begg 
et al 2000, De Grauwe and Camerman 2002).  Total value added by Rio Tinto was 
US$7.5 billion in 2004, which represented 54 % of the Group’s gross turnover (Rio 
Tinto 2005b). For consistency with the rest of this research, this analysis is based on 
2004. It is worth noting, however, that value added by Rio Tinto worldwide continued 
going up steadily, reaching $28.5 billion in 2008.   
 
In a very profitable year for the mining industry32, money retained within Rio Tinto 
accounted for US$2.7 billion in 2004.  In the same year, Rio Tinto’s payments to the 
providers of capital were US$1.3 billion; 90% in dividends33, 34 and the balance in 
interest payments and other financial items (Rio Tinto 2005b).  However, because the 
conditions for thriving capital markets do not usually coincide with the remote and 
isolated places where mining typically operates, these components of value added 
often have a negligible effect at the local and regional level.  As a general rule in 
mining, economic benefits from these financial obligations are more likely to be felt 
in large urban districts than in the remote environments most familiar to mining (Di 
Boscio 2004).    
                                                 
31
 For more on this see Chapter 2, section 2. 
32
 Prices for most mineral commodities reached unprecedented highs in 2004, although most continued 
rising until 2008 
33
 Mostly to institutional shareholders concentrated in the UK, North America and Australia 
34
 In 2005 Rio Tinto declared record profits.  In addition to the above mentioned dividends, the 
company declared a further ordinary dividend and special dividend payment in respect of 2005, of 
US$0.5 and US$1.5 billion respectively.  On top of these, Rio Tinto announced a share buyback of 
US$877 million in 2005.   
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In contrast, Rio Tinto reports that the net effect of labour payments is largest nearby 
the operations.  According to the company (Rio Tinto 2005c), Rio Tinto paid US$2.1 
billion in wages and salaries in 2004.  76% of these payments took place at the local 
level of the operations, 13% at the State or regional level, a further 10% somewhere 
else in the country – and just 1% was paid abroad. With regards to taxes, the 
company’s tax and royalty charge was US$1.5 billion in 2004. Although federal 
governments collect most of the taxes and royalty payments, Rio Tinto claims that 
local and regional governments receive approximately one third of the total take.  It is 
to be noted that this breakdown only captures where tax payments are made and not 
the internal redistribution of revenues that takes place within governments (Rio Tinto 
2005c), which will probably understate the ultimate effect of these payments locally. 
Additionally, a company such as Rio Tinto generates a significant income stream to 
governments through indirect and other taxes such as employee taxes, social security 
contributions or custom duties. 
 
Further to the calculation of value added, Rio Tinto's demand for materials, facilities 
and services from other sectors of the economy was US$6.5 billion in 2004, which 
represented 46% of the Group's total turnover. Chapter 2 explored the challenges and 
opportunities that the literature has attributed to this type of expenditure. Yet, 
assessing the geographical footprint of a company’s supply chain can be complicated. 
To begin with, tracking down records of every purchase by the industry, out of 
millions in a year, is virtually impossible.  Also, many suppliers are themselves 
purchasers of materials and goods from elsewhere.  The analysis by Rio Tinto uses 
the mailbox addresses on the vendor’s invoices as proxy for this.  Overall, 31% of 
Rio Tinto purchases were supplied at the local and regional level, and as much as 
80% within the country of operation. Looking further, however, there appear to be 
large disparities among Rio Tinto businesses – e.g. imports by Australian operations 
will tend to be smaller than those by African companies (Rio Tinto 2006b). This 
study is posed to explore the nature and consequences of these differences in detail. 
 
Rio Tinto also claims it supports circa 2,000 socio economic programmes every year, 
covering a range of activities including health, education, business development, 
housing, environment protection and agriculture.  In 2004, the company invested an 
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estimated US$70.5 million in these initiatives, including commercial and business 
development, charitable gifts, management costs and other legally binding 
agreements for payments to trusts, funds and foundations. In addition, there is also the 
economic stimulus from the capital invested by Rio Tinto in developing or expanding 
projects, including infrastructure that, in some cases, can be used by local 
communities and other parties. 
 
While all these calculations provide an idea of the magnitude of the company’s 
economic activities, they say little about Rio Tinto’s manoeuvring capacity over these 
contributions or, for instance, its ability to substitute imports with local firms; employ 
locally; or influence the level of public expenditure invested back in mining regions. 
Moreover, focussing too much on these capital flows from the company risks 
overlooking how the regional economies affected have coped with these stimuli. It 
should also be established whether these characteristics are intrinsic to modern 
mining, and whether efforts by the industry can significantly affect the geographic 
patterns of these payments – or if they instead remain at the margins. These questions 
too are the subject of this investigation.  Before starting to address them, however, the 
remainder of this section explores Rio Tinto’s drivers for embracing, (and its role in 
shaping), the SD agenda in mining.  
 
 
3.2.2 Rio Tinto and the embracing of sustainable development 
 
Despite the relatively large figures introduced above, the 1980s saw Rio Tinto’s 
reputation deteriorating rapidly across the world, parallel to that of the industry as a 
whole.  As previously discussed, mining companies have throughout history followed 
different stereotypical patterns of interaction with their host economies, which have 
been largely shaped by variables including the prevailing structure of industrial 
production and level of technological progress at the time (see chapter 2, section 3 for 
details). For simplicity, these types of interaction have been typically encapsulated 
under either the Regional Model, first; the Global Model, second; and the Sustainable 
Development Model of mineral production, more recently. Beyond these 
generalisations, however, single corporations have been impacted by specific 
circumstances, events and individuals that have enabled (or hindered) the transition 
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from one model into another. This section explores, in particular, Rio Tinto’s path 
through this process. 
 
 
3.2.2.1 The Regional model 
 
During most of the history of mining, the economic benefits from the sector were 
assumed to take place naturally, and therefore mining companies did not need to 
persuade the public about the social merits of their activities (Humphreys 2000). 
Some localised negative environmental and social externalities were broadly taken as 
a small price to pay for an industry that constituted the pillar of nearly all 
industrialised regional economies. This period has been referred to as the Regional 
Model of mineral development. In the second half of last century, nevertheless, deep 
changes in technology and the broader structure of production worldwide put this old 
model in crisis, an increasing part of the international community on the alert – and 
the mining industry on the defensive. While scholars of the dual economy and 
unequal trade (Prebich 1950, among many others) had been making the general case 
for national economies to avoid specialising in natural resources, the largest mining 
houses, with Rio Tinto among them, suddenly became the focus of heavy scrutiny 
and criticism by the consolidating NGO movement and a large section of academia 
(e.g. Tanzer 1984)  
 
More broadly, this is when the notion of ‘ethical investment’ started to gain 
momentum within investment portfolios, as some investors began to ponder ethical 
considerations at the time of buying companies’ shares.  In separating the good from 
the bad, more often than not mining ended up together with weapons, tobacco or oil 
& gas.  As the wave of indignation against these sectors gathered force, there were 
notable instances of disinvestment.  Suddenly, the environmental, social and 
economic consequences of a company’s activities started to threaten its own financial 
sustainability (Allsop 1995).  While this distinction was generally made on a sectoral 
basis, different companies suffered the stigma of being a bad neighbour more than 
others, and Rio Tinto often fell into that category. As an illustration, one of the most 
conspicuous cases of disinvestment during that time took place in 1972, when the 
Church Commissioners of England withdrew what had been until then a long term 
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and fructiferous investment in Rio Tinto because it now considered that some of the 
company’s practices were unethical (Allsop 1995).  Beyond the symbolic importance 
of losing this investor, the external pressure on the company kept on mounting. 
 
 
3.2.2.2 The Global model    
 
Consistent with the broader approach by the mining industry more generally, Rio 
Tinto’s response to the international community during this period was largely based 
on the principles of patronage and philanthropy (Kunanayagam 2003).  Writing about 
Rio Tinto, nevertheless, Pettifer (1998) argued that, as opposed to the previous model, 
the so-called ‘age of paternalism’ should not be misread as the industry’s disregard 
for the social, economic and environmental impact of mining activities.  Instead, this 
is a time in which large companies evidenced a genuine concern for their 
communities – but treated them with lofty superiority.  As an example, Rio Tinto’s 
preferred model for housing employees at the time was that of company towns, where 
the firm kept full control of the towns’ amenities and infrastructure, while taking 
responsibility for safety and policing inside its borders (Harvey and Bereton 2005).  
Within the company stores, hospitals and schools ‘[…] there was no place for a free 
spirit who might question company wisdom’ (Pettifer 1998, p4). 
  
At the corporate level, this approach was characterised by a focus on direct transfers 
to the communities hosting Rio Tinto businesses.  By large, these initiatives consisted 
of donations for addressing community concerns.  While they followed different local 
agendas, they were typically disconnected from the industrial process of mineral 
production or any other mainstream company activity.  As an illustration, every issue 
of the Rio Tinto’s quarterly publication ‘Review’ devoted a section of the magazine 
to the latest community programs. These spanned from promoting asparagus 
plantations in Namibia or combating tuberculosis in Indonesia, to supporting medical 
research in Australia or committing corporate donations to the Natural History 
Museum in London (Review 1997, various issues). Another key feature of this period 
was the company’s preference for outsourcing issues of community management into 
independent organisations, such as foundations.  In Rio Tinto, the early foundations 
were initially set up in Namibia and Papua New Guinea, during the 1970s.  The 
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considerable success of these initiatives heralded them as flagship instruments and led 
to the concept being exported elsewhere.  Nonetheless, efforts were largely 
concentrated at the national level and aimed at helping improve the company’s image 
as a wider contributor to society.  In the beginning, these institutions would rely 
financially on Rio Tinto, although later their independent status enabled them to 
attract funding from outside donors (Kunanayagam 2003).    
 
All these company responses were at first greeted positively – for instance, the 
Church Commissioners for England resumed their commercial relationship with Rio 
Tinto in the early 1990s (Allsop 1995).  Towards the end of the 1980s, however, the 
Global model of mining development had started to crumble, due mainly to a number 
of strident industry failures in coping with the environmental and social implications 
of mining, primarily in developing countries, but also because of the escalating 
scrutiny by the international community, which started to perceive company 
initiatives as merely public relations strategies, hollow of content.  For Rio Tinto in 
particular, however, one key incident sullied the company’s name, and impacted the 
public perception of Rio Tinto more than any other.  This incident took place at the 
Rio Tinto’s majority owned operation in Panguna, in the island of Bougainville 
(PNG), one of the world’s largest gold and copper open-pit mines in the world at the 
time. 
 
In Bougainville, Rio Tinto needed to dismantle rain forests to access the mineral 
deposit and to relocate villagers to make way for the mine.  On this island, 
community beliefs and behaviours are rooted on a strong relationship with nature; 
regardless of the operating and environmental permits in place, the activities by the 
company eroded the local culture and contributed to dismantling the subsistence 
economy.  Later on, claims emerged that mine waste had filtered into rivers and the 
ocean, affecting the fish that locals depended upon.  Tensions over environmental 
problems and the distribution of the mine’s revenues grew.  Angry landowners, who 
morphed into a revolutionary movement seeking independence for Bougainville, blew 
up power sources to the mine in 1988 (The Guardian 2001). In response to the 
revolutionary movement, the PNG government established a military blockade that, 
according to the Guardian (2002), prevented essential supplies like food and medicine 
from reaching the island – the PNG government owned a 19% share of the operation.  
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Rebels slipped into the rain forest, and instigated an eight-year civil confrontation that 
cost the lives of about 15,000 civilians.  During this period, the company was accused 
of transporting soldiers and of pressuring the government to do anything necessary to 
reopen the mine.  Rio Tinto’s position has always been that the company played no 
part in the civil strife, and that neither the firm nor its employees conspired to commit 
any acts of violence.  An independent study conducted for the PNG government in 
the late 1980’s found, however, evidence of environmental damage from the mine 
(The Guardian 2002). 
 
The way in which the episode was managed by the company exposed the costly 
consequences of a number of emblematic management procedures back then – 
particularly the company’s disregard for the local population and its preference for 
dealing with the central administration – as well as the short-sightedness of the 
prevailing community development strategies.  Gradually, the company started to 
question the whole approach to community development more broadly.  At that time, 
for instance, the Rössing Foundation35 asked to stop the aid wagon going to Rio 
Tinto’s communities in Africa and to rethink the whole strategy to economic 
development, as evidence was showing these contributions were largely ineffective 
(Godfrey 1995).  The idea began to consolidate within the company that the real 
problem in these communities was not necessarily shortages of money, but rather that 
the available resources were not used properly.  In the 1990s, Rio Tinto realised that 
changing the company’s reputation was now a business imperative, as well as moral 
cause.  By then, however, public perception of the extractive industry performance 
was based on increasingly damaging popular judgment.  Rather than attempting to 
change perceptions, Burke (1998) claimed that there was a real need for changing 
performances: 
 
‘In the developing world […], few industries offer poorer countries as good an 
opportunity as mining for increasing incomes rapidly, and also transferring skills 
and technology.  […] But for that case to be believed in the court of public 
opinion mining must rid itself of its outmoded image. […] Performance 
                                                 
35
 The Rössing Foundation is a decentralised organisation created by Rössing Uranium Limited, a Rio 
Tinto subsidiary, with the aim of promoting community activities such as education and training in 
Namibia. 
 102
improvements on their own will not change perceptions. Efforts to change 
perceptions that are not based on real and continuous performance improvements 
will soon be seen through’  (Environmental Policy Advisor to Rio Tinto, Tom 
Burke, 1998 p5) 
 
Later on, Rio Tinto Chairman Robert Wilson would emphasise that: 
 
‘Crucial to the changing of the industry reputation […] is the willingness by 
company leaders concerned to acknowledge that the industry has a case to 
answer in terms of both social and environmental performances.  The way 
forward should not be by hopeless efforts to sway public opinion but rather to 
accept that we have made mistakes and to actively engage with and listen to our 
critics’ (Wilson 2001, p2) 
 
Overall, these realisations prompted a dramatic change in corporate culture.  It 
was at this time that Rio Tinto declared the beginning of the age of ‘post-
paternalism’ (Pettifer 1998). 
 
 
3.2.2.3 Rio Tinto and the age of post-paternalism – or the SD model 
 
Richard Holme, former Rio Tinto director responsible for external affairs and 
human resources, described ‘the age of post-paternalism’ as the redefinition of 
‘community’ (Pettifer 1998).  In the past, a mining community encompassed the 
workforce and their immediate dependants, while nowadays ‘[…] the list 
includes anyone impacted in any way, economically, socially and 
environmentally by the operations of the mine.  We must also include the 
representatives of national and local governments and NGOs.  In the age of post-
paternalism, all the individuals and groups must be considered and consulted by 
Rio Tinto’ (Pettifer 1998 p.4).  This broader understanding of communities came 
together with an internal review of the industry’s priorities in this area.  Major 
scientific advances in the management of physical and chemical impacts had 
started to shift the focus from the environmental to the socio economic 
implications of mining by the mid 1990s: 
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‘The bigger challenge now is not a technical one.  Rather it lies in the 
development of interactive and lasting relationships with the communities 
and regions in which the industry operates.  Within this context, the 
industry’s treatment of the physical environment is but one factor’ (Chief 
Economist Rio Tinto, David Humphreys, 1996 p23) 
 
Accordingly, Kunanayagam argues that community efforts by Rio Tinto evolved 
from one of patronage to that of sustainability, and community relations is now seen 
as a core business activity and critical to successful risk management. For instance, in 
reviewing the role of the old foundations, she declares that these institutions can no 
longer be seen as a substitute for the company’s community relations responsibilities 
(Kunanayagam 2003). This expanded notion of communities also benefited from the 
increasingly popular concept of SD in mining.  Humphreys (1996) claims that, in an 
economic sense, this debate re-establishes as the basic conditions of sustainability the 
principle that the depreciation of one capital asset needs to be compensated by the 
creation of other capital assets with at least the same earning power. These other 
assets may take the form of new mines, but they may equally be in the form of 
manufacturing businesses, farms or service sector activities such as schools and 
tourist facilities. 
  
For Rio Tinto, a further challenge was that a firm may not be able to earn a good 
name if the industry had such a collective bad reputation. By the 1990s, in fact, the 
broad SD agenda had already started to consolidate, and mining was clearly lagging 
behind other industries. Thus, a case emerged internally for coordinating sectoral 
action. In 1998, Rio Tinto played the leading role in launching the Global Mining 
Initiative (Citigroup 2006), an ambitious worldwide industry initiative to embrace 
sustainable development that would become the key milestone for this paradigm shift 
in mining (Brigg 2000). Beyond the company’s willingness to be seen as a good 
neighbour, there were some other fundamental drivers for becoming the SD champion 
industry-wide.  Rio Tinto has never been timid in arguing that, in fact, at the heart of 
the SD debate was the financial performance of the industry (for instance, Leggatt 
2002).  Against popular wisdom, few mining companies have consistently achieved 
their cost of capital in recent decades – as a group, in fact, the mining industry had 
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destroyed shareholder value (Humphreys 2000).  For that reason, ‘[…] the Corporate 
Social Responsibility agenda should be about managing risk’.  In essence, ‘[it] is a 
contemporary manifestation of what we used to call ‘enlightened self-interest’ 
(Wilson 2001 p5).  Humphreys also claimed that: 
 
‘Addressing the legitimate interests of a wider range of stakeholders […] has 
little to do with philanthropy and everything to do with competition.  [The way] 
mining companies perform at a local level will be a key factor in determining who 
gets access to the best mining opportunities in the future.  Only those with good 
truck records globally will be able to raise the finance, gain the permits and 
command the public trust that future success in the industry will require’ 
(Humphreys 1996, p23) 
 
In the same line of argument, Wilson claimed that: 
 
The bottom line is to add value by integrating SD concepts and solutions into all 
operations, products and opportunities. If done well, this will fulfil the business 
case of retaining the Group’s licence to operate, improve economic, social and 
environmental performance, achieving reputational capture and differentiating 
the Group from its peers (Robert Wilson, in Leggatt 2002 p13)  
 
Moreover, Rio Tinto currently proclaims to have identified SD as the key to 
unlocking some of the most challenging problems faced by the industry (Clifford 
2005).  For mining, there are conflicts between economic, social and environmental 
objectives which require complex trade-offs between these component aspects of SD.  
In theory, these conflicts should be resolved by national and regional governments, 
although many of them lack the mechanisms and institutions to do so appropriately.  
While companies tend to prefer that a large part of the mining proceeds accruing to 
host governments be directed to communities close to their mining operations, it 
remained the responsibility of host administrations to decide how their revenues 
should be distributed in their own country.  Against this background, SD proposed a 
governance structure that included the community and the industry working together 
at different levels of government (Rio Tinto 2006b, 2007, 2007b).   
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In practical terms, the Group developed a public statement of business practice called 
‘The Way We Work’ (Rio Tinto 2005), which includes overarching company 
principles in the field of SD and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  In line with 
this corporate constitution, the Group set out its key goals for sustainable 
development in 2000 (Rio Tinto 2001), introducing a number of policy guidelines 
with these regards, and requiring all Rio Tinto businesses to:  
 
- Determine what sustainable development means for them, identifying 
implications, risks and opportunities;  
- Engage with those affected by their activities and examine what measures, targets 
and reporting systems are required in each place;  
- Include sustainable development principles in their business plans and decision 
making processes, and  
- Investigate how economic, social, environmental, and governance issues can be 
integrated in their specific contexts. 
 
Rio Tinto’s claim that SD should be seen as a ‘global concept with local meaning’ 
has favoured the adoption of a decentralised management of these issues. While 
general values and responsibilities are developed under an umbrella of corporate 
principles to ensure consistency across the Group, operating responsibilities remain 
by and large the mandate of local management at each business unit. For this reason, 
SD performances are monitored and reported at the local level principally. Rio Tinto 
claims that all its managed businesses have developed locally relevant sustainable 
development metrics, in accordance with specific circumstances and SD related 
priorities, which are identified through permanent consultation with local 
stakeholders (Rio Tinto 2006b, 2007). The company asserts that SD is not one other 
area of competence for management to deal with, but rather a new and structurally 
different way of approaching business throughout, and thus, it has affected the 
businesses horizontally at every operating level. In ensuring the process is spread 
evenly across the Group, each business managed by Rio Tinto has appointed a 
sustainable development champion to coordinate sustainable development policy 
implementation throughout (Rio Tinto 2006b). In short, the concept of SD generally, 
and for Rio Tinto specifically, can only take full dimension when contextualised 
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within the specific circumstances of each mine and region. Thus, the next section 
brings in the Rio Tinto operations that constitute the core of this research.  
 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 
This research is based on case study analysis. Three parallel studies have been 
developed which explore the interface between large mining companies and the local 
and regional economies in which they operate. The case studies are comprised of: a) 
Rössing, in the Erongo Region of Namibia; b) Pilbara Iron, in Western Australia 
(WA), and c) QMM, in Fort-Dauphin, Madagascar. The grounds for which these 
cases have been selected out of more than fifty Rio Tinto businesses worldwide are 
multiple.  First, the choice includes three mines operating within diverse economic, 
demographic and cultural backgrounds; two African countries – one of them, 
Madagascar, with extremely low income levels–, and Australia, a high income nation.  
While all three Rio Tinto businesses currently claim to operate under the umbrella of 
SD, for one reason or another, they face particular challenges with regards to their 
economic impact at the local and regional levels, and these challenges are set to play 
a significant role in the future finances of these operations.  The company’s case for 
addressing issues of economic development appears to be particularly evident here.  
  
Second, all three operations have expected a substantial capital investment boost. 
This would represent an extra stimulus to the communities involved, as part of this 
corporate expenditure will necessarily spill over the regional economies. This brings 
with it a unique opportunity to explore how these companies applied SD principles 
and further development strategies to maximise the effect of this new spending in the 
surrounding economies. Finally, it is noted that the interface between mining and the 
broader economy often assumes strongly different characteristics, according to 
markedly unique stages throughout the life of a mine, which means that the emerging 
threats, challenges and opportunities in terms of promoting economic development 
will expectedly fluctuate significantly. The selected cases coincide with the three 
most distinctive phases in the life of a modern and large scale operation: (a) 
approaching and planning for closure and decommissioning; (b) full operation, 
business consolidation and expansion, and (c) the process of planning, mine design, 
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pre-inception stakeholder negotiations and construction.   
  
In developing these case studies, this research relied on both primary and secondary 
sources of information. As far as possible, the studies have been structured in 
comparable ways, starting by introducing the context to the broader economy, and 
continuing with a detailed analysis of the past, present or projected economic 
contributions of the operations; a thorough look at the local and regional economies 
since the arrival of mining; and a further focus on the interaction between the mines 
and the communities. In all cases, the key SD challenges faced by the operations, as 
well as the strategies proposed to answer them, have been singled out and analysed in 
depth. This discussion has also been illustrated by first hand commentaries from 
relevant individuals from both the operations and local communities. It is noted that 
the QMM analysis slightly distanced from this proposed structure though, as the 
business was not yet in operation at the time the study was conducted. When 
difficulty in obtaining strong quantitative data locally has prompted circumstantial 
departures from this general approach, this has been noted in the text. 
 
Corporate data was provided by various departments in each of the Rio Tinto 
subsidiaries, principally from Finance, but also Tax, Procurement and HR. In several 
occasions, additional information was provided by the Rio Tinto Head Office, in 
particular the Rio Tinto Economics Department. The base year for these analyses is 
2004, although snapshots on other periods have also been used, and these have been 
indicated in each case. In particular, the study on Rössing relied extensively on time 
series analysis to explore the evolution of monetary contributions up to closure, and 
in these cases, the Namibian currency (N$) has been expressed in 2001 terms unless 
otherwise noted. In Pilbara Iron, monetary values were expressed in Australian 
dollars of the day, which have been frequently converted into US dollar equivalent for 
ease of reference. In QMM, estimates of monetary contributions were expressed in 
US dollars of the day, to maintain consistency with the impact evaluation 
methodology used jointly by Rio Tinto and the World Bank. The relevant exchange 
rates and deflators used throughout were provided by the Rio Tinto Economics 
Department. All customary references have been included throughout. 
  
Good quality information on the local economies has in cases been elusive, and thus 
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numerous different sources were consulted. In general, contextual national and 
regional data has been sourced form Central Bureau of Statistics, both in the case of 
Namibia and WA. The main multilateral organisations provided most information on 
Malagasy national figures. Locally, most Town Halls and Shires consulted in the 
Erongo and Pilbara regions have been cooperative, and their contributions 
acknowledged all through the studies. Given the regional significance of mining in 
WA, Input/Output (I/O) analysis was introduced in the case of PI to understand the 
relative importance of different industries and the interactions among different 
economic sectors. This analysis helped determined output, income, value added, and 
employment multipliers, useful to assess the potential degree of diversification in the 
economic base of the Pilbara economy. While the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) produces I/O tables for Australia, they do not produce state or regional tables. 
In 2005, Rio Tinto commissioned the production of I/O tables for Western Australia 
and the Pilbara, based on existing national tables (Acil Tasman 2005). This research 
has built on that work, while all original tables have been included as appendixes. 
Finally, the case study on QMM could be characterised by a strong liaison between 
the company and development organisations, and so it has relied on data from the 
World Bank, USAid, the UN and others to a large extent. In all cases, universities and 
several other knowledge centres were thoroughly consulted. 
 
Feedback from various interviews with company executives, government officials, 
local entrepreneurs or community members was incorporated to complement the 
quantitative data mentioned above. The interviews were conducted in a 
conversational style, and prescriptive questions were avoided. Interviewees were 
encouraged to speak openly about their personal experiences and to give their 
impressions of the companies and the changes they brought to local communities, 
both positive and negative. Hence, these conversations allowed the recording of 
sentiments with regards to the mine, the economy, the community in general – or 
certain sectors within the community in particular36. Date, affiliation, role, and length 
of participation in the communities were also recorded. Most interviews were 
                                                 
36
 The interviews were solicited on the basis of a contribution to an independent research only and, as 
far as possible, the researcher’s identity as a Rio Tinto employee was concealed to avoid conditioning 
responses. This was not always possible though, and a few interviews could only be facilitated through 
Rio Tinto and called for the presence of a Rio Tinto employee (e.g. CEO Municipality of Swakopmund 
etc) 
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conducted in person, while a few follow up discussions took place over the phone. 
Only relevant observations were incorporated, and thus comments from 28 out of a 
total 33 interviews were finally represented in the text. The study in Rössing 
incorporated comments from nine interviews, all conducted between 2004 and 2007. 
In PI, feedback from 8 conversations were included, all taking place in 2005. In 
QMM, interviews were carried out between 2006 and 2008. Notes from 13 
interviewees were incorporated into the study. Most meetings took place at the 
respective sites with the exception of 1 in Johannesburg and 3 in London. All 
commentaries have been clearly referenced in the text. 
  
 
3.3.1 The case studies 
 
The three case studies in this research are written as stand alone pieces. General and 
comparative lessons from these mining operations, a link back to the literature, and 
overall research conclusions, are therefore discussed altogether in chapter 7. 
Following is an introduction to the key features and challenges of each case.    
 
 
3.3.1.1 Planning for closure: Rössing, the Erongo Region, Namibia  
 
The Rössing Uranium mine (RUL) is located near the West coast of Namibia, in the 
Namib Desert.  At the beginning of the new millennium Rössing was the fifth largest 
producer of uranium in the world, contributing 6% of global production – equivalent 
to 2,643 tonnes. The economic impact of Rössing nationally has been very significant 
in the past, and although it has declined substantially since inception, it continued to 
be important. In 2004, the operation accounted for 10% of total exports in the 
country, and its value of production was equivalent to 3% of GDP. At the same time, 
however, negative market conditions placed Rössing at a turning point, at which the 
mine was pressured to decide either to expand the operation until 2016 or 2022, or 
face early closure in 2008 (Rössing 2006).   
 
During 2005, the price of uranium went up considerably driven mainly by significant 
declines in the stocks held by nuclear generators, especially in the US. The Mining 
 110
Journal (2005) has argued that there are currently serious limitations to the expansion 
of uranium supply from existing sources, and since generators’ demand is relatively 
unresponsive to price, it has been expected that high prices will continue in the mid- 
to long-term. This rapid increase in the price of uranium was, however, 
counterbalanced by the steady appreciation of the Rand against the US dollar.  As 
operating costs are nominated in US dollars, an appreciation of the South African 
Rand – the currency to which the Namibian dollar is pegged- has had a negative 
effect on the company’s finances.  Nonetheless, (and partly in an attempt to gain time 
to prepare for closure), towards the end of 2004 the Rio Tinto Board finally decided 
to expand the operation.   
 
In any case, this period of uncertainty about the future of the mine, as well as the 
company’s reactions during this transition, has provided a unique environment to 
study the potential effects of decommissioning Rössing and to estimate its economic 
implications. Moreover, as the decision was made for the mine to expand, the 
company decided to continue with the closure studies underway and to put in place 
programs and projects to tackle these emerging challenges within a newly defined 
target for closure, initially set for 2016. In parallel, the central government reacted to 
the news of a potential shut down of the mine with great concern, and it engaged in 
discussions with the company in an attempt to keep it open. While the effect of 
decommissioning the operation at the regional level was particularly worrying for the 
government, there has been no financial commitment from the central administration 
to support the local economy during the transition. Pressure mounted on the company 
to deal with these challenges directly. 
 
By 2004, Namibia was a middle income country with a GDP per capita of just over 
US$2,000. Income distribution is heavily skewed, however, with a Gini coefficient37 
of 0.7 (UNDP, 2004), and extremely high unemployment and social exclusion. 
Namibia still relies heavily on the primary sector, although it has been diversifying 
towards a less mining-dependent economy since the early 1990s. During this time, the 
services and manufacturing sector, principally meat and fish processing, accelerated 
notably compared to the evolution of mining (at least until the worldwide mining 
                                                 
37
 The Gini coefficient fluctuates from 0 to 1, with 0 being a completely equal distribution of income. A 
Gini coefficient above 0.55 is considered very unequal. 
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boom that started in 2003). Following independence in 1990, the country embarked 
on a process of economic restructuring aimed principally at securing macroeconomic 
stabilisation. As part of this economic plan, Namibia joined the Common Monetary 
Area with South Africa and started a process of economic deregulation, which paid 
off with a downward trend in inflation.   
 
Ever since inception, the company has invested heavily in improving the social 
services, amenities and infrastructure at the local level – defined as both a medium-
size town where most skilled employees currently live, Swakopmund, and a small 
mining town nearby the mine, Arandis. The way in which the operation has done so 
varies significantly; from the contributions directly taking place through its business 
activities – like payments to employees – to the establishment of an independent 
development foundation, the Rössing Foundation, to which the company effectively 
outsourced a large portion of its community investment strategy38.  Rössing has 
impacted the local economy in dissimilar ways, and while the economy of 
Swakopmund has been relatively successful in diversifying, the prospects for Arandis 
have always been closely tied to the mine.  
 
As a costal town 65km from the mine, Swakopmund became well established as a 
holiday destination in the 1940s. A large demand for accommodation developed 
towards the end of the 1960s, mainly as a tourist destination, and another expansion 
took place after the mine’s inception. Although the mine still plays a fundamental role 
in its economy, Swakopmund seems to have slowly diversified into commerce and 
tourism, and to some extent, manufacturing (Rössing Annual Review 2005).  In 
contrast, Arandis was established and developed as a mining town in the mid 1970s, 
and has historically housed semi-skilled and unskilled mine employees. After many 
years of economic duress due to the company cutting down its social programs 
because of negative market conditions the ownership of Arandis town was transferred 
to the Government in 1992, and it was declared an independent town with an elected 
local authority in 1994.  Its population has since been declining steadily (The Rössing 
Foundation website).   
                                                 
38
 In 2001, for instance, total community expenditure by RUL was N$15.8m, 93% of which went to the 
Rössing Foundation. By 2004, RUL’s contributions represent around 1/2 of the Foundation’s financial 
resources.  
 112
  
Closure raises very particular economic issues for host economies. In Namibia, the 
substantial debate around these questions has also pressured the government and civil 
society into considering alternative economic strategies for the day after mining. 
Meanwhile, Rössing has vowed to approach these issues within the framework of 
sustainable development, position that was explicitly reflected in the company’s 
Closure Standard (Rio Tinto 2004). Efforts have concentrated at securing the quick 
diversification of the economy in the areas most sensitive to closure, and a multi-
stakeholder approach has been favoured for dealing with these challenges. 
Community development strategies put in place aimed at empowering the local 
population, for instance, developing entrepreneurial skills, and supporting alternative 
business activity more generally. In addition to understanding the interface between 
Rössing and the local and regional economy, this case study investigated the key 
challenges and options faced by locals, and the management responses that were put 
in place as a result. The study also explored the chances of these strategies 
succeeding. 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Full operation and expansion: Pilbara Iron in Western Australia 
 
Pilbara Iron (PI) is a world-class asset manager that operates and maintains mining, 
rail and export facilities in the Pilbara region, northwest of Western Australia (WA).  
It is, in effect, the largest business unit in Rio Tinto, with a total turnover of US$2.2 
billion in 2004.  The company was established in 2004 to facilitate closer cooperation 
between Hamersley and Robe – two independent Rio Tinto Group iron ore operations 
in the Pilbara region – which have undergone major restructuring and expansion, with 
enormous consequences for the regional economy.  The full enterprise comprises a 
network of ten mines, three shipping terminals, the largest privately owned railway in 
the world, the power supply system, and several mining towns.  In 2004, Pilbara Iron 
handled more than 130 million tonnes of iron ore (Pilbara Iron 2005).   
 
The Pilbara region covers over 500,000 square kilometres and is sparsely populated 
by nearly 40,000 people.  The area comprises the three Shires of Ashburton, 
Roebourne, and East Pilbara, and the Town of Port Hedland.  The major towns of 
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Port and South Hedland, Karratha, Newman, Paraburdoo and Tom Price 
accommodate approximately 70% of the population.  The remainder of the population 
live in smaller towns, in remote pastoral and mining locations, or in Aboriginal 
communities.  The PI towns are located in the Shires of Ashburton and Roebourne 
(Pilbara Iron 2005).  The State government’s vision for the Pilbara towns is that of 
sustainable and independent communities, underpinned by a strong and diversified 
economy (The Pilbara Development Commission 2006), and Pilbara Iron have 
publicly adhered to this vision. With a gross turnover of US$2.2b there is no doubt 
that Pilbara Iron is an exceptional contributor to the economies of both the Pilbara 
and the State of WA.   
 
However, a key criticism of mining put forward, for instance, by the World Bank 
Extractive Industries Review (WBEIR 2003) was that few benefits accrue at the local 
level. This same criticism has been frequently levelled at Pilbara Iron. The Pilbara 
community exhibit strong signs of social compartmentalisation. Three communities 
coexist with minimum interaction. At the top in socio-economic terms are the mine 
workers employed by Pilbara Iron.  Mine workers tend to be better paid and housed 
than those employed either by government or by PI suppliers and other businesses.  
At the bottom is the Indigenous community. This compartmentalisation has worked 
against diversifying the regional economy and appeared to be responsible for 
notorious social tensions locally (URS 2005).   
 
The Pilbara Towns were established under various State Agreement Acts during the 
1960s and early 1970s. When Hamersley Iron and Robe initially built the towns, the 
companies had full control and responsibility over all aspects of town management, 
maintenance and development, and were thus classified as ‘closed’ towns. During the 
1980s, a process of so-called ‘normalisation’ commenced during which State and 
Local Government authorities started to assume responsibility for standard functions 
in each community. This has proved to be a gradual and irregular process though. 
Quite distinctive geographical, political and socio economic conditions in the Pilbara 
explain the enormous difficulties faced by these towns along this process, including: 
 
1. The gross regional product per capita (A$114,625) is much higher than Perth 
(A$34,593), the State capital, though little value remains in the region (Taylor 
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and Scambary 2005);  
2. 97 % of the region is classified as very remote.  The large distances between 
communities reduce the possibilities of a regional approach to infrastructure 
provision.  This also allows monopoly pricing by some suppliers, hence 
increasing infrastructure management costs (Piper 2005); 
3. Overall prices for goods are 11.3 % higher than in Perth and median housing 
prices are far higher than the WA average (URS 2005); 
4. The non-Aboriginal population has been in decline since its peak in the mid-
1980s.  Although there has recently been an important inflow of people into 
the Pilbara, this has been primarily linked to a construction boom and thus not 
assumed to be a lasting trend (Taylor and Scambary 2005).    
5. The proportion of the Indigenous population is increasing (from 12 per cent in 
1991 to 15 per cent in 2001), largely as a result of the total population 
declining (Taylor and Scambary 2005); 
6. There is a lower average unemployment rate (4.3 %) compared with the 
regional average (6.2 %) and that of Perth (6.6 %), thought this is because 
unemployed people do not remain in the Pilbara.  Indigenous unemployment 
is appreciably higher (Taylor and Scambary 2005); 
7. Recruitment and retention of qualified staff, both by the mining industry and 
other activities, is increasingly difficult (CMEWA 2005); 
8. A declining population results in serious challenges in maintaining a 
consistent ratepayer base in the Shires; 
9. Township infrastructure is aged, and in many cases has exceeded its design 
life – high levels of capital investment would be required to refurbish present 
infrastructure inventories (Piper 2005);  
 
The history and present status of normalisation across the towns varies considerably. 
Together with broad company and local authorities’ initiatives to progress 
normalisation in some towns, there have been some demographic and structural 
changes which have, in some cases, resulted in increased levels of private home 
ownership and the development of more diverse communities.  This is particularly 
evident in coastal towns (Piper 2005).  However, unresolved normalisation processes 
with mining companies result in a situation where all stakeholders are limited in their 
ability to implement effective long-term planning.  Some commentators have argued 
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that, so far, normalisation has been mainly seen as a financial process involving 
companies handing over assets, and the means for their maintenance, to the Shires.   
 
Looking forward, given the demographic and revenues baseline of most of these 
towns, it is challenging to envisage the emergence of sustainable and independent 
communities underpinned by a strong and diversified economy, as proclaimed by the 
government (Pilbara Development Commission 2005, 2006) any time soon. Within 
this context, how has a commitment to sustainable development by this expanding 
business impacted on the towns and communities? On the one hand, this case study 
focussed on the monetary flows and overall economic contributions from the 
company’s business activities to the broader economy. On the other hand, it explored 
the impact of these contributions on local and regional communities, and looked at 
how the broader economy has coped with such stimulus up until now. The study also 
analysed the regional linkages between mining and the rest of the economy, and 
assessed the degree of diversification possible in these types of economies.  
 
 
3. 3.1.3 The mine of the future: the QMM project, Fort-Dauphin, Madagascar 
 
Since the mining industry’s embracing of the concept of sustainable development in 
the late 1990s, most efforts and initiatives by the industry in this regard have been 
applied to existing operations, or brown-field developments. For the most part, 
companies tried to implement new operating systems and processes to reflect their 
commitment to this new approach. In contrast, QMM is among the first projects of its 
kind that has been fully designed and brought about as a pure example of the 
sustainable development model in the extractive industries. As such, the enterprise 
was proposed not just as a mining operation but as a catalyser of broader regional 
development. While some have argued that this repositioning of the project was to 
some extent a corporate response to enable a commercially challenging project, the 
new approach has had an undeniable impact on the way in which the enterprise was 
to be structured, the dynamics around the key stakeholders involved, and also the way 
in which it was to impact the economy in the long run. The project started production 
as this research was coming to a conclusion, and so its ultimate effect on the region 
remains undetermined. The focus of this study is therefore on the process leading to 
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the inception of QMM, its approval by Rio Tinto, stakeholder negotiations and the 
construction stage.   
 
The QMM mine is located near Fort-Dauphin, in the Anosy region, southeast of 
Madagascar. A general background to this region is critical for understanding the 
distinctive features of this mineral development. Anosy has one of the most deprived 
economies in the world, yet it is endowed with a number of comparative advantages 
that have suggested to many development practitioners the existence of significant 
latent potential for rapid growth. Some of its key socioeconomic characteristics are 
introduced below (mostly from World Markets Research Centre 2005): 
 
1. In 2004, the regional per capita GDP, or GRP, was estimated at $180 by 
inhabitant whereas the national average was about $210 per capita; 
2. The self subsistence economy predominates in the Anosy Region; while the 
region has favourable climatic conditions, the product output per unit remains 
very low mainly because of low productivity;  
3. Fishing activities spread out over 194 km of coastline but remain limited to 
the export of relatively small quantities of lobsters and shrimps. There is 
potential for industrial exploitation of tuna and sardines though these have 
been destined exclusively to local consumption so far; 
4. The Anosy Region has enjoyed a remarkable engagement of local associations 
and NGOs, often gathering hundreds of members and activists, including bi- 
and multi-lateral partners including USAid, PAM, Médecins Sans Frontières, 
Aide et Action, and many more. As positive outcome of this engagement, 
since 2004 the region has seen the average rate of schooling increasing to a 
promising 76%; 
5. Yet, the socio-sanitation infrastructure of the area is still highly deficient and 
80% of the population does not have direct access to drinking water; 16% of 
the population suffer from serious respiratory diseases; literacy stands at less 
than 20%; 
6. Only 50% of roads are passable, with the rest either closed down during the 9 
months of the rainy season or simply inaccessible all year round.  Six ships 
wrecks litter the coastal landscape as a reminder of the need for a proper 
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harbour. As a result, the level of trade and movement of goods and people 
remains precarious.    
7. With regards to the environment, the Anosy region used to have vast wooded 
areas as well as waterfalls, extensive lakes, and geothermal sources. However, 
65% of the watershed slopes are today highly degraded. The practice of brush 
fires has also caused sediment deposition in lakes as well as in parts of rice 
plantations, river mouths and some lobsters and shrimps nesting grounds  
 
On the company side, QMM is an industrial mineral (ilmenite) project managed and 
controlled by Rio Tinto, although the government of Madagascar has a 20% stake in 
the business.  Rio Tinto’s technical evaluations indicated the potential for a high 
grade, long-life and relatively low-cost operation. However, the company identified 
the extremely precarious condition of the existing infrastructure in the region as one 
of the key challenges faced by the project.  In particular, the business depended on the 
construction of a deep-water port in the vicinities of the mine.  The cost of the port 
was estimated at US$140 million.  The impact of this upfront disbursement on NPV 
jeopardized the economics of the project. In addition, as the project evolved, it also 
became apparent that this lack of infrastructure constituted a restriction for economic 
development more broadly. Gradually, then, the following rational started to 
consolidate: if the proposed mining port could be turned into a multipurpose facility, 
it would be reasonable to seek financial contributions from the economic agents 
expecting extensive appropriation of the positive externalities that would arise from 
this investment. 
 
These circumstances paved the way for a strategic alliance between QMM and the 
World Bank and other development partners. The Bank would enable the project by 
contributing towards the financing of the port as long as the project demonstrated 
strong potential for broader economic benefits.  The viability of this project was, as a 
consequence, associated to its capacity to ensure it will deliver regional economic 
development in addition to the expected financial returns. This constituted a clear 
business case for engaging in areas of accountability that have been up until this point 
beyond Rio Tinto’s direct business activities. As part of this engagement, the 
company supported the establishment of an innovative and participatory institutional 
architecture with the mandate to lead an ambitious economic development process in 
 118
the region, in which mining was meant to play only a complementary role. Based on 
these efforts, the World Bank made a decision to underpin this development. On its 
part, in late 2005, Rio Tinto announced the approval of the QMM project, thus 
committing to the largest foreign direct investment the country had ever received up 
to that point. This final case study explored this process in detail. 
 
 
3.4. Summary and final remarks 
 
 The beginning of this chapter argued that an increasing demand for minerals and 
metals worldwide has accelerated exploration efforts by mining companies in 
developing countries, with the expectation that the discovery of high quality, large 
mineral deposits will offset the negative impact on the economics of projects resulting 
from riskier investments (Citigroup 2006). A new tier of producer countries are also 
expected to be those sustaining demand growth in the years to come (including China, 
India, Brazil and Russia), a role most typically attributed to the US, Japan and Europe 
in the past (Humphreys 2003). Meanwhile, attracted by the prospects of high mineral 
revenues, many of these potential mining countries started to rewrite their mining 
codes (Otto 2002).  This new geographical pattern will affect Rio Tinto particularly: 
considering its current portfolio, the challenges emerging from these changes may be 
larger for the Anglo-Australian mineral producer than for most of its key competitors.  
Expectedly, these circumstances will put pressure on the company to revisit the 
established methodologies for evaluating business investments in the developing 
world, as well as to readdress issues of economic development more widely.     
 
While it has been an unequivocal reference for the mining industry, Rio Tinto had 
long been blamed for overlooking its impact on the surrounding environment, 
particularly in the developing world. This reputation started to change most notably in 
the last decade, when the company became the visible champion of SD in mining, and 
placed itself at the forefront of the Global Mining Initiative (Citigroup 2006) – 
through which the industry claimed to have shifted towards more sustainable means 
of mineral production (MMSD 2002). Although there has been a noticeable swing 
from the ecological to the economic implications of mining at the regional level, the 
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latter have been somewhat less articulated than the former (for instance, Humphreys 
1996). This is, to a large extent, because an important part of the regional economic 
development agenda has typically fallen outside of the industry’s direct mandate. In 
this sense, Rio Tinto has claimed that SD should be seen as a whole new way of 
approaching mineral production, whereby a deep reshuffling of the previous 
allocation of responsibilities now favours a strong collaboration between companies, 
local governments and civil society. 
 
A decade has now passed since this plea was launched by Rio Tinto – and embraced 
by the biggest players in the industry. Attention should now be focussed on whether 
the fundamentals that prompted the emergence of this movement have been 
successfully addressed, and to explore whether this agenda has overcome the 
problems identified in the previous model of mineral development in terms of the 
opportunities for local supply-chain growth, the local labour force, the reinvestment 
of mineral revenues locally, and the communities’ ability to respond to the changes 
brought in by mining more generally (Radetzky 1994, Stongman 1998).  In essence, a 
new set of questions are starting to ask what is today the economic effect of a large 
mining company at the local and regional level, and whether a large-scale mine can 
catalyse economic development more broadly.  Most of the specialised literature, 
however, points to the futility of one-size-fits-all approaches, and asserts, for 
instance, that the impact of producing and transporting low-value-per-tonne industrial 
minerals is not comparable to that of precious metals; that a mining operation in 
North America is not equal to one in Southern Africa; and that the effect of a mine in 
a semi-urban district is hardly similar to that in an isolated location (McMahoney 
2001, MMSD 2002). Thus, in addressing all these questions, this research attempted 
to identify and examine both communalities and specificities arising from three cases 
at dissimilar stages in the life of a mine, in a variety of geographical and economic 
contexts.  
 
In the first study, Rössing was confronted with the threat of closure. This provided a 
unique basis for studying the handing over of company-built infrastructure to 
communities, the possibilities of weaning off economic dependency on mining, and 
diversifying the economy. It also provided a chance to look in detail at the 
distribution of mineral rent, including a geographical examination of capital flows 
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throughout the years. Second, PI offered an opportunity to look into one of the largest 
mineral developments in the world. Key questions revolved around the financial and 
social sustainability of local communities due to low population and a declining 
revenue base. The expansion of mining is likely to put pressure on infrastructure and 
aggravate social conflict, principally evidenced within Aboriginal communities. 
Looking into the dynamics of the economy of WA contributed to understanding the 
scope for downstream beneficiation in this type of environment. Finally, the study of 
QMM explored a new and holistic way of conceptualising mineral developments, 
where regional planning is at the core of the design process. As opposed to the 
previous models, the distribution of mineral rent appeared to have been addressed 
upfront and in a participatory fashion. This also allowed for documenting the building 
up of new structures of regional economic governance. On the other hand, the project 
risked altering the population structure dramatically, and increasing the menace of 
epidemics, famines and social unrest.  
 
This analysis started by exploring the key current theoretical views on economic 
growth and regional and local development, to then focus on how some of these 
concepts applied to mining throughout history, including the more recent adoption of 
SD by the industry. The current chapter introduced Rio Tinto and investigated, at a 
high level, how the company shifted from a paternalistic approach towards 
communities to what it has been referred to as a bottom-up, region-specific, long-term 
and plural-actor based approach. The rest of this research dug into the specifics of this 
shift. In particular, it sought to answer questions of regional economic governance 
and institutional frameworks; local revenue management; public/private engagement 
in development policy-making; the availability and constraints of development capital 
at the regional level, or the development opportunities for small and medium 
enterprises in remote communities, to name just a few. While the microeconomic 
literature has been increasingly looking into these factors, it has rarely done so in the 
context of regional mining economies. In this regard, the industry’s embrace of SD 
offered an opportunity for considering them vis-à-vis the effects of large mining 
enterprises. The next chapter introduces the case study on RUL, while chapters 5 and 
6 cover the studies on PI and QMM, respectively. As mentioned already, chapter 7 
compares the key messages arising from each of these studies, links them back to the 
literature, and discusses the main lessons from this work.  
 121
References 
 
 
Allsop D. (1995) ‘Investment and the Moral Maze’, Review, Rio Tinto, 33, p16-19 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001), various Input/Output Tables  
 
Begg D., Fisher S. and Dornbush R. (2000) ‘Economics’, Mc Graw Hill, England 
 
Brigg P. (2000) ‘United for a Sustainable Futures’, Review, Rio Tinto, 56, p3-5 
 
Burke T. (1998) ‘Mining Manifesto’, Review, Rio Tinto, 45, p3-5 
 
CMEWA - The Chamber of Minerals & Energy of Western Australia (2005) ‘Fly In / Fly Out: A 
Sustainable Perspective’, Perth, Western Australia 
 
Citigroup (2006) ‘Towards Sustainable Mining: Riding with Cowboys, or Hanging with the Sheriff?’, 
Citigroup Investment Research  
 
Clifford (2004) ‘Madagascar titanium dioxide project approved’ Rio Tinto Press Release, 3 Aug 2005 
 
Clifford L. (2005) ‘Social Responsibility of the Resources Sector’, Paper for Presentation to the 
Resources an Energy Law Association, August 25, Sydney, Australia 
 
Comite Régional pour le Développement de l’Anosy (2001) ‘Schéma de Développement Régional 
(SDR de l’Anosy – rapport phase 1 -5’  
 
Crowson P. (1998) ‘Inside Mining; the Economics of the Supply and Demand of Minerals and Metals’, 
Mining Journal Books Ltd, London 
 
De Grauwe P. and Camerman F. (2002) ‘How big are the Big Multinational Companies?’ 
www.202.pair.com/sterckx/publicatie.php3?pub=globalisering/multinationals.htm 
 
Di Boscio N. and Humphreys D. (2004) ‘Mining and Regional Economic Development’, in Bastida E., 
Walde T. and Warden Fernandez J. (eds.), International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: 
Trends and Prospects, Kluwer Law  
 
Di Boscio N. (2004) ‘Taking the Lead: Mining and the Challenge of Economic Development’, Paper 
Presented to the International Mining Seminar: ‘Global Investment, Local Challenges’, University of 
Dundee, Dundee 7-10 June 2004 
 
Godfrey D. (1995) ‘Squandaid’, Review, Rio Tinto, 34, p21-23 
 
Harvey B. and Bereton D. (2005) ‘Emerging Models of Community Engagement in the Australian 
Minerals Industry’, Paper for presentation to the UN Conference on Engaging Communities, Brisbane, 
Australia, August 2005 
 
Humphreys D. (1996) ‘The Broadening Challenges’, Review, Rio Tinto, 40, p21-23 
 
Humphreys D. (2000) ‘Sustainable Development: Can the Mining Industry Afford it?’, paper for 
presentation to the Northwest Mining Association’s 106th Annual Meeting, ‘Wind of Change’, Dec 
2000, Washington, USA  
 
Humphreys D. (2001) ‘The Role of China in the World Mining Industry’, Paper presented to the China 
Mining 2001 Conference, ‘Improving the Investment Climate and Sustainability of Mining in China’, 
Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, 20-22 September 2001 
 
Humphreys D. (2003) ‘The Relocation of Global Industrial Production: What it Means for Mining’, 
Paper presented to CSFB Metals and Minerals Commodity Conference, London, May. 
 
 122
ICMM (2003) ‘Striking a Better Balance: The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review. 
Comments from the international Council of Mining and Metals’  
 
Kunanayagam R. (2003) ‘Foundations, Funds and Trusts: Issues, Concerns and a Way Forward’, 
Working Paper, Rio Tinto 
 
Krugman P. (1995) ‘Desarrollo, Geografia y Teoria Economica’, Spanish version 1997, Antoni Bosch, 
Barcelona. 
 
Leggatt H. (2002) ‘Signs of the Times’, Review, Rio Tinto, 62, p11-13 
 
McMahon G. and Remy F. eds. (2002) ‘Large Mines and the Community’, International Development 
Research Centre and the World Bank 
 
MMSD (2002) ‘Breaking New Ground: Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development’, by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the World Business Partnership 
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Earthcan Publications, London and Sterling, VA 
 
Otto J. (2002) ‘The Regulation of Mineral Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Economics, Law and 
Policy’, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 
 
Pettifer J. (1998) ‘The Age of Post-Paternalism’, Review, Rio Tinto, 47, p3-6 
 
Pilbara Development Commission (2006) www.pdc.wa.gov.au, last visited November 2006 
 
Pilbara Iron (2005) ‘Pilbara Iron Annual Review 2004’, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/reports/SEReports/2004-02.aspx 
 
Piper R. (2004) ‘Towns Review Project – Pilbara Iron Towns: Past, Present and Future’, Working 
Document, Pilbara Iron 
 
Prebisch R. (1950) ‘The Economic Development of Latin America’, New York, UN 
 
Radetzki M. (1994) ‘Mineral Exploitation – Regional Development in a Historical Perspective’, Raw 
Materials Report, Vol 10 No 1 
 
Rio Tinto (2001) ‘Rio Tinto 2000 Social and Environmental Review’, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/reports/, 
 
Rio Tinto (2004) ‘Rio Tinto Closure Standards’, Rio Tinto, London, UK 
 
Rio Tinto (2005) ‘The Way We Work’, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/microsites/SocEnv2004/intro/200_twww.htm 
 
Rio Tinto (2005b) ‘Rio Tinto 2004 Annual Review’, http://www.riotinto.com 
 
Rio Tinto (2005c) ‘Rio Tinto 2004 Sustainable Development Review’, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/reports/, 
 
Rio Tinto (2006) ‘Rio Tinto 2005 Annual Review’, http://www.riotinto.com 
 
Rio Tinto (2006b) ‘Rio Tinto 2005 Sustainable Development Review’, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/reports/, 
 
Rio Tinto (2007) ‘Rio Tinto Community Policies’, Rio Tinto, London, UK 
 
Rio Tinto (2007b) ‘Rio Tinto Community Standards’, Rio Tinto, London, UK 
 
Rio Tinto Sustainable Development website, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/microsites/SocEnv2004/susdev/100_pol.htm, visited in 2005, 2006, 
 123
2007 
 
Rössing (2005), Annual Review 2004, http://www.riotinto.com/library/reports/SEReports/2004-
02.aspx 
 
Tanzer M. (1984) ‘Stealing the Third World's Non-renewable Resources: Lessons from Brazil’, 
Monthly Review, April,   
 
Taylor J. and Scambary B. (2005), ‘The Relative Socioeconomic Status of Indigenous People in the 
Pilbara’, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR), The Australian National 
University, Canberra 
 
The Guardian (2001) London, May-9 
 
The Guardian (2002) London, May-8 
 
The Mining Journal, various issues 2004, Mining Communications Ltd 
 
The Mining Journal, various issues 2005, Mining Communications Ltd 
 
The Pilbara Development Commission, www.pdc.wa.gov.au, visited January 2005 
 
The Rössing Foundation, http://www.rf.org.na/, visited January 2005 
 
Thomson Financial DataStream, http://www.thomson.com/financial/financial.jsp, visited in 2005  
 
(UKNA)United Kingdom National Accounts (2001), ‘The Blue Book 2001’, The Stationary Office, 
Great Britain 
 
UN (2000), ‘National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables, 1996/1997’, Part I 
and II. United Nations Publications, New York 
 
UNDSD website, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/index.html, visited January 2005 
 
UNDP (2004), ‘Human Development Indicators’, United Nations Publications, New York 
 
UNEP (1991) ‘Agenda 21’, UN, United Nations Publications, New York 
 
UNGC website, www.unglobalcompact.org, visited January 2005 
 
URS (2005) ‘Socio Economic Study of Community Relations in Pilbara Iron Towns’, Working Draft, 
February 2005 
 
WBEIR (2003) ‘Striking a Better Balance: The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review’, 
Available at http://www.icmm.com/ 
 
Wilson R. (2001) ‘The Global Mining Initiative’, Paper for Presentation to the Global Metals and 
Mining Conference, ‘Sustainability in the 21st Century’, June 14, Toronto, Canada 
 
World Markets Research Centre, http://www.wmrc.com/, visited in January 2005 
 
World Bank (2002) ‘World Bank Development Indicators’, The World Bank Group, Washington, 
USA 
 
World Bank (2004) ‘Pôles Intègres de Croissance’, Internal Report on the World Bank Appraisal 
Mission to Madagascar (December), The World Bank Group, Washington  
 
 
 124
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 Planning for closure: the economic legacy of Rössing  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125
4.1. SD and the challenges of closure 
 
The mine that is the subject of this study, Rössing Uranium Limited (or RUL), is 
located in the Erongo region, Namibia. Regionalism, however, is a relatively new 
concept for Namibia, which was split into regions only after independence only two 
decades ago, and as such, its regional administrative capacity is still in formation 
(MRLGH 1997, 1998). The study will therefore focus on the local level, defined here 
as the towns of Swakopmund and Arandis.  Since the mine’s inception, the company 
has invested heavily in improving the social services, amenities and infrastructure of 
both municipalities, which is where the vast majority of employees reside (Figure 
4.1). Swakopmund was originally built as a tourist destination and has since been 
expanding steadily, although often linked to the ups and downs of mine production. 
Arandis, 5 km from the mine, was built instead as a traditional industrial town along 
with the development of the mine. In 1990, however, Rössing had to trim down its 
community programmes in the town due to negative market conditions; in 1992 the 
ownership of Arandis was transferred to the Government, and in 1994 it was declared 
an independent town with an elected local authority.  
 
Years of financial duress left Rössing at a turning point in 2004, when the company 
had to decide either to expand the operation or face early closure in 2008. As the 
company started to consider the prospects of closure, this soon triggered serious 
concerns that such an event could have quite dramatic implications for the 
communities (Rössing undated, SIAPAC 2004). Closure poses fundamental economic 
challenges, including the effects of a drastic cessation of significant financial flows 
into an economy, the often consequential inability of local and regional 
administrations to generate sufficient revenues as to cover the cost of running their 
jurisdictions, or constrains in the human capital necessary to sustain alternative 
economic activities, to name just a few (Kahn et al 2001). Would the economies of 
Swakopmund and Arandis be able to sail through the storm of closure safely? How 
prepared was the company to take on these challenges at a time of financial 
difficulties, and, in any case, would it be able to secure a smooth transition towards 
economic sustainability? 
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A key challenge faced by the SD model in mineral rich economies consists of how to 
apply the concept of sustainability to an economic activity that appears to be 
intrinsically unsustainable; sooner or later exploited mineral bodies deplete, at which 
point mining companies will pack up and leave (Humphreys 2000). From an 
economic point of view, the argument brought forth by the SD movement is that the 
focus of this dilemma should not be on the cessation of the income flowing into the 
economy but on the utilisation of the mineral wealth during the life of the mine, to 
ensure that, at closure, these flows of capital had been successfully transformed into 
other forms of capital to allow the consolidation of long lasting sources of income 
(for instance, Davis 2000; Humphreys 2000, 2000b). This view of sustainability 
considers that the economic benefits created by mining can be sustained in time 
through proper investment, creating wealth after a mine has gone. Good economic 
management should thus help convert finite mineral resources into long lasting 
sources of human well-being. Assessing the economic legacy of a mine, – as is the 
aim of this study -, should thus look at the accumulation of economic impacts since 
inception, but also at the changes and adjustment undergone by the impacted 
economy during this time.   
 
Figure 4.1 – Map of Namibia and the Erongo region 
Source: RUL 
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From early on Rössing pledged to address all issues related to the decommissioning 
of the mine within the framework of sustainability, in line with Rio Tinto’s stance on 
sustainable development39 (see chapter 3 for more on this).  Numerous studies were 
conducted at this stage in an attempt to understand the key implications of closure in 
this specific context. A fundamental question was how to implement a transition 
strategy in the few years available before closure, initially scheduled for 2008. 
Another key dilemma referred to whether the company should attempt to tackle 
questions of long term economic governance or, for instance, issues related to 
financial town management, which have been typically beyond the company’s 
mandate and area of accountability. Chapter 2 explained how some mining companies 
have tried to circumvent this conflict by decentralising their community initiatives 
into independent institutions like foundations, special funds or trusts. (Kunanayagam 
2003, Yakovleva et al 2004). Established in 1978, the Rössing Foundation (RF) was 
an early example of this in Africa. More recently, indeed, the Foundation was charged 
with the task of dealing with the key economic risks emerging from this transition.  
 
As anticipated in chapter 3, towards the end of 2004 RUL escaped closure and 
embarked instead on an ambitious expansion program. While decommission was then 
postponed, the serious considerations given to this matter left a deep mark in most 
stakeholders involved in this process, and encouraged the definition of the carefully 
articulated closure strategy currently embraced by the company. There was a general 
consensus that the challenges posed by a transition to a diversified and sustainable 
economy would require financial resources, but perhaps more importantly, time. 
Rössing’s doors will now remain open at least until 2016. The process undergone has 
provided a unique opportunity to study the risks, threats and opportunities that closing 
a big mine can pose on the surrounding economy. In starting to explore this, the rest 
of this section briefly reviews the chief characteristics and trends of the broader 
economy. Given the relative size of the Namibian economy – and considering the 
embryonic stage of the regional institutions (MRLGH 1997 1998) -, this contextual 
overview is held at the national level. 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Rio Tinto was starting to prepare the Rio Tinto Closure Standards, in accordance with the company’s 
SD approach, at the time in which Rössing began to evaluate the possibility of closing down, in 2003 
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4.1.1 Mining and the Namibian economy 
 
The Namibian economy has gone through a period of macroeconomic stabilisation 
following independence in 1990. A characteristic feature of this period was the 
membership of the Common Monetary Area (jointly with South Africa) followed by a 
downward trend in inflation and economic deregulation, which assured important 
inflows of FDI and the expansion of the business sector, in particular services 
(finance and telecommunications). Namibia is considered a mid-income level country 
(US$2,300 per capita in 2004), though its level of wealth distribution is regarded as 
highly skewed, with a Gini coefficient40 of 0.7. It still has very high levels of 
structural unemployment (above 30% in 2004) and social exclusion, with more than 
55% of the population living on less than US$2/day41 (World Bank 2006). The 
productive capacity of the economy is based mainly on the primary sector, principally 
mining, fishing and agriculture. While Namibian products currently experience good 
demand in their export markets, the country’s dependence on primary exports has 
made it vulnerable to world market fluctuations. The primary sector contribution to 
GDP is still near 25%, although it has been declining steadily over the last two 
decades. 
  
Namibia is a relatively small economy with a GDP of US$5.5 billion (2004). The 
primary sector is still dominated by mining, though the uranium industry in particular 
(RUL, effectively) has declined consistently, both in relative and absolute terms, 
following a dramatic price decline in the global market in the early 1990s. The fishing 
sector has evolved firmly in the post independence years, outdoing the uranium sector 
in terms of contribution to GDP. This was mainly due to improved oceanic 
conditions, which allowed for increased total catches, but also to better policies42 and 
sector restructuring. Local analysts believe, however, that the sector volume is 
currently at its limit (Batty et al 2005). Agriculture production is too narrow for 
commercial purposes, though still provides a means of subsistence for 70% of the 
population. 
                                                 
40
 Gini coefficient is a widely used measure of income distribution, which can fluctuate from 0 to 1, 
with 0 being a perfectly equal distribution of income. A Gini coefficient above 0.55 is considered very 
unequal. 
41
 1993 survey 
42
 The natural stock was systematically over fished prior independence by foreign ship-factories.  
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Figure 4.2 – Primary sector contribution to GDP 
Source: National Accounts, Central Bureau of Statistics, Namibia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The output composition of mining has changed quite dramatically. In 1987 uranium 
production accounted for 15% of GDP and more than 3/4 of the total mining 
production value; by the end of the millennium it represented around 2.5% of GDP 
and less than 1/4% of the sector. The share lost in uranium was gained in the diamond 
industry. The declining proportion of mining to GDP could be seen as a sign of 
economic diversification, a trend that is common to South Africa.  While mining 
contributions to GDP in South Africa, (Namibian key trading partner), stabilised at 
around 6%, mining in Namibia still represents well above 10% of the country’s 
economy (Chamber of Mines of Namibia 2006). Likewise, exports in Namibia have 
been largely dominated by primary commodities, particularly minerals. There has 
been a decline in this trend over the last years, however. In 1985 exports from the 
mining sector represented almost 80% of the total; it is currently around 50%. 
Uranium exports in particular declined from 26% to 10% of total exports in 1985 and 
2000 respectively. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Namibian exports 
 Source: Chamber of Mines of Namibia 
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The manufacturing sector has been growing steadily in the last two decades. It still 
relies to a large extent on the processing of primary products, principally meat and 
fish, and on the production of beverages and food (Figure 4.2). The very narrow 
domestic market has often been blamed as a key limitation43 to the expansion of the 
sector (NEPRU 1999b, 2000). Although government services remain the largest 
contributor to GDP, its share dropped towards the end of the 1990s while provision of 
services by other sectors increased. Following international trends frequently 
associated with globalisation, the financial services have increased notably in 
Namibia. One of the most critical issues for the financial system, however, is still the 
lack of supply of investment finance for the productive sector. The credit allocation is 
biased towards consumption rather than productive investment44 (IMF 2002, Shiimi 
2002). Tourism has grown extensively over the last decade, accounting for 6% of 
GDP, and was responsible for 11% of all exchange earnings in the economy in 2004.  
 
Summarising, Namibia still relies heavily on the primary sector, although it has made 
good progress in changing its economic structure towards a less mining-dependent 
economy since the early 1990s. In effect, in the decade leading to the global mineral 
boom that started in the early 2000s, the mining sector grew at a lower pace than 
services and manufacturing. Yet, manufacturing expansion has mainly concentrated 
on the processing of primary products and has not diversified into other industries. 
Equally, services expanded in the government sector and tourism, but minimally in 
the area of services-to-businesses. Local and international economists have 
repetitively argued that a further stretch of the financial sector would be highly 
desirable (NEPRU 1999b, 2000, IMF 2002)  
 
Within this context, RUL has always been a mayor contributor to this relatively small 
economy. Although this contribution has been declining steadily since the mine’s 
early days, as Rössing faced the prospect of early closure its annual turnover was still 
equivalent to 3% of the Namibian economy – directly adding nearly1.4% of GDP. 
                                                 
43
 Population in Namibia was estimated in 2,000,000 in 2004, with an income per capita of around 
US$2,300 
44
 The African Department of the IMF sites the lack of competition in the banking sector as the main 
reason for this.   
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Nevertheless, (and perhaps not surprisingly), closure deliberations rapidly shifted the 
attention to the vicinities of the mine, as it was broadly feared that it is at this 
geographical level that the worst economic legacy of closure would be felt. The rest 
of this paper is organised as follows: based principally on company’s records, the 
next section focuses on the type (and size) of the economic stimulus generated by the 
mine since inception, and section three explores the characteristics of the local 
economy and, particularly, its interface with the mine. Section four attempts to 
disentangle and quantify the main challenges posed by RUL’s closure threat. Section 
five consolidates a considerable amount of information introduced up to this point, 
and looks in particular at the key issues around Aradis. The last section presents final 
reflections on this case study. 
 
The methodology for this research was already discussed in chapter 3. For 
consistency with the other case studies, the base year for this analysis is 2004.  In the 
company time-series below, the Namibian currency (N$) of the day has been 
expressed in 2001 terms, unless otherwise specified. For local info, the last census at 
the time of writing had taken place in 2001, and therefore several other sources of 
data have been used to fill in the gaps, which have been in all cases explicitly 
referenced. Direct insights from nine interviewees were included towards the end of 
the analysis to illustrate conclusions. All interviews were conducted between 2004 
and 2007, either face-to-face in the Erongo region or by phone. Interviewees included 
senior and mid range mine employees, public servants, business persons and 
residents. Finally, all the analyses introduced here are the author’s original 
investigations unless otherwise noted.   
 
 
 4.2. The economic contributions from RUL 
 
In contrast to the era of commercial inventory accumulation of uranium between 1970 
and 1984, when primary production capacity exceeded the requirements of actual 
plants but still continued to expand in line with expectations of a rapid growth in 
nuclear power, the period from 1985 to 2003 was characterised by inventory 
liquidation, driven by a drastic change in the global perception of nuclear energy, and 
exacerbated by oversupply of Russian enriched uranium from decommissioned 
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nuclear weapons and uranium stocks more broadly (Mining Journal 2004). This 
scenario has been the context under which Rössing operated for most of its active life, 
which pushed it into a status of permanent cost-cutting and rationalisation that helps 
to explain the increasing pressure for early closure. More recently, the decline in 
inventories held by power utilities and a worldwide surge in demand shifted the 
previous market to one increasingly production-driven, which allowed Rössing to 
escape decommissioning. The uranium long-term price assumptions made the 
unexpected U turn towards the end of 2004; from the low of US$7/pound in 2001, 
spot prices have rocketed to more than $45/pound (Mining Journal 2006), with long 
term prices settling at approximately US$23/pound (2007) 
  
Figure 4.4 shows RUL’s total contribution to the economy, measured as gross 
turnover at constant prices (2001). Together with prices, the company’s contribution 
declined pronouncedly during the beginning of the 1990s, then stabilised and slightly 
recovered over the following decade. Towards the end of the time-series in the figure 
below, the company had already started to actively plan for closure.  
 
Figure 4.4 – RUL’s contribution to the economy over time (N$ of 2001) 
Source: RUL – Financial Division 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The economic composition of RUL’s activities had remained roughly unchanged for 
at least a decade. Figure 4.5 displays a detailed analysis of these contributions for the 
year 2001, as an illustration. In that year, RUL’s economic contribution was nearly 
N$1b (US$135m)45, 68% in the form of value added and the balance in payments to 
                                                 
45
 Exchange rate as per Dec 2003 US$1 = N$7.4 
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wages & salaries 14%
taxes & 
royalties 
20%
interests 1%
dividends 8%
reinvested in 
the business 
25%
payments to 
suppliers 
32%
suppliers46. The category ‘reinvested in the business’ entails earnings retained within 
Rio Tinto for future investment, earnings attributable to outside shareholders, 
amortisation and depreciation. Note that in this example year, Rössing managed to 
report some profit, although this had not been the norm during the difficult years prior 
to 2004. There are significant implications to the local economy associated with this 
since, as is explained below, several of the most direct benefits from Rössing are, in 
fact, linked to profits.    
 
Figure 4.5 – Composition of RUL's economic contributions 
Source: RUL – Financial Division 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The adverse market conditions for Uranium explain two periods of drastic 
retrenchments by the mine. Total employment decreased from 2,518 to 1,287 in 1991, 
and then to 810 fte (full time equivalent) jobs between 1998 and 2000. There were 
approximately 800 direct employees in 2001, virtually all Namibians, and this 
number remained relatively stable until 2004. As a result, total labour costs (wages, 
salaries and benefits) declined significantly between 1991 and 1992, and remained 
relatively constant until the late 1990’s.  These marked changes in the labour force 
also impacted on labour productivity statistics, which, despite all the fluctuations, 
improved significantly over the period (labour productivity is measured here as rock 
mined per employee). Total volumes mined and employee numbers declined 
dramatically from 1988. While production rebounded notably, employment remained 
stable between 1991 and 1998. From then on, productivity growth is predominantly 
explained by further retrenchments as production volumes started to decline again 
until after 2004.   
                                                 
46
 Refer to chapter 3 for a discussion on how to measure economic activity  
 134
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
to
n
n
es
 
U
3O
8
RHS
LHS
to
n
n
es
 
ro
ck
 
m
in
ed
 
(m
ill
io
n
s)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f e
m
pl
o
ye
es
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
to
n
n
es
 
ro
ck
 
m
in
ed
 
/ e
m
pl
o
ye
es
RHS
LHS
 
Figure 4.6 – Employment and productivity 
Source: RUL – Financial Division 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – Production volumes 
Source: RUL – Financial Division 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the exception of a peak in 1991, which reflects higher labour costs due to the 
payment of retrenchment packages, average salaries did not improve after the first 
downsizing; on the contrary, they stabilised, thus interrupting a rising trend during the 
late 80s. The second downsizing, however, brought about a marked increment in 
average salaries, reflecting a more skill-based labour force, which in turn contributed 
to the productivity gains after 1998. None of the retrenchments followed any 
particular racial pattern and they have, in general, impacted all different racial groups 
equally.  
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Figure 4.8 – Average salaries by RUL 
Source: RUL – Business Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 – Racial Distribution of RUL's Employees 
Source: RUL – Business Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is frequently claimed that mining salaries are higher than most other industries. In 
effect, Rössing pays generally better than the market average, and this is more evident 
when total remuneration packages are taken into consideration – i.e. basic salaries 
plus benefits, often including health insurance, pension, child allowances and other 
benefits. Figure 4.10 compares the average salaries paid by Rössing and the Namibian 
labour market in general (2006), organised by employment grades (ranked from 2 to 
15). The difference in total payments in favour of Rössing’s employees is narrower 
for lower grades, though it can go up to 30% for grade 11 and onwards.  
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Figure 4.10 – Salaries by RUL and the Namibian market, by grades 
Source: RUL – Business Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite national moves towards political decentralisation following independence, 
the bulk of taxes paid by the company bypassed the local level and went straight to 
the central administration at the time in which RUL started to consider early closure. 
The tax regime applicable to Rössing had been simplified in 2000, and is based on 
corporate taxes set at a fixed 37.5% of taxable profit (FIAS 2006). Tax on dividends 
was the other main contribution to the national administration (there were no royalties 
applicable until 200647). Hence, as the most direct government revenues from mining 
were, at the time, a function of profits, the better the company’s financial 
performance was, the higher the government’s income became. However, the decade 
and a half leading to 2004 was not a fruitful period for this business and payments to 
government were often rather thin. In terms of local duties, Rössing’s direct payments 
to the City Council in the concept of property tax as well as water and electricity 
charges were about N$2,5m (US$340,000) at this time.  
 
Figure 4.11 – Tax payments by RUL 
Source: RUL – Financial Division 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 Namibia introduced a 10% royalty charge for diamonds and a 5% royalty for non-diamond mining 
production in 2006. 
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4.2.1 Payments to suppliers  
 
In the time series introduced in figure 4.12, the average participation of payments to 
suppliers in total sales value was 38%, which is typically much lower than that of 
other industries, for instance mechanicals, footwear, or in fact most manufactured 
products. In relative terms, high value added industries offer smaller business 
opportunities within their supply chains, and thus, smaller opportunities for economic 
diversification and the expansion of backward linkages (see chapter 2 for more on 
this). However, particularly considering the relative size of both Rössing and the 
Namibian business sector, these opportunities have been significant for the economy 
in absolute terms (around US$50m in 2004)48 
 
Figure 4.12 – Payments to suppliers to total contributions 
Source: RUL – Procurements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following analysis focuses on understanding where these outsourcing 
opportunities concentrated, and explores the geographic origin of the final goods and 
services acquired by RUL.  The data introduced in this study has been stripped of 
capital goods and thus reflects operating purchases only. Figure 4.13 shows the 
distribution of these supplies by geographic level (i.e. local, regional, national and 
elsewhere), according to the invoice for each transaction. While the majority of 
RUL’s payments are made to suppliers based in Namibia, only 10% of them take 
place in the Erongo region – and only 5% in the vicinities of the mine.  
                                                 
48
 As global demand for Uranium picked up, leaving the fears of early closure behind, payments to 
suppliers jumped to US$91m in 2005 
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Figure 4.13 – Value of supplies by origin, 2004 
Source: RUL – Procurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important question posed by the prospects of early closure has been how to 
guarantee economic sustainability at the local and regional level after closure, and 
how long it would take to achieve this. Among several alternatives analysed later in 
this study, one of the strategies considered attempted a quick expansion of the local 
supply chain that could serve other regional industries and mines once RUL has 
closed down. The analysis below explores the potential for substituting imports with 
local products and services inherent in Rössing’s supply chain. Table 4.1 lists the top 
30 suppliers according to invoice value in 2004. The electricity provider was the main 
single supplier, followed by a provider of acids, oil products, mechanical parts and 
repairs, water, tyres, and rail transport. The vast majority of national suppliers are 
based in Windhoek, the capital, and almost all regional suppliers are in Walvis Bay, a 
nearby port and main hub of trade. There is just one local firm among the top 30 
suppliers, which is in fact a service contractor. The relative weight of these suppliers 
is high: the top 10 firms accounted for nearly 60% of the total purchase value during 
the year (also see figure 4.14) 
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Supplier Description
Invoice value 
as % of total Location
1 NAMIBIA POWER CORPORATION (PTY) LTD Electricity 14.9% National
2 INTERACID TRADING SA Acid 10.8% International
3 SHELL NAMIBIA LTD Fuels & Lubs 9.4% National
4 KOMATSU stock haultruck maintenance 5.6% International
5 NAMWATER Water 4.0% National
6 BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE SA (PTY) Tyres 3.6% International
7 NAMRAIL (PTY) LTD Railtransport 2.8% National
8 ISCOR LTD LONG PRODUCTS (NEWCASTLE) Structural steel 2.7% International
9 ARANDIS SERVICES Civil contractor 2.5% Local
10 OMNIA FERTILISERS (PTY) LTD Explosives 2.1% International
Sub-total 58.3%
11 SNF FLOERGER Mineral processing technologies 2.0% International
12 WOKER FREIGHT SERVICES (PTY) LTD Freight Services 2.0% Regional
13 GHANA MANGANESE COMPANY LTD Manganese ore, process chemical 2.0% International
14 SONNEX (PTY) LTD (NAMTRAC) Equipment maintenance contractor 1.8% Regional
15 FYNSORT TECHNOLOGY LIMITED Radiometric Sorters & the repairs of sorters 1.7% International
16 PYLON ENGINEERING Mechanical Spares 1.6% International
17 SASOL SMX A DIVISION OF SASOL CHEMI Explosives 1.6% International
18 NEC STAHL Contractor 1.5% National
19 MAGOTTEAUX (PTY) LTD Scaw Metals 1.3% International
20 ERONGO CONTRACT SERVICES CC Labour hire 1.3% Regional
Sub-total 16.8%
21 WESBANK TRANSPORT (PTY) LTD Road transport 1.2% Regional
22 ROTARY HYDRAULIC & PNEUMATIC MINING Drill and shovel spares 1.2% International
23 MARUBENI CORPORATION Marketing services Japan 1.2% International
24 KOMATSU SOUTHERN AFRICA CONSIGNMENT Haultruck Parts 1.2% International
25 METSO MINERALS Machinery Refurbishment 1.1% International
26 WARMAN (AFRICA) (PTY) LTD Pumps 1.1% International
27 SASOL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED Chemicals & Explosives 0.9% International
28 BUSINESS SYSTEMS NAMIBIA (PTY) LTD Computer Services 0.9% Regional
29 SANDVIK TAMROCK SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) Drilling Equipment 0.9% International
30 SANDVIK TAMROCK SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) Drilling Equipment 0.9% International
Sub-total 10.5%
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Table 4.1 - Top 30 suppliers by invoice value (%), in 2004 
Source: RUL – Procurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14 – Top 30 suppliers by invoice value, in 2004 
Source: RUL – Procurement 
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This analysis shows that goods and services equivalent to 45% of the total 
procurement value was imported that year. However, it is worth noting that three 
countries – South Africa, Switzerland, and France - accounted for as much as 97% of 
total imports. In fact, 74% of all imported goods were supplied by the well developed 
mining cluster in South Africa, and so most benefits from Rössing’s supply chain 
remained within the Southern African region.  Looking forward, expanding local 
linkages from the mine’s supply chain would require a meticulous understanding of 
the company’s requirements for goods and services, as well as bottom-up work with 
local partners and other economic players. For instance, as part of the closure studies, 
the company has been analysing the feasibility of the construction of an acid plant by 
Rössing and other local partners in Walvis Bay. If this project were to be 
implemented, the level of national purchases, as opposed to imports, would jump 
from 55 to nearly 70% (simulation based on 2001 values).  
 
Figure 4.15 – Imported purchases by origin 
Source: RUL – Procurements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, social expenditure by Rössing has been mainly 
decentralised in the Rössing Foundation (RF). Annual company payments to the 
Foundation are equivalent to 3% of net profits. While the RF relied heavily on the 
company during its early days, it has managed to diversify its income base over time 
and 50% of its resources are currently coming from sources others than RUL, 
including UN agencies and direct transfers by donor countries (the Rössing 
Foundation website).  As an independent non-for-profit organisation, the RF has in 
the past worked extensively at all geographical levels in Namibia, which gained it an 
outstanding reputation nationwide, chiefly for its work in education and capacity 
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building.  In the 1990s, RUL’s contributions to the RF shrank sharply together with 
the company’s profits, thus raising pressure from other donors, which in turn resulted 
in a considerable reduction of community programs in the vicinities of the mine. The 
commencement of closure considerations has since redirected the work of the 
Foundation back to the local level.  
 
Figure 4.16 introduces a time series of total expenditure in social development by 
Rössing. The notable volatility in total expenditure is mainly determined by the 
oscillation of the company’s contributions to the RF. The collapse in total expenditure 
at the beginning of the 1990’s, and then again early in the new millennium, did not 
reflect a deliberate reduction in social engagement, but rather the severe decline of 
company profits. Although the RF has always been the main recipient of RUL’s 
social investment, the company’s contributions to communities have also taken other 
forms. As transfers to the Foundation declined, the early 1990s witnessed a peak in 
expenditure for the construction of the Namibian Institute of Mineral Technology 
(NIMT) in Arandis, which was donated jointly with the South African government 
for independence, and contributions to cover maintenance costs continued until 1999. 
NIMT has since become a very prestigious institution for mining research and the 
training of skilled professionals with influence on the whole of Southern Africa. 
‘Other expenditures’ includes community services, tuitions, aid for training and 
educational assistance, books and sport competitions. ‘Other donations’ includes 
minor direct donations such as those to local schools.    
 
Figure 4.16 – Expenditure in social development (N$ of 2001) 
Source: RUL – Financial Division 
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In short, although overall contributions to the economy have declined substantially 
since inception, they continued to be of great importance. These contributions have 
taken different forms and affected the local and national economies differently: (i) in 
a still highly centralised governmental administration, most tax payments circumvent 
the local and regional level on their way to Windhoek; (ii) although employment has 
fallen dramatically in the last fifteen years, relatively large labour payments injected 
into the economy continue to contribute to the local economy significantly; (iii) 
payments for supplies and services have been imported into the Erongo region in their 
great majority, although most of overseas goods come from neighbouring South 
African; (iv) direct social expenditure has been extremely important locally, and the 
long-lasting legacy of organisations such as the Rössing Foundation and NIMT 
cannot be overestimated. The next section explores how the local economy has dealt 
with these stimuli – and how prepared it would have been to face up to the challenges 
of early closure.    
 
 
4.3. The local economy: Swakopmund and Arandis 
 
Production in the region is mainly concentrated in the fishing industry49, mining and 
tourism, although manufacturing is growing rapidly. In this arid land, agriculture and 
cattle farming are reserved for self-subsistence. As a general feature, two serious 
restrictions for further development in the region are shortages of water and the 
scarcity, and hence high price, of housing (SPC 2007). That is certainly the case in 
Swakopmund, a charming coastal town approximately 65km from the mine and 
380km west of Windhoek. Swakopmund relies largely on primary resources and 
tourism for its economic base. It became well established as a holiday destination in 
the 1940’s, and its architecture still conserves many European features typical of its 
colonial past.  A high demand for plots and holiday homes developed after the 
completion of the national road connecting Windhoek and Walvis Bay, in 1967. 
Another large expansion took place in the 1970’s after the Rössing mine’s 
inception50. Although Swakopmund’s greatest potential arguably lies in tourism, it 
has also become a support point in the road-and-rail commercial transport corridor 
                                                 
49
 Fishing is mainly concentrated in Walvis Bay. The potential for further expansion in this sector is 
limited by the natural fishery stock, already overexploited.  
50
 RUL began operating in 1976, reaching full production in 1978 
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Windhoek / Walvis Bay. Walvis Bays is the second largest town in the Erongo region 
after Swakopmund, 30km south, and is Namibia’s principal harbour and the transport 
destination of Rössing’s produce. 
 
Figure 4.17 – Population in Swakopmund 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics and the Municipality of Swakopmund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population growth in Swakopmund was heavily influenced by RUL. During the 
1970’s the population doubled, from 7,641 in 1970 to 15,473 in 1980, fuelled by a 
vigorous migration into the region. The growth rate averaged an annual 9.3% during 
this period, much higher than that of Namibia (3.6%). The trend declined during the 
80’s, and in the 90’s the local population grew slower than in the rest of the country 
(figure 4.17). According to data from the last national census available at the time of 
writing, the permanent population in Swakopmund was 25,442 in 200151, 89% of 
which were born in Namibia with the balance coming from either Europe (Germany 
for the most part) or Southern Africa (Central Bureau of Statistics 2001). The Chief 
Executive Officer Swakopmund Municipality (ED 2007), has recently estimated 
current town population at around 40,000 people (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 The population in Swakopmund doubles during holiday seasons, mostly in December and July. 
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Figure 4.20 – Non-Namibian immigration in Swakopmund 
Source: Municipality of Swakopmund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The national census also reveals that there were 7,560 households in Swakopmund in 
2001. Housing in Swakopmund is organised in well-defined and socio-economically 
distinct neighbourhoods. Data from CZMP (1995) shows that 31% of the population 
lived in the former white areas of Kramersdorf, Vineta, and Swakopmund Proper; 
13% lived in the former coloured52 township of Tamariska, and the remaining 56% in 
the former black township of Mondesa. Nowadays, serviced land for development is 
very limited, and when made available by the Municipality, prospective buyers have 
to compete for it by way of auctions. The limited supply of land has had an 
incremental impact on the final prices of the plots and eventually on the prices of 
residential properties in town (SPC 2007). 
 
Consistent local data is scattered and thus the existing figures for unemployment are 
controversial. According to the RF, the unemployment rate in Swakopmund was 11% 
in 2000. On the other hand, CZMP (1995) had estimated a perhaps more realistic 
30%, still below that of the Erongo Region and Namibia as a whole. The latest data 
available on employment goes back to the late 1990s. Table 4.2 shows the evolution 
of formal employment by sector in Swakopmund and Walvis Bay. In 1998, fishing 
was the main formal employer (industry principally based in Wavis Bay though).  
Mining53 came in fact in a fourth place, behind commerce and tourism.  
  
                                                 
52
 Locals refer to people of mixed ethnic background as Coloured  
53
 Employment in mining is mainly in RUL, but there are also small operations of salt, and granite. 
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SECTOR 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Agriculture, commercial 12 19 23 17 12
Agriculture, subsistence 250 250 250 260 260
Aquaculture 13 13 14 13 13
Fishing 6493 7293 6134 6692 6516
Mining and quarrying 1587 1567 1517 1573 1554
Manufacturing 411 455 795 980 1208
Electicity and water 162 175 181 196 193
Construction 95 410 394 381 374
Accommodation and catering 2025 2109 2216 2127 2207
Transport 812 811 818 821 813
Communication 54 54 53 55 55
Commerce 5841 6030 5290 5705 5587
Community services 1168 1245 1327 1369 1412
Others 13 17 17 23 29
TOTAL 18936 20448 19029 20212 20233
Table 4.2 – Formal employment by sector, Swakopmund / Walvis Bay (jobs) 
Source: Municipality of Swakopmund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The town of Arandis is located 60 km northeast of Swakopmund, and less than 5km 
west of the Rössing Uranium mine, in the Namibian Desert. By contrast to 
Swakopmund, Arandis was established and developed as a mining town in 1976, and 
has historically housed semi-skilled and unskilled mine employees. The population in 
Arandis was 7,590 people in 2001 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2001), living in 1,900 
houses. Approximately 40% of residents owe their houses in town. In 1994 the town 
was proclaimed an independent town with an elected Local Authority. The mine 
handed over the management and provision of municipal services to the Arandis 
Town Council (ATC) (Rössing Foundation 2003).  
 
As economic duress impacted the company, Arandis was progressively left alone in 
its struggle to increase reliance on its own revenues. Yet, non-mining income in town 
is currently very limited. For instance, around two thirds of Arandis population still 
depended directly on salaries from Rössing in 2004. Others worked at few small local 
shops, civil services and the Town Centre (Hoadley et al 2005). Independent research 
by NDC (2002) identified the key disadvantages of operating a business in Arandis as 
follows: a) distance from other markets; b) limited local market; c) distance from 
suppliers; d) high communication costs; e) lack of transport; f) shortage of skilled 
labour; g) lack of start-up capital and support, and h) lack of support from local 
government.  
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Figure 4.19 – Formal employment in Arandis 
Source: Hoadley et al 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The unemployment rate in Arandis seems to be lower than that in Swakopmund (88% 
of adults are employed full time), as most retrenched people relocate to other parts of 
Namibia in the search for jobs. Migration into Arandis is very low: less than 7% in 
the four years prior to 2004 (SIAPAC et al 2004). Despite the distance, shopping 
habits are still connected to Swakopmund, with people travelling to the coastal town 
for this purpose once weekly. Moreover, largely due to housing shortages in 
Swakopmund, a number of people working there have chosen to commute daily from 
their homes in Arandis.  Some local commentators have associated all of this to a 
serious lack of ownership, pride and commitment with the town that is evident, for 
instance, in the residents’ unwillingness to pay municipal services, or their inability to 
engage in any sort of community activity (NDC 2002, NEDICO 2002) 
 
 
4.3.1 A long tale of economic impact assessments 
 
In 1991, during the first downsizing process at RUL, the Swakopmund City Council 
hired an independent consultancy firm, Deloitte Pim Goldby, to carry out an 
economic impact assessment of possible further changes in the mine’s input factors, 
which up to that point had hit Swakopmund and Arandis equally – e.g. 50% of 
retrenched employees from each place (Deloitte Pim Goldgy 1991). The objective of 
the analysis was to quantify the loss in income flowing to local businesses due to the 
company’s downsizing, and in doing so it considered three different scenarios. The 
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scenario 1 - optimistic scenario 2 - most likely scenario 3 - pessimistic
Production level (tonnes) 3,750                                        2,500                                           1,250                                           
Number of employees at RUL (fte) 1,700                                        1,390                                           700                                              
Loss in disposable income from RUL (N$/year) 5,328,000                                 10,833,600                                  23,088,000                                  
Total income loss inc. multiplier effect (N$/year) 6,393,600                                 13,000,320                                  27,105,600                                  
study assumed that (a) 80% of disposable income from employees remained in the 
local economy54, and that (b) its final impact on the economy would be affected by a 
multiplier factor of 1.255.  
 
Table 4.3 – RUL’s retrenchments and three local scenarios 
Source: Deloitte Pim Goldby 1991 
 
 
 
As part of this research, this study revisited the forecasts put forward by Deloitte Pim 
Goldby back in 1991. At the time at which RUL started to consider closure, further 
downsizing had determined employment figures at a level equal to the pessimistic 
scenario depicted by the consultant ten years earlier56. The economic impact on 
Swakopmund, however, seems to have not been as catastrophic as initially predicted, 
as for one reason or another, during this time the local economy had started to 
diversify and specialise in activities other than mining.   
 
Figure 4.20 shows the evolution of employment in selected industries (refer to Table 
4.2 for the whole list). Although the data available misses out the impact of the big 
RUL retrenchment of 1991 and later in 1999/00, some interesting trends still arise 
from these records. Overall, employment in mining was quite stable over the period, 
and small movements in RUL’s employment explain small oscillations. After 1998, 
mining employment in the region had declined at the pace of the second big Rössing 
retrenchment. Accommodation and catering increased slowly, though clearly 
outperforming mining as job provider, and ratifying the great potential for tourism in 
                                                 
54
 It is worth noting the analysis ignored the effect of retirement packages of dismissed employees as 
well as pensions spent locally 
55
 Multipliers are measures of the impact on the aggregate economy per unit increase in the sector. For 
instance, income multipliers estimate the increase in economic activity resulting directly and indirectly 
from an increase in the sector’s activity.  Its size is determined by the proportion of capital injected in 
the economy that is re-utilised within the region. 
56
 RUL had 798 direct employees in 2001. Note, however, that steady increases in labour productivity 
pushed production levels up (2,640 tonnes in 2001), relative to the consultant’s predictions (1,250 
tonnes). The consultant underestimated the effects of productivity on total output.  
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Swakopmund. Accordingly, construction peaked in 1995 and remained stable 
throughout the period, more connected to an increasing demand for holiday dwellings 
than to houses for the mining sector. Most interestingly, manufacturing was the 
fastest growing sector, jumping from 455 jobs in 1995 to 1,208 in 1998, in a strong 
upward trend. 
 
Figure 4.20 – Formal employment in selected sectors, Swakopmund / Walvis Bay 
Source: Municipality of Swakopmund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data on local registration of businesses has been more fruitful. The evolution of the 
local business sector is suggested here as a proxy to total economic activity. 
Businesses registered in Swakopmund climbed from a stable 140 units at the 
beginning of the 1970s (prior to RUL’s inception), to 194 and 368 in 1980 and 1991 
respectively. Following the first major downsizing at RUL, local businesses collapsed 
in 1992. There is a gap in the data until 1998. Interestingly, registered businesses 
jumped that year to 504 units, and kept on rising to 729 in 2002 (Archives of the 
Municipality of Swakopmund 2004).  
 
This trend can accommodate different explanations. First, the de-regulation process 
that started after independence may have impacted positively in business creation. 
Second, de-regulation may have facilitated the registration of activities already 
existing in the informal economy. Third, increasing diversification may explain the 
emergence of small and mid-size enterprises, especially in tourism. There is little 
evidence that retrenched employees may have used their relatively large retrenchment 
packages to start new businesses. While many of them had tried to remain in 
Swakopmund after dismissal, Mosimane (2003) claims that very few had in fact 
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invested in formal entrepreneurial activities successfully. Note, finally, that the 
second downsizing process that started in 1998 does not show negatively in the chart. 
Similarly, current records show that there were 1,400 business registered in 
Swakopmund in 2006.   
 
Figure 4.21 – Net business creation in Swakopmund 
Source: Archives of the Municipality of Swakopmund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Erongo Region has the highest income per head in the country after the Khomas 
Region (where the capital Windhoek is situated), although as in the case of Namibia 
as a whole, unequal wealth distribution and social exclusion continue to be notorious 
(Ekstrom 1998). Recent data on local income distribution is non-existent. According 
to the Research Facilitation Service (1998), however, while less than 3% of 
households57 in Swakopmund earned more than US$1,800/month, 50% got less than 
US$180/month at the end of the millennium. Figure 4.22 shows income distribution 
in Swakopmund and average salaries paid by RUL in 1998. This marked disparity has 
been linked to a local inflationary process led by the real state market in 
Swakopmund, which started with RUL’s inception and that is currently deepening, 
accentuating a process of gentrification long present in the town (SPC 2007). With a 
shrinking mining sector and Rössing planning for closure, however, this phenomenon 
presently seems more closely associated to a characteristic of holiday destinations 
than that of mining towns. 
 
                                                 
57
 Average household consists of 4.2 members. Families are social constructs that can be more 
inclusive than immediate family (on average, each household house an average of 0,5 other family 
member) 
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Figure 4.22 – Income distribution in Swakopmund and RUL 
Source: Municipality of Swakopmund and RUL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, mining salaries reinvested locally have constituted a remarkable 
stimulus for the local economy. Figure 4.23 compares salaries paid by Rössing at the 
local level (Swakopmund and Arandis), total contributions to the community and 
local charges and services (excluding utility payments), with total expenditure by 
Arandis and Swakopmund City Council. In 2005, for example, as RUL started to 
respond to the increasing global demand for Uranium, payments for wages and 
salaries reached US$28.1m, while direct payments to the municipalities for services 
and other charges were around US$400,000 (excluding payments to utility 
companies). In the same year, total municipal expenditure in Swakopmund was 
US$28.6m (Municipality of Swakopmund 2006).   
 
Figure 4.23 – Municipal expenditure and local contributions from RUL* 
Source: Municipality of Swakopmund and RUL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * excludes payments to utility companies 
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Although some payments remained in cash, most wages in Rössing were paid into 
bank accounts in 2004. In a national context of marked shortages of investment in the 
productive sector, the financial situation at the local level has fundamental 
implications for business development. In Arandis in particular, banking services are 
limited to twice a week, although as it occurs with shopping more broadly, residents 
tend to commute to Swakopmund for this purpose (Hoadley et al 2005). The banking 
sector in Swakopmund is well established, and there are several local/offshore banks 
in town58. However, loans are highly restricted to a small clientele and conditions are 
harsh (NEPRU 1999). For example, the Commercial Bank of Namibia59 requires a 
minimum of 40% own capital before assisting, with annual interest rates around 20-
22%.  Loans and credits for business start-ups, SMEs, or micro businesses are rare. In 
the Erongo Region, the informal financial sector has bridged this gap at outrageous 
prices - i.e. approx 30% interest rate per month in the streets of Swakopmund60 
(Ikhide and Fitchat 2002). As a result, a series of worrying trends take place within 
Rössing’s workforce, worsened by the financial illiteracy of many employees. 
Numerous Rössing workers currently have serious financial problems. Despite having 
relatively good earnings, around 80% of employees live under financial stress, mainly 
resulting from financial mismanagement61, child care payments for unplanned 
children, and financial support for an increasing number of dependent family 
members, due to the effects of the HIV epidemic (RS 2007).  
  
Finally, a centralised effort toward local economic development in Namibia has been 
the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZ) after independence, which is a 
fiscal scheme for the establishment of export-oriented manufacturing enterprises. The 
main incentive set up by the regime is the drastic reduction of corporate taxes. 
Arandis holds an EPZ status. In addition to the fiscal cost implicit in the policy, these 
types of regimes bear the risk of becoming instruments for territorial competition, as 
opposed to strategies for industrial restructuring, and of replacing legitimate 
                                                 
58
 Bank of Windhoek, First National Bank of Namibia, Commercial Bank of Namibia, Standard Bank, 
Bank of Swakopmund 
59
 Interviews held at the Swakopmund branch in March 2007 
60
 A normal modality for informal lenders in Swakopmund is to hold the client’s bankcard and pin 
number as guarantee, and to extract the instalments directly when salaries are deposited monthly. 
61
 Although Rössing employees have access to loans and credits in the local financial market, most fall 
behind in their payments, or indeed, cannot pay loans back at all. Under financial pressure, many in 
desperation turn to ‘loan sharks’.  
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investment by one that is profitable only under special tax incentives. So far, the 
initiative to attract manufacturing activity to Arandis has not been successful. Locals 
have blamed this to the fact that Walvis Bay has obtained an EPZ status as well, thus 
redirecting opportunities to the costal city. In fact, EPZs as a development tool have 
been severely questioned in the whole of Namibia, and it is broadly accepted that they 
have been, as such, largely unsuccessful (FIAS 2006) 
 
 
4.4. The economic impact of early closure 
 
How badly would have early closure impacted the local economy?  The analysis in 
this section estimates the potential economic contribution from Rössing in the 
different business scenarios contemplated at the time – i.e. early closure in 2008 
(scenario 1) or expansion until 2016 or 2022 (scenarios 2 and 3).  The present value62 
63
 (2004) of the total economic contribution from RUL was estimated at around 
US$408m, US$705m and US$808m for the scenarios 1, 2 and 3 respectively. On the 
offsetting expenditure side, US$241m, US$373m and US$434m was to be paid to 
suppliers in each scenario. The remaining US$167m, US$332m and US$374m 
represents gross value added.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62
 To make the figures for different scenarios comparable the exercise uses present value (NPV) 
estimates, with a discount rate of 10%. Normally, when expenditures are made over time, the values are 
discounted to bring them to ‘present value’. Discounting accounts for the fact that there is always risk 
associated with income and expenditure streams over time and quite simply, it is always better to have 
money earlier than later.  Thus, money that is to be received in the future should be valued at lower rate 
than money that is to be received earlier.  
63
 The calculations introduced in this section are based on estimates used for project evaluation and 
thus follow the same assumptions in terms of production volumes and uranium price, which already 
reflected increases in the price of uranium – and thus made expansion seem a more plausible option.  
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Table 4.4 – Estimate of total economic contributions from Rössing, by scenario (a) 
Source: RT Technical Services. Local/national and saving ratios from Deloitte Pim Goldby (1991) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
  (2003 – 2008) (2003 – 2016) (2003 – 2022) 
 N$m US$m N$m US$m N$m US$m 
Wages, salaries and benefits 720 97 1197 161 1385 186 
Taxes and royalties 45 6 164 22 201 27 
Interest payments -15 -2 -7 -1 0 0 
Earnings (b) 492 66 1118 150 1199 161 
Total value added 1242 167 2471 332 2786 374 
Payments for supplies 1686 241 2781 373 3234 434 
(a) Exchange rate as per Dec 2003 US$1 = $N7.4 
(b) Includes dividends and retained earnings 
Source: Calculations based on estimates used for project evaluation, Rio Tinto Technical Services. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 – Direct employment opportunities by scenario 
Source: Based on estimates for project evaluation, Rio Tinto Technical Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regards to employment, average job opportunities in scenarios 1, 2 and 3 were 
estimated at 848, 926 and 954 people p/year, respectively.  Scenario 1 estimated 
closure within 6 years, while projections for scenarios 2 and 3 reflect a mine’s life 
span of 14 and 19 years. As discussed earlier, labour compensation was at the time 
the biggest form of value added locally.  The present value of these payments was 
calculated at US$97m in scenario 1, US$161m in scenario 2, and US$186m in 
scenario 3. How much of this money would actually flow into the local economy, or, 
more precisely, how much would stop flowing once the operation ceases activities? 
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The table below estimates this by combining the figures introduced above with some 
indexes capturing key local economic features discussed earlier64 65.  The overall 
contribution to local income from Rössing’s labour payments exclusively would have 
been US$65m, US$108m or US$125m in cases 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
Table 4.5 – The importance of Rössing’s labour payments to the local economy (a) 
Source: RT Technical Services. Local/national and saving ratios from Deloitte Pim Goldby (1991) 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
    2003/08 2003/16 2003/22 
# of employees (average p/year)    848  926  954 
    N$m US$m N$m US$m N$m US$m 
Labour remuneration (b)   720 97 1,197 161 1,385 186 
Disposable income (c) 0.7 504 68 838 113 970 130 
Local/national ratio (d) 0.8 403 54 670 90 776 104 
Total local income (estimate of multiplier) 1.2 484 65 804 108 931 125 
Total estimated income p/year   80 11 57 8 49 7 
(a) Exchange rate as per Dec 2003 US$1 = $N7.4 
(b) Present value estimate (discounted at 10%) 
(c) Total income after personal taxation and savings 
(d) Ratio of consumption taking place locally. Includes transfers to family members in other parts of Namibia 
 
 
4.4.1 The economic sustainability of Arandis 
  
Closure would have had strong consequences for the Namibian economy in general, 
but of all the challenges it would have brought, the most critical was (and still is) the 
economic sustainability of Arandis. Rössing was directly responsible for its 
construction as a mining town, and although it is currently run by an independent 
administration, it still today relies heavily on the company, and is therefore still 
largely associated with it. Failure to secure the town’s economic independence could 
therefore have strong consequences for Rio Tinto’s reputation. The analysis 
introduced in the previous section showed that early closure would have stopped 
                                                 
64
 As referenced earlier, in 1991, during the first downsizing process at RUL, the Swakopmund City 
Council commissioned an economic impact assessment of eventual further changes in the mine’s input 
factors.  
65
 The average tax-taking rate used is 30%. 
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significant monetary flows into the local economy and, perhaps more importantly, it 
would have also denied vital time to consolidate a better transition toward new 
sources of jobs and income for Arandis. The closure deliberations by RUL considered 
three main scenarios for the town (ML 2004): (a) directing resources towards local 
economic diversification and business generation in activities other than mining; (b) 
aiming at transforming the current economy into one with high degree of 
specialisation, most likely in the education sector; or (c) relocating existing activities 
and population to Swakopmund.  
   
a) Economic diversification and business generation  
 
This approach considered that economic diversification in anticipation of closure is 
achievable, and that this is needed to compensate for the income that will be lost 
when RUL is decommissioned. This scenario is also based on the assumption that a 
change in trend in the currently declining population, and the recovery of the 
deteriorating but significant infrastructure in place, could be rapidly accomplished 
(the Rössing Foundation 2001). This infrastructure consists of water supply, power, 
asphalted roads, three schools and a health clinic, NIMT, and housing, all of which 
are scarce and very valuable resources in Namibia. Business generation and 
expansion in Arandis would prove difficult to sustain, however. Rössing’s salaries 
still generate most of the demand for goods and services that keep the town alive. 
Arandis’ economy seems to lack the comparative advantages needed for the attraction 
of investment necessary for business development – particularly so in competition 
with the nearby Swakopmund and Walvis Bay and their growing manufacturing 
sector.  
 
b) Specialisation (centre of educational excellence) 
 
The second option under consideration was economic specialisation – in particular as 
an education centre. This alternative rests on certain competitive advantage provided 
by existent infrastructure (NIMT and several schools). Specialisation can bring in 
new and different sources of income (i.e. fees, private contributions, subsidies etc). 
This is an innovative approach, which would require a large amount of upfront 
planning and strong commitment from management. The conversion of Arandis into 
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an education centre will also demand extra capital investment. The company’s 
influence within the central administration could be essential for maximising 
opportunities and redirecting government support, as well as that from international 
organisations and other not-for-profit institutions, for grants, scholarship schemes and 
so on (ML 2007). This alternative would require time for a well planned transition to 
work, and Swakopmund would likely have a key role to play during the process. 
Nonetheless, this shift would imply a change in the characteristics of the local 
population, from mostly low and semi-skilled miners to one based on students, 
teachers, professors, and some related supporting sectors. This still poses the question 
of what prospect exist for those currently living in Arandis, a majority of which are 
Rössing’s employees.  
 
c) Dismantle and relocate to Swakopmund 
 
Although Swakopmund is certainly better prepared to absorb population and 
economic activities that seem increasingly unsustainable in the mine’s vicinity after 
closure, the large build up of infrastructure makes this a very undesirable option. 
Also, the government was in principle firmly opposed to any plan to dismantle 
Arandis. Yet, existent infrastructure has to be maintained and thus it could quickly 
become a liability to locals. Despite the best intentions, business generation and broad 
economic diversification will be extremely challenging.  A large portion of the 
income in town leaks out of the circular flow – mostly through consumption, which 
takes place largely in Swakopmund, and through relatively prominent savings sent 
away to family members in other parts of the country. Marginal propensity to invest 
in Arandis has been typically non-existent (Hoadley et al 2005). Without alternative 
sources of income, people would likely relocate for jobs to other parts of the country, 
as has happened after large retrenchment processes in the company took place in the 
past. 
 
Regardless of these observations, the possibility of abandoning Arandis to its fate 
soon started to be seen as simply too high a risk for Rio Tinto (ML 2007). Rössing 
has since reaffirmed its explicit dedication to Arandis’ sustainability, and 
categorically rejected the possibility of dismantling the town. The company 
persuaded the RF to refocus its activities to Arandis (the RF opened an office in town 
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in 2003) and to take charge for an Arandis Sustainability Project, ASP. Within this 
context, the Foundation then assumed responsibility for a number of programs 
including SME support; tourism promotion; education; recreation and culture, health 
and safety, and local government infrastructure. Consisting of the RF, the ATC and 
RUL, an Arandis Steering Committee was then set up and charged with the task of 
setting the investment priorities as well as reviewing the Foundation’s programs in 
Arandis. Within this context, the ASP defined the vision for Arandis as follows 
(Arandis Sustainability Project 2004 p1):  
 
‘Arandis is an independent and viable town that is known as a centre of 
excellence (in everything we do). A model town that is a platform for vital 
economic activity, places its citizens first, and is the town of choice to live in’ 
 
RUL also established a Closure Fund for Arandis. In addition to the company’s 
financial commitment to the RF, this fund was to receive regular financial 
contributions that would be released at closure. The specific objective of the Fund 
was to constitute a pool of money large enough as to top up shortfalls in the Council’s 
operating budget for at least five years after closure, thus contributing to an orderly 
transition. The ATC depends primarily on rates and water and sewage charges for its 
revenue; however, the municipality had struggled to generate sufficient revenue to 
cover its operational expenditure since it gained autonomy, let alone setting funds 
aside for capital projects (Arandis Town Council 2006). There are a number of 
reasons for this, including the fact that the water accounts make a loss consistently 
(for several reasons, including the high level of water loss in the system), poor 
payment records of both employed and unemployed residents, as well as poor 
payment by government departments (e.g. in 2004 the Ministry of Education had long 
standing debts with the ATC). The Council has been systematically cutting back on 
the efficiency of the services it provides (Hoadley et al 2005) 
  
 
4.5. Further reflections on Arandis  
 
This study has highlighted the economic impact of RUL at different geographic 
levels. In the context of a national economy that is still well based on the exploitation 
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of natural resources, the cessation of Rössing’s activities would have always had a 
significant impact. During closure deliberations, the issue of economic diversification 
and business generation in activities that could be sustained after the mine’s closure 
has thus made it to the top of the agenda. To some extent, the Erongo Region enjoys 
some comparative advantages that position it in a relatively good place with respect 
to other parts of Namibia. At the local level, however, the economy shows two 
different faces. On the one hand, although Swakopmund had suffered the cyclicality 
typical of the mining industry in the past, it has managed to slowly diversify its 
economic base. There is no evidence that the latest downsizing at Rössing, early in 
the new millennium, has hit the town severely (either Swakopmund or Walvis Bay for 
that matter). In short, Swakopmund appears strong enough to face periods of distress 
or economic turbulence (i.e. closure) safely. 
 
On the other hand, Arandis, born as a mining town nearly 30 years ago, has continued 
to be highly dependent on the ever-shrinking demand for low and semi skilled 
employment from the mine. It is thus not surprising that RUL has identified the 
economic afterlife of Arandis as the key closure challenge for the company and put 
the sustainability of the town at the centre of its closure strategy. To have any chance 
of survival, the town’s income base would have to start diversifying without delay. 
For example, in a drastic demonstration of the company’s commitment to this 
strategy, (and in spite of the obvious cost implications of the measure), Rössing has 
recently confirmed that the plans for housing new employees following the latest 
expansion decision will now exclude Arandis (ML 2007). This commitment also 
meant that the RF had to shift the focus of attention from national programs back to 
the level of Arandis. Funded largely by the company, a new plan for promoting 
sustainable development in town was also put in place, closely monitored by the 
Foundation, the ATC and the company itself.  
 
More recently, the news of the mine escaping closure and embarking instead in an 
ambitious expansion plan had secured more time to work on the transition: the new 
target for an economically sustainable Arandis is now 2016 (ASP 2004). However, 
considering all these initiatives; the intense attention received over the last years; and 
the rather sophisticated infrastructure in town, it is pertinent to start asking why 
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Arandis has not yet shown signs of revival – and, looking forward, whether it could 
ever become sustainable. 
  
Some of the key stakeholders involved have pointed out to what they see as problems 
with the type of intervention promoted by the Rössing Foundation thus far. Marie 
Hoadley (MH 2007), for instance, believes that the Foundation’s focus on training 
needs to be revisited: ‘Training programs put in place by RF in the past (e.g. 
agriculture self subsistence etc) have systematically failed’. Similarly, Florida Cloete 
(FC 2007), Chief Executive Officer of Arandis, said that ‘capacity building has to 
come to an end. Training is a good thing, but endless training is extremely frustrating 
for the people’. A similar message came up from the principals of the three schools in 
Arandis (SP 2007): ‘The RF aims at creating an educational centre of excellence. 
That is far from happening. Teachers’ salaries are paid by the government, but there 
are no central resources for capital expenditure. The RF’s programs should include 
photocopies and printers, as well as after-hour classes and mentoring. That has not 
been delivered yet’. Nonetheless, they went on to say that ‘on a positive note, schools 
results in 2006 improved 30% with respect to previous years, mainly due to the 
Foundation’s work training teachers’. 
 
There appear to be deeper rooted difficulties, however. MH has also mentioned that 
‘Within Arandis, RUL is overwhelmingly seen as the leading development agent – 
and this is very concerning. If the population think of RUL as a financial sponsor, 
economic sustainability will be impossible to achieve’. In the same vein, FC stressed 
that once RUL announced that they will expand as opposed to closing down the 
operation ‘[…] people became complacent again: they believe Rössing will take care. 
[…] In fact, even the central government’s position tends to be that Arandis is 
Rössing’s problem and that they will sort it out. Despite the challenges, there are no 
new government funds made available to Arandis’. The chairman of the Arandis 
Business Association (ABA 2007) has also added that: ‘The Community is 
demoralised and abusing alcohol because there are no jobs and because there is no 
appropriation [sic]. RUL and the RF feed the problem when they put money to 
finance the Council’s salaries and to cover for services unpaid by residents. The 
Foundation has grandiose plans but we cannot see the results’ 
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Whether Arandis has the potential to accomplish the goal defined by Rössing and 
others is questionable. Many believe that the definition of this goal is deeply 
misleading, because the conditions are not set for Arandis becoming sustainable any 
time soon. For example, Enviro-Business Consultancy (2004) claimed that ‘the flight 
of physical forms of capital from this community, coupled with the lack of social and 
cultural capital, results in the local economy being unsustainable and dysfunctional, 
and that any expectation of significant economic growth […] would be unrealistic’ 
(p3). Pressure is mounting on different fronts: considering the financial circumstances 
in which the ATC currently finds itself, there is a real and imminent risk that Arandis 
will be relegated to a village status, which would represent a mortal blow to any hope 
left for ever attaining local sustainability. As opposed to towns, villages are managed 
by central government administrators, in what in practice represents a severe de facto 
downgrading in the provision of town services (FC 2007) 
 
To recapitulate, it is unquestionable that Rössing has taken closure very seriously and 
that it has shown commitment to identify and tackle the challenges emerging from 
this. Chief of these challenges has always been the future of Arandis. With most 
stakeholders openly relying on the company to come up with the solution to this 
problem – but at the same time signalling that anything other than securing the town’s 
longevity would be unacceptable -, incentives for debating dispassionately seem to 
have been missing. Within this context, and with a central government that has made 
no solid vow to the town, the company has adopted what was arguably its only 
plausible option: to declare its full determination to attain economic sustainability. 
However, while the town will always be associated to the mine, it is now an 
independent entity and its economic fate has effectively grown beyond the company’s 
hands. It remains to be seen whether all the efforts and resources that are (and will 
continue to be) invested in backing up this strategy would have not been better spent 
on an orderly transition towards a vision of the Erongo region without Arandis.   
  
 
4.6. Final remarks 
 
Sustainable development has deeply changed the expectations that both the local and 
international communities have on companies’ behaviour generally and, as 
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particularly explored in this case study, their long lasting legacy. For the mining 
industry, closure may be seen as the ultimate SD challenge: if these business activities 
were going to convert a latent underground wealth into other, more sustainable forms 
of wealth, then closure should be the right occasion to finally assess this. Closure 
provides an opportunity for an ex post evaluation of the economic implications of 
mining. In this sense, these implications might be more relevant to large multinational 
corporations with a reputation at stake, such as Rio Tinto, than for single-mine 
companies that would otherwise cease to exist after decommissioning. The economic 
fate of Arandis posses a very real threat to Rio Tinto’s future license to operate in 
Namibia and other parts of the world.   
 
The discussion in this paper has made the case for addressing these questions early 
on; the key economic challenges caused by the prospects of decommissioning 
Rössing had been, in fact, inherited from decisions made decades ago, many of which 
can be tracked down to the mine’s early days. Similarly, decommissioning cannot be 
treated as an isolated challenge but instead as an integral part of project design; as 
such, a closure strategy should be entrenched in every aspect of the mining plan, and 
should thus pay close attention to, for instance, mining and processing activities, 
human resources, employee accommodation, transport and further infrastructure, as 
much as it does to C&E (communities and environment). This discussion, however, 
has also reinforced the idea that these questions cannot be single-handedly addressed 
by mining companies. Closing down a large mine is typically an extremely stressful 
event for host economies, and thus policy decisions in this respect should include a 
large number of local – and in cases national – stakeholders. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The expansion challenges of Pilbara Iron –   
and the local ambitions for economic sustainability 
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5.1. The Meaning of Economic Sustainability in the Pilbara 
 
The beginning of the worldwide mineral boom early this decade has resulted in a 
rapid shift in the strategies of large mining companies, from cost cutting to output 
maximisation, as an attempt to cash in the unprecedented price bonanza. In many 
cases, the quickest way for companies to increase production has been to invest in 
expanding existing operations, otherwise known as brown-field investment. This type 
of investment brings in very specific challenges, as pre-existing economies have to 
accommodate a rapid increase in the demand for inputs such as labour or 
infrastructure, with quite significant implications in terms of sustainable development 
(SD). Chapter three introduced Rio Tinto’s subsidiary Pilbara Iron66 (PI) and the 
Australian region in which its mining operations take place, the Pilbara, in Western 
Australia (WA). PI, the largest contributor to Rio Tinto’s revenues since 2004, 
committed to a significant expansion of its operations, equivalent to a combined 
investment of more than US$4.5 billion. It has always been clear that an investment 
of this magnitude would create substantial challenges as well as opportunities for both 
the mining house and the regional economy (Mining Journal, various issues 2004, 
2005, 2006)  
 
The scale of this expansion is such that most groups of people in the Pilbara will be 
affected. For PI there would be arguably two stakeholders with unrivalled 
importance: the State and local government, and the Aboriginal people. The 
government has long articulated its vision for the Pilbara67 as that of ‘[…] Sustainable 
and independent communities, underpinned by a strong and diversified economy’ 
(Pilbara Development Commission 2005, 2006, DLGRD 2006). State negotiations 
with the company have been guided by this vision and targeted increasing local 
benefits from the operations. For instance, Pilbara-based accommodation has always 
been the government’s preferred housing option for mineworkers, at a time in which 
FIFO68 was strongly opposed (CMEWA 2005). In the same way, the town 
normalisation – a process by which the State government started to regain 
                                                 
66
 PI operations encompass a network of ten mines, an extensive railway line, three ports and the power 
supply system, in addition to several mining towns.  
67
 See, for instance, The Pilbara Development Commission, www.pdc.wa.gov.au 
68
 Fly-in and fly-out. 
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responsibility for company towns in the Pilbara - gained momentum during the last 
decade based on the assumption that these towns could, in effect, became ‘normal’ 
and sustainable towns.  
 
In the second group, many Aboriginal people in Australia still inhabit the most 
remote and isolated parts of the country. In this sense, Rio Tinto’s Community 
Standards highlight the company’s commitment to establishing special relationships 
with these communities through permanent consultations (Rio Tinto 2000), and 
recognises the Aboriginal people as the traditional owners of the land now within Rio 
Tinto’s mining concession. Furthermore, the company has repeatedly stressed its 
promise to always obtaining their prior consent before new mining begins. This 
consent has frequently been formalised in carefully negotiated and legally binding 
agreements, which can include recognition of no-go areas and targets for Aboriginal 
employment, as well as specific economic contributions by the company, which has 
often included direct transfers to ad hoc Aboriginal Trusts and Funds. Regardless of 
these efforts, the Aboriginal participation in the formal economy remains extremely 
low. For one reason or another, these communities have not benefited from the 
booming mineral economy.   
 
Figure 5.1 - Map of Pilbara region and towns 
Source: URS (2005) 
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PI has ratified its commitment to SD in going forward with the current expansion (for 
instance, Pilbara Iron 2005c).  It has also aligned itself with the government's vision 
for a diversified and strong regional (Pilbara) economy (Minera 2004, Pilbara Iron 
2005c), and has thus been inclined to position itself as a Pilbara player principally – 
as opposed to a broader, albeit perhaps less critical, contributor to the State economy. 
Reasons for this choice are manifold. As the SD agenda consolidated worldwide, 
attention shifted to the vicinities of the mine (MMSD 2002. See also chapter 2). 
Almost by definition, Aboriginal relations involve Pilbara-based activities. Also, full 
employment in a FIFO basis was never seriously considered a feasible option in the 
past, for both logistic and political reasons (CMEWA 2005). The expansion plans by 
PI require government approvals and compliance with existing regulations, from 
technical matters related to the extraction and processing of the mineral, to the 
expansion of essential infrastructure (e.g. railway and ports), access to land, build up 
of new accommodation for employees and other substantial town investment. 
Backing the government’s idea of strong and sustainable towns became the obvious 
strategy for PI.  
 
This choice would guide the corporate positioning with regards to SD in WA, 
including its community investment, procurement practices, targets for local and 
Aboriginal employment as well as the company’s communication plan. However, are 
the government vision for the region, regulations and other agreements in accordance 
with the principles of sustainable economic development? Can the Pilbara ever 
became economically and socially sustainable?  Paying the bills for unrealistic 
expectations (e.g. maintaining unreasonable levels of welfare in this remote location) 
could became a severely value-substracting policy strategy, costly indeed for both the 
government and the company. What lies beneth the plausibility of this vision is the 
nature and real economic potential of the Pilbara, and its inherent capacity to react to 
the large, though particular, economic stimuli by mining enterprises operating locally.   
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 Roebourne Ashburton 
Size 15,000 sq km 105,647 sq km 
Towns Karratha, Wickham, Point Samson, 
Dampier, Roebourne 
Tom Price, Paraburdoo, 
Pannawonica, Onslow 
Population 15,974 6,888 
Sealed Roads 525km 133.47km 
Unsealed Roads 375km 2,478km 
 
 
Table 5.1 – Key shire statistics 
Source:  Shires’ Annual Reports 2003/04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So far, the proposed vision of a sustainable regional economy has rested on the 
assumption that the expansion of the resource industry will de facto benefit this 
regional economy. Similarly, the transfer of existing company infrastructure assets to 
the local governments, as contemplated by the normalisation process underway, is 
expected to strengthen the towns and local communities. The present study puts these 
assumptions under examination, exploring, for instance, how much of the capital 
flowing into the region actually stick to the local economy; considering the 
performance of non-mining enterprises; and investigating the potential for economic 
diversification in the Pilbara.  Thus, the subject of study in this chapter is PI and the 
Pilbara region, in particular the towns of Dampier, Karratha and Wickham, in the 
Shire of Roeburne, and Panawonica, Paraburdoo and Tom Price, in the Shire of 
Ashburton – referred in this study as ‘PI towns’ (Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1) 
 
The research methodology was discussed in chapter 3. It is worth reiterating that most 
Rio Tinto data has been sourced from the Rio Tinto and PI financial departments 
unless otherwise specified. As in chapter 4, corporate data is mainly based on 2004 
figures, although in some cases the information discussed reverts to the latest census 
available at the time of writing (2001). The analysis of the local economy mainly 
relies on secondary sources of information, largely from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS), data from the Shires’ Authorities, and other sources, which are 
explicitly referenced in all cases. In particular, I/O analysis is based on tables for the 
year 2001/02 commissioned by Rio Tinto. The study also incorporates the supporting 
views emerging from conversations with local residents, both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal. All interviews were conducted in person during 2005. Finally, the study 
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is organised in the following way: section 2 examines PI and its contributions to the 
economy. Section 3 focuses on the economy of the Pilbara and compares it to that of 
WA, explores the financial situation of PI towns and reviews the challenge of 
normalisation. Section 4 explores the socioeconomic structure of the different 
communities in the Pilbara. Section 5 summarises the main findings of the 
investigation. Section 6 covers final remarks and key conclusions. 
 
 
5.2. The company’s economic contribution69   
 
The contribution of PI to the economy is, in absolute terms, huge.  In 2004, the 
value added by the business was equivalent to A$1.9 billion (U$1.5b) – out of a 
gross turnover of A$2.9 billion (US$2.2b).  In addition, the activities by the 
company generated demand for goods and services from other sectors in the 
economy equivalent to A$0.9 billion (U$0.7b). While the gross turnover of the 
business has grown substantially during this decade, (reflecting increases in total 
production, exchange rates movements70 and, more fundamentally, significant 
rises in the price of iron), the overall economic composition of these activities has 
seldom changed, value added still accounting for over 60% of the total value of 
mineral production.  As argued in chapters 2, modern mining tends to add more 
value to the economy in relation to the total value of the industry’s production 
than most other sectors, which is largely explained by the intensity of capital 
required to operate – i.e. the relatively high allowances to repay to the providers 
of capital71.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
69
 All PI figures in this study are in accordance with the UK GAAP accounting system. Direct 
comparison with current corporate reports should take into consideration the fact that Rio Tinto 
has most recently adopted the IFRS system.   
70
 In mining, contract prices are nominated in US dollars while costs are largely in local currencies. 
71
 In 2004, PI paid A$718m (U$552m) to the providers of capital, 79% in dividends and 21% in interest 
payments.  In addition, the company retained A$421m (U$324m) to allow for the replacement of 
depreciated assets as well as for future investment. 
 
 171
U$ million Payments to Suppliers Value Added Total Contribution 
PI 2003 
PI 2004 
517 (30%) 
704 (33%) 
1,186 (70%) 
1,473 (67%) 
1,703 
2,177 
Change from 2003 36% 24% 28% 
 
wages 11%
taxes & royalties
 16%
interests 
5%
dividends
20%
reinvested 
15%
payments to 
suppliers
 33%
Table 5.2 – PI economic contribution 
Source: Based on data from PI 
 
 
In the present analysis based on annual cash flows, this capital intensity is represented 
by the aggregation of interest payments, dividends and capital reinvested in the Rio 
Tinto Group, which roughly accounted to half of the value added by PI in 2004, or 
one third of its gross turnover (Figure 5.2). The category ‘reinvested’ entails earnings 
retained within Rio Tinto for future investment, earnings attributable to outside 
shareholders, amortisation and depreciation. While it is possible to assume that part of 
the capital that Rio Tinto is currently investing in PI expansion originated in the 
Pilbara, typically the best capital markets are not to be found in remote Australia. The 
most direct effects of this large component of value added are likely to go away from 
the local level of the operations, and thus to have a negligible effect on economic 
development in the vicinities of the mines. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Economic contributions by PI in 2004 
Source: Based on data from PI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rest of the value added by PI is essentially taxes and labour payments, which 
combined accounted for 27% of gross turnover in 2004, similar to that of Rio Tinto as 
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Coast (Cape Lambert & Dampier) 1,138 4 0 1,142
FIFO (Brockman, Yandicoogina, West Angelas) 529 1 0 530
Inland (Tom Price, Marandoo, Paraburdoo, Pastoral Stations, Pannawonica) 1,532 2 0 1,534
International (Hong Kong, Beijing, Korea, London, Shanghai, Japan) 0 11 0 11
Perth 316 12 5 333
Total 3,515 30 5 3,550
local 
90%
regional 
9%
interantional 
0.3%
a whole (26%). That year, the total amount paid to PI employees in wages and 
salaries was A$316m (U$243m). This figure includes employee benefits for over 
A$76m (US$58m), encompassing relocation allowances, rental and interests 
assistance, water and power subsidies, and annual allowances, among other benefits 
applicable to PI employees living in the Pilbara. Total employment by the company 
was just above 3,500 people, the vast majority of which were Pilbara residents. PI 
jobs based in Perth accounted for 9% of the total. There were 11 PI employees 
working outside Australia in 2004 (PI 2005). Overall, there were 134 Aboriginal 
people working for PI in 2004, 2/3 as direct PI employees and the rest as contractors.   
 
Table 5.3 – Employment by PI in 2004 
Source: PI Human Resources 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 – Employees by location 
Source: PI Human Resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total employee numbers in PI surged during the 2000s, matching the tendency for the 
mining industry in Australia. Overall, mining employment in Australia declined 
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000 employees 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
Coal   18 20 18 20 21 21 
Oil and gas    6 4 6 4 4 6 
Metal ore   31 29 30 34 35 38 
Other mining (inc. services)   25 25 24 23 26 27 
Total mining 86 83 80 78 77 80 86 92 
 
steadily during the 1990s, along with (or, perhaps, explained by) strong increases in 
productivity in the sector (RTED 2004). There was also a consolidating trend towards 
outsourcing labour in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, which has been in part an 
attempt to respond to business cycles more flexibly. However, due mainly to the 
mineral boom worldwide, with prices for most commodities at record highs, total 
employment in Australia rebounded in 2001, reaching 92,000 people in 2004. This 
came together with a new restructuring wave in the sector, triggering higher demand 
for skilled jobs, which in turn explains, at least partially, increases in average mining 
wages higher than the average for Australia. Demand increased for highly qualified 
employees, particularly engineers. A notable surge in exploration expenditure also 
made geologists scarce (Hall 2003, Argus Research 2004). Rio Tinto Global Practice 
Leader Recruitment, Errol Muir, warned that ‘there is insufficient skilled staff 
available to the industry, […] in Australia alone, the resource sector will require 
70,000 more people by 2015’ (The Mining Journal 2006 p3) 
 
Table 5.4 – Mining employment in Australia 
Source: RTED 2004 
 
 
While mining has typically paid well, this mineral boom exacerbated differences with 
other sectors. Table 5.5 compares average salaries paid by mining and other selected 
industries in Australia. In 2004, mining was by far the best paid occupation in 
Australia with each mineworker earning an average of A$1,600 per week, more than 
double the average for the whole economy. Later this work will turn the attention to 
how much these above-average labour payments are in fact contributing towards 
sustainable economic development in the Pilbara.   
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A$ per person
Mining 1608
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 1229
Finance and Insurance 1038
Communication Services 936
Transport and Storage 929
Manufacturing 907
Government Administration and Defence 907
Construction 849
Wholesale Trade 844
Education 779
Property and Business Services 769
Average 746
Health and Community Services 708
Personal and Other Services 642
Cultural and Recreational Services 631
Retail Trade 432
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 390
Table 5.5 – Average weekly earnings by industry in Australia (2004) 
Source: ABS catalogue 630.2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2004, taxes and royalties charged to PI amounted to A$460m (U$354m), 
which represents 16% of total sales value. In this case, 42% of the total charge 
corresponds to the government of WA and the balancing 58% to the federal 
government (Figure 5.5). The tax and royalty charged during a year is often 
different from the figure actually paid by the company, as some payments are 
frequently deferred to the following year. PI also generates an extra income 
stream to governments through indirect and other taxes such as employee taxes, 
social security contributions and others.  In 2004, PI paid A$426m (U$328m) in 
taxes and royalties, including direct duties like corporate taxes as well as indirect 
(payroll, VAT etc) and other taxes.  Of that amount, PI reported A$3.9m (U$3m) 
paid in rates to the local administrations72 (PI 2005b), which represents less than 
1% of the total.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 Excludes utility subsidies and other employment contributions 
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State 42%
Federal 58%
Figure 5.5 – Geographic Distribution of Tax and Royalty Charges, 2004 
Source: PI Tax  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Payments to suppliers   
 
In 2004, PI’s demand for materials, facilities and services from other sectors of the 
economy was A$915m (U$704m), or approximately 33% of gross turnover. These 
statistics reflect PI operating supplies. In producing these numbers, PI’s consolidated 
annual vendors’ database has been stripped of most capital expenditure items 
reflecting purchases for the expansion program as well as other capital costs. 
Although in cases this separation was challenging (i.e. it has been difficult to 
distinguish contractors’ work carried out for the expansion project from that of 
operating activities), the methodology should still convey an accuracy of more than 
90%. Where are the benefits from this expenditure mainly felt? The following 
analysis looks at the level of sourcing from within a given economy – the geographic 
origin of the final goods and services acquired -, as the most frequently used proxy 
for backward linkages (UN 2001). Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of these supplies 
organised in four categories (local, regional, national and elsewhere) reflecting the 
postcodes in the invoice of every purchase73. Virtually all operating purchases where 
bought in Australia, with only 2% having been brought in from abroad. Also, more 
than 60% of the total was obtained within Western Australia. Less than 10%, 
however, appears to have been sourced from within the Pilbara itself (PI 2005b).   
                                                 
73
 Note, however, that practically every single item purchased would contain intermediate supplies 
purchased from somewhere else. For large items, it is possible to get a fairly accurate idea of the origin 
of the bulk of these intermediate parts – for instance, key supplies such as fuel are increasingly being 
purchased centrally through the Group’s procurement arm, Rio Tinto Procurement, to secure maximum 
advantage from scale economies-, though it would be virtually impossible to track down the complete 
productive chain for every purchase made by PI. Later this study readdresses this issue, looking at the 
local content of local purchases in more detail. 
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Pilbara 9%
WA 52%
Australia 37%
international 2%
Figure 5.6 – Origin of PI operating supplies, 2004 
Source: Rio Tinto Procurement & PI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As suggested in earlier chapters, the industry’s interpretation of economic 
sustainability has often favoured strategies for substituting imports with local 
products and services. This work investigated the actual scope for this happening in 
the Pilbara. Figure 5.7 displays the complete list of operating goods, materials and 
services procured by the company in 2004, this time organised by type and ranked by 
dollar value. Similarly to the analysis conducted on Rössing, in chapter 4, there is a 
huge concentration of value in relatively few items here as well. Out of more than 60 
categories, the top 5 account for almost 60% of the total value, while the top 15 
account for over 80%. In contrast, the lowest 30 categories account for just over 5%. 
By far the largest item in terms of value was fuel, accounting for 18% of the total, 
followed by contractors74 (including civil, mining, drilling and marine contractors). 
The next group of vendors includes mechanical parts, (either for the trucks or railway 
operation), explosives, travel costs (including FIFO operations), electrical and 
industrial supplies.  The other end of the graph is populated by smaller items like 
office supplies, car hire, clothing and uniforms, travel agency services and couriers 
(see Appendix 1 for details).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74
 These statistics are likely overestimating the importance of contractors slightly, as it was impossible 
to obtain a clean separation between capital and operating activities in this category. 
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Figure 5.7 – PI operating supplies by category, 2004 
Source: Rio Tinto Procurement & PI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Included in the company’s total contribution to the economy is PI’s direct expenditure 
in the community. PI reported providing direct benefits to the community worth 
A$22m (U$16m) in 2004 (PI 2005c, Rio Tinto TS 2005). Interestingly, this 
represented a striking ¼ of total Rio Tinto’s direct investment in the community 
worldwide (US$88m), which is 40% higher than its share contribution to Group 
turnover in 2004.  Arguably, this is the area where most discretionary company 
investment to advance SD objectives should be expected to take place. PI claims that 
these contributions have financed development projects for the most part, as opposed 
to philanthropic donations, in accordance with the SD principle of avoiding 
community dependence. The company reports that half of this investment was direct 
community investment, encompassing a variety of programs like heritage or training, 
principally aimed at Aboriginal communities. Direct handouts only represented 1% of 
the total. It is noteworthy, however, that the overall cost of managing these programs 
accounted for more than ¼ of the total investment reported (Figure 5.8).  
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community 
investment 
52%
charitable gifts 1%commercial initiatives 
01%
direct 
payments 
18%
management costs 
28%
Figure 5.8 – PI community expenditure in 2004 
Source: PI Community Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 below introduces a detailed breakdown of these payments. The largest 
individual payments correspond to (i) training programs, (ii) the Future Fund, and (iii) 
Native Title Payments. Excluding management costs, these items account for 85% of 
the total expenditure. A few observations on the way in which some of these 
contributions have been accounted for: While the Future Fund is an ad hoc, PI-created 
fund that redirects investment into selected projects for social development, thus 
being a voluntary initiative by the company, the Native Title Agreements are instead 
enforceable contracts negotiated and signed with organised traditional land owners, 
and thus non-voluntary contributions. Although much smaller in value, the total 
reported for community expenditure includes contributions to Pilbara towns. As these 
are largely company towns, created for the single purpose of housing mineworkers, 
the beneficiaries of this investment are largely PI employees. As such, these 
initiatives could have also been catalogued, for instance, as HR programs for 
employee retention.  
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Community Investment  
Community and Towns 59,025 
Heritage 1,163,962 
Community Development 336,851 
Training 7,100,000 
Future Funds 2,610,736 
External Affairs 117,000 
West Angelas 95,000 
Expansion Projects 11,302 
Total 11,493,876 
  
Charitable Gifts  
Community and Towns 100,901 
Heritage 3,919 
Community Development 67,248 
External Affairs 19,131 
Pannawonica 74,755 
RRIA Exec Mgt 7,365 
Pilbara Rail 8,428 
Expansion Projects 4,107 
Total 285,854 
  
Commercial Initiatives  
External Affairs 56,753 
Pannawonica 16,295 
Total 73,048 
  
Direct Payments  
Native Title Payments 3,949,023 
Total 3,949,023 
  
Management Costs  
Community and Towns 10,138 
Future Funds 371,776 
External Affairs 3,126,434 
Negotiation 2,170,565 
Community Affairs ATAL Salaries 466,493 
Total 6,145,406 
  
Grand total 21,947,207 
 
Table 5.6 – Community investment by PI in 2004, A$ 
Source: PI Community Affairs 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital investment represents an additional flow of money into the economy, in part 
financed by money previously retained that is now reinvested in the business.  
Normally, this investment consists of acquisitions, the purchase of land or other 
property, equipment, and new construction or expansions.  Capital expenditure by PI 
was A$1billion (U$0.77b) in 2004 (PI 2005b).  Frequently, the local component of 
capital expenditure tends to be small during the operating years (often the equipment 
requirements are highly sophisticated and are not available locally), and higher during 
construction (in inputs such as labour and materials).  However, given supply 
restriction on local labour and materials, most inputs for construction in the Pilbara 
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A$ million 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Agriculture 24           28           27           39           na 53           na
Mining 9,130      8,370      11,717    15,762    14,865    15,892    14,543    
Fishing 14           15           18           12           13           17           19           
Manufacturing 134         na na na 134         na na
Construction 78           35           30           40           42           59           85           
Retail 355         na na na 298         na 326         
Tourism na na 107         118         147         112         na
are also imported from other regions. In addition, the current expansion program 
entails an overall investment of over US$4.5 billion, which is expected to add 
capacity of around 80 million tonnes per year. 
 
In short, the magnitude of PI’s economic activities is enormous, although a significant 
fraction of these benefits appears to be bypassing the local level on its way to Perth. 
Virtually none of the tax and royalty payments are made to the local administrations. 
Also, a level of imports into the Pilbara larger than 90% of total operating purchases 
suggests a fairly small multiplier effect locally. On the other hand, even when some 
of PI’s discretionary investment in the community is in fact contractually binding, it 
overall represents a very material capital injection into the local economy. Similarly, 
payments to mineworkers is huge compared to other industries in Australia – and 
these have been mostly made to Pilbara residents. However, the extent to which this 
stimulus helped consolidate a diversified and sustainable local economy is not yet. 
The next section explores this question in detail as it shifts the attention to the 
regional and local economy. 
 
 
5.3. The Pilbara economy  
 
Table 5.7 shows that mining (including oil and gas) is by far the largest economic 
sector in terms of dollar value in the Pilbara. Also worth noting is the outstanding 
expansion of the sector in this decade, driven to a large extent by sustained demand 
from China, which has resulted in an unprecedented period of high commodity prices. 
This expansion, in fact, continued until the end of the cycle in late 2008. 
 
Table 5.7 – Value of production by industry in the Pilbara (A$ millions) 
Source: Pilbara Development Commission 
Mining includes minerals and petroleum  
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The Pilbara contributes 55% of the minerals and energy production in WA 
(Department of Industry and Resources 2006). Of a total value of mineral production 
of A$14.5 billion (US$11.3b) in 2004, oil and gas and iron ore accounted for 62% 
and 34% respectively, the balance corresponding to salt, copper, sand and other 
minerals. In 2004 the Pilbara produced more than A$9 billion (US$7b) of energy 
products, including crude oil, LNG, LPG-butane, LPG-propane, and natural gas. The 
region also produces 95% of all the production of iron ore in WA – and more than 
90% of that in Australia. In 2004, the Pilbara produced 196 million tonnes of iron 
worth A$5.3 billion (US$4.1b). The bulk of this production is exported, principally to 
China and Japan, but also to South Korea, Taiwan and Europe. There were two large 
producers in the Pilbara in 2004: PI, which produced circa two thirds of the total iron 
ore in the region, and BHP Billiton Iron Ore (BHPB), accountable for the rest75.  
 
Figure 5.9 – Iron ore production in Australia and Western Australia 
Source: Department of Industry and Resources of WA 
 
Table 5.8 shows the dramatic increase in royalties from mineral production in the 
Pilbara that was paid to the government of Western Australian as the expansion of the 
mining sector started to gain momentum. Iron ore was by far the largest contributor 
with A$284m (US$222m) in 2004. The Pilbara is generally considered the most 
prospective and under-explored mineral cluster in Australia, which has prompted 
analysts to assert there is good potential for sustained resource development, and with 
it, good prospects for long term contributions to the State’s coffer (Dames and Moore 
2000).  
                                                 
75
 In 2009, these two companies rocked the markets with the announcement that they intended to form 
a 50/50 strategic alliance to operate their Pilbara resources jointly.  At the time of writing, this alliance 
was still subjected to regulatory approvals.   
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000 A$ 1995/96 2000/01 2003/04
iron ore 178,437            265,313            283,853            
solar salt 1,166                1,335                1,491                
manganese 1,091                2,842                3,164                
Chromite n/a 295                   1,117                
Copper cathods 864                   1,601                1,641                
total 181,558            271,386            291,266            
Table 5.8 – Mining royalties from operations in the Pilbara  
Source: Department of Industry and Resources of WA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The local manufacturing industry is tiny compared to mining. The main form of 
manufacturing in the Pilbara falls under the category ‘metal products, machinery and 
equipment’. The latest statistics available correspond to 2001, and estimated a value 
of production of A$134 million (US$105m) in the Pilbara. However, this statistic 
largely entailed the BHP Hot Briquetted Iron plant, which ceased operations later in 
2004. Smaller activities also exist, including the prawn processing industry at Nickol 
Bay near Karratha. There were some prospects for the installation of a downstream 
petroleum industry for fertilisers and chemical production at the time of writing.  
 
The pastoral industry still plays an important role locally. It is the major land user in 
the Pilbara and provides employment of local people including many Aborigines. In 
2004 the value of agriculture production was estimated to be A$53 million 
(US$41m), 1.2% of the total agriculture production in WA. The cattle industry is the 
primary activity. During the same year, the fishery production in the Pilbara was 
A$19 million, or US$15m (there are three major commercial fisheries in the region). 
Pearl production is another small local industry. Pearls are grown on land-based 
aquaculture sites. No financial data has been obtained76. Finally, 260,000 tourists 
visited the Pilbara in 2004, with an overall spent estimated at A$112 million.  
 
In its effort to promote sustainable economic activity in the Pilbara region, the 
government makes available a fairly large number of financial assistance initiatives 
for the support of small enterprises. There are Business Enterprise Centres located in 
Port Hedland and Karratha, and a Chambers of Commerce has been established in 
                                                 
76
 Overall pearl production in WA was A$150 million in 2004 
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 Number of 
businesses 
Average 
income 
Average 
expenses 
Average 
profit 
 no. A$ A$ A$ 
1995-96 2,651 190,749 164,195 26,554 
1996-97 3,009 180,618 159,636 20,982 
1997-98 3,204 176,554 157,457 19,097 
1998-99 2,930 192,476 170,707 21,769 
1999-00 2,711 204,570 178,774 25,796 
2000-01 2,058 269,238 243,389 25,850 
 
Port Hedland, Karratha and Newman. Regardless of these continued efforts towards 
regional economic development, total number of small and medium private 
enterprises is declining. According to the ABS, there were around 2,000 small to 
medium private enterprises in the Pilbara in 2001, two thirds of which were sole 
traders (Table 5.9).  The Australian definition of SME encompasses businesses whose 
total income is between A$10,000 and A$5 million in the financial year. The Pilbara 
Development Commission estimates that there were circa 1,100 of such businesses in 
2004. The fact that mining in the Pilbara expanded its value of production by 74% in 
5 years (Pilbara Development Commission 2006) does not seem to have fuelled other 
economic sectors – with the exception of construction, which has been directly linked 
to mining in the Pilbara.   
 
Table 5.9 – Small business information in the Pilbara region 
Source: ABS, Regional Small Business Statistics, Cat. 5675.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst mining has always been the dominant employer in the Pilbara, contributing 
nearly 25% of total jobs, the total number of mining employees has fallen over time. 
Overall unemployment, however, has always remained way below WA’s rates, which 
suggests that unemployed people do not remain in the Pilbara (RTED 2004). 
Unemployment in the Pilbara fell to 3.2% in 2004 compared to 5.1% in the State. As 
a result of the mining boom, mining employment in WA (and, in fact, employment in 
general) started to rise again in 2001. Accordingly, the level of payroll tax from this 
activity accelerated since 2002. Payroll tax paid to the WA government from labour 
in the Pilbara was A$40m (US$31m) in 2004 (ABS Catalogue 6202.0) 
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The single major employer of resident workers is Pilbara Iron. Other major employers 
in the Pilbara are the construction sector, retail trade, education77, and iron ores (other 
than Pilbara Iron), all closely linked to the extractive industries in the Pilbara. Figure 
5.10 shows employment by industry in the Pilbara compared to WA, as percentage of 
total jobs. While the main employers in the Pilbara tend to be industry oriented (i.e. 
mining and construction), they lean instead towards the service activities in the State 
economy, with jobs concentrating in retail trade, and property and business services.   
 
Figure 5.10 – Employment by economic sector in the Pilbara and WA 
Source: ABS Catalogue 2003.0 
 
 
5.3.1 The interface between mining and the rest of the economy 
 
This section explores the relationship between mining and the rest of the economy in 
the Pilbara, relying on input/output (I/O) analysis. Input-output tables provide a 
summary of the transactions occurring within an economy. They are used here to 
understand the relative importance of different industries, as well as the interactions 
                                                 
77
 Includes training activities outsourced by PI as part of the company’s community relations 
 185
among different economic sectors. They show, for a given industry, which other 
industries it purchases from and to which other industries it sells to. The national 
input-output tables also show the use of industry production in private and 
government consumption, and the use in public and private investment and exports. 
While the ABS produces I/O tables for Australia, they do not produce state or 
regional tables. The most recently published national I/O table was for the financial 
year 1998-99. In 2004, Rio Tinto commissioned the production of I/O tables for 
Western Australia and the Pilbara, based on the existing national tables, and updated 
to the fiscal year 2001/02, in accordance to the latest available census (Acil Tasman 
2005). These tables include (i) Rio Tinto’s iron ore operations (PI) as a separate 
industry, (ii) other Rio Tinto businesses operating in the Pilbara (i.e. Dampier Salt), 
and (iii) 83 Pilbara-based industries, including the two Rio Tinto industries (see 
Appendix 2 for details). The conclusions in this section are based on these tables.  
  
Table 5.10 presents the components of gross product at market prices (i.e. including 
indirect taxes) and in percentage terms for the Pilbara and Western Australia, as 
derived from the regional input-output tables. The Pilbara input-output tables suggest 
the Gross Regional Product78 (GRP) of the Pilbara was approximately A$12,921 
million (US$10,080m), or over 16% of the Western Australian economy. 
Remarkably, mining has a 90% share of the Pilbara economy, while no other industry 
                                                 
78
 An alternative estimate of the Pilbara GRP is available from the Department of Local Government 
and Regional Development (DLGRD 2006).  This estimate is for the 2002-03 financial year and is an 
estimate at factor cost, as opposed to market prices, and therefore does not include indirect taxes.  
According to this the Pilbara’s GRP in 2002-03 is estimated to be A$3,713 million.  For comparison, 
the 2001-02 Pilbara GRP also at factor cost (derived from the region’s input-output table) is A$12,470 
million.  There is clearly a major discrepancy between the two estimates. 
The DLGRD estimate is derived using ABS data on broad industry contributions to Gross State 
Product (GSP) at factor cost in Western Australia.  The Pilbara share of each broad industry is 
estimated using employment shares derived from the 2001 census (ABS). According to the 2001 
census, mining employment in the Pilbara was slightly over 18% that of WA. In 2001-02, however, the 
output from the minerals industry (slightly different from mining in that it includes some mineral 
processing) in the Pilbara was 57% that of Western Australia (Department of Industry and Resources). 
Yet, as very little minerals processing occurs in the Pilbara compared with the rest of the state this will 
underestimate the Pilbara mining share.   
In 2001-02, mining contributed A$14,768 million of total factor income to the economy of WA.  Using 
the Pilbara’s employment share this would translate to a A$2,722 million contribution to the Pilbara 
economy in 2001-02 (and A$2,733 in 2002-03, the base year used in the Department of Local 
Government and Regional Development calculation).  Alternatively, applying the 57 per cent share 
derived from minerals production gives an estimate of A$8,355 million.  From the Pilbara input-output 
table, mining’s contribution to the Pilbara economy at factor cost was A$9,189 million in 2001-02.  
Given that the Pilbara’s minerals industry production share underestimates the region’s mining share, 
the Pilbara input-output table’s estimate of mining industry contribution to the regional product appears 
reasonable. 
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(A$ million) (%) (A$ million) (%)
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 40 0.3 3,835 4.9
Mining 11,659 90.2 15,100 19
Manufacturing 91 0.7 6,288 8
Electricity, gas & water supply 49 0.4 1,767 2.2
Construction 127 1 4,366 5.5
Trade 131 1 7,359 9.3
Accomm., cafes & restaurants 35 0.3 1,303 1.7
Transport and storage 122 0.9 4,013 5.1
Communication services 25 0.2 1,721 2.2
Finance and insurance 18 0.1 3,513 4.5
Property and business services 114 0.9 7,016 8.9
Government adm. & defence 60 0.5 2,611 3.3
Education 63 0.5 2,970 3.8
Health and community services 51 0.4 3,882 4.9
Cultural and recreational services 10 0.1 1,078 1.4
Personal and other services 38 0.3 1,548 2
Ownership of dwellings 119 0.9 5,786 7.4
Final demand (a) 171 1.3 4,550 5.8
Gross Product 12,921 100 78,708 100
Sector
Pilbara WA
exceeds 1.5%. The industry is by far the major component of the regional economy. 
Mining is also the largest contributor to the economy of WA, although its 19% 
contribution looks relatively small when compared with the situation in the Pilbara. 
As opposed to the Pilbara, only one out of the 18 sectors shown in the table 
contributes less than 1.5% to the size of the state economy. 
 
Table 5.10 - Components of gross product at market prices, Pilbara and WA, 2001-02 
Source: Acil Tasman (2005) Pilbara and Western Australian Input-Output tables, 2001-02  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Final Demand: consumption, government spending, investment and exports 
 
 
All of this indicates that the Pilbara economy specialises in mineral production.  The 
lack of a major contribution from any other sector also indicates that very little 
processing of the output of the minerals industry is occurring in the region, and that 
the region meets relatively few of its needs from its own production. Table 5.11 
breaks down mining contribution into different sectors. Oil and gas, with 69% of the 
total in the Pilbara, is the major contributor.  Pilbara Iron is the next largest, with 19% 
of the total. Rio Tinto as a whole (PI and Dampier Salt) account for just over 20%.  
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                  Pilbara             Pilbara
(A$ million) (% of Mining)
Pilbara Iron 2,256 19.3
Dampier Salt 106 0.9
Oil and gas 8,016 68.8
Iron ores 1,134 9.7
Non-ferrous metal ores 85 0.7
Other mining 29 0.3
Services to mining 32 0.3
Gross Product 12,921 100
Sector
Oil & gas Iron ore Non-ferrous 
metal ores
Other mining Average Pilbara
Output 1.0504 1.0475 1.3855 1.0599 1.4447
Income 0.0536 0.116 0.1722 0.0987 0.3216
Value added 0.7717 0.5847 0.6158 0.5456 0.6428
Employment 0.0001 0.0007 0.0033 0.0026 0.0089
Table 5.11 – Mining contribution to GRP at market prices, 2001/02 
Source: Acil Tasman (2005) Pilbara and Western Australian Input-Output tables, 2001-02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input-output multipliers are another tool that can be used to examine mining’s impact 
on the Pilbara economy (see Appendix 2 for details on multipliers and the full set of 
multiplier tables).  Table 5.12 shows the simple multipliers for the Pilbara mining 
industry (excluding Rio Tinto) and compares these with the average in the region. 
The simple output multipliers indicate the impact that increases in output from the 
mining industry have on total output in the region (note that simple multipliers, as 
opposed to total multipliers, do not capture the impact of additional private 
consumption from increased payments to labour). For example, the iron ore simple 
multiplier of 1.0475 means that for every A$1 increase in output in the iron ore 
industry there is an extra increase in output from other industries in the Pilbara worth 
A$0.04754.  
 
Table 5.12 – Mining (excl. Rio Tinto) simple multipliers in the Pilbara, 2001/02 
Source: Acil Tasman (2005), Pilbara and Western Australian Input-Output tables, 2001-02 
 
 
With the exception of value added, the mining industry multipliers compare poorly 
with the regional average – i.e. increases in output in the sector have relatively little 
flow-on effects on the rest of the economy. In fact, the I/O tables suggest that an 
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Category Impact
Share of Pilbara GRP 17%
Share of Pilbara resident employment 13%
Purchases of Pilbara production A$53 million
increase in production in the Pilbara has larger flow-on effects in WA than in the 
Pilbara itself. Why are mining multipliers in the Pilbara so small? As discussed in 
previous chapters, mining operations use relatively few non-capital inputs. Therefore, 
during production, mining provides a relatively small stimulus to the local economy 
per dollar of output. The relatively underdeveloped manufacturing and service 
industries in the Pilbara restrict the benefits the region can extract from mineral 
production. To put it differently, it seems there is relatively little scope for 
diversification – the economy is largely dependant on the direct contributions from 
mining. However, mining operations in the Pilbara are of such an enormous scale 
that, although their per-unit stimulus may be small, their impact on an absolute basis 
is still enormous.  
 
With regards to Rio Tinto, Pilbara Iron represents a significant part of the Pilbara 
economy. Table 5.13 shows that PI contributes 17% of GRP. Also, earlier this study 
indicated that payments to local suppliers by PI were approximately A$80m in 2004. 
For this calculation, PI provided data on purchases by vendor for its Pilbara 
operations, so vendors with a Pilbara postcode were assumed to be Pilbara based 
suppliers. However, not all purchases from businesses with a Pilbara postcode are 
produced in the Pilbara, and some can be simply on-sold by a Pilbara based business. 
Acil Tasman (2005) adjusted these cost data so that intermediate inputs were 
excluded. This analysis suggests that the company consumed just over A$50 million 
worth of production from other Pilbara industries in 2001/02. With regards to 
employment, in 2001 PI employed 2,051 Pilbara residents out of a total resident 
employment of 16,264 people, constituting 13% of the workforce resident in the 
region (ABS 2001). 
  
Table 5.13 – PI impact on the Pilbara economy 
Source: Acil Tasman (2005), Pilbara and Western Australian Input-Output tables, 2001-02  
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Multipliers type Pilbara Iron
Output 1.0265
Income 0.081
Value added 0.8031
Employment 0.0011
Table 5.14 shows the indirect impact of PI operations through the simple multiplier 
effects. Comparing these figures with those in table 5.12 suggests that the output, 
income and employment multipliers are, in fact, quite typical for the overall mining 
industry in the Pilbara. The PI value added multiplier, however, is larger than most of 
the other businesses within the mining sector, suggesting that an extra unit of 
production by PI adds more value to the region than does an extra unit by the rest of 
the mining industry.    
 
Table 5.14 –PI’s simple multipliers 
Source: Acil Tasman (2005), Pilbara and Western Australian Input-Output tables, 2001-02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2 Making sense of town finances 
 
This section turns the attention from the economic structure of the Pilbara as a whole, 
to the individual Shires and Towns. There are four Local Government Areas (LGA) 
in the Pilbara region: the Shire of Ashburton, the Shire of East Pilbara, the Shire of 
Roebourne and the Town of Port Hedland. The LGAs raise income from rates, and 
increasingly more importantly from a range of discretionary grants from State and 
Federal governments and other sources. Maintaining services in the remote and 
climatically extreme north west of WA is expensive, and most of these towns have a 
level of facilities that would have been difficult to establish without company support. 
Table 5.15 shows the date and basis of establishment and population of Pilbara towns 
(see also figure 5.1). The six main towns within the sphere of influence of Pilbara 
Iron (1 to 6 in the table) fall within the jurisdiction of the Roebourne and Ashburton 
Shires, and have varying levels of company investment and support. 
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Population 
Town (% of Region)
1. Dampier 1,490 (3.5) Roebourne 1965 HI & Robe
2. Karratha 10,800 (25.5) Roebourne 1968 Pastoral – later invest by HI, Robe & Woodside
3. Wickham 2,500 (5.9) Roebourne 1972 HI & Robe
4. Pannawonica 700 (1.7) Ashburton 1971 HI & Robe
5. Paraburdoo 1,200 (2.8) Ashburton 1971 HI & Robe
6. Tom Price 3,600 (8.5) Ashburton 1966 HI & Robe
7. Port Hedland 6,000 (14.2) Port Hedland 1870s Pastoral, mining & pearling – later BHP 
8. Pt Samson 500 (1.2) Roebourne 1866 Pastoral and mining industries
9. Roebourne 980 (2.3) Roebourne 1866 Pastoral and mining industries
10. South Hedland 10,053 (23.8) Port Hedland 1973 Due to shortage of land above cyclonic storm surge
Shire Est. Year Base for Establishment
Roebourne Ashburton Roebourne Ashburton
Revenue $20,261,063 $10,792,371 $24,494,905 $11,958,329
Expenditure $21,875,153 $9,568,357 $21,819,266 $11,788,397
Interest/borrowing costs $46,409 $103,141 $87,270 $144,930
Net Profit or (Loss) ($1,660,499) $1,120,873 $2,588,369 $25,002
2002/2003 2003/2004
Table 5.15 – Towns in the Pilbara 
Source: Piper (2005)  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.16 summarises Roebourne and Ashburton’s revenue and expenditure 
accounts for 2002/03 and 2003/04. The non-Aboriginal population in the Pilbara, on 
whose properties rates are mainly based, has been decreasing in the last years, while 
the local Aboriginal population has remained static – although the aggregate numbers 
are held up by immigration and inter-race marriages.  The contribution that 
Indigenous people make to rates is immaterial in absolute terms, as the largest 
majority of the population are not homeowners or live outside the town rating 
boundaries (Taylor and Scambary 2005). The Shire of Roebourne receives 
approximately twice the revenue of the Shire of Ashburton largely from much higher 
rates and fees & charges, which is a reflection of its larger population centres 
compared with other non-urban LGAs in WA.  
 
Table 5.16 – Summary of shire revenue and expenditure 
Source: Ashburton and Roebourne shire annual reports (02/03 & 03/04) 
 
 
Revenue as a percentage of asset value for the average Pilbara LGAs is 16.2%, 
compared to 14.4% for non-Pilbara non-urban LGAs (2001/02) (Pilbara Regional 
Council 2006). However, inelastic revenues and a declining non-Aboriginal 
population deteriorate the Shires’ capacity to assume additional responsibilities for 
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Roebourne Ashburton Roebourne Ashburton
Grants & subsidies $4,847,867 $5,756,107 $6,215,607 $5,438,914
Reimbursements and donations $294,434 $338,417 $428,086 $179,305
Rates $6,383,869 $3,084,777 $7,004,260 $3,324,262
Fees & charges $7,571,030 $1,041,328 $9,347,834 $2,538,913
Profit on asset disposals $155,498 $40,520 $188,320 $3,348
Interest earnings $220,143 $97,770 $330,199 $180,016
Other revenue $788,222 $433,452 $980,599 $293,571
Total $20,261,063 $10,792,371 $24,494,905 $11,958,329
2002/03 2003/04
infrastructure. Moreover, close inspection to the sources of revenue suggests, in fact, 
that recurrent income will not be enough to sustain the current level of recurrent costs 
indefinitely. These Shires have very few recurrent revenue earners. Revenues from 
rates – 28 to 32% of expenditures– are half what they are in other Australian LGAs. 
The money that comes from rates barely covers public salaries (this situation would 
be worse if the 30% of vacancies at the time of the study were to be filled). As in 
most LGAs, rates are based on assessments of the value of properties. The rates are 
generally low compared to total revenue because of low population and the housing 
stock in the Pilbara increasing very slowly. Also, asset values in the Pilbara are 
different from large metropolitan areas like Perth. The Pilbara shires have argued that 
an inability to rate mining company landholdings further lowers the rate base (URS 
2005). Worse still, these Shires are not even providing all the services other LGAs in 
Australia do. Because of incomplete normalisation, PI still assumes responsibilities 
for a significant number of amenities and services in these towns. 
 
Table 5.17 – Source of revenue, Roebourne and Ashburton 
Source: Ashburton and Roebourne shire annual reports (02/03 & 03/04) 
 
 
Revenue from grants and subsidies in the Shire of Roebourne made up 22% and 28% 
of total expenditure in 2002/03 and 2003/04, and as much as 60% and 46% in the 
Shire of Ashburton. These Shires are much more dependent on grants and subsidies 
than is normally the case with LGAs. As an illustration, Figure 5.11 compares the 
dollar value of grants & subsidies and rates per head of population in Ashburton to 
selected LGAs. The Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) is a statutory 
authority operating under the CGC Act 1973 with their mandate being to distribute, 
among the States and Territories, the pool of general revenue assistance made 
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available by the Commonwealth. These funds are distributed through the Western 
Australian Local Government Grants Commission (WALGGC). State funding is 
divided into two parts, an equalisation component and a local roads component. The 
funding is allocated on the basis of horizontal equalisation, to ensure that each local 
government in the State is able to function at a standard not lower than the average 
standard of other local governments (DLGRD 2006).  
 
Figure 5.11 – Grants/subsidies & rates per capita, selected LGAs, 2003/04 
Source: LGA Annual Reports 2003/04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of the Pilbara a grant system that was probably intended to supplement 
revenues has become a major source of revenues for Ashburton and Roebourne. 
Although it allows for small capital expenditures, it does not provide the means of 
raising the funds to meet the recurrent costs.  Also, the Shires dependency on grant 
funding that can change from year to year makes planning through forward budgeting 
impossible. The Shires are locked into a fixed pattern of costs associated with their 
asset management responsibilities and are not in a position to launch new initiatives. 
They can only try to extract more money from government or the company to cover 
existing liabilities. 
 
In turn, the PI approach to infrastructure management is ultimately driven by the 
cyclical demands for housing and employee retention. Table 5.18 summaries Pilbara 
Iron’s current involvement in town infrastructure. As a result of incomplete 
normalisation, PI still retains key responsibilities for provision of township utilities in 
the towns, which is generally a requirement of the State Agreements under which the 
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Town PI Responsibilities for town infrastructure
Dampier Company is still responsible for the majority of infrastructure due to limited Shire 
involvement. 
Tom Price Company is still responsible for electricity, sewerage and water (along with other assets not 
transferred in final normalisation agreement).
Paraburdoo Company is still responsible for electricity, sewerage and water (along with other assets not 
transferred in final normalisation agreement).
Wickham The majority of infrastructure is owned and maintained by Robe and the Shire has 
responsibility for some sections of the town (areas with Homeswest housing, some private 
buildings, school, hospital etc).
Pannawonica All the infrastructure owned and maintained by Robe, with the exception of the access road 
from the highway which the Shire maintains.
company operates.  The company is responsible for the majority of infrastructure in 
Dampier and Wickham and virtually all the infrastructure in Pannawonica. PI is still 
responsible for some infrastructure in the towns of Tom Price and Paraburdoo. Under 
these circumstances, it seems unlikely that local governments will be in a position to 
take on these responsibilities from PI, as endorsed by the normalisation process under 
way. Roebourne and Ashburton Shires would face serious challenges in meeting 
future financial targets for maintenance and upgrade of infrastructure.    
  
Table 5.18 – Overview of Pilbara Iron’s responsibilities in town operations 
Source: Piper (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4. The people of the Pilbara 
 
Prior to the latest mining boom, the total population in the Pilbara had been 
decreasing. There were 43,000 people living in the area in 1993, which went down to 
39,500 by 2003, approximately 2 per cent of the population of WA. Not all segments 
of the analysis have behaved similarly, however. Population in coastal areas have 
either remained stable or even increased (Roebourne and Port Hedland). Also, 
increases in Aboriginal population have partially compensated the overall declining 
trend.  With 6,514 people, the Aboriginal population constituted 16% of the total 
Pilbara in 2001 (Taylor and Scambary 2005). Looking forward, as the mining 
expansion increased the demand for mineworkers, headcounts in the region started to 
rise again. The WA Planning Commission estimates that the population of the Pilbara 
 194
Shire 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Ashburton 7,201 7,329 7,369 6,503 6,888 5,781
East Pilbara 8,959 7,372 7,046 6,819 6,786 5,682
Roebourne 14,909 14,038 13,983 14,507 15,974 15,281
Port Hedland 12,542 12,134 12,821 13,248 13,099 12,785
Pilbara 43,611 40,873 41,219 41,077 42,747 39,529
WA 1,677,700 1,733,787 1,798,129 1,857,586 1,901,159 1,952,238
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will grow by 0.8% per year in the period 2001-16, though it will then slow down 
again to 0.4% between 2016 and 2031. In essence, like many other variables in this 
region, population growth in the Pilbara is a cyclical phenomenon.   
 
Table 5.19 – Population:  Western Australia and Pilbara region 
Source: Pilbara Development Commission, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
 
Generally, the Pilbara residents have higher incomes than the average in WA. 
According to the census 2001, the average income in the Pilbara was A$46,976 
compared to A$33,620 in WA. The reason for this disparity is the generally skilled 
nature of employment in the Pilbara – in addition to the fact that mining companies 
typically have to offer higher salaries to attract personnel to the region. 90% of the 
income is derived from wages and salaries, and the rest split between government 
cash benefits (mainly for Indigenous people), own incorporated businesses, 
superannuation and annuities.  Income from other investments (i.e. interests paid to 
financial institutions, net rent and dividends, and corporate or public trusts) is 
negligible in comparison (ABS Catalogue 6524.0).  
 
Figure 5.12 – Income distribution in the Pilbara and WA, A$ per week/person (2001) 
Source – ABS Census 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 195
 
Income is not evenly distributed. A polarised Pilbara economy has resulted in a 
polarised community, with three distinct classes whose sources of employment 
determine their income and area of residence (Taylor and Scambary 2005).  The three 
classes coexist with minimum interaction, separation mirrored in the physical layout 
of residences in the towns. First are the mineworkers. In PI towns, these are 
principally PI workers, though a number of employees from other companies live 
here as well (i.e. energy producer Woodside, BHPB, and Rio Tinto’s Dampier Salt). 
URS (2005 p3) identified a ‘[…] lack of vision for the towns and a lack of community 
energy and spirit’ among these people.  In addition to the generally aging and rapidly 
deteriorating infrastructure, which explains general dissatisfaction over town services, 
the lack of community participation is a reflection of the way in which the majority of 
residents regard life in the Pilbara: short term and of a single purpose.  Most 
mineworkers go to the Pilbara with the idea of saving money and then return to Perth.  
This is exacerbated by the long work hours, the existence FIFO arrangements, poor 
career prospects for spouses and partners, and lack of support services predominantly 
in the area of health and education (URS 2005).  
 
Second are the European non-mining residents. This group is made up of service 
providers, small entrepreneurs, their employees and public servants.  The dominant 
factor facing small businesses is operating in a polarised economy, and trying to 
prosper in a market with notoriously high labour costs, high housing and living 
expenses. These elements constitute clear constraints on expansion or diversification 
of the regional economy.  The labour market for small businesses and government is 
typified by difficulties to attract and retain good staff. The high cost of housing and 
electricity (summers are extremely hot) means that it is very difficult to attract people 
to low paid positions. The poor quality of benefits provided to public servants has 
resulted in a high turnover in the public sector staff (doctors, teachers, nurses etc). 
 
These two groups constitute the bulk of the non-Indigenous people. A number of 
demographic characteristics within this population set the Pilbara apart from the rest 
of Western Australia, including: 
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- A volatile level of population, which is directly influenced by resource activities.  
In particular, the influx of temporary workforce during the construction phases of 
large projects causes community populations to peak.    
- A demographic profile that tends to be skewed to the 25-45-age cohort and 
towards the male gender (ABS 2001) 
- A relatively high turnover.  Less than half of the Pilbara population living in the 
region in 2001 were living in the region in 1996. Almost 40% of the population in 
2001have only moved to the Pilbara in the previous 5 years (ABS 2001) 
- A high level of education.  The Pilbara has the highest proportion of people with 
vocational qualifications (20%) in Western Australia (mineworkers are 
increasingly high-skilled) 
- The highest level of labour force participation in Western Australia at 78% 
(basically, people go to the Pilbara with jobs) 
 
Most non-Indigenous people move to the Pilbara with the initial purpose of making 
money. Overall they have a relatively high marginal propensity to save, though very 
little seems to be reinvested in the Pilbara. In conversation with non-Aboriginal 
residents the point is regularly strongly made that ‘Most saving is still outside the 
region. There is little investment locally […] Shopping is 50:50 local and in Perth. 
You can get most products locally, but people often want a trip to Perth and shopping 
can provide a good reason’ (non-Aboriginal resident I, 2005). The ability to save 
seems highly variable though, and further conversations have suggested that many 
people have poor financial management skills and are easily stuck in a cycle of 
consumption, largely focussed on luxury goods. ‘Financial management and lack of 
savings is a problem across the community – Indigenous and non-Indigenous. There 
are high levels of indebtedness and gambling is a problem. […] Some people get into 
problems with overspending and high debt levels. These debts are not investments but 
associated with consumption of big cars and boats’ (non-Aboriginal resident II, 
2005). 
 
Finally, most people in these categories come for a short period and then choose to 
stay longer: ‘Most people come with a two year plan which changes later to a five 
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year plan or more’ (non-Aboriginal resident III, 2005). More generally, locals claim 
that it is possible to think of these people as falling into four groups.  They frequently 
refer to the terms: two, five, ten and twenty-year-people. Two year people survive 
two winters and one summer.  They find the heat excessive.  Five year people come 
with a clear savings goal.  They reach that goal and leave. Ten year people come for 
five years, they then like the lifestyle, and stay for ten. When they leave it is usually 
for family reasons – usually lack of educational opportunities for youngsters.  The 20 
year people may have come for the money, but are seduced by the quiet lifestyle 
(URS 2005).   
 
 
5.4.1 The Aboriginal community 
 
The third category of Pilbara residents is the Indigenous population, whose 
participation in the local labour force is very low79. Taylor and Scambary (2005) note 
that despite substantial growth in economic activity in the Pilbara since the 1960s, the 
overall employment rate for Indigenous people rose only slightly from 38 per cent of 
all adults in 1971 to just 42 per cent in 2001. Curtin University (2005) suggests that 
Indigenous employment share at all mine sites might be as low as 2% to 3% of the 
total (despite the many programs targeted at increasing Aboriginal employment PI 
had 89 direct Aboriginal employees in 2004, less than 3% of its total labour force) . In 
absolute terms, Indigenous employment increased from 814 in 1971 to an estimated 
1,808 in 2001. However, much of this growth was due to their increased participation 
in the CDEP scheme80.      
 
Taylor and Scambary (2005) write that the majority of the Indigenous population 
remains largely dependent on welfare, structurally detached from the labour market, 
and ill-equipped to engage with it. There are no individual savings in these 
communities, and local private investment and credit activities are extremely low. 
Aboriginal marginal propensity to consume is large – any cash surplus is shared 
                                                 
79
 6% of the formal employment in 2001, according to the ABS (2001)   
80
 The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) is a subsidised governmental labour 
scheme by which beneficiaries contribute with community work for a fixed salary.  CDEP provides 
employment and training opportunities for indigenous Australians who voluntarily forgo their income 
support from the government. CDEP also offers opportunities for Indigenous people to establish their 
own businesses.  
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within the communities for consumption. As a result, the accumulation process does 
not take place in these communities (Martin 1995, 2001). Accordingly, only 14% of 
dwellings are fully owned or being purchased by Indigenous people, while as much as 
80% of their accommodation is rented. This is indicative of their relatively low 
economic status, although some commentators have argued that this may also be an 
expression of a cultural inclination for collective forms of tenure (URS 2005). 
 
Chronic diseases such as cardio vascular, cancer, chronic pulmonary and diabetes 
have become the predominant causes of indigenous mortality in the Pilbara (Taylor 
and Scambary 2005). The number of diabetic Indigenous persons is almost equivalent 
to the numbers in mainstream employment. A serious implication for the private 
sector is the ability of these individuals to participate in the mainstream economic 
activity.  Likewise, the total number of Indigenous people arrested in the Pilbara is 
almost equivalent to the total number of Indigenous people aged 15-45 estimated to 
be employed in the mainstream regional labour market. 
 
Figure 5.13 - Income distribution in the Aboriginal communities, A$ per week/person   
Source: ABS Census 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13 shows the distribution of income of the Aboriginal communities in the 
Pilbara. Most Aboriginal people earn between A$120 and A$399 per week. The 2001 
census revealed that these incomes were around one third of those of non-Aboriginal 
people in the region. The source of Aboriginal income is fundamentally CDEP. Apart 
from this, the Aboriginal labour force is prominent in the pastoral industry. There are 
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Labour Force Status -                        
15 years old and over
Indigenous 
Males
Indigenous 
Females
Indigenous 
Persons
Non-
Indigenous 
Males
Non-
Indigenous 
Females
Non-
Indigenous 
Persons
% Employed by CDEP 22% 19% 21% 0% 0% 0%
% Employed Other 78% 81% 79% 100% 100% 100%
% in Labour Force Employed 84% 85% 85% 96% 95% 96%
% in Labour Force Unemployed 16% 15% 15% 4% 5% 4%
% in Labour Force 52% 41% 47% 85% 65% 76%
% Not in Labour Force 43% 55% 49% 15% 35% 23%
% Not Stated 4% 4% 4% 0% 1% 1%
still a number of pastoral leases held by or on behalf of Aboriginal people in the 
Pilbara.  These properties provide economic benefits to Aboriginal people through 
beef and cattle production but also the provision of government services to the 
communities that live on the properties and through the operation of community 
stores. There is also some tourism, and art & craft related economic opportunities 
associated with the pastoral industry. 
 
Table 5.20 – Labour force status, Indigenous and Non-Indigenous  
Source: Taylor and Scambary 2005 
 
 
Several Aboriginal small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been established in 
recent years to service the resource sector and related activities. There are also a few 
other Aboriginal businesses from a range of industries (Table 5.21). In addition, most 
non-Aboriginal companies in the region are targeting Aboriginals as employees. A 
number of Aboriginal communities have entered into agreements with mining 
companies under the Native Title Act 1993 that provides for ongoing financial 
assistance representing an important source of income for this population. In 
particular, PI has an Indigenous Land Use Agreement with Gumula Aboriginal 
Corporation, representing the native title claimants of the land, for the establishment 
of the Yandicoogina Mine, and relates to an area comprising 26,000km2 (PI 
Community Affairs 2006). 
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Company
Total 
employees
Aboriginal 
employees Industry Clients
Ngarda Civil Mining 90 78 BHPB, PI
Gumula Earthmoving, catering and equipment hire PI
Bridda 23 20 Equipment, labour hire PI
Excel Resources 15 4 General cleanup BHPB 
Indigenous Mining Resources Labour hire and mining services BHPB 
Abment Holdings 2 2 Employment & training for Aboriginals
IBN Corporation Employment & training for Aboriginals IBN and others
Nyamal Crane Hire Pty Ltd Brambles
Headland Sampling
Ieramugadu Gardening Services Gardening & maintenance PI
Karajini Walkabouts Tours at Karajini National Park
Table 5.21 – Key Aboriginal owned businesses in the Pilbara (2004) 
Source: Pilbara business directories and local references 
 
 
Is more mining good news for the Aboriginal people? The recent escalation of mining 
activity in the Pilbara is the largest that has ever taken place in Australia. Large 
mining companies operating in the region have recognised that major social and 
economic impacts to Aboriginal communities should be expected, and that visible 
welfare improvements in these communities would provide the necessary foundations 
for a social licence to operate. However, despite PI’s commitment to SD, and in 
particular a level of investment in the communities that is – relative to value of 
production – larger than anywhere else in the Group, very little has been achieved in 
terms of enhancing Indigenous socioeconomic status in the Pilbara since the early 
1970s (Taylor and Scambary 2005). Anecdotal conversation with Aboriginal 
residents of Pilbara towns often reinforces this view: ‘The companies don’t do enough 
for our people. This is our land. They have to do more for our communities, and give 
the Aboriginal people more jobs’ (Aboriginal resident I, 2005) 
   
Companies often claim that it is extremely difficult for them to find more Indigenous 
people with the practical skills necessary to work in the mines, which is what explains 
the low ratios of Aborigines among mining workers. It has also been claimed that the 
government’s CDEP program may play against company efforts to increase their 
proportion of Indigenous people in the formal workforce, as this subsidy may 
represent a stimulus not to get engaged in the mainstream labour force. In addition, 
the social ownership of individual income amongst Indigenous people means that the 
individual financial incentive is diluted, meaning that the Aboriginal obligation to 
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share wealth or resources with extended families can reduce the incentive to work for 
a wage (Pearson 2000, Martin 2001). When asked about the deterring effects of 
CDEP on jobseekers, however, another Aboriginal resident and PI employee 
maintained that ‘The incentive to work in a real job is there. Salaries paid by PI can 
come up to several times the income from government subsidies’ (Aboriginal resident 
II, 2005) 
  
In turn, welfare standards that are substantially below the average in the region have 
contributed to the lack of assimilation described earlier. Many of the residents in 
these communities find the origin of this problem associated to the saving and 
expenditure patterns of Aboriginal people. A number of interviews conducted during 
2005 illustrate these perceptions: ‘Most Indigenous people don’t know how to save; 
they just spend the money when it is there’ (non-Aboriginal resident IV, 2005). When 
queried about the nature of this expenditure, a general perception among non-
Aboriginals seems to be that pressure from extended families to share the income of 
those in the formal labour force tends to play a key role in their inability to invest in 
productive activities.  ‘They have to learn how to say no to family requests’ (non-
Aboriginal resident V, 2005). Accordingly, Martin (2001) has claimed that the 
marginal propensity to consume in Aboriginal communities in Australia is close to 
100%, and thus their investment capacity is almost inexistent. 
 
These comments have been linked back to some fundamental cultural features in 
these communities.  Martin (2001) explains that having been hunter communities 
until fairly recently, the notion of savings has little practicality; meat rots quickly and 
so surpluses were to be shared.  Many westerner political and economic arrangements 
and institutions have since been incorporated into the indigenous systems, although 
filtered and adapted to aboriginal values. Cash is an example of this: cash surplus - as 
meat was in the past-, is frequently shared within the local population for 
consumption (e.g. Martin 1995, 2001). In addition, there are few available 
instruments for saving cash. For example, the local councils issue payments for those 
in the CEDP program weekly, but there are typically no bank branches or cash 
machines in the Aboriginal settlements outside the towns (McDonnell 2001).  
Corroborating this point, another local resident said that ‘Some community stores 
manage the finances of many Aborigine people; they are like financial centres for 
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them. These stores are often the only link into the market economy for many in 
isolated communities’ (non-Aboriginal resident VI, 2005) 
 
Thus far, it is not apparent that the practical implications of these cultural differences 
have been fully appreciated and incorporated into a more targeted policymaking 
process.  Altman (2001) describes these remote Aboriginal economies as ‘hybrid 
economies’, made up of the market, the state and customary components. He argues 
that the essence of the problem with Aboriginal development in these places is that 
this type of hybrid economy is in general poorly understood by politicians, 
companies, and even Aboriginal people and their representative organisations. It 
follows that policies based on market engagement delivered to communities that are 
extremely remote from markets, both in location and cultural terms, are destined to 
fail. The actual meaning and repercussions of ‘modernity’ in the context of these 
native districts has yet to be fully discovered (Altman 2001)  
 
 
5.5. Implications for the state and local economies 
 
The current PI’s expansion constitutes a huge capital inflow into a region that already 
specialises in mining. This new investment will be expected to impact the existing 
land-access agreements, the broader regional infrastructure, the regional housing 
system and local agglomeration patterns. It will also affect the already delicate social 
structure at the local level. In addressing these emerging challenges, PI has pledged to 
embrace the SD model. The company has had a fundamental advantage in doing so: 
The local meaning of sustainability was in this case unambiguously predefined – it 
translates here to the supporting of the government’s vision for a sustainable and 
independent community and its underpinning economy. In the light of this, then, is 
Pilbara Iron contributing towards economic sustainability?  
 
In absolute terms, PI’s contribution to the economy of Western Australia is very 
significant. This study showed that this predominantly takes the form of taxes and 
royalties and a strong demand for operating supplies from a vast network of State 
businesses, which accounts to more than half of the annual purchases by the 
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company. Similarly, while virtually all wages and salaries are paid to residents of the 
Pilbara, the ultimate effect of these payments locally appears to be substantially 
moderated by high levels of income leaking out of the circular flows – in particular, a 
high marginal propensity to save where the income is higher combined with an 
investment pattern that seems to have Perth as final destination. With regards to the 
capital component of value added (i.e. dividends and interest payments), it should not 
be surprising that both the financial sector and company shareholders, again, have a 
much larger presence in the State than at the local level of the operations.  
 
This study has found that the structure of the regional economy largely explains why 
most of the economic contributions from the company fly away from the local 
economy. The Input/Output analysis introduced in section 3.1 showed that an 
increase in production in the Pilbara has larger flow-on effects in the rest of WA than 
in the Pilbara itself. In their quest for local economic sustainability, the different 
economic players have tried to compensate for this trend by relying on the indirect 
effects of mining and thus have favoured import substitution from local suppliers and 
services. There are, however, no evident comparative advantages encouraging the 
emergence of upstream economic activities in the Pilbara. Likewise, issues such as 
the relative scale of the local and State economies, geographic and demographic 
characteristics, as well as the prevailing composition of the local supply chain, have 
so far played against economic diversification. 
 
In the Pilbara itself, economic benefits from mining come principally from the 
construction of houses and other town infrastructure and its maintenance.  (It is worth 
reiterating, however, that these are still largely mining towns). Likewise the large 
investments taking place on the dedicated iron-ore ports and railway are exclusively 
aimed at increasing mining capacity and thus benefits are not directly reaped by other 
economic players. As discussed, also, while there is a fraction of labour payments 
destined to local consumption, the bulk of personal savings and investment still flows 
to the State. With regards to the direct contributions to government, apart from rates 
levied on local house ownership, taxes and other duties are fundamentally paid to the 
State and Federal governments.   
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Two fundamental dilemmas faced by PI stick out from the rest at the local level: the 
precarious living standards of local Aboriginal population, and the financial and 
administrative uncertainties surrounding the so-called ‘normalisation’ process taking 
place in PI towns. With a very restricted pool of skilled local workers from which to 
recruit, employment by mining companies could offer a unique opportunity for 
Aboriginal people with few other sources of income available. However, cyclical 
peaks in labour demand have been for the most part filled by immigrants. Despite 
company and government efforts, Aboriginal employment outside CDEP remains 
very low. This has been often linked to strong cultural differences between 
Aboriginal practices and companies’ skills requirements. While numerous academic 
commentators have elaborated on the intrinsic difficulties of this relationship, 
policymakers within government, companies or Indigenous communities have yet to 
come up with innovative governance responses that are effective on the ground. 
  
The problems around normalisation point out to another failure in the existing 
systems of governance locally. State agreements have assumed that normalisation in 
Pilbara towns will occur when PI hand over assets in good condition and some funds 
for maintenance during a transition period, although a closer analysis of the towns’ 
finances suggests that significantly expanding the Shires’ responsibilities will not be 
financially sustainable any time soon. The LGAs in question have higher 
expenditures as a percentage of asset value than their peers. So far, this extra 
expenditure has been financed by grants and subsidies from government, and by PI. 
In practice, the existing demarcation of roles and responsibilities in the towns has 
largely been defined by the status of normalisation in each case, but more 
significantly by the Shires’ capacity, ability, and predisposition to carry out required 
tasks in each location.  A recent assessment of ‘normalised’ towns indicates that the 
PI towns are still overly reliant on trends in the mining industry, principally its labour 
force (Pipper 2005). In turn, unresolved normalisation processes have resulted in a 
situation where all stakeholders are limited in their ability to implement effective 
long-term planning. 
  
In tackling these issues, what has been the role of PI’s direct investment in the 
communities (CI) – arguably the most discretionary company instrument to advance 
issues of economic development? While minuscule in relation to the total flow of 
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capital generated by the company, this contribution by PI is still very significant when 
compared to other Rio Tinto businesses. In accordance with SD rhetoric the company 
has minimised the philanthropic component of CI, and donations are today a tiny 
portion of the total. The bulk of ‘capital transfers’, accounting for 18% of the total, 
goes to Aboriginal trusts for intergenerational development, which are then managed 
by an independent board of trustees subjected to independent regulation. These 
payments represent an important source of income for Aborigines, though there is no 
clear evidence that they have yet helped change the structural disadvantage of these 
communities. Yet, the largest portion of CI actually goes to the maintenance of towns 
and their infrastructure, often more associated to human resources than community 
initiatives, as they can be seen as a necessary investment for attracting and retaining 
employees in remote areas.  
 
Up until now, the three Pilbara communities described in this paper do not seem to 
share a common vision for the future of the region. While the government’s plan for 
the Pilbara argues that a robust and sustainable community is possible in these towns, 
a significant expansion of mining activities will likely accentuate, rather than narrow, 
the socio-economic gap between the three distinctive groups.    
 
 
5.6. Final remarks 
 
This analysis has shown that the established vision of long-term sustainability for the 
existing Pilbara communities beyond the extractive industry, so determinately 
endorsed by the government and PI, rests in fact on wobbly foundations. This 
understanding should lead to revisiting the regional strategy towards the towns’ 
normalisation, regional infrastructure, housing and FIFO practices by mining 
companies, as well as other issues such as Aboriginal employment, the welfare 
system and CDEP. Assuring sustainable economic development in the Pilbara will 
require much more than good CSR practices on behalf of PI. It will rather demand 
readdressing broad strategic decisions that are, regrettably or not, beyond the mandate 
of a single company. A new consensual strategy for the future of the region should be 
based on facts and not on an idealistic representation of how the region looks like and 
what its economic potential really is.   
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The question should also be posed whether a sustainable Pilbara economy, as 
currently defined, is ever going to be possible – or even desirable. Western Australia 
– and in fact the Pilbara on its own- is broadly referred to as a mining cluster due to 
the large concentration of world-class ore bodies (Eggert 2001). Providing that 
technology continues to bring previously unfeasible deposits into production, there 
should be sufficient mineral resources in the region for mining to continue in the 
foreseeable future (Dames & Moore 2000, Mining Journal, various issues 2005 and 
2006). Care should then be taken when defining what makes for sustainability in this 
place. In the case of isolated mining clusters like this one, economic sustainability 
may be better served by shifting the focus of the policy responses (i) from individual 
mines to the overall mining sector (e.g. by allowing labour and capital to follow the 
geographic logic of mining operations freely), and (ii) from the very local level to the 
broader region (for instance, by concentrating efforts on the consolidation of a strong 
supply chain around Perth) 
 
 207
References 
 
 
ACIL Tasman (2005), ‘The Structure and Performance of the Pilbara Economy’, Input/Output Tables 
of the Pilbara and WA, Working document - a Report Prepared for Rio Tinto 
 
Allen Arthur Robinson (2005) ‘Explanatory Note: Town Normalisation in Relation to the Towns of 
Tom Price, Dampier, Paraburdoo, Pannawonica and Wickham’, Working Paper 
 
Altman J. (2001) ‘Sustainable Development Options on Aboriginal Land: The Hybrid Economy in the 
Twenty-first Century’, CAEPR 226/2001, ANU, Canberra 
 
Argus Research (2004) ‘Western Australian Development Projects, Employment Demand and 
Predicted Skill Requirements 2003/07’, Department of Education and Training, Governmnet of 
Western Australia 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS (2001), various Input/Output Tables  
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS (2001), National Statistics, Census 2001 http://www.abs.gov.au/ 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS, Catalogue 2003.0 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS, Catalogue 5675.0, Regional Small Business Statistics, 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS, Catalogue 6202.0 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS, Catalogue 6524.0 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS, Catalogue 630.2010 
 
CMEWA - The Chamber of Minerals & Energy of Western Australia (2005) ‘Fly In / Fly Out: A 
Sustainable Perspective’, Perth, Western Australia 
 
Curtin University (2005), ‘A Social Review of Pilbara Towns’, Alcoa Research Centre for Stronger 
Communities, Curtain University, Perth 
 
Dames & Moore (2000) ‘Central Pilbara Infrastructure Planning Study’, Prepared for the Department 
of Resources Development of WA, 
http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Centralpilbar_Execsumm120050809151121.p
df 
 
Department of Industry and Resources, Western Australia, website last visited in November 2006, 
http://www.doir.wa.gov.au/ 
 
DLGRD (2006), Department of Local Government and Regional Development, website last visited in 
November 2006, http://www.dlgrd.wa.gov.au/ 
 
Di Boscio N. and Humphreys D. (2004) ‘Mining and Regional Economic Development’, in Bastida E., 
Walde T. and Warden Fernandez J. (eds.), International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: 
Trends and Prospects, Kluwer Law  
 
Di Boscio N. (2004) ‘Taking the Lead: Mining and the Challenge of Economic Development’, Paper 
Presented to the International Mining Seminar: ‘Global Investment, Local Challenges’, University of 
Dundee, Dundee 7-10 June 2004 
 
Eggert R. (2001) ‘Mining and Economic Sustainability: National Economies and Local Communities’, 
Division of Economic and Business, Colorado School of Mines. 
 
Hall B. (2003) ‘The size of the Bucket’, The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
 
 208
Harvey B. and Bereton D. (2005) ‘Emerging Models of Community Engagement in the Australian 
Minerals Industry’, Paper for presentation to the UN Conference on Engaging Communities, Brisbane, 
Australia, August 2005 
 
Hames Sharley (2004) ‘Workforce Delivery Strategy Paper’, Working Paper 
 
ICMM (2003) ‘Striking a Better Balance: The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review. 
Comments from the international Council of Mining and Metals’  
 
Martin D. (1995) ‘Money, Business and Culture: Issues for Aboriginal Economic Policy’, Centre for 
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR), the Australian National University, Discussion Paper 
101/1995 
 
Martin D. (2001) ‘Is Welfare Dependency Welfare Poison An Assessment of Noel Pearson’s Proposals 
for Aboriginal Welfare Reform’, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR), the 
Australian National University, Discussion Paper 213/2001 
 
McDonnell S. (2001) ‘Giving Credit Where It’s Due: The Delivery of Banking and Financial 
Services to Indigenous Australians in Rural and Remote Areas’, CAEPR, ANU, 
Canberra 
 
McMahon G. and Remy F. eds. (2002) ‘Large Mines and the Community’, International Development 
Research Centre and the World Bank 
 
Minera (2004) ‘A Magazine for the Rio Tinto Iron Ore Group’, Issue 4, September, Clarity 
Communications 
 
MMSD (2002) ‘Breaking New Ground: Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development’, by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the World Business Partnership 
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Earthcan Publications, London and Sterling, VA 
 
Otto J. (2002) ‘The Regulation of Mineral Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Economics, Law and 
Policy’, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 
 
Otto J., Andrews C., Cawood F., Doggett M., Guj P.,Stermole F., Stermole J. and Tilton J (2006) 
‘Mining Royalties – A global Study of their Impact on Investors, Government and Civil Society’, The 
World Bank, Washington 
 
Pearson N. (2000) ‘Passive Welfare and the Destruction of Indigenous Society in Australia’ in 
Reforming the Australian Welfare State, ed. Saunders P., Australian Institute for Family Studies, 
Melbourne, p136-55 
 
Pilbara Development Commission (2005) ‘Sustainability Action Plan’, Government of Western 
Australia 
 
Pilbara Development Commission (2006), www.pdc.wa.gov.au, last visited November 2006 
 
Pilbara Iron (2005), ‘Annual Report’, http://www.hamersleyiron.com/pilbara_iron.asp 
 
Pilbara Iron (2005.b), ‘Financial Statement’, http://www.hamersleyiron.com/pilbara_iron.asp 
 
Pilbara Iron (2005c), ‘Pilbara Iron Community Affairs’, Various Corporate Brochures, WA  
 
Pilbara Regional County (2006), http://www.prc.wa.gov.au/, last visited November 2006 
 
Pipper R. (2004) ‘Towns Review Project – Pilbara Iron Towns: Past, Present and Future’, Working 
Document,  
 
Pipper R. (2005), ‘Infrastructure and Normalisation: A Macro Audit of Infrastructure across Pilbara 
Iron Townships’ 
 209
 
Rio Tinto (2005) ‘The Way We Work’, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/microsites/SocEnv2004/intro/200_twww.htm 
 
Rio Tinto (2000) ‘Rio Tinto Community Standards’ 
http://rthqserver6.corp.riotinto.org/portal/RT%20External%20Affairs/RT%20External%20Affairs/Co
mmunity%20Relations/Standards%20and%20Guidance/Community%20Relations%20Standard/Com
munitiesStandard.pdf 
 
Rio Tinto 2005 Annual Review (2006), http://www.riotinto.com 
 
Rio Tinto 2005 Sustainable Development Review (2006), http://www.riotinto.com/library/reports/, 
 
Rio Tinto 2005 Social and Environmental Review (2006), http://www.riotinto.com/library/reports/, 
 
Rio Tinto Sustainable Development website, 
http://www.riotinto.com/library/microsites/SocEnv2004/susdev/100_pol.htm, visited in January 2005 
 
RTED (2004), ‘Recent Trends in Employment and Labour Costs in the Australian Mining Sector’, 
working paper, Rio Tinto Economics Department  
 
RTTS (2005), ‘2004 Rio Tinto Health, Safety & Environment Data Resource & Reference Document’, 
Internal Document, Rio Tinto Technical Services, Rio Tinto Technology Group 
 
Shire of Ashburton, ‘Annual Reports’ 2001/02 to 2003/04, http://www.ashburton.wa.gov.au/ 
 
Shire of East Pilbara, ‘Annual Reports’ 2001/02 to 2003/04, http://www.eastpilbara.wa.gov.au/ 
 
Shire of Esperance, ‘Annual Reports’ 2001/02 to 2003/04, 
http://www.esperance.wa.gov.au/eservice/navigation.jsp 
 
Shire of Kalgoorlie Boulder, ‘Annual Reports’ 2001/02 to 2003/04, http://www.kalbould.wa.gov.au/ 
 
Shire of Roebourne, ‘Annual Reports’ 2001/02 to 2003/04, http://www.roebourne.wa.gov.au/ 
 
Strongman (1998) ‘Mining and the Community: From Enclave to Sustainable Development’, 
Presentation to the Asia/Pacific Mining and the Community Conference, July 26-30, Madang PNG 
 
Taylor J. and Scambary B. (2005), ‘The relative Socioeconomic Status of Indigenous People in the 
Pilbara: A Baseline for Regional Participation’, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 
(CAEPR), The Australian National University, Canberra 
 
The Mining Journal, various issues 2004, Mining Communications Ltd, London UK 
 
The Mining Journal, various issues 2005, Mining Communications Ltd, London UK 
 
The Mining Journal, various issues 2006, Mining Communications Ltd, London UK  
 
The Mining Journal (2006), December 22, Mining Communications Ltd, London UK 
 
Town of Port Headland, ‘Annual Reports’ 2001/02 to 2003/04, http://www.phpa.wa.gov.au/ 
 
URS (2005) ‘Socioeconomic Study of Pilbara Towns in the Pilbara Region of Western Australia’, 
Working Draft, February 2005 
 
UN (2000) ‘National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables, 1996/1997’, Part I 
and II. United Nations Publications, New York 
  
UN (2001) ‘World Investment Report – Promoting Linkages’, United Nations Publications, 
Switzerland 
 210
 
Interviews: 
 
Aboriginal resident I, interview conducted in the Pilbara in March 2005 
 
Aboriginal resident II, also a PI employee interview conducted in the Pilbara in March 2005 
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Non-Aboriginal resident III, interview conducted in the Pilbara in March 2005 
 
Non-Aboriginal resident IV, interview conducted in the Pilbara in March 2005 
 
Non-Aboriginal resident V, interview conducted in the Pilbara in March 2005 
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D escrip tion
1 Fuel
2 C ontractors (M ining, c iv il, d rilling &  m arine)
3 R ail - P arts &  C om ponents
4 M echanical P arts  
5 T ruck - P arts &  com ponents 58%
6 E xplosives &  A ccessories
7 P rofessional Services
8 B uild ing M aintenance S ervice
9 T ravel
10 E lectric Supplies 71%
11 Industria l Supp lies
12 C atering  
13 N atural G as
14 C onsulting  Services
15 R oad freight 81%
16 C hem icals
17 T yres
18 Legal Serv ices
19 Lubricants
20 T raining  Services
21 IT  Services
22 B uild ing Lease
23 T rucks M aintenance Service
24 Safety C onsum ables
25 P lum bing M aintenance
26 T rucks M aintenance Service
27 Locom otive P arts (H M E )
28 G rounds M aintenance Service
29 H ydraulic  Equipm ent &  C om ponents
30 P lant M aintenance Service M echanical
31 E lectricity
32 T elecom m unications
33 P C , So ftware  and R elated
34 P ipes/V alves/F ittings 95%
35 O ffice  E quipm ent &  M aintenance
36 M etal, Fabrication P roducts/Services
37 A dvertising/M arketing  Service
38 Industria l E ngines P arts  
39 W ater
40 M ed ical Serv ices
41 C onsum ables
42 H otel/A ccom m odations
43 Site Services 
44 P lant M aintenance Service E lectrical
45 Lab Supplies
46 P lant M aintenance Service W ater T reatm ent
47 Sand/G ravel
48 Industria l G ases
49 O ffice  Supplies
50 C ar H ire / R ental C ar
51 R isk  M anagem ent Services
52 E m ployee T ransporta tion Service
53 P ublications
54 Security Services
55 Insurance
56 A ccounting/aud it/tax Service
57 T im ber/W ood P roducts
58 C lo th ing/U niform s
59 T ravel A gency Services
60 P ackaging
61 C ouriers
62 H ealth  Insurance
63 P lant M aintenance Service R ail T rack 100%
Appendix 5.1 – Pilbara Iron payments to suppliers in 2004 
 
The following items present the complete list of PI operating purchases of materials 
and services, organised by Category, as recorded by PI Procurement. In 2004, this 
expenditure was equivalent to A$915 millions. Note that the top five items together 
accounted for almost 60% of the total value. The first 34 items, in turn, accounted for 
95% of the total.  
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Appendix 5.2 – Input/Output tables and multipliers 
 
In 2004, Rio Tinto commissioned to Acil Tasman the production of I/O tables for 
Western Australia and the Pilbara (Acil Tasman 2005). The resulting tables were 
derived by the following process:  
  
1. An input-output table for Australia for 1996-97 was updated to 2001-02 (The 
1996-97 Australian input-output table was used as the basis for this approach 
rather than the 1998-99 table so as to make use of the 1996 census data) 
2. An input-output table for Western Australia and for the Pilbara were then 
generated using a modified cross-industry quotient method. 
 
The 2001-02 Pilbara input-output tables contains: 
• Rio Tinto’s iron ore operations as a separate industry; 
• Rio Tinto’s salt operations as a separate industry; 
• 83 Pilbara-based industries (including the two Rio Tinto industries). 
 
Flow-on impacts or I/O multipliers 
 
The input-output multipliers are derived from the I/O tables, and they are used to 
estimate the economic impact from a one dollar change in the final demand 
(consumption, government spending, investment and exports) due to the change in 
output in one of the region’s industries. The total economic impact identified by use 
of input-output multipliers includes the direct effect of the initial increase in demand 
and the indirect (or ‘flow-on’) effects.  The flow-on effects result from the linkages 
between industries in the regional economy.  For example, transport service providers 
in the Pilbara purchase inputs from other local industries.  When demand for their 
output increases, the transport companies will increase their purchases from other 
local businesses, who themselves must increase their consumption, some of which 
will be from other local firms, and so on. Multipliers are normally used to measure 
impact on output, income, value added and employment.    
 
There are different types of multipliers. When additional sales to final demand 
(consumption, government spending, investment and exports) are made, for example 
through increased exports or sales to the public, production increases to meet the 
increased demand, and this produces the initial effect.  Since production increases to 
exactly match the increased final demand, the output initial effect is always equal to 
one.  The income initial effect is given by the share of wages and salaries in total 
costs; value added is similarly defined and includes wages and salaries, profits and 
indirect taxes.  Output, income and value added multipliers are all defined in terms of 
dollar change per dollar stimulus, and they are therefore without units.  Employment 
type 1 and type 2 multipliers are defined in terms of total jobs per job created and are 
also without units.  However, employment initial effects, simple and total multipliers 
are defined in terms of jobs per dollar - i.e. jobs per thousand dollars of increased 
final demand in this case. 
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The industry producing the additional output makes purchases to achieve increased 
production, and these new purchases are met by production increases in other 
industries.  These production increases cause other industries to increase their 
purchases, and these purchases cause other industries to increase their production, and 
so on. These flow-on effects eventually diminish, but when added together with the 
initial effect produce the simple multiplier. 
 
This chain of events has ignored one important factor: the effect on labour and its 
consumption.  When output increases, employment increases, and increased 
employment translates to increased earnings and consumption by workers, and this 
translates to increased output to meet the increased consumption.  This consumption 
effect added to the simple multiplier produces the total multiplier. 
 
All the effects and multipliers mentioned so far have had one thing in common: they 
all measure the impact on the economy of the initial increase in final demand.  Then, 
type 1& 2 multipliers are ratios of the abovementioned multiplier types.  The type 1 
multiplier is the ratio of the simple multiplier to the initial effect.  The type 2 
multiplier is the ratio of the total multiplier to the initial effect. For reference, the 
tables below contain the full set of output, income, value added and employment 
multipliers for Western Australia and the Pilbara (Acil 2005). 
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Western Australian output multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 1.0000 1.4275 1.4275 1.6746 1.6746 
Grains 1.0000 1.3745 1.3745 1.5656 1.5656 
Beef cattle 1.0000 1.5154 1.5154 1.8497 1.8497 
Dairy cattle 1.0000 1.8933 1.8933 2.2735 2.2735 
Pigs 1.0000 1.7168 1.7168 2.1128 2.1128 
Poultry 1.0000 1.8036 1.8036 2.2016 2.2016 
Other agriculture 1.0000 1.5008 1.5008 1.8545 1.8545 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 1.0000 1.4002 1.4002 1.9653 1.9653 
Forestry and logging 1.0000 1.8310 1.8310 2.4872 2.4872 
Commercial fishing 1.0000 1.5569 1.5569 1.9084 1.9084 
Coal 1.0000 1.6205 1.6205 2.1797 2.1797 
Oil & gas 1.0000 1.2696 1.2696 1.4385 1.4385 
Iron ores 1.0000 1.3619 1.3619 1.6691 1.6691 
Non-ferrous metal ores 1.0000 1.5303 1.5303 1.8833 1.8833 
Other mining 1.0000 1.5642 1.5642 1.9130 1.9130 
Services to mining 1.0000 1.5065 1.5065 2.0045 2.0045 
Meat and meat products 1.0000 2.0156 2.0156 2.5370 2.5370 
Dairy products 1.0000 1.8780 1.8780 2.2944 2.2944 
Fruit and vegetable products 1.0000 2.1417 2.1417 2.7428 2.7428 
Oils and fats 1.0000 1.8993 1.8993 2.3230 2.3230 
Flour mill products and cereal foods 1.0000 2.1277 2.1277 2.6155 2.6155 
Bakery products 1.0000 2.0026 2.0026 2.7226 2.7226 
Confectionery 1.0000 1.9762 1.9762 2.6751 2.6751 
Other food products 1.0000 1.9532 1.9532 2.4673 2.4673 
Soft drinks, cordials and syrups 1.0000 2.1305 2.1305 2.7301 2.7301 
Beer and malt 1.0000 1.9684 1.9684 2.3651 2.3651 
Wine and spirits 1.0000 1.6301 1.6301 1.9964 1.9964 
Textile fibres, yarns and woven fabrics 1.0000 1.9688 1.9688 2.4951 2.4951 
Textile products 1.0000 1.7421 1.7421 2.3897 2.3897 
Knitting mill products 1.0000 1.7781 1.7781 2.4527 2.4527 
Clothing 1.0000 1.4934 1.4934 2.0350 2.0350 
Footwear 1.0000 1.3905 1.3905 2.0003 2.0003 
Leather and leather products 1.0000 2.0855 2.0855 2.6593 2.6593 
Sawmill products 1.0000 1.8126 1.8126 2.4320 2.4320 
Other wood products 1.0000 1.9177 1.9177 2.6552 2.6552 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 1.0000 1.8358 1.8358 2.3740 2.3740 
Paper containers and products 1.0000 1.6456 1.6456 2.1906 2.1906 
Printing and services to printing 1.0000 1.8326 1.8326 2.5281 2.5281 
Publishing; recorded media and publishing 1.0000 1.7673 1.7673 2.4702 2.4702 
Petroleum and coal products 1.0000 1.6142 1.6142 1.7656 1.7656 
Basic chemicals 1.0000 1.7768 1.7768 2.2030 2.2030 
Paints 1.0000 1.7015 1.7015 2.2060 2.2060 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, pesticides 1.0000 1.8459 1.8459 2.3812 2.3812 
Soap and detergents 1.0000 1.9680 1.9680 2.5206 2.5206 
Cosmetics and toiletry preparations 1.0000 1.9302 1.9302 2.5394 2.5394 
Other chemical products 1.0000 1.9039 1.9039 2.4513 2.4513 
Rubber products 1.0000 1.7584 1.7584 2.4146 2.4146 
Plastic products 1.0000 1.8450 1.8450 2.4543 2.4543 
Glass and glass products 1.0000 1.7989 1.7989 2.4577 2.4577 
Ceramic products 1.0000 1.7169 1.7169 2.3515 2.3515 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 1.0000 2.1918 2.1918 2.7681 2.7681 
Plaster and other concrete products 1.0000 1.9840 1.9840 2.6335 2.6335 
Other non-metallic mineral products 1.0000 1.9824 1.9824 2.6393 2.6393 
Iron and steel 1.0000 2.1133 2.1133 2.7137 2.7137 
Basic non-ferrous metal and products 1.0000 1.9649 1.9649 2.3616 2.3616 
Structural metal products 1.0000 1.9873 1.9873 2.6905 2.6905 
Sheet metal products 1.0000 2.1157 2.1157 2.8494 2.8494 
Fabricated metal products 1.0000 1.9585 1.9585 2.7458 2.7458 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 1.0000 1.7929 1.7929 2.2968 2.2968 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Ships and boats 1.0000 1.5839 1.5839 2.1075 2.1075 
Railway equipment 1.0000 1.9071 1.9071 2.6570 2.6570 
Aircraft 1.0000 1.2237 1.2237 2.0797 2.0797 
Photographic and scientific equipment 1.0000 1.8639 1.8639 2.6593 2.6593 
Electronic equipment 1.0000 1.4516 1.4516 1.9510 1.9510 
Household appliances 1.0000 2.0280 2.0280 2.6382 2.6382 
Other electrical equipment 1.0000 1.9171 1.9171 2.5985 2.5985 
Agricultural, mining and c 1.0000 1.7850 1.7850 2.4487 2.4487 
Other machinery and equipment 1.0000 1.8497 1.8497 2.6130 2.6130 
Prefabricated buildings 1.0000 1.5507 1.5507 1.9950 1.9950 
Furniture 1.0000 1.7374 1.7374 2.4415 2.4415 
Other manufacturing 1.0000 1.7835 1.7835 2.4504 2.4504 
Electricity supply 1.0000 1.7714 1.7714 2.1671 2.1671 
Gas supply 1.0000 1.4564 1.4564 1.9236 1.9236 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 1.0000 1.5604 1.5604 1.9447 1.9447 
Residential building 1.0000 1.7767 1.7767 2.2413 2.2413 
Other construction 1.0000 1.6351 1.6351 2.2999 2.2999 
Wholesale trade 1.0000 1.8466 1.8466 2.7503 2.7503 
Retail trade 1.0000 1.7227 1.7227 2.6349 2.6349 
Mechanical repairs 1.0000 1.4650 1.4650 2.0341 2.0341 
Other repairs 1.0000 1.3337 1.3337 1.9187 1.9187 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 1.0000 1.8682 1.8682 2.5912 2.5912 
Road transport 1.0000 1.7764 1.7764 2.4500 2.4500 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 1.0000 1.8315 1.8315 2.8101 2.8101 
Water transport 1.0000 1.7498 1.7498 2.2067 2.2067 
Air and space transport 1.0000 1.9213 1.9213 2.5986 2.5986 
Services to transport; storage 1.0000 1.5291 1.5291 2.2182 2.2182 
Communication services 1.0000 1.5021 1.5021 2.1672 2.1672 
Banking 1.0000 1.4976 1.4976 2.1752 2.1752 
Non-bank finance 1.0000 1.8058 1.8058 2.3785 2.3785 
Insurance 1.0000 1.4998 1.4998 2.3075 2.3075 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 1.0000 1.0874 1.0874 1.4959 1.4959 
Ownership of dwellings 1.0000 1.2263 1.2263 1.3107 1.3107 
Other property services 1.0000 2.0261 2.0261 2.8843 2.8843 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 1.0000 1.4562 1.4562 2.3419 2.3419 
Legal, accounting, marketing &  business services 1.0000 1.6619 1.6619 2.5752 2.5752 
Other business services 1.0000 1.9198 1.9198 2.6872 2.6872 
Government administration 1.0000 1.5918 1.5918 2.7008 2.7008 
Defence 1.0000 1.7091 1.7091 2.7555 2.7555 
Education 1.0000 1.1684 1.1684 2.4809 2.4809 
Health services 1.0000 1.1644 1.1644 2.4116 2.4116 
Community services 1.0000 1.7247 1.7247 2.6695 2.6695 
Motion picture, radio and television services 1.0000 1.7003 1.7003 2.4091 2.4091 
Libraries, museums and the arts 1.0000 1.2847 1.2847 2.2573 2.2573 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 1.0000 1.6761 1.6761 2.2785 2.2785 
Personal services 1.0000 1.5182 1.5182 2.2242 2.2242 
Other services 1.0000 1.2944 1.2944 2.5066 2.5066 
Data source: Western Australia 2001-02 Input-Output table. 
Note: na  = not available.  
 216
Western Australian income multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 0.0565 0.1468 2.5988 0.2046 3.6236 
Grains 0.0530 0.1135 2.1411 0.1583 2.9854 
Beef cattle 0.0833 0.1986 2.3839 0.2769 3.3239 
Dairy cattle 0.0540 0.2258 4.1858 0.3149 5.8364 
Pigs 0.0954 0.2352 2.4657 0.3280 3.4381 
Poultry 0.0930 0.2364 2.5430 0.3297 3.5459 
Other agriculture 0.1090 0.2101 1.9277 0.2930 2.6879 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 0.2645 0.3357 1.2688 0.4680 1.7691 
Forestry and logging 0.2135 0.3898 1.8259 0.5435 2.5459 
Commercial fishing 0.0984 0.2088 2.1213 0.2912 2.9579 
Coal 0.1831 0.3322 1.8145 0.4632 2.5300 
Oil & gas 0.0473 0.1003 2.1211 0.1399 2.9575 
Iron ores 0.1104 0.1825 1.6531 0.2545 2.3050 
Non-ferrous metal ores 0.1103 0.2097 1.9011 0.2924 2.6508 
Other mining 0.0893 0.2072 2.3202 0.2889 3.2352 
Services to mining 0.1840 0.2958 1.6079 0.4124 2.2420 
Meat and meat products 0.1398 0.3097 2.2159 0.4319 3.0897 
Dairy products 0.0935 0.2473 2.6440 0.3449 3.6866 
Fruit and vegetable products 0.1260 0.3571 2.8335 0.4979 3.9509 
Oils and fats 0.0975 0.2517 2.5813 0.3509 3.5992 
Flour mill products and cereal foods 0.0999 0.2898 2.9005 0.4041 4.0444 
Bakery products 0.2330 0.4277 1.8359 0.5964 2.5599 
Confectionery 0.2075 0.4152 2.0008 0.5789 2.7899 
Other food products 0.1228 0.3054 2.4874 0.4259 3.4683 
Soft drinks, cordials and syrups 0.1032 0.3562 3.4523 0.4967 4.8138 
Beer and malt 0.0717 0.2356 3.2879 0.3286 4.5845 
Wine and spirits 0.0885 0.2176 2.4595 0.3033 3.4294 
Textile fibres, yarns and woven fabrics 0.1603 0.3127 1.9509 0.4360 2.7203 
Textile products 0.2032 0.3847 1.8929 0.5364 2.6394 
Knitting mill products 0.2143 0.4008 1.8699 0.5588 2.6074 
Clothing 0.2029 0.3217 1.5859 0.4486 2.2113 
Footwear 0.2694 0.3623 1.3449 0.5051 1.8753 
Leather and leather products 0.1232 0.3409 2.7663 0.4753 3.8572 
Sawmill products 0.1838 0.3680 2.0022 0.5131 2.7918 
Other wood products 0.2225 0.4381 1.9693 0.6109 2.7459 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 0.1395 0.3197 2.2925 0.4458 3.1965 
Paper containers and products 0.1716 0.3238 1.8871 0.4515 2.6313 
Printing and services to printing 0.2253 0.4131 1.8339 0.5760 2.5571 
Publishing; recorded media and publishing 0.2192 0.4175 1.9051 0.5822 2.6564 
Petroleum and coal products 0.0264 0.0899 3.4000 0.1254 4.7409 
Basic chemicals 0.1129 0.2531 2.2428 0.3530 3.1273 
Paints 0.1440 0.2997 2.0806 0.4179 2.9011 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, pesticides 0.1139 0.3180 2.7913 0.4435 3.8921 
Soap and detergents 0.1245 0.3283 2.6360 0.4577 3.6756 
Cosmetics and toiletry preparations 0.1575 0.3619 2.2970 0.5046 3.2028 
Other chemical products 0.1377 0.3251 2.3609 0.4534 3.2919 
Rubber products 0.2111 0.3898 1.8462 0.5435 2.5743 
Plastic products 0.1868 0.3620 1.9380 0.5047 2.7022 
Glass and glass products 0.2192 0.3914 1.7853 0.5457 2.4893 
Ceramic products 0.2273 0.3770 1.6583 0.5256 2.3123 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 0.1021 0.3424 3.3526 0.4774 4.6747 
Plaster and other concrete products 0.1814 0.3858 2.1262 0.5379 2.9647 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.1937 0.3902 2.0149 0.5441 2.8095 
Iron and steel 0.1455 0.3567 2.4508 0.4973 3.4173 
Basic non-ferrous metal and products 0.0853 0.2357 2.7617 0.3286 3.8508 
Structural metal products 0.2081 0.4177 2.0071 0.5825 2.7986 
Sheet metal products 0.2025 0.4359 2.1523 0.6077 3.0011 
Fabricated metal products 0.2623 0.4677 1.7831 0.6521 2.4863 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 0.1357 0.2994 2.2062 0.4174 3.0762 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Ships and boats 0.1822 0.3110 1.7069 0.4337 2.3801 
Railway equipment 0.2384 0.4455 1.8687 0.6211 2.6057 
Aircraft 0.4548 0.5085 1.1180 0.7090 1.5589 
Photographic and scientific equipment 0.2708 0.4725 1.7446 0.6589 2.4326 
Electronic equipment 0.1885 0.2967 1.5742 0.4137 2.1950 
Household appliances 0.1328 0.3625 2.7284 0.5054 3.8044 
Other electrical equipment 0.2129 0.4048 1.9011 0.5644 2.6508 
Agricultural, mining and c 0.2154 0.3943 1.8302 0.5498 2.5519 
Other machinery and equipment 0.2658 0.4534 1.7060 0.6322 2.3788 
Prefabricated buildings 0.1431 0.2640 1.8443 0.3681 2.5716 
Furniture 0.2439 0.4183 1.7152 0.5832 2.3916 
Other manufacturing 0.2218 0.3962 1.7861 0.5524 2.4905 
Electricity supply 0.1005 0.2351 2.3381 0.3278 3.2602 
Gas supply 0.1744 0.2776 1.5912 0.3870 2.2187 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 0.1093 0.2283 2.0895 0.3183 2.9135 
Residential building 0.0987 0.2759 2.7950 0.3848 3.8972 
Other construction 0.2437 0.3949 1.6203 0.5506 2.2593 
Wholesale trade 0.3187 0.5368 1.6844 0.7485 2.3487 
Retail trade 0.3589 0.5419 1.5100 0.7556 2.1055 
Mechanical repairs 0.2174 0.3381 1.5551 0.4714 2.1683 
Other repairs 0.2658 0.3475 1.3075 0.4845 1.8232 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 0.2335 0.4295 1.8396 0.5989 2.5650 
Road transport 0.2122 0.4002 1.8853 0.5580 2.6288 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 0.3865 0.5813 1.5039 0.8106 2.0970 
Water transport 0.1042 0.2714 2.6046 0.3785 3.6317 
Air and space transport 0.2321 0.4023 1.7333 0.5610 2.4168 
Services to transport; storage 0.2701 0.4093 1.5153 0.5707 2.1128 
Communication services 0.2702 0.3951 1.4620 0.5509 2.0386 
Banking 0.2801 0.4025 1.4371 0.5612 2.0038 
Non-bank finance 0.1395 0.3402 2.4385 0.4744 3.4002 
Insurance 0.3520 0.4798 1.3631 0.6690 1.9006 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 0.2183 0.2427 1.1115 0.3384 1.5499 
Ownership of dwellings 0.0000 0.0502 na 0.0700 na 
Other property services 0.2454 0.5098 2.0776 0.7109 2.8970 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 0.3985 0.5261 1.3203 0.7336 1.8410 
Legal, accounting, marketing & business services 0.3684 0.5425 1.4728 0.7565 2.0536 
Other business services 0.2176 0.4558 2.0948 0.6356 2.9210 
Government administration 0.4843 0.6588 1.3603 0.9186 1.8967 
Defence 0.4572 0.6216 1.3596 0.8667 1.8957 
Education 0.7352 0.7797 1.0604 1.0871 1.4786 
Health services 0.6925 0.7409 1.0698 1.0330 1.4917 
Community services 0.3821 0.5613 1.4688 0.7826 2.0480 
Motion picture, radio and television services 0.2460 0.4211 1.7116 0.5871 2.3866 
Libraries, museums and the arts 0.5021 0.5778 1.1507 0.8056 1.6045 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 0.1891 0.3578 1.8927 0.4990 2.6391 
Personal services 0.2846 0.4194 1.4735 0.5847 2.0546 
Other services 0.6456 0.7201 1.1155 1.0041 1.5554 
Data source: Western Australia 2001-02 Input-Output table. 
Note: na  = not available.  
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Western Australian value added multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 0.6475 0.8378 1.2937 0.9694 1.4970 
Grains 0.7030 0.8955 1.2739 0.9973 1.4188 
Beef cattle 0.6116 0.8569 1.4010 1.0350 1.6922 
Dairy cattle 0.4638 0.8501 1.8328 1.0527 2.2696 
Pigs 0.5218 0.8318 1.5940 1.0428 1.9983 
Poultry 0.5163 0.8557 1.6574 1.0678 2.0681 
Other agriculture 0.6718 0.8868 1.3201 1.0753 1.6006 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 0.4274 0.6319 1.4784 0.9330 2.1827 
Forestry and logging 0.3939 0.7430 1.8865 1.0927 2.7742 
Commercial fishing 0.4090 0.6333 1.5486 0.8206 2.0066 
Coal 0.5698 0.8471 1.4865 1.1450 2.0094 
Oil & gas 0.7435 0.8683 1.1679 0.9583 1.2889 
Iron ores 0.5589 0.7220 1.2919 0.8857 1.5848 
Non-ferrous metal ores 0.4648 0.6904 1.4853 0.8785 1.8900 
Other mining 0.5159 0.7547 1.4629 0.9406 1.8231 
Services to mining 0.3951 0.6191 1.5671 0.8844 2.2386 
Meat and meat products 0.1861 0.6939 3.7290 0.9717 5.2219 
Dairy products 0.2144 0.5870 2.7384 0.8088 3.7733 
Fruit and vegetable products 0.2768 0.7961 2.8762 1.1164 4.0333 
Oils and fats 0.1924 0.6091 3.1665 0.8348 4.3401 
Flour mill products and cereal foods 0.2761 0.8692 3.1478 1.1292 4.0890 
Bakery products 0.3718 0.7936 2.1348 1.1772 3.1667 
Confectionery 0.3412 0.7546 2.2115 1.1270 3.3029 
Other food products 0.2298 0.6805 2.9618 0.9545 4.1540 
Soft drinks, cordials and syrups 0.2172 0.7030 3.2375 1.0225 4.7087 
Beer and malt 0.3449 0.8431 2.4443 1.0544 3.0571 
Wine and spirits 0.3489 0.6561 1.8807 0.8513 2.4400 
Textile fibres, yarns and woven fabrics 0.2671 0.7871 2.9474 1.0676 3.9976 
Textile products 0.3090 0.6504 2.1048 0.9954 3.2214 
Knitting mill products 0.3274 0.6581 2.0102 1.0176 3.1081 
Clothing 0.2838 0.5024 1.7701 0.7909 2.7868 
Footwear 0.3517 0.5137 1.4603 0.8386 2.3840 
Leather and leather products 0.1584 0.6185 3.9051 0.9242 5.8355 
Sawmill products 0.4060 0.7689 1.8938 1.0989 2.7067 
Other wood products 0.3471 0.7486 2.1567 1.1416 3.2887 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 0.3403 0.7132 2.0960 0.9999 2.9388 
Paper containers and products 0.3284 0.6190 1.8851 0.9094 2.7695 
Printing and services to printing 0.3792 0.7337 1.9351 1.1043 2.9123 
Publishing;recorded media and publishing 0.4376 0.7992 1.8263 1.1737 2.6821 
Petroleum and coal products 0.1149 0.4969 4.3256 0.5775 5.0278 
Basic chemicals 0.2536 0.5825 2.2965 0.8095 3.1917 
Paints 0.3450 0.6350 1.8405 0.9038 2.6196 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, pesticides 0.2419 0.6184 2.5562 0.9036 3.7354 
Soap and detergents 0.2463 0.6422 2.6071 0.9366 3.8023 
Cosmetics and toiletry preparations 0.2562 0.6405 2.5001 0.9651 3.7671 
Other chemical products 0.2879 0.6552 2.2761 0.9469 3.2891 
Rubber products 0.3642 0.6898 1.8938 1.0394 2.8537 
Plastic products 0.3420 0.6851 2.0035 1.0098 2.9528 
Glass and glass products 0.3796 0.7409 1.9520 1.0919 2.8768 
Ceramic products 0.4486 0.7806 1.7401 1.1188 2.4937 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 0.2602 0.8043 3.0914 1.1114 4.2716 
Plaster and other concrete products 0.3716 0.7942 2.1375 1.1403 3.0687 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.3481 0.7793 2.2386 1.1293 3.2441 
Iron and steel 0.2820 0.7599 2.6948 1.0798 3.8293 
Basic non-ferrous metal and products 0.2208 0.6154 2.7867 0.8268 3.7440 
Structural metal products 0.3175 0.7149 2.2514 1.0895 3.4314 
Sheet metal products 0.3307 0.7852 2.3743 1.1761 3.5565 
Fabricated metal products 0.3864 0.7790 2.0161 1.1985 3.1016 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 0.2849 0.5947 2.0873 0.8632 3.0297 
Ships and boats 0.2891 0.5223 1.8064 0.8012 2.7712 
Railway equipment 0.3139 0.6521 2.0770 1.0516 3.3497 
Aircraft 0.4678 0.5677 1.2134 1.0238 2.1883 
Photographic and scientific equipment 0.4155 0.7797 1.8764 1.2035 2.8963 
Electronic equipment 0.3680 0.5730 1.5573 0.8391 2.2805 
Household appliances 0.2009 0.6203 3.0884 0.9454 4.7071 
Other electrical equipment 0.3275 0.6948 2.1216 1.0578 3.2302 
Agricultural, mining and c 0.2828 0.6101 2.1572 0.9638 3.4074 
Other machinery and equipment 0.3786 0.7257 1.9167 1.1324 2.9908 
Prefabricated buildings 0.3440 0.5683 1.6521 0.8050 2.3404 
Furniture 0.3484 0.6642 1.9067 1.0394 2.9835 
Other manufacturing 0.3918 0.7234 1.8462 1.0787 2.7530 
Electricity supply 0.4474 0.8555 1.9121 1.0663 2.3833 
Gas supply 0.5555 0.7873 1.4174 1.0362 1.8656 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 0.5540 0.8232 1.4861 1.0280 1.8557 
Residential building 0.3735 0.6987 1.8707 0.9462 2.5333 
Other construction 0.4314 0.7085 1.6424 1.0627 2.4635 
Wholesale trade 0.4397 0.8407 1.9119 1.3221 3.0068 
Retail trade 0.4331 0.7789 1.7984 1.2650 2.9206 
Mechanical repairs 0.5512 0.7569 1.3732 1.0601 1.9233 
Other repairs 0.6662 0.8206 1.2318 1.1323 1.6996 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 0.3814 0.7788 2.0421 1.1641 3.0522 
Road transport 0.4288 0.7884 1.8387 1.1473 2.6757 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 0.4976 0.8491 1.7065 1.3705 2.7544 
Water transport 0.2524 0.5941 2.3540 0.8375 3.3186 
Air and space transport 0.3637 0.7418 2.0394 1.1027 3.0315 
Services to transport; storage 0.6181 0.8762 1.4176 1.2433 2.0116 
Communication services 0.6332 0.8649 1.3660 1.2192 1.9256 
Banking 0.6178 0.9396 1.5209 1.3006 2.1053 
Non-bank finance 0.3953 0.9248 2.3398 1.2300 3.1118 
Insurance 0.5617 0.9361 1.6667 1.3664 2.4329 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 0.9419 0.9922 1.0533 1.2098 1.2844 
Ownership of dwellings 0.8470 0.9512 1.1231 0.9962 1.1762 
Other property services 0.3788 0.8428 2.2252 1.3001 3.4324 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 0.6110 0.8394 1.3739 1.3113 2.1462 
Legal, accounting, marketing & business services 0.5651 0.8920 1.5786 1.3786 2.4397 
Other business services 0.3454 0.7847 2.2721 1.1936 3.4559 
Government administration 0.5695 0.8786 1.5427 1.4694 2.5802 
Defence 0.5184 0.8151 1.5724 1.3726 2.6479 
Education 0.8548 0.9385 1.0979 1.6378 1.9160 
Health services 0.8608 0.9441 1.0968 1.6086 1.8688 
Community services 0.4575 0.7986 1.7457 1.3020 2.8461 
Motion picture, radio and television services 0.5165 0.8580 1.6614 1.2357 2.3926 
Libraries, museums and the arts 0.7154 0.8539 1.1935 1.3721 1.9179 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 0.4772 0.7992 1.6747 1.1201 2.3473 
Personal services 0.5803 0.8286 1.4278 1.2047 2.0760 
Other services 0.7728 0.9130 1.1814 1.5589 2.0172 
Data source: Western Australia 2001-02 Input-Output table. 
Note: na  = not available.  
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Western Australian employment multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 0.0086 0.0105 1.2256 0.0122 1.4221 
Grains 0.0015 0.0027 1.8233 0.0040 2.6988 
Beef cattle 0.0229 0.0255 1.1132 0.0278 1.2131 
Dairy cattle 0.0093 0.0131 1.4054 0.0157 1.6846 
Pigs 0.0047 0.0075 1.6109 0.0102 2.1899 
Poultry 0.0048 0.0078 1.6177 0.0105 2.1822 
Other agriculture 0.0123 0.0145 1.1815 0.0170 1.3780 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 0.0054 0.0082 1.5223 0.0121 2.2355 
Forestry and logging 0.0090 0.0133 1.4864 0.0178 1.9874 
Commercial fishing 0.0027 0.0050 1.8262 0.0074 2.7072 
Coal 0.0038 0.0070 1.8467 0.0108 2.8571 
Oil & gas 0.0002 0.0013 5.5239 0.0025 10.3873 
Iron ores 0.0010 0.0022 2.3012 0.0043 4.4588 
Non-ferrous metal ores 0.0020 0.0039 1.9443 0.0063 3.1553 
Other mining 0.0018 0.0041 2.2688 0.0065 3.5885 
Services to mining 0.0034 0.0059 1.7076 0.0093 2.7002 
Meat and meat products 0.0022 0.0104 4.6873 0.0140 6.2913 
Dairy products 0.0020 0.0068 3.3890 0.0096 4.8168 
Fruit and vegetable products 0.0024 0.0088 3.6317 0.0129 5.3364 
Oils and fats 0.0007 0.0038 5.5526 0.0067 9.7490 
Flour mill products and cereal foods 0.0019 0.0058 2.9949 0.0092 4.7063 
Bakery products 0.0083 0.0127 1.5347 0.0177 2.1275 
Confectionery 0.0256 0.0304 1.1902 0.0352 1.3770 
Other food products 0.0012 0.0055 4.5885 0.0090 7.5402 
Soft drinks, cordials and syrups 0.0021 0.0086 4.0972 0.0127 6.0589 
Beer and malt 0.0015 0.0053 3.5536 0.0081 5.3589 
Wine and spirits 0.0038 0.0076 2.0161 0.0101 2.6771 
Textile fibres, yarns and woven fabrics 0.0026 0.0089 3.4635 0.0125 4.8638 
Textile products 0.0138 0.0179 1.2956 0.0223 1.6159 
Knitting mill products 0.0054 0.0096 1.7579 0.0142 2.6063 
Clothing 0.0219 0.0247 1.1306 0.0284 1.3001 
Footwear 0.0091 0.0114 1.2503 0.0155 1.7091 
Leather and leather products 0.0045 0.0106 2.3540 0.0145 3.2251 
Sawmill products 0.0051 0.0096 1.8924 0.0139 2.7250 
Other wood products 0.0081 0.0131 1.6280 0.0182 2.2530 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 0.0023 0.0064 2.8026 0.0101 4.4165 
Paper containers and products 0.0024 0.0055 2.3542 0.0093 3.9394 
Printing and services to printing 0.0104 0.0145 1.4046 0.0193 1.8640 
Publishing; recorded media and publishing 0.0074 0.0121 1.6262 0.0169 2.2734 
Petroleum and coal products 0.0003 0.0013 4.6891 0.0023 8.4814 
Basic chemicals 0.0013 0.0039 3.1205 0.0068 5.4356 
Paints 0.0058 0.0089 1.5403 0.0124 2.1356 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, pesticides 0.0025 0.0073 2.8976 0.0109 4.3606 
Soap and detergents 0.0062 0.0107 1.7242 0.0145 2.3310 
Cosmetics and toiletry preparations 0.0052 0.0097 1.8664 0.0139 2.6655 
Other chemical products 0.0028 0.0067 2.4130 0.0104 3.7646 
Rubber products 0.0050 0.0092 1.8286 0.0137 2.7213 
Plastic products 0.0052 0.0088 1.6888 0.0130 2.4862 
Glass and glass products 0.0087 0.0126 1.4470 0.0171 1.9643 
Ceramic products 0.0048 0.0081 1.6745 0.0124 2.5754 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 0.0016 0.0062 3.8963 0.0101 6.3814 
Plaster and other concrete products 0.0037 0.0080 2.1749 0.0124 3.3883 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.0076 0.0117 1.5316 0.0162 2.1207 
Iron and steel 0.0043 0.0084 1.9694 0.0125 2.9311 
Basic non-ferrous metal and products 0.0018 0.0045 2.5254 0.0072 4.0611 
Structural metal products 0.0043 0.0091 2.1116 0.0139 3.2295 
Sheet metal products 0.0047 0.0099 2.1253 0.0149 3.2011 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Fabricated metal products 0.0100 0.0147 1.4706 0.0201 2.0093 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 0.0027 0.0063 2.3248 0.0097 3.6039 
Ships and boats 0.0063 0.0093 1.4651 0.0129 2.0292 
Railway equipment 0.0035 0.0075 2.1685 0.0127 3.6440 
Aircraft 0.0128 0.0140 1.0948 0.0198 1.5538 
Photographic and scientific equipment 0.0184 0.0231 1.2572 0.0285 1.5533 
Electronic equipment 0.0081 0.0107 1.3089 0.0141 1.7286 
Household appliances 0.0049 0.0102 2.0929 0.0144 2.9508 
Other electrical equipment 0.0082 0.0127 1.5392 0.0173 2.1054 
Agricultural, mining and c 0.0058 0.0098 1.6696 0.0143 2.4468 
Other machinery and equipment 0.0077 0.0119 1.5527 0.0172 2.2311 
Prefabricated buildings 0.0032 0.0060 1.8460 0.0090 2.7841 
Furniture 0.0093 0.0134 1.4389 0.0182 1.9569 
Other manufacturing 0.0111 0.0151 1.3585 0.0197 1.7677 
Electricity supply 0.0014 0.0038 2.7858 0.0065 4.7494 
Gas supply 0.0015 0.0035 2.4005 0.0067 4.5896 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 0.0039 0.0065 1.6716 0.0091 2.3483 
Residential building 0.0077 0.0114 1.4848 0.0146 1.8978 
Other construction 0.0044 0.0075 1.7122 0.0121 2.7457 
Wholesale trade 0.0055 0.0098 1.7988 0.0160 2.9318 
Retail trade 0.0166 0.0206 1.2419 0.0269 1.6173 
Mechanical repairs 0.0075 0.0098 1.3114 0.0137 1.8301 
Other repairs 0.0018 0.0035 1.9555 0.0075 4.2102 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 0.0110 0.0152 1.3834 0.0202 1.8320 
Road transport 0.0045 0.0083 1.8589 0.0129 2.8899 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 0.0034 0.0071 2.0771 0.0138 4.0443 
Water transport 0.0022 0.0055 2.5280 0.0086 3.9699 
Air and space transport 0.0022 0.0052 2.3927 0.0098 4.5251 
Services to transport; storage 0.0036 0.0064 1.7901 0.0111 3.1098 
Communication services 0.0044 0.0070 1.5752 0.0115 2.6014 
Banking 0.0051 0.0078 1.5132 0.0124 2.4132 
Non-bank finance 0.0031 0.0075 2.4186 0.0114 3.6876 
Insurance 0.0041 0.0067 1.6309 0.0123 2.9696 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 0.0047 0.0052 1.1114 0.0080 1.7109 
Ownership of dwellings 0.0000 0.0011 na 0.0017 na 
Other property services 0.0022 0.0069 3.1757 0.0128 5.8714 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 0.0078 0.0107 1.3612 0.0167 2.1330 
Legal, accounting, marketing & business services 0.0078 0.0117 1.5095 0.0180 2.3134 
Other business services 0.0092 0.0141 1.5380 0.0194 2.1097 
Government administration 0.0080 0.0117 1.4550 0.0192 2.4019 
Defence 0.0071 0.0110 1.5507 0.0182 2.5560 
Education 0.0173 0.0183 1.0568 0.0272 1.5763 
Health services 0.0145 0.0157 1.0806 0.0242 1.6683 
Community services 0.0220 0.0262 1.1915 0.0326 1.4856 
Motion picture, radio and television services 0.0067 0.0111 1.6578 0.0159 2.3823 
Libraries, museums and the arts 0.0135 0.0153 1.1323 0.0219 1.6247 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 0.0081 0.0121 1.4932 0.0162 2.0034 
Personal services 0.0222 0.0254 1.1424 0.0302 1.3600 
Other services 0.0111 0.0128 1.1566 0.0211 1.9033 
Data source: Western Australia 2001-02  Input-Output table.    
Note: na  = not available.  
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Pilbara output multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 1.0000 1.3552 1.3552 1.4224 1.4224 
Grains 1.0000 1.3430 1.3430 1.3856 1.3856 
Beef cattle 1.0000 1.1296 1.1296 1.1978 1.1978 
Other agriculture 1.0000 1.4006 1.4006 1.5158 1.5158 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 1.0000 1.1702 1.1702 1.3800 1.3800 
Commercial fishing 1.0000 1.3159 1.3159 1.4366 1.4366 
Oil & gas 1.0000 1.0504 1.0504 1.0832 1.0832 
Iron ores 1.0000 1.0475 1.0475 1.1397 1.1397 
Non-ferrous metal ores 1.0000 1.3855 1.3855 1.4816 1.4816 
Other mining 1.0000 1.0599 1.0599 1.1418 1.1418 
Services to mining 1.0000 1.2493 1.2493 1.3752 1.3752 
Meat and meat products 1.0000 1.5492 1.5492 1.6297 1.6297 
Dairy products 1.0000 1.4535 1.4535 1.5212 1.5212 
Bakery products 1.0000 1.5840 1.5840 1.7830 1.7830 
Other food products 1.0000 1.5910 1.5910 1.6994 1.6994 
Clothing 1.0000 1.2920 1.2920 1.5526 1.5526 
Other wood products 1.0000 1.6814 1.6814 2.0314 2.0314 
Printing and services to printing 1.0000 1.5506 1.5506 1.7955 1.7955 
Publishing; recorded media and publishing 1.0000 1.5606 1.5606 1.8516 1.8516 
Petroleum and coal products 1.0000 1.4863 1.4863 1.5334 1.5334 
Basic chemicals 1.0000 1.6398 1.6398 1.8161 1.8161 
Paints 1.0000 1.5103 1.5103 1.7424 1.7424 
Other chemical products 1.0000 1.4592 1.4592 1.6645 1.6645 
Rubber products 1.0000 1.4367 1.4367 1.7211 1.7211 
Plastic products 1.0000 1.7314 1.7314 1.8876 1.8876 
Glass and glass products 1.0000 1.6260 1.6260 1.9450 1.9450 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 1.0000 1.8592 1.8592 2.0582 2.0582 
Plaster and other concrete 1.0000 1.4944 1.4944 1.7301 1.7301 
Other non-metallic mineral  1.0000 1.7571 1.7571 2.0689 2.0689 
Iron and steel 1.0000 1.5631 1.5631 1.7539 1.7539 
Basic non-ferrous metal and  1.0000 1.8914 1.8914 2.0192 2.0192 
Structural metal products 1.0000 1.7418 1.7418 2.0707 2.0707 
Sheet metal products 1.0000 1.8688 1.8688 2.2073 2.2073 
Fabricated metal products 1.0000 1.5307 1.5307 1.8310 1.8310 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 1.0000 1.6644 1.6644 1.8807 1.8807 
Ships and boats 1.0000 1.4201 1.4201 1.6249 1.6249 
Railway equipment 1.0000 1.4546 1.4546 1.7479 1.7479 
Aircraft 1.0000 1.1689 1.1689 1.3100 1.3100 
Electronic equipment 1.0000 1.3957 1.3957 1.5377 1.5377 
Household appliances 1.0000 1.7905 1.7905 2.0604 2.0604 
Other electrical equipment 1.0000 1.6126 1.6126 1.8861 1.8861 
Agricultural, mining and c 1.0000 1.5133 1.5133 1.7693 1.7693 
Other machinery and equipment 1.0000 1.6224 1.6224 1.9669 1.9669 
Prefabricated buildings 1.0000 1.4061 1.4061 1.5498 1.5498 
Furniture 1.0000 1.5890 1.5890 1.8975 1.8975 
Other manufacturing 1.0000 1.6331 1.6331 1.9572 1.9572 
Electricity supply 1.0000 1.8236 1.8236 1.9215 1.9215 
Gas supply 1.0000 1.1982 1.1982 1.3517 1.3517 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 1.0000 1.3305 1.3305 1.4744 1.4744 
Residential building 1.0000 1.4979 1.4979 1.6636 1.6636 
Other construction 1.0000 1.3153 1.3153 1.5486 1.5486 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Wholesale trade 1.0000 1.5982 1.5982 1.9905 1.9905 
Retail trade 1.0000 1.4853 1.4853 1.9108 1.9108 
Mechanical repairs 1.0000 1.3502 1.3502 1.6108 1.6108 
Other repairs 1.0000 1.2489 1.2489 1.5507 1.5507 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 1.0000 1.4419 1.4419 1.7086 1.7086 
Road transport 1.0000 1.6201 1.6201 1.9306 1.9306 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 1.0000 1.6316 1.6316 2.0135 2.0135 
Water transport 1.0000 1.3178 1.3178 1.4305 1.4305 
Air and space transport 1.0000 1.6182 1.6182 1.8638 1.8638 
Services to transport ;storage 1.0000 1.2982 1.2982 1.5790 1.5790 
Communication services 1.0000 1.3888 1.3888 1.7096 1.7096 
Banking 1.0000 1.2487 1.2487 1.5538 1.5538 
Non-bank finance 1.0000 1.4392 1.4392 1.6702 1.6702 
Insurance 1.0000 1.3110 1.3110 1.6442 1.6442 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 1.0000 1.0779 1.0779 1.3048 1.3048 
Ownership of dwellings 1.0000 1.1529 1.1529 1.1800 1.1800 
Other property services 1.0000 1.7905 1.7905 2.1776 2.1776 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 1.0000 1.3350 1.3350 1.6624 1.6624 
Legal, accounting, marketing and business services 1.0000 1.5545 1.5545 1.9648 1.9648 
Other business services 1.0000 1.5598 1.5598 1.8562 1.8562 
Government administration 1.0000 1.3677 1.3677 1.9089 1.9089 
Defence 1.0000 1.5580 1.5580 2.0469 2.0469 
Education 1.0000 1.1113 1.1113 1.8135 1.8135 
Health services 1.0000 1.1268 1.1268 1.7559 1.7559 
Community services 1.0000 1.5224 1.5224 1.9858 1.9858 
Motion picture, radio and television services 1.0000 1.5447 1.5447 1.8684 1.8684 
Libraries, museums and the arts 1.0000 1.2008 1.2008 1.6998 1.6998 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 1.0000 1.5635 1.5635 1.8361 1.8361 
Personal services 1.0000 1.3474 1.3474 1.6824 1.6824 
Other services 1.0000 1.1694 1.1694 1.7965 1.7965 
Pilbara Iron 1.0000 1.0265 1.0265 1.0838 1.0838 
Dampier Salt 1.0000 1.0594 1.0594 1.1280 1.1280 
Data source: Pilbara 2001-02 input output table. 
Note: na  = not available.  
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Pilbara income multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 0.0565 0.1327 2.3496 0.1478 2.6175 
Grains 0.0530 0.1058 1.9956 0.1154 2.1766 
Beef cattle 0.0833 0.1131 1.3582 0.1285 1.5424 
Other agriculture 0.1090 0.1897 1.7408 0.2157 1.9788 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 0.2645 0.2999 1.1338 0.3472 1.3124 
Commercial fishing 0.0984 0.1540 1.5644 0.1812 1.8404 
Oil & gas 0.0473 0.0536 1.1331 0.0610 1.2894 
Iron ores 0.1103 0.1160 1.0518 0.1368 1.2400 
Non-ferrous metal ores 0.1103 0.1722 1.5609 0.1938 1.7569 
Other mining 0.0883 0.0987 1.1183 0.1172 1.3273 
Services to mining 0.1840 0.2298 1.2491 0.2581 1.4033 
Meat and meat products 0.1398 0.2368 1.6943 0.2549 1.8240 
Dairy products 0.0935 0.1876 2.0059 0.2029 2.1689 
Bakery products 0.2330 0.3586 1.5391 0.4034 1.7314 
Other food products 0.1228 0.2499 2.0354 0.2743 2.2342 
Clothing 0.2029 0.2827 1.3938 0.3414 1.6831 
Other wood products 0.2225 0.3829 1.7212 0.4617 2.0755 
Printing and services to printing 0.2253 0.3562 1.5812 0.4113 1.8260 
Publishing; recorded media and publishing 0.2192 0.3710 1.6929 0.4366 1.9920 
Petroleum and coal products 0.0264 0.0612 2.3132 0.0718 2.7138 
Basic chemicals 0.1129 0.2183 1.9344 0.2580 2.2862 
Paints 0.1440 0.2580 1.7911 0.3103 2.1541 
Other chemical products 0.1377 0.2257 1.6389 0.2720 1.9747 
Rubber products 0.2111 0.3093 1.4650 0.3733 1.7683 
Plastic products 0.1868 0.3329 1.7825 0.3681 1.9708 
Glass and glass products 0.2192 0.3503 1.5979 0.4221 1.9256 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 0.1021 0.2689 2.6336 0.3137 3.0723 
Plaster and other concrete 0.1814 0.2797 1.5415 0.3328 1.8340 
Other non-metallic mineral  0.1937 0.3450 1.7816 0.4152 2.1440 
Iron and steel 0.1455 0.2333 1.6031 0.2763 1.8983 
Basic non-ferrous metal and  0.0853 0.2045 2.3962 0.2333 2.7333 
Structural metal products 0.2081 0.3632 1.7449 0.4372 2.1008 
Sheet metal products 0.2025 0.3815 1.8838 0.4577 2.2602 
Fabricated metal products 0.2623 0.3699 1.4104 0.4375 1.6682 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 0.1357 0.2678 1.9737 0.3165 2.3327 
Ships and boats 0.1822 0.2743 1.5053 0.3204 1.7584 
Railway equipment 0.2384 0.3393 1.4233 0.4053 1.7003 
Aircraft 0.4548 0.4940 1.0861 0.5258 1.1560 
Electronic equipment 0.1885 0.2789 1.4800 0.3109 1.6497 
Household appliances 0.1328 0.3065 2.3073 0.3673 2.7648 
Other electrical equipment 0.2129 0.3434 1.6129 0.4050 1.9022 
Agricultural, mining and c 0.2154 0.3257 1.5120 0.3834 1.7796 
Other machinery and equipment 0.2658 0.3987 1.5001 0.4763 1.7919 
Prefabricated buildings 0.1431 0.2318 1.6198 0.2642 1.8458 
Furniture 0.2439 0.3830 1.5707 0.4525 1.8556 
Other manufacturing 0.2218 0.3629 1.6361 0.4359 1.9652 
Electricity supply 0.0386 0.1281 3.3143 0.1501 3.8848 
Gas supply 0.1744 0.2084 1.1945 0.2429 1.3926 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 0.1093 0.1688 1.5454 0.2012 1.8420 
Residential building 0.0987 0.2111 2.1388 0.2485 2.5167 
Other construction 0.2437 0.3159 1.2962 0.3685 1.5119 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Wholesale trade 0.3187 0.4676 1.4673 0.5559 1.7445 
Retail trade 0.3589 0.4800 1.3376 0.5759 1.6046 
Mechanical repairs 0.2174 0.3093 1.4230 0.3680 1.6930 
Other repairs 0.2658 0.3226 1.2138 0.3905 1.4695 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 0.2335 0.3315 1.4197 0.3915 1.6769 
Road transport 0.2122 0.3575 1.6845 0.4274 2.0139 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 0.3865 0.5280 1.3659 0.6140 1.5884 
Water transport 0.1042 0.1631 1.5650 0.1884 1.8084 
Air and space transport 0.2321 0.3257 1.4029 0.3810 1.6412 
Services to transport ;storage 0.2701 0.3442 1.2743 0.4074 1.5084 
Communication services 0.2702 0.3665 1.3564 0.4387 1.6236 
Banking 0.2801 0.3446 1.2303 0.4133 1.4757 
Non-bank finance 0.1395 0.2555 1.8316 0.3075 2.2044 
Insurance 0.3520 0.4370 1.2415 0.5120 1.4547 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 0.2183 0.2403 1.1005 0.2914 1.3345 
Ownership of dwellings 0.0000 0.0318 na 0.0379 na 
Other property services 0.2454 0.4423 1.8024 0.5295 2.1577 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 0.3985 0.4918 1.2343 0.5656 1.4193 
Legal, accounting, marketing & business management services 0.3684 0.5147 1.3972 0.6071 1.6480 
Other business services 0.2176 0.3550 1.6313 0.4217 1.9381 
Government administration 0.4843 0.5980 1.2347 0.7198 1.4864 
Defence 0.4572 0.5848 1.2791 0.6949 1.5199 
Education 0.7352 0.7636 1.0386 0.9217 1.2536 
Health services 0.6925 0.7308 1.0553 0.8725 1.2599 
Community services 0.3821 0.5065 1.3255 0.6108 1.5985 
Motion picture, radio and television services 0.2460 0.3830 1.5570 0.4559 1.8533 
Libraries, museums and the arts 0.5021 0.5562 1.1077 0.6686 1.3315 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 0.1891 0.3306 1.7484 0.3920 2.0731 
Personal services 0.2846 0.3731 1.3109 0.4485 1.5760 
Other services 0.6456 0.6860 1.0626 0.8272 1.2813 
Pilbara Iron 0.0751 0.0810 1.0793 0.0939 1.2514 
Dampier Salt 0.0705 0.0846 1.1995 0.1001 1.4185 
Data source: Pilbara 2001-02 input output table.  
Note: na  = not available.  
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Pilbara value added multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 0.6475 0.7995 1.2346 0.8368 1.2922 
Grains 0.7030 0.8795 1.2512 0.9032 1.2849 
Beef cattle 0.6116 0.6683 1.0927 0.7062 1.1545 
Other agriculture 0.6718 0.8397 1.2499 0.9037 1.3452 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 0.4274 0.5033 1.1775 0.6198 1.4501 
Commercial fishing 0.4090 0.5287 1.2927 0.5957 1.4565 
Oil & gas 0.7435 0.7717 1.0379 0.7899 1.0624 
Iron ores 0.5592 0.5847 1.0456 0.6359 1.1372 
Non-ferrous metal ores 0.4648 0.6158 1.3248 0.6691 1.4395 
Other mining 0.5214 0.5456 1.0464 0.5911 1.1336 
Services to mining 0.3951 0.4925 1.2465 0.5624 1.4235 
Meat and meat products 0.1861 0.4560 2.4504 0.5006 2.6905 
Dairy products 0.2144 0.3932 1.8343 0.4308 2.0097 
Bakery products 0.3718 0.6095 1.6394 0.7199 1.9366 
Other food products 0.2298 0.4763 2.0730 0.5365 2.3350 
Clothing 0.2838 0.4170 1.4691 0.5617 1.9790 
Other wood products 0.3471 0.6392 1.8415 0.8336 2.4014 
Printing and services to printing 0.3792 0.6147 1.6210 0.7506 1.9796 
Publishing; recorded media and publishing 0.4376 0.7048 1.6108 0.8665 1.9801 
Petroleum and coal products 0.1149 0.4389 3.8205 0.4650 4.0480 
Basic chemicals 0.2536 0.5151 2.0309 0.6130 2.4169 
Paints 0.3450 0.5534 1.6040 0.6823 1.9776 
Other chemical products 0.2879 0.4655 1.6171 0.5796 2.0133 
Rubber products 0.3642 0.5420 1.4881 0.6999 1.9215 
Plastic products 0.3420 0.6280 1.8364 0.7147 2.0901 
Glass and glass products 0.3796 0.6559 1.7280 0.8330 2.1947 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 0.2602 0.6394 2.4577 0.7499 2.8823 
Plaster and other concrete 0.3716 0.5715 1.5382 0.7024 1.8904 
Other non-metallic mineral  0.3481 0.6652 1.9109 0.8383 2.4081 
Iron and steel 0.2820 0.5135 1.8209 0.6194 2.1966 
Basic non-ferrous metal and  0.2208 0.5596 2.5343 0.6306 2.8555 
Structural metal products 0.3175 0.6063 1.9093 0.7889 2.4845 
Sheet metal products 0.3307 0.6749 2.0407 0.8628 2.6091 
Fabricated metal products 0.3864 0.5932 1.5352 0.7600 1.9668 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 0.2849 0.5333 1.8719 0.6535 2.2936 
Ships and boats 0.2891 0.4514 1.5614 0.5651 1.9547 
Railway equipment 0.3139 0.4646 1.4800 0.6275 1.9987 
Aircraft 0.4678 0.5407 1.1558 0.6191 1.3233 
Electronic equipment 0.3680 0.5396 1.4665 0.6185 1.6808 
Household appliances 0.2009 0.5127 2.5525 0.6626 3.2987 
Other electrical equipment 0.3275 0.5685 1.7361 0.7204 2.1999 
Agricultural, mining and c 0.2828 0.4846 1.7134 0.6268 2.2159 
Other machinery and equipment 0.3786 0.6211 1.6405 0.8124 2.1456 
Prefabricated buildings 0.3440 0.5056 1.4698 0.5853 1.7017 
Furniture 0.3484 0.5946 1.7066 0.7658 2.1983 
Other manufacturing 0.3918 0.6509 1.6611 0.8309 2.1206 
Electricity supply 0.1908 0.7115 3.7290 0.7659 4.0139 
Gas supply 0.5555 0.6626 1.1929 0.7478 1.3463 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 0.5540 0.7033 1.2695 0.7832 1.4138 
Residential building 0.3735 0.5735 1.5354 0.6655 1.7817 
Other construction 0.4314 0.5622 1.3034 0.6918 1.6038 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Wholesale trade 0.4397 0.7119 1.6190 0.9298 2.1145 
Retail trade 0.4331 0.6604 1.5247 0.8967 2.0703 
Mechanical repairs 0.5512 0.7020 1.2737 0.8467 1.5362 
Other repairs 0.6662 0.7735 1.1610 0.9410 1.4125 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 0.3814 0.5786 1.5172 0.7267 1.9055 
Road transport 0.4288 0.7076 1.6502 0.8800 2.0523 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 0.4976 0.7477 1.5026 0.9597 1.9288 
Water transport 0.2524 0.3828 1.5168 0.4453 1.7646 
Air and space transport 0.3637 0.5990 1.6467 0.7353 2.0216 
Services to transport ;storage 0.6181 0.7581 1.2265 0.9140 1.4787 
Communication services 0.6332 0.8096 1.2787 0.9877 1.5599 
Banking 0.6178 0.7435 1.2034 0.9129 1.4777 
Non-bank finance 0.3953 0.6202 1.5692 0.7485 1.8937 
Insurance 0.5617 0.7709 1.3726 0.9559 1.7020 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 0.9419 0.9862 1.0470 1.1122 1.1808 
Ownership of dwellings 0.8470 0.9124 1.0772 0.9274 1.0950 
Other property services 0.3788 0.7143 1.8857 0.9293 2.4533 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 0.6110 0.7765 1.2708 0.9582 1.5683 
Legal, accounting, marketing and business management services 0.5651 0.8341 1.4760 1.0619 1.8792 
Other business services 0.3454 0.6008 1.7394 0.7653 2.2160 
Government administration 0.5695 0.7531 1.3224 1.0536 1.8501 
Defence 0.5184 0.7454 1.4379 1.0169 1.9616 
Education 0.8548 0.9080 1.0623 1.2979 1.5184 
Health services 0.8608 0.9251 1.0748 1.2745 1.4806 
Community services 0.4575 0.6949 1.5191 0.9522 2.0816 
Motion picture, radio and television services 0.5165 0.7764 1.5034 0.9562 1.8515 
Libraries, museums and the arts 0.7154 0.8112 1.1339 1.0883 1.5213 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 0.4772 0.7390 1.5487 0.8904 1.8659 
Personal services 0.5803 0.7423 1.2792 0.9284 1.5997 
Other services 0.7728 0.8496 1.0995 1.1978 1.5501 
Pilbara Iron 0.7914 0.8031 1.0147 0.8349 1.0550 
Dampier Salt 0.7448 0.7715 1.0358 0.8096 1.0869 
Data source: Pilbara 2001-02 input output table. 
Note: na  = not available.  
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Pilbara employment multipliers 
Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Sheep 0.0197 0.0213 1.0812 0.0218 1.1045 
Grains 0.0324 0.0370 1.1433 0.0373 1.1523 
Beef cattle 0.0063 0.0070 1.1046 0.0075 1.1784 
Other agriculture 0.0123 0.0140 1.1399 0.0148 1.2041 
Services to agriculture; hunting and trapping 0.0054 0.0063 1.1592 0.0077 1.4247 
Commercial fishing 0.0013 0.0024 1.8352 0.0032 2.4685 
Oil & gas 0.0000 0.0001 3.7839 0.0004 9.5427 
Iron ores 0.0007 0.0007 1.0789 0.0013 2.0385 
Non-ferrous metal ores 0.0020 0.0033 1.6356 0.0039 1.9659 
Other mining 0.0024 0.0026 1.0845 0.0032 1.3147 
Services to mining 0.0034 0.0045 1.3056 0.0053 1.5573 
Meat and meat products 0.0022 0.0052 2.3534 0.0058 2.6015 
Dairy products 0.0020 0.0039 1.9700 0.0044 2.2027 
Bakery products 0.0083 0.0110 1.3273 0.0124 1.4915 
Other food products 0.0012 0.0038 3.2290 0.0046 3.8531 
Clothing 0.0219 0.0237 1.0838 0.0255 1.1656 
Other wood products 0.0081 0.0118 1.4576 0.0142 1.7550 
Printing and services to printing 0.0104 0.0133 1.2891 0.0150 1.4513 
Publishing; recorded media and publishing 0.0074 0.0110 1.4850 0.0130 1.7537 
Petroleum and coal products 0.0003 0.0006 2.2647 0.0009 3.4467 
Basic chemicals 0.0013 0.0031 2.4936 0.0043 3.4541 
Paints 0.0058 0.0080 1.3808 0.0096 1.6555 
Other chemical products 0.0028 0.0046 1.6720 0.0060 2.1805 
Rubber products 0.0050 0.0074 1.4758 0.0094 1.8636 
Plastic products 0.0052 0.0082 1.5609 0.0092 1.7658 
Glass and glass products 0.0087 0.0117 1.3455 0.0139 1.5966 
Cement, lime and concrete slurry 0.0016 0.0047 2.9714 0.0061 3.8315 
Plaster and other concrete 0.0037 0.0057 1.5693 0.0074 2.0109 
Other non-metallic mineral  0.0076 0.0108 1.4116 0.0129 1.6918 
Iron and steel 0.0043 0.0061 1.4217 0.0074 1.7281 
Basic non-ferrous metal and  0.0018 0.0039 2.2041 0.0048 2.6998 
Structural metal products 0.0043 0.0079 1.8367 0.0102 2.3609 
Sheet metal products 0.0047 0.0088 1.8859 0.0111 2.3834 
Fabricated metal products 0.0100 0.0126 1.2573 0.0146 1.4634 
Motor vehicles and parts; other transport equipment 0.0027 0.0056 2.0768 0.0071 2.6273 
Ships and boats 0.0063 0.0085 1.3330 0.0099 1.5543 
Railway equipment 0.0035 0.0052 1.5009 0.0072 2.0794 
Aircraft 0.0128 0.0136 1.0695 0.0146 1.1453 
Electronic equipment 0.0081 0.0103 1.2639 0.0113 1.3836 
Household appliances 0.0049 0.0090 1.8452 0.0108 2.2256 
Other electrical equipment 0.0082 0.0113 1.3763 0.0132 1.6042 
Agricultural, mining and c 0.0058 0.0083 1.4264 0.0101 1.7270 
Other machinery and equipment 0.0077 0.0108 1.3994 0.0131 1.7063 
Prefabricated buildings 0.0032 0.0052 1.6184 0.0062 1.9225 
Furniture 0.0093 0.0125 1.3494 0.0147 1.5769 
Other manufacturing 0.0111 0.0144 1.2901 0.0166 1.4895 
Electricity supply 0.0014 0.0023 1.6959 0.0030 2.1825 
Gas supply 0.0015 0.0021 1.4618 0.0032 2.1826 
Water supply; sewerage and drainage services 0.0039 0.0052 1.3488 0.0062 1.6029 
Residential building 0.0032 0.0054 1.6921 0.0065 2.0477 
Other construction 0.0072 0.0086 1.2043 0.0102 1.4278 
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Sector Initial effect Simple 
multiplier 
Type 1 
multiplier 
Total 
multiplier 
Type 2 
multiplier 
Wholesale trade 0.0055 0.0083 1.5224 0.0110 2.0157 
Retail trade 0.0166 0.0192 1.1535 0.0221 1.3291 
Mechanical repairs 0.0075 0.0092 1.2316 0.0110 1.4697 
Other repairs 0.0018 0.0029 1.6608 0.0050 2.8270 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 0.0110 0.0130 1.1810 0.0148 1.3469 
Road transport 0.0045 0.0074 1.6524 0.0095 2.1288 
Rail, pipeline and other transport 0.0034 0.0061 1.7813 0.0087 2.5510 
Water transport 0.0022 0.0033 1.5161 0.0041 1.8725 
Air and space transport 0.0022 0.0037 1.6908 0.0054 2.4661 
Services to transport ;storage 0.0036 0.0051 1.4283 0.0070 1.9675 
Communication services 0.0044 0.0063 1.4235 0.0085 1.9197 
Banking 0.0051 0.0065 1.2706 0.0086 1.6770 
Non-bank finance 0.0031 0.0056 1.8301 0.0072 2.3433 
Insurance 0.0041 0.0058 1.4087 0.0081 1.9624 
Services to finance, investment and insurance 0.0047 0.0051 1.1002 0.0067 1.4341 
Ownership of dwellings 0.0000 0.0006 na 0.0008 na 
Other property services 0.0022 0.0055 2.5364 0.0082 3.7557 
Scientific research, technical and computer services 0.0078 0.0099 1.2625 0.0122 1.5485 
Legal, accounting, marketing &  business services 0.0078 0.0111 1.4294 0.0139 1.7915 
Other business services 0.0092 0.0121 1.3145 0.0141 1.5359 
Government administration 0.0080 0.0103 1.2904 0.0140 1.7537 
Defence 0.0071 0.0105 1.4687 0.0138 1.9396 
Education 0.0173 0.0179 1.0351 0.0227 1.3137 
Health services 0.0145 0.0154 1.0630 0.0197 1.3603 
Community services 0.0220 0.0249 1.1350 0.0281 1.2796 
Motion picture, radio and television services 0.0067 0.0101 1.5137 0.0123 1.8455 
Libraries, museums and the arts 0.0135 0.0148 1.0944 0.0182 1.3477 
Sport, gambling and recreational services 0.0081 0.0114 1.4090 0.0132 1.6405 
Personal services 0.0222 0.0243 1.0938 0.0266 1.1973 
Other services 0.0111 0.0120 1.0850 0.0163 1.4723 
Pilbara Iron 0.0009 0.0011 1.1700 0.0015 1.6003 
Dampier Salt 0.0008 0.0012 1.4648 0.0016 2.0580 
Data source: Pilbara 2001-02 input output table. 
Note: na  = not available.  
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Chapter 6 
 
QMM, the mine of the future     
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6.1. The mine of the future  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 examined how the old models of regional economic development 
have frequently relied on large firms providing direct capital and jobs, and have 
assumed that the new technologies, production systems and managerial skills brought 
in by these firms would be eventually transferred to local enterprises, thus 
underpinning long-term regional growth. Outcomes from these models have often 
been disappointing, and even large industrial complexes have been repeatedly unable 
to energise the local business environment and to secure the sustainable expansion of 
regional economies beyond the initial push from one-off capital investments. In the 
same way, heavy reliance on infrastructure with no emphasis on other development 
factors has generally failed to increase competitiveness in the long run and has thus 
been unable to prevent local enterprises from falling behind more dynamic external 
firms (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose and Arbix 2001). Another problem with these models has 
been the tendency to replicate the same strategies in regions with markedly different 
socioeconomic and cultural characteristics (Vazquez Barquero 1990). 
  
Previous chapters have also explored how the increasing rejection of these 
approaches, together with the escalating challenges faced by sub-national economies 
due to globalisation, led to the emergence of a group of bottom-up and territory-
specific regional development policies over the last twenty years, based on the 
principles of social participation and dialogue; the mobilisation of local resources; the 
consolidation of competitive advantages; and the effective support for local 
ownership and management (Vazquez Barquero 1999). However, and despite the 
strength of these new ideas, it would be a mistake to interpret this as a linear and 
undisputed phenomenon by which top-down and centralised policies have been 
suddenly and extensively abandoned for more pluralistic approaches. Rather, this has 
been a gradual and at times staggered process where custom-made responses 
progressively gained ground as the underpinning force of new regional development 
strategies (Lovering 1999). In mining, for example, an industry commonly enabled by 
significant flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) with little pre-existent roots in the 
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local economies81, development efforts associated to major projects have typically 
remained alien to this new thinking. 
 
The development of QMM (QIT Madagascar Minerals) is among the first cases 
where there has been an explicit attempt to incorporate some of these new concepts 
into the designing of a regional development process dominated by the construction 
of a large mine. QMM is a leading example in a new generation of mining projects 
that have had to conceive their business activities as driving forces for broader 
regional development interventions as part of their core strategies for mitigating 
project risk. As such, this project has been described as a pure representation of the 
SD model of mineral development (Rio Tinto website). In particular, as a green-field 
project in early stages of production, QMM provided an unrivalled opportunity to 
explore the type of preparation work in the socioeconomic arena to be undertaken 
within this model. It is also a good example of how the logistics around the 
transportation of a mine’s produce to the markets, often a critical challenge for the 
industry in developing economies, has became here an opportunity to address issues 
of economic development more broadly.   
  
In August 2005, the Rio Tinto’s Board approved the development of this large 
ilmenite82 project, initially estimated at $580 million83, 84. In 2009, as this research 
was coming to a conclusion, QMM came into production. The mine is located near 
the town of Fort-Dauphin, in the Anosy region, South-East of Madagascar. Early 
capacity was planned at 0.75 million tonnes per year (MTY), peaking at 1MTY after 
a short ramp up period (Rio Tinto 2005). At this rate of production, the life of the 
deposit was estimated in between forty and sixty years. The mine will also become 
the main customer of a new multi-user sea harbour near Fort-Dauphin85, providing a 
base load business to help establish the export facility (World Bank 2004). Being up 
until this point the largest single investment in the history of the country, QMM 
                                                 
81
 For more on this see chapter 2.  
82
 Illmenite is an industrial mineral used as whitening pigment, for instance, in toothpaste 
83
 80% Rio Tinto ownership and the balance by the government of Madagascar 
84
 All monetary values throughout this study are expressed in US dollars of the day unless otherwise 
stated 
85
 The pre-existing improvised and unprotected port was repeatedly blamed for the economic isolation 
of the region (e.g. QMM 2001) 
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attracted the attention of the international community from day one. In response, the 
company claim to have liaised extensively with various regional players, so as to 
understand and capture its full potential benefits to the economy and to maximise the 
local content of these benefits (Rio Tinto Economic Department 2004).  
 
Figure 6.1 – Map of Madagascar, the Anosy Region, and the project area 
Source: Rio Tinto 
 
It was within this context that former Rio Tinto Chairman, Paul Skinner, described 
the project as ‘A model for further projects which are likely to follow in Africa and 
the developing world’ (Rio Tinto website). Similarly, Rio Tinto CEO at the time, 
Leigh Clifford, portrayed it as the ‘mine of the future’, claiming that the company has 
managed to design an operation that effectively integrates environmental, social and 
economic aspects. He added:  
  
‘We have already demonstrated that we are committed to developing the project 
in a manner consistent with the principles of sustainable development. Indeed, it 
will be a model of the contribution mining can make through the successful 
integration of financial, environmental and community objectives’ (Clifford 
2004 p1)  
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In the early hours, and despite the high environmental sensitivity associated to the 
Anosy region, the project even managed to enthuse many environmental activists, 
perhaps the most intransigent of the mining critics. For instance, Martin Nicoll of 
WWF told the English journal The Economist that mining is not necessarily 
incompatible with preserving the environment, and that in Madagascar, slash-and-
burn farming, not mining, was responsible for most of the ecological damage (The 
Economist, 2007). As such, long-term economic development could actually have a 
net positive effect on the environment. For Rio Tinto, it soon became apparent that 
the long term viability of this project was intimately linked to its ability to contribute 
to orderly regional economic development compatible with the expectations it had 
created – in addition to delivering strong shareholder value. 
 
Given its early stage, the effect of QMM on the Anosy economy will not be fully 
visible for several years. Instead, this study undertakes an examination of the 
rationale underpinning the design process behind this project up to its feasibility stage 
(FS). It also highlights some early signs of conflict identified during construction, and 
some perceived strains in the relationship between key stakeholders – some of which 
had crossed boundaries of responsibility previously assumed out of reach. Thus, a 
central focus of this analysis is the process of economic planning and the negotiation 
between Rio Tinto and the government (or the World Bank on its behalf). The next 
section introduces the economy of Madagascar and the Anosy region, as well as a 
thorough description of the QMM project. Section three describes the establishment 
of a broad development framework for the region and a wider attempt to build 
managerial capacity at the local level. Section four explores the emerging partnership 
between the company and the World Bank, and the projected benefits for the region 
from an ambitious regional investment strategy. Section five introduces the view of 
those directly affected by the project and identifies some early discussion around the 
problems and virtues of the undertaking up until the end of construction. Final 
comments take place in section six.    
 
The research methodology was already discussed in chapter 3. As a summary, 
consistent with previous case studies, the base year for this analysis is 2004. 
However, as there were no financial results available from the company at the time of 
writing, instead of actual cash flows, the assessment of economic contributions is 
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based on existing projections discounted at applicable rates. The methodology for 
these calculations is explained in the text, with all original tables included as 
appendixes. For local data, the study relies on economic literature on Madagascar and 
the Anosy region mainly from World Bank, IMF and local sources. As primary 
sources, the study builds on interviews with relevant Rio Tinto employees, local 
residents and other regional players, all of which are referenced throughout. As in the 
previous case studies, all interviews were conducted for the sole purpose of this 
research and took place in Fort-Dauphine, Johannesburg, or London, between 2007 
and 2008. 
 
 
6.2. Background to the region and project  
 
6.2.1 Madagascar and the Anosy region 
 
Madagascar was a French colony from 1896 until its independence in 1960. After 
almost two decades under a socialist system, the country moved to a liberal 
democracy. Its political system is based on autonomous provinces with a central 
government managed by a prime minister, and a bicameral legislature. Madagascar is 
one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita equivalent to $210 
(2004) and 69% of the population below the poverty line. In an effort to attract 
foreign investment and to underpin growth, the government completed its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (Document de Stratégie pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté), 
or DSRP (2000), setting the target to halve poverty in ten years. This policy strategy 
paper followed World Bank and IMF policy advice and led to some business-friendly 
reforms, including the privatisation of some public services. A period of economic 
growth averaging 4.6% between 1997-2001 increased average living standards 
nationwide but had a disappointingly low impact on improving conditions for the 
rural population. 
 
In 2001, a conflictive presidential election led to a six month political crisis. The 
impact on economic and social conditions was significant, with GDP contracting by 
12.7%; foreign investors leaving Madagascar; roads and bridges destroyed throughout 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GDP growth, % 6.0 -12.7 9.8 4.7 5.5
GDP, US$ billion 4.5 4.4 5.5 3.7 3.7
GDP per capita, US$ 283 267 324 210 209
Inflation (CPI) 6.9 15.9 -1.2 14.1 7.4
Population, millions 16.0 16.4 16.9 17.3 17.8
Population growth, % 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6
Trade balance, US$ billion -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6
Local currency to US$ 6588 6831 6191 10711 11952
Total export earnings, US$ billion 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.2
Foreign direct investment, US$ million 83 63 11 44 62
Total External Debt, US$ billion 4.7 4.1 5.0 4.8 4.7
the country; and exports coming to a virtual standstill (the Mining Journal 2007). 
Under the Presidency of Marc Ravalomanana, the economy started to recover from 
this political upheaval in 2002. Strong economic growth of near 10% in 2003 aided 
the easing of political tensions, but worries returned with an inflation crisis in 2004. 
Some key macroeconomic indicators for Madagascar during this period are 
introduced in Table 6.1. Towards the end of this study, Andry Rajoelina ousted 
former president Ravalomanana in a bloodless coup in March 2009, and launched a 
thorough review of mining contracts which, by September that year, had not had 
included QMM (The Wall Street Journal 2009)   
  
In 2005, the population was near 18 million, divided into 18 ethnic groups sharing a 
common language, Malagasy. Approximately 80% of the population are engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, with limited access to transport often blamed as the main 
obstacle to higher agricultural productivity. Health care and education are extremely 
precarious throughout the country. Only 54% of the population have access to clean 
water in urban areas – and 4% in rural areas. Life expectancy is 52 years and the 
infant mortality rate is as high as 89 deaths per 1000 births. Literacy is estimated at 
46% (The World Bank 2006). The country has a unique but rapidly depleting natural 
environment, cleared extensively for agriculture and harvested by the local population 
for firewood, charcoal and construction wood. Approximately 85% of the flora and 
fauna in Madagascar are endemic, though nearly 80% of the original forest has been 
destroyed and the rest is being cut down or burned at a high rate. Given the number of 
unique species at risk, environmental organisations refer to the country as a global 
biodiversity ‘hotspot’ (for instance, Panos London 2007) 
 
Table 6.1 - Key macroeconomic indicators 
Source: World Markets Research Centre 
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Located in the South-East extreme of Madagascar, in the Toliara province, the Anosy 
region is one of the poorest in Madagascar. Within Anosy’s 64 communes the 
population is estimated at 360,000 people (2000) and projections estimate this will 
double to 720,000 by 2020. This is expected to increase pressure on the endangered 
local forest. As elsewhere in Madagascar, the littoral forest remnants are under heavy 
strain from villagers who depend on it (TZMI 2004). Satellite photos taken of the 
littoral forest indicate that about 60% of what remained of it in 1950 has disappeared, 
with the rest bound to disappear over the next 25-40 years at current depleting rates. 
Income in the region is estimated at US$183 per capita (2004), significantly lower 
than that of the country as a whole, with 80% of the population below the poverty 
line. Literacy in the region sits between 25 and 15%. In addition, one quarter of the 
population suffers from malaria, and 16% from serious respiratory infections – often 
liked to the widespread use of charcoal (World Markets Research Centre 2005) 
 
Most economic transactions take place in the largest town in Anosy, Fort-Dauphin, 
which has a population of around 50,000 people. The town has a small airport that 
accommodates Boeing 737s, but otherwise its infrastructure is very precarious, 
including a small port and roads in very poor condition. As per sources of income, 
around 20,000 visitors travel to Fort-Dauphin every year, mainly attracted by the 
beauty of the Andohaela National Park and some further ecotourism spots, and 
typically stay for a few days. Occasionally, cruise ships attempt to anchor in the Fort-
Dauphin bay, but the unpredictability of the ocean waves and the lack of a large port 
have all but curtailed this activity. Approximately 6,000 people work in sisal 
plantations to the west of Fort-Dauphin with about 12,000 tonnes of sisal being 
exported annually. Lower cost competition has negatively impacted this industry over 
the past decade. Lobsters, caught by villagers along the coast, are purchased by local 
businesses and processed for export. High potential has often been attributed to this 
industry, although growth would require significant improvement in local 
infrastructure. Other small-scale economic activity in the region includes agriculture, 
exotic fruit and spices, and the import of food and construction materials for local 
consumption (QMM 2001).  
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2001 billions of francs millions of US$
Deficit or Surplus -1,203 -185
Revenue 3,029 466
Grants received 1,003 154
Expenditure 5,182 797
Financing
Domestic 580 89
Foreign 518 80
Adjustment to total financing 104 16
Table 6.2 - Government finances* 
Source: IMF 2004 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The publication of this data was later interrupted and reliable figures on government finance are not 
easily obtainable. 2001 appears to be a rather typical year, and the ratio ‘foreign grants’ to ‘government 
revenues’ of around 33% is consistent with previous records. 
 
 
Within a national context of extreme underdevelopment and financial shortfalls, the 
World Bank has long played a fundamental role in the country’s finances, including 
annual contributions often accounting for more than 1/3 of total government revenues 
(Table 6.2 illustrates this point based on data for 2001). The Bank has also turned its 
attention to the real economy. In this regard, despite the recurrent political and 
economic crises, many commentators have highlighted the significant potential for 
fast economic growth in Madagascar including: large spare capacity in the textile 
industry and other firms operating near the capital Antananarivo; an agricultural 
sector whose productivity is among the lowest in the world; natural beauty and 
biodiversity that presents a large potential for tourism; and rich (though unexploited) 
mining potential that has so far concentrated in the informal sector, with precious 
stones smuggled into the world market with little benefit to Madagascar (QMM 2001, 
TZMI 2004, MAP 2006). To take advantage of the country’s potential, and in support 
of Madagascar’s PRSP, the World Bank proposed a new Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS) towards the end of 2003.  
 
Underpinned by a lending program of US$500 million over 3 years, the Bank’s 
strategy consisted in establishing an Integrated Growth Poles plan (Pôles Intègres de 
Croissance), or PIC, aiming to accelerate growth in three selected regions. The PIC 
programme would provide a minimum infrastructure platform to allow the 
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development of agriculture and agro-processing, mining, tourism and export 
processing zones in these regions. It would rely on public-private partnership (PPP), 
whereby public investment would cover most off-site infrastructure while private 
investment would secure on-site investment (World Bank 2003). More specifically, 
the strategy aimed to establish 1) an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) for manufacture 
production near Antananarivo, 2) the consolidation of a tourist destination in the 
costal area, and 3) the development of the mining sector in the Anosy Region.  
 
 
6.2.2 The QMM project      
 
QMM is managed and controlled by Rio Tinto, which owns an 80 per cent share of 
the project. The government of Madagascar, through its public company OMNIS, 
owns the balancing 20 per cent. While the characteristics of the mineral deposit fits 
with Rio Tinto’s well publicised target of large, long-life and low-cost operations, the 
company identified country risk, and particularly the extremely harsh economic 
environment around the mine, as the main difficulty faced by the operation. Partly 
driven by risk mitigation, from early on, the company made notable efforts to 
understand the expected direct economic contributions to be expected from the 
business (Rio Tinto Economics Department 2004). At a steady state, Rio Tinto’s early 
estimate of total value of production (FOB) was over US$100 million per year. In this 
calculation, value added represented more than 70% of the total. As discussed in 
previous chapters, a large value added is a typical feature of modern mining, and it is 
primarily explained by the intensity of capital required to operate. This capital 
intensity is reflected in annual allowances for: (a) interest payments for money 
previously borrowed from the financial sector, (b) repayments to shareholders in the 
form of dividends for their provision of capital, and (c) the cash retained in the 
business to replace depreciated assets and to fund future investments. For illustrative 
purposes, these three elements have been split here in equal parts. The remaining 27% 
of value added takes the form of labour costs, tax and royalty payments.     
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Year of production 1 2 3 4 5
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EMPLOYMENT (full-time equivalent)
QMM direct 550 550 550 550 555
    - Expats 50 50 25 25 5
    - Local 500 500 525 525 550
Direct contractors (between 150 and 200) 150 150 150 150 150
Total employment (mine) 700 700 700 700 705
wages 8%
taxes and 
royalties 
19%
interests 15%
dividends 15%
reinvested 15%
payments to 
suppliers 
28%
Figure 6.2 – Projected composition of QMM’s economic contributions 
Source - QMM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regards to the company’s potential for direct job creation, during operation 
QMM will directly employ over 700 people in Fort-Dauphin, including contractors. 
The company’s assumption is that the majority of these vacancies will be taken by 
locals from day one, although QMM has anticipated that a transition period will be 
required to fill high skilled and senior management roles with Malagasy nationals 
(see Table 6.3). This transition will demand a significant effort in terms of training 
and skills development at the community level. The company has estimated that there 
will be an average of six direct dependents from each job at the mine. There is no 
sufficient local data as to assess the level of employment multipliers accurately, 
although the labour intensity nature of most economic activity in Fort-Dauphin, as 
well as the widespread availability of cheap labour, would presumably imply these to 
be high.   
 
Table 6.3 – Projected direct employment by the mine 
Source - QMM 
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US$ million year 22
Local duties 0.7                                
Mining royalties 2.0                                
Custom duty and fuel taxes 2.0                                
Income tax 9.0                                
Dividend tax 5.1                                
Total 18.8                              
In terms of direct government revenues, QMM estimated that payments in taxes, 
royalties and other duties will amount to almost US$20 million per year once in full 
production. Table 6.4 shows that income tax will be by far the largest type of 
contribution, followed by dividend tax. In this example, however, QMM will have 
been in operation for years. In fact, the company will not declare profits for some 
time after inception, however, and thus profit-related contributions will not take place 
right away. In addition, the government of Madagascar exempts large capital 
investments from paying income tax for some time, which in this case will be five 
years after generating profits for the first time86. Some observers have expressed 
concerns with regards to the geographic split of government receipts, claiming that 
current government provisions are detrimental to the mining regions (for instance, 
Harbinson 2007). The new Mineral Law provides for devolution of a fraction of 
royalty payments. Royalties are set at 2% of total revenue (FOB). While 30% of the 
total goes to the central administration, the balance is expected to return to the host 
province, Toliara, and the region, Anosy – 10 and 90% respectively (Government of 
Madagascar 2007). Instead, income and dividend tax, as well as custom duties, all go 
straight to the central administration. 
 
Table 6.4 – Direct government income from QMM 
Source - QMM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the time of writing, QMM management had expressed optimism that external 
pressure, – expected primarily from the World Bank -, would ensure that a larger 
portion of the total government take would be made available to the regional and 
local administrations during operation (Dean 2007). The company understands that it 
                                                 
86
 For this reason, this annual snapshot is a suboptimal indication of total government benefits. Next 
section focuses instead on the operation’s overall impact on Madagascar throughout the life of the 
mine, in present value terms. 
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would benefit from, and thus claimed it would support, a more equitable formula than 
the one currently in place. While QMM’s regional engagement strategy will be 
positively influenced by larger flows of money into the local economy, this is an issue 
that lies beyond the company’s’ direct accountability. Moreover, in addition to the 
geographical distribution of monies, QMM reputation would also be affected by the 
ultimate use of these revenues. In this sense, Robert Mills (2007), Financial 
Controller QMM, said ‘It would be important for us to understand whether the tax 
and royalty money that comes back to the region will be administered by the Chef du 
Region or whether the multilateral organisations would have a say’.   
 
In addition to value added, approximately 30% of projected annual revenues 
correspond to payments to suppliers for goods, materials and services. These 
estimates are only inclusive of operating supplies, and thus exclude purchases that 
correspond to the construction phase or further capital items. Given the 
unsophisticated industrial capacity of the Malagasy economy, the current estimate for 
local content in the supply chain is very low. Yet, figure 6.3 shows a ramp up process 
of import substitution reflective of QMM’s procurement strategy, which is expected 
to go from US$1 million to over US$4 million during the first decade of production. 
The company has repeatedly said that this will demand intensive bottom up work to 
strengthen the capacity of local suppliers from early on (Dean 2007). Current 
initiatives include training efforts, microfinance schemes and business incubators, 
among other (more on this below) 
  
Figure 6.3 – Expected value of operating supplies sourced locally 
Source - QMM 
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Direct upfront investment in the mine and further infrastructure by the company was 
estimated at more than US$460 million in Madagascar87. In addition, making up the 
remaining capital requirement for the enterprise, the company has agreed to finance 
the 20% share of OMNIS with an interest-free loan from QIT, with repayment to be 
made at the completion of construction. The bulk of the construction process is 
expected to take three years, to be followed by another three-year ramp-up. 
Employment during a mine’s construction is substantially larger than during 
operation, and often implies a different skills profile. Early during the second year of 
construction, the total workforce involved amounted to 1,457 people in Fort-
Dauphine; 747 sourced from local communities, 640 from elsewhere in the country, 
and 70 expatriate workers. As the construction of the port was about to commence, 
however, these figures were set to expand, and the total number of foreign employees 
were also expected to rise substantially.  
 
Regardless of these direct contributions, however, from day one Rio Tinto argued that 
developing QMM would require a different approach altogether (QMM 2001). As 
discussed above, the Anosy is one of the poorest regions in the world and home to a 
wide range of unique and endemic flora and fauna; for these reasons, a sustained and 
coordinated high profile campaign by environmental groups against the project was 
always recognised as a critical threat. From early on, the company invested heavily in 
addressing environmental issues, including leading-edge technologies in dune 
rehabilitation and, more broadly, in developing a network of technical alliances with 
environmental organisations, including Kew and the Missouri botanical Gardens. 
These efforts led to a situation where risk of significant environmental opposition 
appeared to have receded. The debate has since moved on substantially, and most 
environmental groups in Madagascar now acknowledge that the fundamental cause of 
environmental degradation is poverty, and that orderly economic development is thus 
required in the region (e.g. QMM 2001, the Economist 2007). Most of the project 
criticism has since tended to focus on social issues. 
 
Some of these challenges could have severe consequences for QMM. For example, 
large scale speculative migration, if not anticipated and managed properly, could 
                                                 
87
 Complementary to the investment in Madagascar, Rio Tinto has also approved further investment in 
upgrading the company’s processing facilities in Canada (QIT) 
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increase competition for scarce resources in the region significantly, including land, 
fuel, water and food. Also, a potential impact on the community through HIV 
infection would be particularly high in early stages of the project, when large 
numbers of South African construction personnel, with high average HIV rates, 
would be introduced in an environment where HIV infection rates are low by African 
standards, but where high rates of sexually transmitted diseases would likely facilitate 
the spread of the virus. Given the magnitude of the social risks, the usual Rio Tinto 
approach to community investment (CI) was to take a different dimension in this 
project. QMM has pledged to invest in the order of US$900,000 per year in direct 
community investment during the life of the project, though according to their 
records, current commitments have already surpassed this. Some of these early 
investments became contractual obligations later on, mainly including environmental 
issues such as the restoration of affected areas to their status prior to mining. These 
also include compensations and a resettlement plan for some eighty families that had 
given way to the mine, and some specific programs for the population whose sources 
of income will be affected by the project, such as a small group of fishermen (QMM 
2005).   
 
Around 80% of the expenditure in social programs, however, is in fact non-
contractual contributions (see Figure 6.4 for details). This mainly includes HIV/AIDS 
programs and other health initiatives, education (including the training of 
mineworkers), and other income generation initiatives such as programs supporting 
local SME development. The company has aspired to build an effective network of 
specialist partners – but otherwise is trying not to be drawn into activities it has no 
mandate or expertise to deal with, or where others, such as government or aid 
agencies, must play the leadership role (QMM 2005). Table 6.5 outlines the basic 
distribution of responsibilities as envisioned by QMM. For instance, QMM claimed 
to have been instrumental in the setting up of the micro-lending institution mentioned 
earlier by taking charge of salaries and logistic costs, and by contributing with 
US$20,000 to a rotating fund with the view that once the fund has reached full 
operating volume (estimated at US$300,000) it would be handed over to partners 
such as the UNDP. The company claims that around 1,000 local people have already 
joined the scheme (Razafindramosa 2007).  
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RT Lead RT + NGOs lead NGOs Lead
-    Infrastructure development -    Education and school support -   Welfare
-    Direct and indirect job creation -    Staff volunteers -   Arts, culture and sport development
-    Supply chain development and SME support -    Support to government development initiatives -   Bursaries
-    Outsourcing - subcontracting -    Micro-lending -   Animal care and agriculture
-    Primary Health Care and training practitioners -    Internet and computer facilities in education -   Public services development
-    HIV/AIDS -    Building a broader entrepreneurial environment -   Disaster relief programs
-    Environment -    Sharing expertise and distributing information -   Literacy programs
33%
10%
6%8%
14%
6%
3%
22%
Agriculture
Culture
Education
Environment
Health
HIV/AIDS
Business Development
Other
 
 Figure 6.4 – QMM community investment by sector 
Source: QMM 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another example of this preferred modality can be found in the Global Development 
Alliance (GDA), a local partnership including USAid, the local government (Chef de 
Région) and QMM, which was formed with the objective of fostering local economic 
development in the project area, although it has so far committed most of its efforts to 
issues of HIV/AIDS and malaria. The second phase of the GDA started in 2006, with 
up to US$6m to be invested locally over three years, funded in equal parts by QMM 
and USAid (GDA 2006). The company has also committed significant resources 
through an urban planning scheme for the town of Fort-Dauphin, as well as through 
the financing of a comprehensive regional development planning process – perhaps 
the most innovative initiative thus far –, explored in more detail below. 
 
Table 6.5 – Corporate social investment – focus areas and key responsibilities 
Source: Rio Tinto 2007b 
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In short, QMM’s direct economic contributions to the region should be primarily 
expected to arise principally from the recirculation of royalty payments, but also from 
local salaries and wages, and from the payments to a number of local contractors 
which should increase over time. In absolute terms, these will represent a large 
injection of cash for such an impoverished economy. The company has been very 
vocal in its support for local businesses, including preferential procurement policies 
for local suppliers and distributors, and for the employment of local people backed by 
considerable training efforts. Direct CI is also significant. New rhetoric has 
contributed to differentiating the company from the old philanthropic models of 
corporate engagement. While investing heavily in a variety of health, education and 
income generation programs, QMM has repeatedly claimed to define its investment 
priorities in an open and participatory manner, prioritising partnerships with the view 
of leveraging capital and expertise from specialist parties. 
 
Rio Tinto recognised that the fate of their long-term investment in Madagascar was 
intimately related to that of Fort-Dauphine (for instance, Rio Tinto website). 
However, underdevelopment in the area was a structural condition, not just the result 
of circumstantial shortage of capital. No matter how well organised direct investment 
in the community was, significantly reducing social risk would require a bolder 
approach. This call for radical action encouraged the company to become the pivotal 
element in a broader regional development scheme. This was going to demand capital 
and, perhaps more importantly, the strong support of, and commitment from, the 
government, the international community, and the local population. Together with 
this commitment came a number of challenges to QMM, of which two deserve early 
mention: i) the internal risk of overlooking the company’s fundamental mandate as a 
profit making organisation, and ii) the external risk of being seen as impinging on 
government sovereignty. The rest of this study will thus shift attention to the 
emergence of this approach and to the extensive engagement process that it entailed. 
 
 
6.3. Building capacity – and a regional development plan 
  
Modern growth theory has indicated that sustainable increases in output cannot be 
achieved solely through capital accumulation, and has explained why policy efforts 
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should additionally aim at securing steady increases in productivity rates. Similarly, 
this chapter opened by claiming that heavy investment in infrastructure with little 
emphasis on other development factors has proved an inefficient development tool. In 
particular for mining, a fundamental challenge is how to develop targeted policy 
actions that can maximise benefits from capital-intensive investments and sustain 
economic growth once the initial accumulation of capital has taken place. Recent 
development literature emphasised the need for complementary development 
elements such as the strengthening of human capital, the supporting of services to 
local enterprises, or the wider diffusion and assimilation of technology and 
managerial practices, to name just a few (Rodriguez-Pose 2002, Vazquez Barquero 
1999). In this sense, a most critical dilemma is often how to address these issues 
within a context of extremely weak local governance and institutional capacity.   
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, QMM became instrumental in the establishment of an 
innovative institutional architecture at the regional level. The key driver behind this 
effort was the overall requirement for an environment more conducive to sustainable 
economic development. While the company saw orderly regional development as a 
key risk-mitigation strategy, and was thus prepared to champion this process, it also 
realised that the challenge was beyond its expertise and that it would never be able to 
achieve the desired outcomes on its own. There was also increasing recognition that, 
to be effective, ownership of this process would have to sit with a broader group of 
local players, while a process of wider coordination would have to be facilitated. In 
addition, the successful development of the region would be expensive, and while 
significant, direct project inputs would only contribute a fraction of the required 
inputs (Cochrane 2008). As a response, QMM promoted the establishment of the 
Comite Régional pour le Développement de l’Anosy (Regional Development 
Committee of Anosy) – including the lions’ share of its required operating funding. 
 
The Comite Régional pour le Développement de l’Anosy, or CRD, was a local 
development agency integrated by representatives of the local government (i.e. the 
Chef du Région), donor organisations, NGOs, and the private sector. This Committee 
was quickly recognised, praised and backed by most local players including the 
World Bank. In 1999, the CRD launched a locally-driven and consultative regional 
planning process to determine the best long-term strategy (2005-2025) for the 
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development of the Anosy region. This participatory process led to the formulation of 
a regional development framework known as the Schéma de Développement 
Régional de l’Anosy, or SDR (CRD 2001). The purpose of the SDR was to promote 
sustainable economic development through an agreed investment plan negotiated 
under the active participation of representatives from the public and private sectors. 
In describing the SDR, James Dobbin (2006), Chief Regional Planner Anosy Region 
for the CRD, said: 
 
‘The development process of the SDR, as well as its products, are unique to 
Madagascar and give the local population (players) the opportunity to make a 
legitimate and serious contribution, and to change the current direction of the 
Anosy region towards a more certain and prosperous future. […] Simply, the 
SDR represents a knowledge, dialogue, planning, and implementation tool. It 
also constitutes a set of guidelines making possible to direct the framework’s 
regional and communal actions in regards to development and planning’ (p9) 
 
In effect, the SDR became a platform of consultation from all players whose long 
term vision for the region included:  
 
- Permanent regional consultation; 
- The identification of key axes of development; 
- The identification of potential synergies among different development sectors; 
- Permanent communication and wide coordination of main regional players; 
- Follow up and evaluation of the identified action plan 
  
Based on the SDR, the Anosy region developed a mid term (5 years) strategic plan – 
Plan Regionale de Developpement (PRD). This PRD addressed the economic and 
social challenges particularly in relation to the national Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper – PRSP (or in French, DSRP). The PRD approach to economic growth was 
based on the region’s diverse economic potentials, encompassing agriculture, fishing, 
mining, ecological restoration, biodiversity conservation, tourism, physical 
infrastructure, and social infrastructure – i.e. including education and health (PGRM 
2006). The PRD was then a combination of key economic sectors organised in sub-
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regions, or nodes of development, which are explored in more detail in Figures 6.5 to 
6.11 (based on Dobbin 2004).   
 
Figure 6.5 – Agriculture and fisheries 
The productivity of local plantations could 
be increased significantly, and the arable 
land expanded without affecting the native 
forest, through strict geographic 
delimitations, training, irrigation, and the 
rehabilitation of internal roads. There is 
potential to boost the export of exotic fruits 
(mainly produced in the fertile valleys in 
the north), lobsters and other seafood 
   
 
Figure 6.6 – Mining 
This graph shows the location of the 
mineral potential in the region, represented 
here by QMM’s licenses, a comparatively 
thin strip along the coastline near For-
Dauphin. There also appears to be 
potential for the economic exploitation of 
bauxite and granite deposits.    
 
 
Figure 6.7 – Conservation   
Both the SRD and PRD make explicit 
reference to zones that have a unique value 
in terms of biodiversity. These areas 
include the Andohaela National Park, and 
are thus expected to play a key role in 
attracting eco-tourists. Defined as no-go 
areas, any expansion of the private sector 
is restricted by this demarcation.  
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Figure 6.8 – Tourism 
The natural beauty of the region makes it a 
potential tourist destination, though a lack 
of basic infrastructure has played against 
it.  Efforts are to concentrate on sanitation 
and basic urban infrastructure, roads and 
communications. The plan aims at 
consolidating the ecotourism business first, 
and building a more sophisticated industry 
with time.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 – Restoration 
In addition to the allocation of no-go areas, 
the plan defined some places in need of 
urgent restoration, where the native forest 
had been more severely damaged. The 
scheme included plans for sustainable trees 
plantations, so as to provide the natives 
access for sustainable sources of wood.   
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 – Infrastructure 
This stage in the process identified and 
incorporated all the cross-sector 
requirements in terms of regional 
infrastructure to enable the plan, including 
internal roads, basic sanitation and other 
urban works in Fort-Dauphin, irrigation, 
dunes’ stabilisation etc, as well as social 
infrastructure including training and 
education, and health.  
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Figure 6.11 – Nodes of development  
In order to facilitate a subsequent 
implementation and investment strategy, 
the CRD, through the SRD, identified the 
seven nodes of development pictured here. 
Later on, the Plan Regionale de 
Developpement, led by the Chief of 
Region, added four extra nodes. The final 
eleven nodes are illustrated in Appendix 1. 
 
 
The nodes of growth described in Figure 6.11 were defined as those sub-regions 
believed to convey the highest development potential, i.e. soil quality and hydrology, 
location of mineral deposits, proximity to tourist attraction etc. These sub-regions 
provided a physical platform, or spatial framework, for the delivery of integrated 
services and investments to secure better economic synergies and materialise the 
development opportunities identified (Dobbin 2006). As both the SRD and the PRD 
consolidated, however, it soon became apparent that the absence of a reliable harbour, 
a gateway to the world, had become a bottleneck for these economic development 
plans more broadly. At this point, the economics of QMM were also jeopardised by 
the inexistence of a deep-water port in the vicinities of the mine. The economic 
interests of a number of separate regional players started to concur. If the required 
mining port could accommodate a multipurpose facility, then the potential from the 
economic sectors described above could be realised, helping locals appropriate a 
significant fraction of the positive externalities arising from QMM. At US$140 
million, the port represented nearly 1/4 of the total capital initially estimated for the 
project. 
 
  
6.4. A concurrence of interests    
 
These development opportunities brought in by the project soon caught the attention 
of the World Bank, which subsequently decided to focus one of its proposed growth 
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poles of development on the Anosy region. Both the Bank and the company would 
benefit from the development of key regional infrastructure, but also from economic 
development more broadly and the consequent reduction of poverty – as this is the 
raisons d’être for the former, and risk insurance for the latter. This concurrence of 
objectives opened the door to the exploration of further synergies and defined the 
parameters for a strategic alliance. The Bank would contribute towards the financing 
of the port and other development initiatives (further infrastructure, education and 
health), as long as the project was able to demonstrate its potential for contributing 
broad-base economic growth.  For Rio Tinto, the World Bank involvement 
constituted a additional reassurance that the social and environmental aspects of the 
project were being dealt with properly and would thus play an additional role in 
mitigating company risk. Moreover, QMM could raise the standard for new mining 
projects in developing countries and become a flagship project for the industry from 
the perspective of sustainable development (QMM 2001). The business case for 
promoting regional economic development beyond Rio Tinto’s strict business 
activities seemed all too clear.   
 
This strong scope for collaboration did not come without challenges.  For the 
company, the Bank can represent a rigid and bureaucratic organization; work culture 
is substantially different and communication can be difficult.  Conversely, the project 
would be among the first large mines to receive strong World Bank endorsement 
since the independent World Bank Extractive Industries Review (EIR) published its 
final report in 2003, which concluded that international organisations should be 
discouraging mining in developing countries (WBEIR 2003).  The Bank anticipated 
heavy criticism and scrutiny both externally and from within the organisation.  
Despite the growing consensus that development of the local economy was crucial to 
prevent further environmental degradation, some environmental NGOs, including 
Friends of the Earth, WWF and others, have continued to vigorously oppose the 
project (e.g. FoE, undated). The Bank needed to build a strong case if it was to help 
develop the mining sector in Madagascar.  The negotiation and collaboration process 
that followed was mainly driven by the need to:   
 
- Develop a model for understanding the economic impact of this investment in the 
region; 
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- Provide technical arguments and articulate a case in support of a collaborative 
approach, particularly the possibility of the Bank financing part of the proposed 
multipurpose port, in spite of some hostility against mining in developing 
countries and the particular sensitivity around Madagascar;  
- Set the agenda for collaboration between the Bank, the Government and QMM 
 
In collaboration with QMM, the World Bank embarked on the task of assessing the 
value of the proposed port as a development instrument in Madagascar, a 
precondition to decide whether it was worth investing in. The Bank’s first approach to 
assess large infrastructure projects in developing countries typically centres on the 
government’s capacity to pay back from the project’s returns, which in essence 
constitutes a cash flow analysis discounted at certain rate (10%, in this case). This 
first model has thus focussed on government receipts. While the multilateral 
organisation was never going to finance the mine, the emerging consensus was that 
the entire investment should be considered (i.e. mine and port) rather than just 
looking at the port – the rationale being that economic benefits would arise from the 
complete investment system, and that without the port the mine would never be 
developed. 
 
Several contesting points emerged right away. For example, QMM’s position was 
that a discount rate of 10 percent (in real terms) was very high, especially because 
some of the benefits arising from the project are not profit-related (royalties, personal 
income tax, duties, etc) and therefore convey a lower risk of volatility in the 
government revenues.  The government’s ability to repay any loan obligation from 
the project cash flows seemed robust. Against this argument, the Bank claimed to use 
a flat NPV10 for first approaches and consider country risk-free rate in subsequent 
analyses. The Bank later accepted to run complementary scenarios discounted at 8 
and 12%. Also, the company questioned the WB’s proposition that the residual value 
of the port, provided that it was properly maintained, should decline in real terms by 
60% in 25 years. There was a strong positive message in the fact that the region 
would own a functioning deep-water port as a result of this investment. The Bank 
claimed that the effect of any residual value attributed to the harbour would be small 
in present value terms. It also argued that the port would represent an asset only if it 
had been able to promote economic growth after mining has ceased – otherwise, it 
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would constitute a further liability for the country, and it was thus removed altogether 
from subsequent analyses.  
 
While some technical discrepancies were to persist during the discussions, subsequent 
analyses built-in two additional dimensions into the model: first, it incorporated all 
direct economic benefits (essentially, retained value added, local payments for 
materials and services, and direct expenditure in community investment); and second, 
it included in the cash flow some of the indirect economic benefits expected from the 
project’s capacity to unlock the development potential of the region. The focus thus 
shifted towards the integrated regional development plan – i.e. synergies from the 
mine, port and further regional investment – rather than on the fiscal impact of the 
project only. This increased the dollar value of the estimated benefits for Madagascar 
notably. In essence, the message emerging was that the greatest significance of this 
investment was in the potential for catalysing economic growth. This model took the 
form of a Cost-Benefit analysis, which is attached to this paper as Appendix 2 
 
Some further adjustments were still necessary. For instance, US$2m annual 
investment in soft factors of development needed to be incorporated, including 
expected investment in social programs and environmental initiatives by the company 
and its partners. Nevertheless, the new model centred on the benefits for Madagascar 
as a whole, which appeared to be positive – a present value of $48m.  Moreover, in 
addition to providing the necessary direct government revenues to repay a potential 
loan, the new model recognised that the port and mine investment had the potential to 
trigger a concatenation of positive effects and promote regional economic 
development more broadly, which is captured in the row ‘Regional Development’ 
(Appendix 2).  In order for this development to materialise, it was acknowledged that 
further investment had to take place outside the mining sector, and thus the Bank 
included $26m for this purpose (see row 28, ‘Other Infrastructure Investment Cost’). 
While this new approach represented a conceptual turnaround in the thinking about 
the project, it also unveiled the difficulties of estimating the potential for increases in 
regional output.  An illustration of this is the apparent absurdity of committing 
$21.5m (present value) to promote economic growth worth just $6m (rows 28 and 8 
respectively).  
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The real technical challenge then became to produce sound and credible output 
projections in sectors others than mining. It was clear that there was no local capacity 
in governments to produce these estimations accurately – and, given the evident 
incompatibility of interests, the company was not well placed to take on the job. All 
key players involved thus acknowledged the CRD as the ideal entity to produce this 
analysis, which became known as the Regional Investment Strategy (Stratégie 
d’Investissement Régional), or SIR. In collaboration with the local and central 
government, NGOs and the investor and operator of the mine and port, the 
Committee was asked to identify and prioritise $30m worth of infrastructure 
investments88 that would best contribute to unravelling the economic potential of the 
region.  Following the direction set by the SRD and PRD, the SRI incorporated 
various inter-sectoral investment projects with potential for public-private partnership 
development, calculating cost/benefit ratios for each of them. 
 
The expected increase in output in each sub-region was then priced and attributed to 
the integrated system of investment.  The SRI proposal aimed at accomplishing quick 
increases in productivity. Simply, it contemplated direct investment in three general 
sectors: a) transport and road rehabilitation; b) agriculture, fishery and plantation 
forestry, including irrigation, drains etc, and c) tourism infrastructure. A summary of 
these projections is presented in Appendix 3. These calculations indicated that, after 
ten years, these investments would increase the regional value of production to circa 
$37m annually, and would generate extra direct employment for around 26,000 
people (Dobbin 2006). This would determine a present value far higher than the $6m 
initially proposed by the Bank. In short, this work and extensive dialogue between the 
Bank and the company was ultimately able to reveal the strong economic potential of 
the region. The World Bank’s pre-appraisal report strongly supported the 
development of the mine, port and complementary infrastructure. As part of its PIC 
strategy, the Bank committed a total of $60m to the region; $35m towards the port, 
and the balance for financing the complementary regional development initiatives 
discussed earlier. QMM, on its part, committed to the largest private investment ever 
to be deployed on the island thus far.   
 
                                                 
88
 This assumed that $4M was provided as domestic counterpart against WB financing of $26M 
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Two further World Bank initiatives are worth mentioning given their potential 
implications for both the region and QMM. First, the Dynamic Mineral Resources 
Management Project (Project de Gouvernance des Ressources Minérales), or PGRM, 
is an initiative of the Malagasy government funded by the World Bank, established to 
promote the mining sector. The objective of the PGRM is to assist the government in 
implementing a strategy to accelerate a sustainable development of the industry with 
a view to contributing to poverty reduction. More specific objectives include (i) 
improvement of the transparency and governance in the mining sector; (ii) 
institutional reform for a decentralised management of the mineral resources; (iii) 
promotion of private investments and value adding activities; (iv) rapid growth of the 
mining sector and increase of the economic impacts for the population, and (v) 
improvement of the natural resources management to prevent environment 
degradation. More recently, largely building on the SRD and the PRD, the PGRM 
launched a first pilot study on the Anosy region (PGRM website, Stanley and 
DeVerle 2006). This could have significant implications for the region and has raised 
expectations that the program may help maximise the level of mineral revenues 
flowing back to the Anosy.  
 
Second, the International financial Corporation (IFC), the private arm of the World 
Bank Group, has started to promote the idea of CommDev in Madagascar. This 
initiative was one of several actions IFC promised to counter criticisms of donors’ 
involvement in the extractive industries made in the World Bank Extractive Industry 
Review (WBEIR 2003). CommDev aims at establishing itself as a community 
development fund and at working collaboratively with PGRM to ensure that mining 
yield long-term benefits for local people. Again, their aspiration is to use QMM’s 
investment in Anosy as a pilot case, and have ascribed to the objectives of the SDR. 
CommDev would be funded by direct financial contributions from donors, 
government and industry, including QMM. They anticipate this could be 
supplemented by a royalty share scheme – in essence a guaranteed allocation of the 
royalty payments by the company. Regardless, CommDev’s target is to become an 
independent and self-sustaining institution (CommDev 2007). On this point, there has 
been some scepticism with regards to their implementation credentials. Also, since 
management capacity is in such short supply, and given that one of the most valuable 
skills that both the World Bank and QMM bring is their management expertise, it 
 257
seems short-sighted that they should be sidelined.  Deliberations on the future of this 
proposal were still ongoing at the time of writing.  
 
 
6.5. Delivering the mine of the future 
 
To summarise, this new approach to mining and regional development generated a 
great deal of optimism as the project moved into construction. QMM portrayed this 
undertaking as the finest example in a new generation of mines that would help 
regions set a development process in motion, while a broader range of economic 
activities other than mining would secure sustainable development thereafter. 
Together with a sophisticated management of the environment, this enterprise would 
be able to offset some of the negative implications of mining and deliver a net 
positive impact on the region (QMM 2003, Rio Tinto 2005, 2005b). Underpinning 
this approach was an unpredicted partnership between the company and the World 
Bank. As evidence of their mutual commitment to regional growth the Bank agreed to 
fund a portion of the multipurpose infrastructure, and QMM assisted with the 
preparation of an ambitious development scheme. A Regional Development 
Committee was established to deliver broader coordination of the many activities and 
financial commitments by different players, and to produce a Regional Development 
Plan. This plan, which had until that point enjoyed broad based participation and 
consensus, had also contained an agreed set of investment priorities.   
  
It was only within this framework that the World Bank was able to justify a 
multimillion dollar contribution towards the infrastructure requirements of a mining 
corporation. Studies had shown that, well coordinated, the overall investment, (in 
contrast to isolated initiatives), would help the region unlock its full economic 
potential. Furthermore, this framework had already generated upbeat expectations 
from other organisations: this appeared to be a good development story and 
institutions like USAid or CommDev, among others, had already secured their 
participation – or were eager to join in. Fort-Dauphin also became a hotspot for 
NGOs working on social issues. Much of the current NGO effort is still concerned 
with relief and food distribution in the drought and poverty stricken areas to the south 
of the town, nonetheless. Without the macro-agreement described above, this NGO 
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activity would have never been able to have stimulated growth on the scale 
envisioned by the SDR (Cochrane 2007).  
   
Despite this promising outlook, however, a few fissures in the World Bank/QMM 
relationship became visible as soon as construction started. In conversation, Glynn 
Cochrane (2007), Senior Advisor Communities for Rio Tinto, suggested that ‘Tension 
was always on the cards since the World Bank is used to dealing with slow moving 
poor country governments rather than nimble private sector entrepreneurs. And, let’s 
be honest, both the World Bank and Rio Tinto are used to being in control’. In his 
view, problems also aroused from the fact that the World Bank is not always well 
placed to pursue on-the-ground development. The Bank can deal with a country or a 
sector but has real problems focusing staff and resources on a specific region. It is 
often difficult for the Bank to make decisions with the speed required by the private 
sector (also in Harbinson 2007b) 
 
This setback would have noticeable implications. Since early planning, it has been 
clear that there would be a lapse between the beginning of construction and the 
delivery of visible benefits for the broader population. Lisa Dean (2007), Principal 
Advisor Community Relations at QMM said ‘It was always accepted that the process 
of construction would in all likelihood stimulate expectations that would be beyond 
the immediate capacity of the mine to meet. It was then that the complementary donor 
investment needed to start creating jobs and employment in other sectors of the 
economy. Although urgently needed, this has been slow to emerge’. Even in the event 
that the PIC money is finally delivered, there is still a serious risk that these funds 
will not be efficiently used; initiatives such as the PRD, or the once highly-regarded 
Comité Régional de Dévelopement (CRD), seemingly lost momentum. ‘It is 
frustrating to see all that rhetoric from before gone nowhere’ (Dean 2007).  
Significant delays, in fact, would generate risks for both QMM and the World Bank, 
because: 
 
- Without substantial regional investment outside mining Fort-Dauphine might well 
become a mining town; 
- In the absence of the promised flow of capital into the region the World Bank will 
face a charge that they are subsidising a mining company; 
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- Without inward investment the needs of the region may exert pressure on QMM 
to increase its social investment drastically. 
 
By the time construction begun, the company was starting to worry that the Bank’s 
commitment to the Fort-Dauphin area may be arbitrarily re-allocated to other areas of 
Madagascar. Some World Bank staff were still concerned that working closely with 
QMM would bring criticism from the NGO’s which had expressed opposition to the 
use of soft loan IDA money for the port, – and were also unsure whether QMM 
would take local and regional development seriously after project approvals were 
obtained. Regardless, Gary O’Brien (2007), Executive Director of QMM, remained 
largely positive: ‘This has been new for both organisations, and an element of conflict 
was probably inevitable as both sides did things as they normally would at the start. 
However, I do believe we are making good progress – and that the Bank will commit 
the funds of the Growth Poles project to the Fort-Dauphin area’. 
 
 
6.5.1 Community issues 
 
‘The sleepy town of Fort-Dauphin in southeast Madagascar is trying to catch its 
breath. Lying in the least developed corner of one of the poorest countries in 
Africa, Fort-Dauphine is only accessible by aircraft […] But four-wheel drive 
vehicles have recently become common and locals congregate in the main 
square to watch cranes and lorries at work in the tiny harbour below. Hundreds 
of people have moved in from abroad and from other parts of the country.’ 
 
With these words, The Economist (2007, p90) described the fuss taking place in Fort-
Dauphine since QMM started construction. The commencement of engineering works 
brought with it the disruptions and physical and social changes that, while anticipated, 
would still pose critical challenges. ‘Construction contractors go in and out, and do 
not particularly worry about certain community issues like, say, the local content of 
materials or provisions. We always knew that that would be the case – but the local 
population does not think in terms of construction stage vs. operation stage. For 
them, it is just QMM’ (Dean 2007). Willy Rasamoelina, Director of Community 
Relations for QMM (2007) points out that there is an intrinsic lack of 
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entrepreneurship in the culture that makes the opportunities from an expanded 
demand for local products difficult to materialise. Progress has been made, though he 
agrees that the end of construction would make things easier. ‘The delivery of the 
training package and micro-credit schemes that have been developed should help 
contractors in their relationships with locals. Yet, most of the problems we see today 
with South African contractors should finish when the Anglophone construction 
period is succeeded by a francophone operation’. The effect of these disruptions was 
about to get worse though. The Economist’s article went on: 
 
‘The town’s few hotels and food prices and rents have doubled in the past year. 
Why? Because Rio Tinto, a global mining giant, has started work on a big mine 
just outside town’ 
 
It was probably inevitable, given the lagging investment in other development 
initiatives mentioned above, that the company would be blamed for an inflation 
process that has been severe for some commodities. The construction of the mine and 
port attracted an influx of additional people to the city of Fort-Dauphin. These people 
have created an increased demand on the local market. Increased activities at 
restaurants and the food purchases by contactors have also had an indirect impact on 
prices. However, Hugues Razafindramosa (HR), Development Economist for QMM 
(2007), pointed out that ‘This inflationary process also responds to causes other than 
QMM. The shortage of products in the local market is a result of appalling roads and 
other infrastructure. No storage capacity or refrigeration makes it impossible to store 
produce. Farmers rely on poor farming methods. Unseasonable draughts have made 
things worse, and have affected some products more than others (i.e. beans and 
lentils)’. David Stone, Principal Advisor SD for QMM, has also stressed that the local 
inflationary pressure has been more related to global trends in food prices than 
QMM-induced reasons (Stone 2008).  Immediate company initiatives to ease this 
pressure include providing assistance with the transport of products into the market; 
assessing and helping upgrade the market store capacity and refrigeration issues; 
promoting associative measures to better market management, and prompting the 
contractor companies to coordinate food purchases to minimise impact on local 
prices.  
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unit Jan-06 Jan-07 Variation
Rice  bag (50kg) 50,000 70,000 40%
Oil litre 2,400 4,400 83%
Sugar kg 2,000 2,400 205
Cattle meat kg 3,000 3,000 0%
Salt bag 150 300 33%
Lentils bag 250 700 180%
Beans bag 250 700 180%
Candles unit 250 400 60%
Table 6.6 – Inflation in Fort-Dauphin, selected items (in local currency - MGA) 
Source: PGRM 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This phenomenon seems to have exacerbated some pre-existing social conflicts. As 
the price for food and other local supplies went up, relatively well off local 
agricultural producers benefited the most. Rasamoelina explained that the economy is 
still organised as per the old colonial structure. White land-owners with safe land 
titles89 own the best land, whose produce is mainly destined to the export market. 
There is a second class of Indo-Pakistani and relatively successful entrepreneurs that 
are the merchants in the region and manage the import/export business. Finally, the 
Indigenous people are mainly engaged in self-subsistence or small scale farming, and 
are often highly exploited by middle-men. ‘With the exception of charcoal, which is 
sold directly by individuals, the agriculture system is mainly organised by 
Frenchmen. They have become the coordinators of the existing middle-men that pick 
up the locals’ production that is then sold in the market’ (in conversation with Willy 
Rasamoelina 2007)   
 
While most stakeholders accepted it was too early to assess the impact of the mine 
after just two years into construction, some groups have already raised heavy 
criticism. For instance, Friends of the Earth (FoE) has argued that, contrary to Rio 
Tinto’s claims that QMM will increase incomes, inflation is aggravating local living 
standards for the poorest people.  They have pointed out to an alleged growing local 
perception that ‘Society is dividing into two tiers: a fast developing educated class 
able to participate in the development and the rest who are not able to participate’ 
(FoE 2007b, p5). In addition to the sharp rise of prices in Fort-Dauphin, the NGO has 
also claimed that people are generally angry that promises of employment have not 
                                                 
89
 Only 13% of people in Madagascar have property titles, which has impacted significantly in the 
development a formal housing market (HR 207) 
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materialised. FoE also claimed that, a year after being displaced, approximately 
eighty families that had to make room for the mine have not yet been allocated their 
new plots of land and so they have been consuming their compensation packages 
instead (also in Harbinson 2007b). In representation of FoE, Clifton (FoE 2007, p1) 
said that ‘Rio Tinto claims that the Madagascar mine development is whiter than 
white, designed to benefit local people and preserve the unique natural environment. 
[…] The reality on the ground is a murky shade of grey.’ 
 
The company has argued that most criticism by FoE is unfounded and claimed, for 
instance, that the level of Malagasy employment by the mine, which sat at 1,800 
people at the end of 2007, actually trebled the company’s commitment made for local 
recruitment during construction (Rio Tinto 2007). In fact, Harbinson (2007) has also 
recognised that most local skilled workers have already been recruited by QMM, 
which in turn led to skills shortages in other sectors and inflationary pressure on 
salaries. Discussing resettlement, Lisa Dean (2007) claimed that ‘There have been 
serious problems. It is important to stress, however, that resettlements are the 
responsibility of governments and the World Bank, not companies. The government 
conducted this process following the Bank’s standards and approvals. QMM simply 
made the agreed payment’. While accepting that there is ‘room for improvement’ 
(Rio Tinto 2007 p1), the company attributes an inflexible attitude to FoE, maintaining 
that hey have always opposed mining on principle. Indeed, FoE has recently restated 
the claim previously made by the World Bank Extractive Industries Review (2003) 
that urges the World Bank to stop investing in future mining projects altogether (FoE 
2007, 2007b) 
 
All the same, as the company had anticipated, construction brought considerable 
socioeconomic turmoil. One local resident interviewed said that ‘having always been 
a very quiet town, Fort-Dauphin became a complete chaos all of the sudden. Trucks, 
noise, and dust, and all those trees destroyed by the company’ (LR1 2007). Another 
local resident complained that ‘Life is only better if you have a job with QMM. 
Salaries are good and you are paid every month. But for the rest of us, we still make 
the same income while everything is getting more expensive to buy in the market’ 
(LR2 2007). Change has had significant emotional implications too. A young native 
claimed that ‘when I grew up, we used to wake up and go to the sea with my friends 
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where they are building the port. It is all gone now; this place is not what it used to 
be’ (LR3 2007).  
 
In contrast, other local players have been more supportive of all the necessary 
changes associated with economic expansion. ‘Some environmental NGOs are very 
idealistic, romantic: the reality on the ground is much more complicated. There is 
extreme poverty in this area, severe education and health problems. You need to be 
able to feed these people. Orderly development is essential’ (Micol Sandrini, of PAM 
Madagascar, 2007). In the same line of argument, one local entrepreneur concluded 
that ‘people are starting new businesses all around, the markets are full, hotels are 
being built. The reality is that people don’t like change in general, but I say that it is 
a small price to pay. This place needed to be woken up, and it has been. I think there 
is a better future ahead of us’ (LR4 2007). 
 
So far, this study has explored the potential and downsides of an approach to regional 
development new to the industry, in which a mining firm has taken a proactive role in 
filling up a void in the local system of governance by attempting to leverage capital 
and expertise from third parties, and by taking a leading role in their coordination. 
Yet, a different set of criticisms has related to the essence of this approach and argued 
that this is not the place for a private company. On this issue, Harvinson said that ‘Rio 
Tinto […] should exercise restraint with its own involvement. It has extended its role 
from mining company to development actor, and has taken various steps to fulfil 
expectations and resolve grievances, but these have largely fallen short and failed to 
fully address the issues. Committees that have tried to play a negotiating role between 
competing stakeholders have fallen foul of accusations that their interests and 
motives are compromised by their relationship with the company. This has led some 
stakeholders to turn away from the table, and important development decisions have 
been made in their absence’ (Harbinson 2007, p.4).  
 
With all its promises and uncertainties, it is clear that QMM has chosen a way quite 
different from the typical mining intervention in developing regions. This study has 
reviewed the key concepts, drivers and characteristics behind a new model that was 
still unfolding as this analysis reached conclusion. More broadly, whether the efforts 
behind this model have been worthwhile or not are yet to be determined.  
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6.6. Final remarks 
 
The development of QMM provided a unique opportunity to look in detail into the 
planning process of a modern mine within the framework of sustainable development. 
In essence, this constituted an opportunity for an ex ante evaluation of issues 
repeatedly identified by the literature as significant challenges associated to the 
development of large extractive enterprises in regions with lagging economies, 
including the enabling of multi-purpose infrastructure, the distribution of revenue and 
its further reinvestment, the development of a local supply chain, local inflation, 
economic dependence on mining and so on. For the reasons discussed in this study, 
this project was conceived not just as a mining enterprise but as the fundamental 
driver of development in the Anosy region – and it has thus aimed at delivering 
tangible economic benefits to its neighbours, in addition to healthy financial returns 
to its owners. In this sense, the most distinctive feature of this process has been the 
new role adopted by the company as a proactive catalyst of growth. This fundamental 
shift from previous roles has not gone unnoticed by mining critics, which have 
already questioned its legitimacy.    
  
It is too soon to conclude whether QMM’s enlarged approach succeeded in delivering 
its promise of sustainable economic development. Some warnings emerged early on. 
As predicted by the project’s developers, considerable economic turmoil hit the 
region as soon as construction begun. There have been, on the other hand, some 
positive surprises. For instance, although the risk remains, early fears that speculative 
inward migration would prove to be the most severe social externality appears to have 
been unfounded. In any case, for all the good intentions, the real test will come at the 
end of construction, when the revenues from this investment system start flowing 
through the regional economy. In the long run, as with economic development 
elsewhere, a dispassionate ex-post evaluation of QMM will need to pay special 
attention to the multiple tradeoffs between both the physical and socioeconomic 
disruptions and improvements.   
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Appendix 6.1 – RDS and RDP growth nodes of development  
 
 
 
 
 
NPV Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9-25
1 Benefits
2  
3 1. Port Activity
4 Transaction cost savings 13,730 0 0 0 649 759 888 1,039 1,216 60,770
5 International Transhipment 530 0 0 0 37 50 67 90 119 1,017
6 Port  Concession Fee 1,863 0 0 0 108 108 113 145 183 6,801
7 Port Tax 1,289 0 0 0 73 73 77 99 126 4,732
8 Regional development 6,080 800 800 800 500 515 530 546 562 12,548
9 Total 23,492 800 800 800 1,366 1,506 1,675 1,919 2,206 85,868
10
11 2. Mining Activity
12     - Local taxes 2,544 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12,485
13     - Mining royalties 10,599 0 0 0 710 882 1,099 1,099 1,099 33,436
14     - Custom duty and fuel taxes 11,289 0 0 0 1,042 1,198 1,181 1,181 1,251 33,551
15     - Income tax 20,429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 101,214
16     - Divident tax 14,721 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70,242
17     - OMNIS dividend 49,876 0 0 0 0 3,663 5,845 6,248 0 171,497
18     - Income tax from local salary 10,081 0 0 0 772 937 1,116 1,317 1,524 29,035
19     - Income tax from expatriates salary 4,339 0 0 0 1,918 1,414 966 518 294 4,998
20     - Local salaries 11,521 0 0 0 882 1,071 1,275 1,505 1,742 33,182
21     - Rent on 15% of expat salaries spent locally 372 0 0 0 164 121 83 44 25 428
22     - Rent on local purchases (goods and services) 3,463 0 0 0 174 182 172 172 346 12,715
23 Total 139,235 0 0 0 5,662 9,467 11,737 12,084 6,281 502,782
24
25 Costs  
26 Port Investment Costs -59,639 -18,000 -36,000 -18,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 Port incre. Reccurrent Costs -24,967 0 0 0 -2,341 -2,645 -2,980 -3,238 -3,540 -75,666
28 Other infrastructure Investments Costs -21,533 -6,000 -14,000 -6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 Other infrastructure Incre. Recurrent Costs -9,022 0 0 0 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -22,100
30 Total -115,161 -24,000 -50,000 -24,000 -3,641 -3,945 -4,280 -4,538 -4,840 -97,766
31
32 Net benefits 47,566 -23,200 -49,200 -23,200 3,387 7,027 9,132 9,466 3,648 490,883
33 Economic Rate of Return (ERR) 0
Appendix 6.2 – World Bank cost/benefit analysis  
Mine & port investment and further regional development investment (real US$1,000 discounted at 10%) 
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Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 Year 18 Year 19 Year 20 Year 21 Year 22 Year 23 Year 24 Year 25 Total
1
2
3
4 1,423 1,621 1,846 2,104 2,397 2,732 3,114 3,551 3,887 4,254 4,508 4,667 4,773 4,856 4,936 5,013 5,086 60,770
5 158 170 168 147 123 98 73 46 27 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,017
6 228 215 229 240 266 299 336 376 410 447 487 531 544 547 548 549 548 6,801
7 157 149 159 166 185 208 233 262 285 311 339 370 380 381 382 383 383 4,732
8 579 596 613 631 650 669 689 710 731 752 775 797 821 845 870 896 923 12,548
9 2,544 2,750 3,015 3,288 3,621 4,006 4,445 4,944 5,340 5,773 6,108 6,365 6,518 6,629 6,737 6,841 6,940 85,868
10
11
12 0 0 0 0 1,302 1,244 1,186 1,128 1,070 1,011 952 893 834 775 716 716 656 12,485
13 1,361 1,636 2,024 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,024 2,024 2,030 2,030 33,436
14 1,591 1,753 2,076 2,076 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 33,551
15 0 0 993 4,923 5,049 5,259 5,429 5,566 5,676 5,766 8,758 8,846 8,919 8,942 8,991 9,028 9,069 101,214
16 0 0 893 4,430 4,544 4,734 4,886 5,009 5,109 5,189 4,963 5,013 5,054 5,067 5,095 5,116 5,139 70,242
17 7,407 9,566 11,886 10,920 10,619 10,550 10,497 10,457 10,427 10,404 9,863 9,847 9,836 9,792 9,782 9,819 9,825 171,497
18 1,602 1,641 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 29,035
19 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 4,998
20 1,831 1,876 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 1,965 33,182
21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 428
22 428 469 550 550 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 825 12,715
23 14,539 17,259 22,426 28,933 30,376 30,650 30,862 31,023 31,144 31,233 33,399 33,463 33,506 33,433 33,440 33,541 33,552 502,782
24
25
26
27 -3,899 -4,136 -4,311 -4,394 -4,406 -4,403 -4,401 -4,400 -4,431 -4,465 -4,501 -4,533 -4,579 -4,628 -4,678 -4,727 -4,775 -75,666
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -1,300 -22,100
30 -5,199 -5,436 -5,611 -5,694 -5,706 -5,703 -5,701 -5,700 -5,731 -5,765 -5,801 -5,833 -5,879 -5,928 -5,978 -6,027 -6,075 -97,766
31
32 11,885 14,574 19,831 26,527 28,292 28,954 29,605 30,267 30,753 31,242 33,706 33,995 34,146 34,134 34,200 34,355 34,417 490,883
33
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Agriculture Annual Other
Development Node Target Area Additonal Additional Annual Value
(Sub-region) Investment (ha) Base Gross Additional Tourism Value Production Value  of Production Jobs Exports (t)
Ranomafana Valley 7,800,000$             4000 750,000$          10,860,000$     10,110,000$     1,000,000$      -$                     11,110,000$      8,000 14,550
FTD-Manambaro Corridor 11,100,000$           6000 2,250,000$       13,860,000$     11,610,000$     400,000$         -$                     12,010,000$      7,000 20,550
Tsivory 3,600,000$             6450 2,438,000$       14,535,000$     12,097,000$     -$                 -$                     12,097,000$      6,500 21,900
Coastal (Middle Coast) 5,000,000$             - -$                  1,000,000$       1,000,000$       1,000,000$      -$                     2,000,000$        4,000 667
Fort-Dauphin 1,000,000$             - -$                  -$                  -$                  -$                 250,000$             250,000$           500 0
   Total 28,530,000$           16450 5,438,000$       40,255,000$     34,817,000$     2,400,000$      250,000$             37,467,000$      26,000 57,667
   Contingency 1,430,000$             
   Total Financing 30,000,000$           
Annual Agriculture Value
Total Additional
Appendix 6.3 – Quantifying regional economic benefits  
Estimated impact of proposed US$30m in investments adjacent to the Fort-Dauphin growth pole, as identified by the SIR 
All monetary figures in US dollars  
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7.1. Introduction 
 
This research aimed to investigate an emerging number of questions vis-à-vis the 
effect of large mining enterprises on regional and local development, as well as their 
potential to improve economic standards and favour sustainable economic growth in 
the vicinities of large mines. In doing so, it explored the vast literature on resource 
economics and proposed a link to a consolidating school of thought on regional 
development and economic growth, namely the Endogenous Growth Theory, 
Institutional Economics and Local Economic Development (LED).  So far, academia 
has stayed clear of mining when exploring these theories, and largely disregarded this 
sector as not particularly conducive to the type of growth they endorsed90. However, 
the early chapters of this work already called for a reassessment of this position. The 
type of interface between mining and the economy is not static, and the evolution of 
technology and social expectations has been continually reshaping the structure of the 
industry and explained, for instance, the shift from the Regional to the Global and 
more recently the SD model of mineral development. SD has since distilled some key 
principles from modern growth theory and offered large mining houses a policy 
guideline for practical implementation. Up until now, however, little rigorous 
research to explore the actual implications of these new practices had been conducted.  
 
The interpretation of sustainable development endorsed by the industry warrants early 
mention. The approach adopted throughout this work is that generally referred to as 
soft sustainability. This view has accepted manmade capital as a surrogate for natural 
capital (Costanza 1991, Van Pelt 1995, Becker 1997). More specifically, this research 
has focussed on the economic aspects of this agenda. As such, it has looked at how 
successful new mining practices have been in substituting finite mineral resources for 
other forms of capital that can generate long term wealth, in particular for those 
communities most directly impacted by these activities. This is by and large the 
approach to sustainability embraced by the industry, and in particular Rio Tinto, 
towards the end of the 1990s (Humphreys 1996, Rio Tinto 2001, 2005, Clifford 
2005). Many of the conclusions of this work relate to the nature of how, and extent to 
which, a shift in approach materialised and discuss whether today’s practices are 
                                                 
90
 Some good work has started to bridge this gap more recently (including, for instance, Lederman and 
Maloney 2007) although this has focus on the macroeconomic aspects of this agenda for the most part.   
 274
fundamentally different from previous practices. Yet, other conclusions have queried 
the very nature of economic decisions made in the name of economic sustainability, 
and have in cases put the prevailing interpretation of this concept into question. 
 
The last three chapters examined different Rio Tinto operations in detail, covering the 
most characteristic phases in the life of a mine. Each case study looked at the 
economic contributions from the operations, the distinctive characteristics of their 
host economies, and the economic interface between one and the other. They also 
identified the main emerging challenges with respect to economic sustainability as 
well as the responses put in place by the different local players. In closing the circle, 
the current chapter highlights the most important findings and lessons from these 
studies and goes back to the theoretical background used for this analysis. In 
introducing the overall conclusions, and before moving into a detailed discussion, 
what follows is an early review of the original hypotheses that framed this research. 
From the outset, this work put forward two complementary propositions: that (i) large 
mines operating under the SD model can provide a positive economic stimulus to 
local economies and become a catalysing force for wider economic growth; and (ii) in 
order for this to materialise, proactive economic management should be exerted.  
  
This investigation followed a systematic method to disentangle the economic impacts 
from a company like Rio Tinto, which has strongly claimed to operate under the 
principles of SD. The assessment of the economic stimuli from the operations studied 
made evident the relative robustness of these impacts, confirming the frequent 
importance to sub-national economies often attributed to mining (Strongman 1998, 
Eggert 2001, McMahon and Remy 2002, MMSD 2002, ICMM 2006). However, not 
all impacts appeared in a positive light. In particular, large increases in cash flowing 
through these economies do not necessarily mean the same to all in the communities. 
When groups of locals had been unable to derive sustainable benefits from these 
incentives, reasons could generally be traced back to government failure regarding the 
economic fundamentals (Humphreys 2000b); the industry’s inability to respond 
innovatively and dispassionately to the distinctive characteristics and limitations of 
different economies (Ross 2001, WBEIR 2003, FoE undated); and/or to cultural 
barriers impeding access to the opportunities created by these enterprises (Martin 
1995, NEPRU 2000, Altman 2001). Thus, an alternative view emerging from these 
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analyses is that large mines are often positively associated with some of the measures 
of economic development, while simultaneously negatively associated with others. 
  
Yet, early this work suggested that the main economic potential from mining 
enterprises may lie not just with the companies’ cash flows, but most notably with 
their ability to trigger a process of economic development more broadly, largely 
driven by their significant institutional and organisational presence, strong managerial 
capacity, and ability to influence local players and established structures of economic 
governance. The findings of this research support this view. However, while modern 
growth theories still regard investment as a key element in the growth equation, they 
also stress the importance of other factors that were previously underestimated. This 
turnaround calls for different and more proactive policymaking with regards to 
business generation, training and the transferral of skills, the consolidation of local 
institutions, or local economic development more generally. Thus, this research 
emphasizes that the agenda for advancing sustainable economic development in areas 
under the influence of large mines typically contains elements that have so far been 
beyond the mandate of corporations. Realising the full economic potential from these 
enterprises will require revisiting the accountabilities assigned to key players up until 
now (Humphreys 2000, 2002, Sachs 2008). 
 
This chapter is organised in five sections. Based on the lessons from the case studies, 
the next section looks at those mining inputs with largest implications for the local 
and regional economies, and explores how these inputs may have changed under the 
SD model of development. Section three discusses the singular features of remote 
local economies under the influence of large mines, and asks whether preconditions 
have determined outcomes in these cases. Section four returns to the literature, re-
explores the notion of economic sustainability, and examines the emergence of a new 
agenda for mining companies. Section five readdresses the main research questions, 
considers the key caveats to this work’s conclusions, and ponders whether in light of 
this new agenda, mining companies should continue to be seen differently from those 
in other economic sectors. It also suggests possible research areas for academics to 
advance these conclusions. As a long commodity boom came to an end, the last 
section offers a final consideration on possible directions the industry may take 
regarding SD in the next turn of the cycle.  
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7.2. Direct economic benefits from mining operations 
 
This work has referred to direct mining contributions as the aggregation of value 
added and payments to suppliers, whereas value added is defined as the sum of 
remuneration to labour, taxes, and capital repayments (De Grauwe and Camerman 
2002). Intrinsic to the notion of SD is a shift in focus from the national to the local 
level (e.g. Strongman 1998, Eggert 2001, McMahon and Remy 2002). The cost 
structures of companies are set have obvious direct implications for the local 
economies that host them (think of the supply chain, for example), and the same can 
be said regarding the way in which companies go about acquiring the inputs for their 
business activities. This work has argued that some inputs hold larger potential to 
benefit local economies than others. At the lower end are capital repayments 
encompassing dividends provided to shareholders, interest paid to financers, and cash 
retained in the business to fund future investment and replace depreciated assets. 
While these payments are the fundamental enablers of mining in the first place, 
previous chapters already discussed that their effect at the local level tends to be 
negligible (for instance Di Boscio & Humphreys 2004). This section focuses instead 
on those elements with largest implications for local economies and discusses the key 
lessons emerging from the case studies in this regard.  
 
 
7.2.1 Employment, the productivity of labour, and labour remuneration  
 
In established operations like PI and RUL, employment is one of the most visible 
economic contributions at the local level. Trends for direct employment (as opposed 
to contracted-out labour) evidenced the shift towards an ‘all-staff’ policy adopted by 
Rio Tinto in the 1990’s, in which most of the labour force became salaried employees 
(Rio Tinto Economics Department 2006). Total employment (direct and contractors) 
decreased significantly until the early 2000s, which in turn contributed a conclusive 
increase in labour productivity (measured as total volumes of rock processed per 
employee). By 2004, however, PI was expanding its operations dramatically, and 
with that employment increased notably, together with the cost of labour (in both 
absolute and per-unit terms). Several commentators suggested that the new mining 
rush in Australia was now responsible for a significant productivity loss (Rio Tinto 
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Economics Department 2007). Likewise, the surge in prices that ultimately kept RUL 
safe from early closure prompted a rapid change in employment trends, with 
significant increases in total employee numbers materialising from 2005 onwards. 
 
Chapter 1 claimed that local benefits from mining operations can be optimised when 
increases in company productivity are followed by increases in the productivity of the 
economy more broadly. Looking at national economies, Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio 
(2007) arrived to similar conclusions. Furthermore, higher productivity in the private 
sector has the potential to trickle down to the rest of the economy, helping improve 
the productivity of the overall economy more broadly (Krugman 1995). However, 
this work suggested that, due to the characteristics of remote economies, local 
increases in productivity will not always follow company trends (Di Boscio and 
Humpreys 2004). More particularly, local economic benefits from productivity gains 
at the company level will not take place equally at all local economies. Local profit 
from increases in the productivity of the mine will actually rise as host economies 
mature. In other words, the more dependent an economy is on the direct employment 
and income from the mines, the more difficult it is to perceive the potential indirect 
benefits arising from better technology and managerial spillovers, an expanding 
supply-chain, indirect employment opportunities, and so on.  
  
Virtually all employees resided locally in the cases analysed. Highly paid 
mineworkers take jobs in remote locations for a short period of time, although their 
involvement in the local economy often continues for much longer than anticipated at 
the outset. This has been the case at communities as disparate as those of 
Swakopmund and Arandis, in Namibia, or remote settlements like those in the 
Pilbara, in Western Australia. As they live nearby the mines, mineworkers spend a 
large proportion of their income locally; and, depending on the characteristics of each 
local economy, this can represent a sizable figure. Overall, mining salaries 
outperform the market average at national level, and are remarkably higher at the 
local level. Detailed data from both PI and RUL showed that mining paid 
significantly above market average at the time this research was conducted. It also 
showed that jobs at the mine are ever more skilled, and remuneration has been 
increasingly reflecting this by widening the gap between lower and higher grades 
over the recent commodity boom. In short, while the mainstream approach to impact 
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assessment in mining (typified by GRI 2005) has frequently emphasised the 
importance of local mining employment, this work shifts the focus to labour 
productivity and overall remuneration. In particular, while total direct jobs from a 
single mine will seldom meet local expectations, the recirculation of mining salaries 
within the economy appeared to have had a remarkable effect in the cases analysed.  
  
Employment during construction follows a different logic. It often involves many 
thousands of jobs, though for a period of three to four years only. There is rarely 
enough specialised local labour readily available in these places, and there is 
normally very limited time for training people. In avoiding the consequences of 
dismissing a large number of employees during the transition between construction 
and operation, companies often find it easier to bring in specialised construction 
workers from elsewhere for a limited period of time. Very large and temporary 
groups of foreign workers can seriously disturb the local customs and lifestyle, and 
add to delinquency, the sex trade, proliferation of STDs91 and so on. A usual response 
by companies has been to keep these groups of workers separated from the local 
population as far as possible, in dedicated and even fenced camps. Such was the 
practice adopted by QMM. 
 
 
7.2.2 Taxes, royalties, and other direct payments to government 
 
Corporate tax on the income generated by companies was in all cases the largest form 
of government revenue from mining, followed by royalties, which aim to compensate 
governments for the depletion of a non-renewable resource (save for mining in 
Namibia, which was royalty exempt until 2006).  Indirect taxation92 on the 
repatriation of dividends, custom duties and fuel taxes, and employee taxes retained 
by companies is another material source of income for central governments. Local 
duties only represent a small proportion of the total government intake. In spite of 
current company efforts to increase this ratio, around 11% of the total government 
                                                 
91
 Sexually transmitted diseases 
92
 Indirect taxes are defined here as taxes chargeable to the cost of production or sale of goods and 
services. According to the UN (2000), they include 1) import and export duties, 2) excise, sales and 
turnover taxes, 3) real state and land taxes, 4) levies on value added and the employment of labour, 5) 
motor vehicle, driving-test, license, airport and passport fees, when paid by producers, and 6) the 
operating surplus of government fiscal monopolies on items such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco. 
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receipts from QMM are forecasted to flow back to the local and regional level in 
Madagascar. More extreme is the case of RUL, where virtually all tax payments 
bypass the local administration and go strait to Windhoek. Similarly, in a highly 
urbanised country like Australia, administrative organization mean that Perth and 
Canberra are the sole recipients of tax payments for mining activity in the Pilbara.   
 
Government revenue from mining is determined by the tax regime in each country, 
but it is also dependant on the price of each commodity at any given point – and 
evidence shows that it is not only the latter that experiences significant changes over 
time. During the last twenty years, changes in mining laws worldwide aimed at 
attracting foreign investment have brought significant amendments to tax provisions. 
The incidence of mining taxes in total value added plummeted in several mineral 
economies around the world in the early 1990s (Di Boscio & Humphreys 2004). In 
some countries, the more capital intensive an industry is, the less tax it tends to pay, 
given the tendency for capital allowance regimes to favour such investments (Otto 
2002). Then again, relative to the size of local and regional economies, the absolute 
value of local tax payments from large mines can be significant. More recently, high 
commodity prices encouraged governments to increase their share of the booming 
mineral wealth, thus once again numerous mining codes changed accordingly around 
the globe.  
 
For years, academia has looked into the question of optimum taxation (for instance, 
World Bank 2000, Tilton 2004, Otto et al 2006). A full examination of this concept is 
beyond the scope of this work, and therefore only a few critical considerations are 
addressed here (for a detail discussion see ICMM 2009). Investment decisions by 
companies are based on long term price assumptions, not spot prices. As mining is a 
highly cyclical industry, long-term price forecasts attempt to capture the expected ups 
and downs in the cycle. In normal cycles, periods of supra-normal profits are 
followed by downturns. In addition, margins during booms are typically affected by 
increases in capital and operating costs. Governments’ enticement to increase taxes as 
the market strengthens has contributed to the fact that, overall, investments in mining 
have historically underperformed most other industries (Humphreys 2000). A 
sustainable approach to taxation policy should focus on maximising the present value 
of the stream of revenues flowing from the mineral sector over time. In countries and 
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regions with vast deposits, this implies putting sufficient incentives in place to ensure 
the continuity of investment over the long term. Raising taxes above an optimal level 
is ultimately a trade-off between higher short and mid-term government revenues and 
the negative effect of soaring costs on investment decisions by companies. 
  
Regarding the local level, the SD model builds on the notion of increasing local 
accountability (Strongman 1998, Eggert 2001, McMahon and Remy 2002), and so it 
has come together with the idea of greater government decentralisation. However, 
whether tax payments are further redistributed to mining localities depends on the 
administrative structure of each economy. Companies benefit from more revenues 
flowing back to mining regions, as this would increase living standards locally and 
reduce the risk of social tensions. In weaker states, companies often have the capacity 
to influence these decisions, at least partially. QMM joined efforts with the World 
Bank to increase the revenues flowing back to Fort-Dauphin. This, however, 
generated concerns around the legitimacy of these interventions among NGOs, and 
raised questions regarding the boundaries of corporate mandate (e.g. Harbinson 
2007). More decentralisation is not always better, and the dilemmas faced by Rio 
Tinto in the Pilbara provide a useful example. The government in the Pilbara is 
represented by a number of remote and minuscule administrations largely dependent 
on mining. Given the difficulties faced by non-mining activities, further devolution 
would likely mean expanding these bureaucracies beyond sustainable levels. Overall, 
while the discussion around taxation in underdeveloped mining economies has 
frequently centred on determining the right share of rent between companies, central, 
and local governments (for instance Auty 1993, 1997, Ross 2001, 2007, Bryan 2007), 
the issues emerging from this work instead suggest repositioning the debate around 
the use of such resources. 
 
 
7.2.3 The economic opportunities of expanding business linkages  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the relevance that development practitioners have often attributed 
to the consolidation of business linkages from the mining industry to the rest of the 
economy (see also UN 2001). It also argued that the potential to develop these 
linkages changed considerably throughout the industry’s history. In particular, 
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proponents of the SD model have encouraged policymakers to favour strategies for 
substituting imports with local products and services, and argued that this should 
become a key feature of the industry’s new operating practices (Strongman 1998, 
World Bank 2000, Eggert 2001, McMahon and Remy 2002, ICMM 2003, 2009b). 
The empirical evidence introduced here provided insight into the key economic 
challenges and opportunities associated with the development of upward linkages 
under this model. This evidence contradicts the above mentioned proposition and 
concludes that, despite remarkable corporate efforts, the ultimate potential for further 
substituting imports with goods and services originated at the local level often 
remains marginal. Apart from an explicit intention to increase the local content of the 
supply chain, there have not been fundamental changes to the production structure of 
large mines since the global model of development (see Radetzki 1994) to justify 
extensive optimism in this regard.  
 
While the value added by local suppliers per unit of output is frequently small 
compared to other industries (Krugman 1995), investment and employment from 
established enterprises serving large mines are often substantial relative to other local 
opportunities (McMahon and Remy 2002). This could vary though, depending on 
local economic features and, also critically, the stage of development in the life of the 
mine. The first of such stages is construction, normally encompassing three to four 
years of intense in-site work, frequently followed by a period to ramp-up production. 
The majority of the goods and labour required are seldom available locally and is thus 
often imported. Even for smaller supplies, there is normally limited time to strengthen 
the local supply-base between the investment decision and the commencement of 
works. Despite significant groundwork, the construction of QMM found most locals 
unprepared. Also, efforts at this stage may prove wasteful, as the challenges faced by 
local businesses supporting construction have limited resemblance to those of later 
phases. Conversely, a large influx of workers increases aggregated demand and can 
represent longer-term opportunities for entrepreneurs in sectors like accommodation 
or catering. Excessive demand, however, may also generate price distortions. This 
phase is associated with sharp boosts to property transactions, which often fuel 
inflation. In brief, this period is characterised by a large and sudden increase in the 
supply of money and thus by indirect business opportunities for some local 
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entrepreneurs. Local difficulty to cope with these economic transformations can also 
generate disruption and social conflict.  
 
During operation, a detailed look at established mines showed that the value of 
company purchases is vastly concentrated on a narrow list of products, often topped 
by the purchase of energy. With differences from mine to mine, energy is followed by 
mechanical components; large service providers (e.g. mining contractors); tyres for 
mining trucks; chemicals, explosives, lubricants and gases; repairs and mechanical 
works. There is still significant value concentrated in smaller items of the supply 
chain, although the ability of local enterprises to capture it appeared to have been 
constrained by local conditions. Taking the example of PI, in 2004, less than 10% of 
this value accrued to companies based in the Pilbara. Rössing showed a similar 
situation in Namibia, with just one local firm among the top 30 suppliers, which was, 
in fact, a provider of services (as opposed to manufactures). In very remote mines 
particularly, the scope for a significant process of import substitution is narrow. 
Becoming a reliable producer requires competitive advantages and economies of 
scale of the sort typically missing from these places. Actually, expenditure by 
employees appeared to have a much more extensive impact on local economies than 
corporate spend. In 2005, the value of supplies purchased by RUL from Arandis and 
Swakopmund was equivalent to 1/3 of the salaries and wages of the company’s 
employees living there.  
 
On the other hand, when the focus moves up one geographic level, the economic 
potential associated to the expansion of the supply chain becomes remarkable. 
Western Australian businesses benefited enormously not only form Rio Tinto’s 
operations in the Pilbara but also from those of its competitors. Seen as a whole, WA 
has developed an efficient system of upstream linkages, including high technology 
mining machinery and equipment, IT systems and specialised mining software, as 
well as an extensive network of services to mining, spanning from geotechnical, 
hydrological or mining engineering to most sophisticated environmental services 
(Mining Journal 2005). For this reason it is often referred to as one of the most 
successful mining clusters in the world (Eggert 2001). Moreover, contrary to the 
expenditure pattern seen in Rössing’s employees, where most income tends to be 
spent locally, PI workers living in the Pilbara spend and invest most of their money in 
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Perth. Mining clusters also provide a safety net to suppliers at the time of mine 
closure, as their production can be absorbed by other customers. Without this safety 
net, closing out mining operations has revealed the difficult challenge of minimising 
damage to suppliers as linkages are suddenly broken. Such was the dilemma faced by 
Rössing in Aranids. 
  
This research has not considered downstream processing in detail, as potential for 
local downstream benefits was not identified in any of the three operations studied. At 
the local level, the development of downstream, or forward, linkages tends to be more 
difficult than the above referred to backward linkages, in part given that these 
activities frequently require access to different types of markets, technology, 
significant levels of capital, and skilled labour, among others. Chapter 2 already 
explored the economic rational and geographical forces behind the current industry 
structure as well as the forces for and against vertical integration (Radetzki 1982, 
1994; Studwell 2009). An important conclusion from this is that large endowments of 
natural resources do not necessarily lead to a comparative advantage in the processing 
of minerals, their refinement or further beneficiation. Evidence has shown that top-
down efforts to establish processing plants near the mines have regularly led to value 
destruction (Krugman 1995, Humphreys 2002, Rio Tinto Economics Department 
2007b) 
 
 
7.2.4 Direct corporate expenditure in the communities 
 
Against the established wisdom that SD would bring the end of a philanthropic 
approach to community development in mining (Pettifer 1998, Strongman 1998, 
Eggert 2001, Kunanayagam 2003, Harvey and Brereton 2005), this research found 
that voluntary corporate expenditure continues to be a critical instrument for 
community engagement by the corporation. Interestingly, however, there is not one 
single pattern in the cases analysed. In Namibia, the bulk of community investment 
by RUL was linked to profits. In essence, the better-off the company, the more 
investment communities will receive from this source. Conversely, unlike anti-
cyclical arrangements, this has meant that periods of economic hardship in the 
communities due to slowdown in mine production coincided with empty company 
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pockets for palliative measures. In this model, Rössing decentralised community 
investment (CI) into the Rössing Foundation, which for the most part supported 
educational programs at the national level, largely disconnected to mining. More 
recently, the Foundation re-focussed its initiatives to address potential closure, 
effectively spending more money locally (RF website). In Australia, instead, 
community expenditure by PI has primarily aimed at compensating Aboriginal people 
near the mines. The scale of this contribution was considerable: the Pilbara region 
receives the largest share of Rio Tinto community investment worldwide, even when 
measured relative to the size of the operations (Rio Tinto 2006). All other types of 
economic opportunities from mining have mostly circumvented the Aboriginal 
economies. Ruled by carefully negotiated arrangements, these contributions could be 
seen as another form of tax.  
 
A number of lessons emerging from the studies are worth reflecting upon. A first 
point relates to scale. Even adjusting for items that could be accounted for as part of 
operating costs, like training programs, CI is considerable in absolute terms; that is, it 
represents a major source of income for those directly targeted by the community 
programs. However, when seen relative to the value of inputs into production 
(particularly salaries, but also payments to suppliers), they are in fact insignificant. 
This conclusion is consistent with recent findings by Zandvliet and Anderson (2009). 
Second is the fact that, as described, these contributions are largely detached from the 
production processes of mining companies. While they came from mining companies 
in these cases, they would have arguably had the same effect if they had come from 
other industries – or in fact any other donor. This research has provided details on the 
drivers and motivations behind each of these agreements, both from the companies 
and communities points of view. Whether or not these flows of cash can promote 
economic activity in line with the principles of SD appear to depend more on the uses 
that these payments are put to, rather than on the deal each community was able to 
strike.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, from the outset, QMM’s community engagement 
strategy focussed on agreeing a clear division of accountabilities with the other local 
stakeholders (Rio Tinto 2007). Direct company responsibilities would encompass 
economic opportunities flowing from mining activities principally, like training 
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programs, or efforts aimed at expanding the local supply chain. The focus has been 
less on philanthropic contributions and more on business-driven opportunities. There 
has also been recognition of the limits of these opportunities, particularly during the 
construction phase of the mine. Thus, a second tier of work focussed on attracting 
other institutions to help where mining companies lacked direct expertise. In these 
cases QMM would only act in partnership with others. Finally, a third tier of work 
determined a number of no-go areas for the company, perceived to be clearly beyond 
its mandate. Here, corporate efforts would centre on leveraging capital and further 
contributions from third parties like donors or NGOs. QMM broke the mould and 
embraced this challenge by using its unique institutional leverage. This was, 
probably, the most innovative feature coming from Rio Tinto’s strategy in 
Madagascar – but it has also been its main source of criticism.    
 
 
7.3. The local economies 
 
This discussion has indicated that, while mining has often provided a unique 
economic stimulus, the local populations have not always managed to take full 
advantage. In particular, while some groups benefited considerably from it, others 
missed out notoriously. As argued above, some of the reasons explaining this pattern 
go back to the very nature of mining, and are thus applicable to all local mining 
economies. However, a number of distinctive economic limitations affecting each of 
the different localities covered in this research can only be explained by their unique 
characteristics, these being geographic, cultural or political. In other words, despite 
the universality of a set of questions involving mining and its surrounding 
communities, preconditions have determined socioeconomic outcomes to a 
significant extent.  
 
 
7.3.1 Geography, economic interaction and social exclusion 
 
Broadly, in the cases analysed, general socioeconomic conditions around the mine do 
not appear radically dissociated from country trends, and hence these local 
communities can only be understood within their national contexts. For example, 
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social exclusion and poverty in the Pilbara region is characteristic of remote 
Aboriginal economies in Australia (Altman 2001, Taylor and Scambary 2005). Yet, 
significant differences in the type of interaction between the operations and the local 
economies led to different outcomes. On the whole, where direct interaction was 
greater (namely, where there was evidence of local reliance on (i) direct mining 
salaries, (ii) the demand for local supplies, or (iii) community investment that was 
linked to corporate performance), the impact from changes in the company’s input 
factors was larger. This, in fact, applied both for periods of corporate bonanza as well 
as duress.  For example, the economy of Swakopmund grew enormously after RUL’s 
inception; then, a large downsizing at the beginning of the 1990s caused significant 
economic contraction locally. Interestingly, after a decade of economic expansion and 
diversification, the second big retrenchment at RUL did not affect Swakopmund 
much.  
 
Strong direct ties to an operation become a liability when the life of a mine is 
presumed to be soon coming to an end, as was the case in Arandis. Instead, these ties 
turn into an opportunity when mining has a long term horizon – either because the 
mineral deposit in question is vast enough, or because of the presence of a mining 
cluster, like in the Pilbara region (The Mining Journal 2005). Direct interaction 
between the operation and the pre-existing local economy was minimal in the case of 
Pilbara Iron though, and changes in input factors at the mine did not show in the 
neighbouring Aboriginal communities at all (URS 2005). The amount of native 
people employed by the mine remained negligible in relative terms, as was the 
participation of Aboriginal businesses in the local supply chain (Taylor and Scambary 
2005). This seeming economic independence was not the result of successful 
economic diversification in these communities but rather evidence of their complete 
segregation from formal business activities. As discussed, even community 
expenditure by the company was negotiated and agreed on separately for the most 
part, and contrary to the case of Rössing, it was set at a fixed value from the 
beginning, completely uncorrelated to measures of company performance like profits 
or others (PI 2005, Rio Tinto TS 2005) 
 
Particularly regarding the economic interactions within different business activities, 
this research has already discussed that in mining, the development of upstream and 
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downstream linkages locally can follow a fundamentally different pattern to those 
which are present at the regional level (for instance, Acil Tasman 2005). We have 
seen how the mining industry in WA has well-developed linkages from and to the rest 
of the economy, although this does not hold locally. Remoteness, cultural barriers, 
scale economics, or the lack of reliable transport or communications infrastructure, 
further restrain the expansion of the local supply chain and other business networks. 
Notably, in well-established operations, the vast majority of supplies imported into 
the region still came from either the same country or bordering nations, and so most 
benefits from these purchases stay relatively close by. For example, 74% of RUL’s 
imported goods and services are in fact supplied by the well-developed South African 
mining sector. For the most part, PI relies on Australian goods and services. 
 
In one case, Swakopmund, there was strong evidence of successful economic 
diversification. Diversification here was driven by clear comparative advantages 
alternative to mining, as discussed, although it was also underpinned by reinvestment 
of mineworkers’ income in the local construction sector. Indeed, a booming housing 
market, together with the emergence of a large pocket of high earners (made up of 
both mineworkers and a group of well-off seasonal European migrants), became the 
pillar on which a strong local financial market consolidated. This development cannot 
be seen as the norm in local mineral economies though, as serious deficiencies in 
local capital markets were identified in all other cases. In general, some crucial 
features of remote and small economies can prevent local credit activities from 
expanding. Many of these economies remain scarcely monetised93, staying as cash 
economies in a great proportion. Cash94 is not transformed into bank deposits; it is 
stored instead by fragmented groups of people, and cannot be captured and re-
injected to finance economic development. In small and remote towns like Arandis, 
Fort-Dauphin or those in the Pilbara, sociological constraints often add to 
geographical constraints, and banks tend to limit their clientele to confined segments 
of the surrounding population, normally to the detriment of small and medium 
borrowers (Martin 1994, Martin and Klagge 2005). 
 
                                                 
93
 Monetisation is referred to as the transformation of cash into bank deposits. 
94
 Cash refers to the currency that is in the public domain and circulating and not that deposited in 
banks. 
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In all cases, the local reinvestment of salaries was the principal contributor to 
increases in the demand for local goods, services and, notably, property.  This 
demand had positive and significant economic implications for local businesses, 
which witnessed a major increase in the amount of cash circulating in the economies. 
As a consequence, and together with the other direct contributions discussed above, 
the three mines analysed have ignited processes of considerable wealth accumulation. 
This accumulation has benefited either the local or regional economies greatly, 
depending on the ability of each community, or sub-community, to attract some of 
that wealth for reinvestment.  The dichotomy between Arandis, the small mining 
town home to low skilled workers, and Swakopmund, is one example. The tension 
between the Pilbara region and Perth is another. 
 
On the other hand, and despite the importance of mining salaries to the economy, 
locals resent that mining often exacerbates income disparities. Labour compensations 
from the companies have pushed employees and other direct beneficiaries from 
mining into the highest earning brackets of these societies. Zandvliet and Anderson 
(2009) argue that the concept of fairness is locally determined and necessarily 
context-specific. In these cases, the arrival of high income earners and the sudden 
consolidation of groups of people significantly wealthier than the average has been 
associated with some degree of local resentment, and has generated (or exacerbated) 
social tensions due to raising inequality. These changes have also been linked to the 
above mentioned local inflationary processes, often led by the local real estate 
market, which can be frequently traced back to the construction of the mines. Overall, 
the arrival of large mining operations has inflicted changes to pre-existing social and 
power structures.  The conflicts manifested by either segregated Aboriginal people in 
the Pilbara, or displaced local residents in Fort-Dauphin, serve as illustration.  
 
To sum up, specific local characteristics have determined the type of economic 
stimulus from mining that each economy is more likely to capitalise from. A first 
group of economies (or sub-economies) may remain largely detached from the 
influence of large mines. On the one hand, this group can considerably reduce 
exposure to the inherent volatility of commodity cycles; on the other, they often fail 
to exert tangible benefits from mining altogether (Altman 2001). In a second group, 
the better the performance of the mine, the greater the direct benefits captured by the 
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local economies. This is the case when business links between the mine and economy 
are strongest, or when contributions from the mine are related to business 
performance, as often tax payments are, or sometimes community expenditure. 
However, a growing dependence on a single company can represent a threat to the 
long-term economic viability of these places. Over-reliance on direct benefits brings 
in other issues. This work identified a number of local situations that fit well with 
what the literature calls rent-seeking behaviours, understood as the efforts by groups 
of individuals to capture a larger share of the existing wealth (Krueger 1974, among 
many others). This literature has claimed that this phenomenon may accentuate local 
income disparities and social tensions, which have also taken place in the cases 
analysed.  
 
Yet, in a third group, an initial investment push from mining can help consolidate 
local economies by specialising in sectors others than mining. This research has 
referred to this group as successful diversification. In these case studies, increased 
disparity has mostly been the consequence of the emergence of new pockets of 
wealth, which in turn increased the circulation of cash within the economies, and in 
some cases improved local conditions more broadly. In particular, this study found 
that local diversification and growth has occurred principally where some economic 
potential outside mining pre-existed, including basic fundamentals such as a 
minimum economic scale. In these situations, the economic incentives that give rise 
to rent-seeking behaviour can be minimised. The findings from this study are, 
therefore, more closely aligned with the literature claiming that nothing intrinsic in 
mining should prevent mineral income from being re-invested in other forms of 
capital to promote longer term economic development (Rodriguez and Sachs 1999, 
Sachs and Warner 1999; Humphreys 2000b; Davis and Tilton 2002, 2005; Czelousta 
and Write 2003, Sachs 2008). Once again, the use to which mining revenues are put 
to comes to the fore. 
 
 
7.3.2 (Sustainable) policy responses 
 
In general, when there have been suboptimal economic performances, responses by 
the companies have tended to narrow the policy spectrum and focus on those 
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challenges most critical in each place. In contrast to previous practice, for the most 
part, the companies defined priorities in consultation with local communities, which 
is strongly consistent with the key SD attributes highlighted by the mining literature 
(Strongman 1998, Eggert 2001, Humphreys 2002). Moreover, in fact, local and 
regional governments have taken the leading role in setting up these priorities. In the 
Pilbara region, for example, the State government of Western Australia left PI little 
option but to endorse the official vision of ‘Strong and Sustainable Local 
Communities’ (Pilbara Development Commission 2005), even when the State itself 
had so far failed to secure the economic sustainability of Aboriginal communities, 
still relying heavily on government handouts. The sheer magnitude of this mining 
operation has put PI under a permanent spotlight, and thus every policy decision 
taken with regards to its expansion plans has been influenced by this overarching 
goal. In the case of Arandis, in Namibia, it was the federal government directly who 
pressured RUL to assume long lasting responsibility for the economic survival of this 
unlikely town in the event of closure. As with PI, this unequivocal government 
definition has become the foundation for every deliberation around closure ever since.  
  
One new focus area of corporate policy has taken on the task of soothing the effect of 
negative economic externalities from the operations. One example is the previously 
mentioned worsening of the distribution of income that can take place around the 
mines. In the absence of thorough local development strategies, corporate responses 
have generally aimed at facilitating local access to the direct economic opportunities 
by the company, and have thus attempted to improve the ability of locals to provide 
goods, services and labour, for instance, by underpinning small suppliers or by 
supporting local employability with training programs. We have seen that in practice, 
and contrary to claims from SD advocates (Pettifer 1998, Strongman 1998, McMahon 
and Remy 2002, Harvey and Brereton 2005), limits to what companies can effectively 
do to materially expand the local supply chain and improve local employment trends 
meant that these responses have been complemented by discretionary community 
investment to a large extent. Yet, the volatility evidenced in the value of mine inputs 
throughout the years has been such that most direct interventions could only affect 
these trends marginally – with the exception of QMM.   
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QMM adopted a different approach altogether. Chapter six explained why intrinsic to 
this project was the requirement to attract investment in complementary sectors and to 
consolidate productivity gains for the broader economy. As part of this task, QMM 
took on the challenge of coordinating positive economic externalities.  A key 
component of this challenge was to establish a new local economic institution that 
could bring about regional consensus as well as greater capability for local 
coordination (Dobbin 2006). This focus implied engaging in areas of work that have 
been so far beyond mining companies, and adopting roles different from the ones they 
typically played in the past. Among others, a change in the skills-base of the company 
became imperative. Local economic development practitioners, for example, or 
development economists with experience in dealing with the World Bank and other 
multilateral organisations were brought onboard. In its attempt to mobilise 
endogenous forces in the local economy, QMM managed to generate an innovative 
space for interaction with the participation of the private and public sectors and the 
community. This new space for dialogue resulted in the adoption of a local 
development blueprint that was to guide policy making initiatives in the transition 
period lying ahead (Dobbin 2004, PGRM 2006)   
 
The interpretations of sustainable development adopted by the corporations as well as 
the local governments and the communities, have in all cases conditioned the policy 
strategies finally put forward by the companies. One way or another, PI and RUL 
have resorted to palliative measures to counteract the negative implications of their 
presence – or those that could have came up from their withdrawal, in the case of 
Namibia. While well-intended efforts by PI and RUL have been largely predefined by 
a policy context that was dated many years back in time, QMM’s radical shift in 
approach was not conditioned by policy decisions made before the times of 
sustainable development. In this sense, Rio Tinto’s operation in Madagascar may be 
considered a pure example of a mine working under the premises of the SD model 
(Clifford 2004). Furthermore, QMM’s attempts to favour bottom-up institutions, 
human capital development, the local appropriation of positive externalities, the 
coordination of local economic agents and so forth, have been most reminiscent of the 
propositions often made by endogenous growth theorists. To bring attention back to 
this link is the purpose of the next section. 
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7.4. Building on theory: mining, regions and SD 
 
7.4.1 Pre-empting the emergence of a new mining orthodoxy 
 
Chapter 2 explained that the different responses to issues of economic and community 
development by mining companies have typically been driven by changes in the 
fundamentals of the industry over time – including the evolution of social 
expectations. The sustainable development model in mining is the latest of these 
identified responses. While the concept of SD had been elsewhere consolidating for 
years, mining had largely remained oblivious to its message, resigned to the portrayal 
that epitomised it as the antithesis of this concept. Towards the end of the last 
millennium, and partially in response to high-profile external pressure, the sector 
made a ‘U’ turn and vigorously embraced the key principles from this movement, and 
adapted them to the unique nature of mining (MMSD 2002).  
 
Rio Tinto was going to play a key role in this process. A rapidly degrading reputation 
that bottomed during the dramatic events in Bougainville described in chapter 3 
represented a loud wake up call for change. To a large extent, the mistakes of the past 
have paved the way for this new approach, and a process of corporate learning was 
set off. Lessons from the experience of individual operations started to feed into the 
design of new corporate standards and procedures and underpinned a radical shift in 
the culture of Rio Tinto and also that of the mining sector more broadly. The 
industry’s rhetoric changed accordingly. A vast number of social programs and 
community projects targeting new industry priorities were put in place.  In turn, the 
human resources profile of large companies started to adjust, reflecting the new need 
for community practitioners, anthropologists, and many others (ICMM 2003, Prescott 
2009, Anglo American, BHPB and Rio Tinto websites). As such, SD brought with it a 
renewed set of policy recommendations and a breath of fresh air to the mining 
industry.     
 
Thus, in a short period of time, the so-called SD model of mining and development 
filtered down into every level of corporate decision making and a legion of new 
propositions became part of the industry’s daily reality. These included, for instance, 
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a conviction that benefits from mining should concentrate at the local level, as it is 
here where the industry’s worst legacy has taken place; that sustainable mining must 
lead to flourishing and diversified local economies; that local procurement, therefore, 
ought to be prioritised; or that dedicated mining towns are intrinsically bad for 
community and economic development – and that FIFO (fly-in and fly-out) practices 
are perhaps worst (for example, WBEIR 2003). As highlighted by this research, so 
established are such propositions that they are hardly contentious these days. This is a 
shame: with all the positive changes accomplished by the SD movement, it may have 
also brought with it, as it happens, a renewed set of unchallenged beliefs that has 
contributed to the formation of a new policy orthodoxy in mining, not always 
underpinned by rigorous analysis.     
 
One such belief is that manufacturing and services are better for the local economies 
than mining, and should thus be encouraged (WBEIR 2003). This resonates strongly 
with the propositions made earlier by the theorists of the dual economy analysis 
(Prebisch 1950, Rostow 1952, Sunkel 1989, Cueva 1993). However, accelerating a 
move towards increased manufacturing production and services would be partially 
served by policy objectives focussing on increasing the accumulation of physical and 
human capital – which is precisely what mining proved to do in some of the 
economies analysed, the most salient example being Rössing’s Swakopmund. In this 
sense, initial production concentration in one economic sector can be justified by 
substantial capital accumulation. Additionally, earlier this chapter argued that 
improvements in the productivity of the main economic sector locally can sometimes 
be transferred to other sectors. This way, changes in mining productivity from 
investment in technology, skilled human capital or better managerial practices, can 
sometimes spill-over and help improve local productivity more broadly. Yet, these 
case studies also showed that the higher the starting level of human and physical 
capital, the higher the potential for local absorption. If the initial stock of human 
capital is below a certain threshold, for instance, the economy can become stuck in a 
resource trap, where most local skills are devoted to the extractive sector – or 
otherwise imported. The Pilbara region provided a good example of this.  
 
For these reasons, this research has suggested that asking how local resource 
economies can diversify towards other sectors may be a misleading question. First, it 
 294
should be established whether such diversification is desirable. Many of these places 
are remote and small, and lack the necessary economies of scale. When economic 
diversification is not natural, there is a chance that it should not be desirable, even if 
circumstantially attainable through dirigisme from either the public or corporate 
sector. For example, at the national level, centralised efforts to diversify from natural 
resources led to the widely-discredited venture into import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) in most of Latin America (Hadass and Williamson 2001). In 
much the same way, economic fundamentals had decided the post-closure fate of 
Arandis even before its construction started: a remote and small mining-town without 
a mine, in the middle of the Namib Desert, would not be able to live up to the legacy 
that Rio Tinto now promotes for its communities. As with other mining towns 
elsewhere in the world, Arandis was built to be dismantled after mining came to an 
end. The essence of the dilemma faced by Rössing was not how to turn Arandis into a 
sustainable economy, which today appears to be largely unattainable, but rather how 
to live with a decision that was made back in the 1970s, and that nowadays appears to 
be antagonistic to what has come to be expected of a large mining house embracing 
sustainable development.  
 
This discussion points out the importance of avoiding blanket responses to these 
dilemmas and founding policy strategies on sound and dispassionate diagnostics. In 
those cases where legitimate economic opportunities can be identified at the 
community level, efforts to expand the local economy may indeed deliver results.  If 
that is the case, policymaking should endeavour to maximise economic impacts 
locally. Instead, when non-mining economic activities would likely not outlive 
mining, efforts should be better directed at minimising local impacts from day one. In 
these cases, policymakers would be better advised to focus on maximising mining 
economic linkages at the regional, or even national, level. This study also showed that 
there may be cases in which extensive mineral resources underpin the establishment 
of mining clusters, turning an inherently finite economic activity into one with a very 
long term horizon. In the case studies undertaken, this research has encountered all 
these situations. However, in all cases too, local interpretations of SD have predefined 
a strong set of expectations, not always realistic, which in turn have conditioned the 
policy strategies ultimately pursued.  
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7.4.2 The materialization of an innovative approach 
 
In brief, this paper has argued that local economic expansion should not be pursued at 
any cost. In some cases, as discussed above, basic economic fundamentals will not be 
in place. Minimising, as opposed to maximising impact, may sometimes be a better 
strategy. In the other cases, however, the realisation of this economic potential has 
often been constricted by sub-optimal, although at times fixable, local conditions. 
Where these conditions occur, proactive responses may be necessary. From the 
analyses in this work, these conditions could be summarised as follows:  
 
- Lack of infrastructure and leading technologies. In poor and isolated places, harsh 
economic pre-conditions may result in a poverty trap, where income cannot be 
reinvested in the first place. Sachs (2008) identifies four priority areas: modern 
infrastructure, including transport, electricity, and telecoms; educational 
infrastructure; health care technologies of all sorts; and high-yield agriculture 
technologies, including small scale irrigation, fertilizers, or improved seed 
varieties 
 
- Lack of broader local and regional development plans. Some mineral economies 
have tended to rely excessively on the wealth generated by mining.  In cases, 
capital and labour may even shift from traditional activities to a booming mineral 
sector. In the absence of comprehensive development strategies, this situation 
could create significant distortions once the resource boom has passed 
 
- Lack of institutional or administrative capacity. Inadequate institutions as well as 
skills and expertise can mean that the full range of opportunities flowing from 
major projects is not always realised.  The challenges associated with managing 
large extractive operations are nowhere near those otherwise faced by these 
economies  
   
These have recently been capturing the attention of the academia more generally, and 
are now starting to be looked at in the light of new development theory more broadly. 
To recapitulate, chapter 1 explored how, in thinking about economic growth, growth 
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theorists had initially overlooked the role of technological and productivity change, as 
well as the level of education and skills available in a given economy – partly because 
these had been assumed to be extensively driven by exogenous forces. However, 
while still a factor, exogenous forces could not fully explain the divergent 
performances of seemingly comparable economies. Evidence later showed that 
technological breakthroughs, the adoption of new technologies, the quality of human 
capital, managerial practices, and productivity growth more generally, could actually 
be explained endogenously to a large extent (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Barro 1991, 
Grossman and Helpman 1991). This suggested a change in approach to economic 
growth from one largely focused on capital accumulation to one that also considered 
the ability of local economies to increase aggregated factor productivity by capturing 
the positive externalities arising from the investments of different economic players 
as well as from their interactions (Pack 1996).  
  
The issue of local coordination and economic institutions hence acquired striking 
importance. At this time, it became clearer that different structures of economic 
governance, and different ways of organising the human capital locally, were 
influencing growth outcomes too. This gave rise to Institutional Economics, which 
has been consolidating since as a mainstream field of academic work. Numerous 
empirical analyses then linked underdevelopment with institutional failure, but have 
also suggested that there could not be blanket solutions (Bates 2001, North 2001, 
Acemoglu 2003, Rodrik et al 2002, Rodrik 2003, 2004). Existing institutional 
arrangements are the result of historical conditions and cultural beliefs; rather than 
pursuing optimal configurations, policymakers should aim at understanding the 
possible institutional constructs that are most conducive to sustainable growth in each 
circumstance. Institutional economists have also argued that proximity and the 
resulting potential for more frequent interactions means that sub-national institutions 
are better suited to deal with the challenges of local economic development than 
central organisations are, and have thus diverted attention to better understanding 
different possible forms of local governance (Pratt and Toterdill 1992, Amin and 
Thomas 1996, Acemoglu 2003) 
 
More particularly, building on Vazquez Barquero (1999), chapter 1 also explored the 
characteristics of the most successful non-mining experiences of Local Economic 
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Development, and described how these have been frequently structured around three 
pillars – which essentially tackle the sub-optimal conditions for mining economies 
described above: (i) the provision of infrastructure, which poor quality is largely seen 
as a cause of market failure that prevents supply and demand forces to meet, meaning 
that some enterprises that would otherwise be feasible will seldom be developed; (ii) 
the consolidation of a comprehensive mid and long-term development strategy to 
enable local and regional communities fulfil their economic potential; and, (iii) the 
implementation of this strategy into action and the management and coordination of 
the multiple elements involved. While some key players in these economies have 
often catalysed the emergence of different regional economic policies, it is critical 
that these policies are ultimately appropriated by the majority of the local society 
(Storper 1997, Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix 2001, Rodriguez-Pose mimeo)     
 
The study of QMM in Madagascar provided a detailed exploration of how some 
mining companies are responding to these same challenges by assuming a proactive 
role in order to help fill the financial gap that affects the development of essential 
infrastructure and the adoption of basic technologies; facilitate the formulation and 
implementation of development plans that look beyond mining; and address the need 
to develop human capital and to build institutional capacity at sub-national levels 
capable of coordinating the strategic objectives of both the company and region. 
QMM was under construction at the time of this analysis: it will be necessary to 
revisit this study once the mine has been in operation for several years and more 
tangible indicators could be considered. However, while mining activities have long 
been ignored as potential triggers of local and regional sustainable development, the 
approach and experience of QMM thus far suggests that large mining enterprises, 
under certain circumstances, can become one of the key catalytic players described by 
Vazquez Barquero (1999); can nurture strong synergies between the mine and region; 
and can thus help set an endogenous growth process into motion.  
 
This conclusion distances itself radically from previous mining wisdom. On the one 
hand, scholars of the endogenous growth theory have argued that different types of 
investments held different development potentials (Pack 1994). This work already 
discussed that while mining contributed significantly towards local capital 
accumulation in the cases analysed, its ability to sustain increases in total factor 
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productivity outside of the company’s perimeters would be closely related to the 
starting point of human capital, managerial capacity, and the technological stage in 
the wider economy. On the other hand, however, QMM’s chief contribution in this 
regard has arguably been on the institutional front, beyond mining production strictly 
speaking. This contribution has been in line with a call for the active coordination of 
local governance made by some theorists (Martin 1990), in particular the suggestion 
that players others than government could legitimately fill a local void and play a 
critical part in economic development planning and the building up of innovative 
institutional frameworks more conducive to long-term development (Peck and Tickell 
1994, Amin and Thomas 1996, Acemoglu et al 2003). As this case study has shown, 
these may consist of formal and informal systems of governance, including 
development agencies, foundations, cooperatives, consultative processes, industry 
associations and others.  
 
The QMM trajectory will hardly become the default outcome in mining however, and 
this research has also emphasized the intrinsic complexity of this approach. The 
mining industry resolutely addressing economic development challenges signals a 
departure from business as usual for both companies and development organisations. 
For companies, this means venturing into a field previously kept exclusively for 
governments and development specialist groups. For development organisations, this 
means accepting that large extractive enterprises are not necessarily the problem, and 
that they can indeed be part of the solution. For many, this proposition is still not easy 
to digest (WBEIR 2003). First is the question of mandate, and the condition to accept 
that a private company can and should step into public policy making. So far, this has 
been seen as an invasion of government sovereignty. Indeed, QMM has been less 
attacked for the type of economic development approach adopted than for the fact 
that it has aggressively adopted an economic development approach (Harbinson 
2007). Next is the issue of expertise: while large companies frequently excel in 
management and organisational capacity, so far they have rarely applied these 
attributes to the science of economic development. This work already praised the 
adaptation capacity shown by QMM in this regard, although advancing this approach 
systematically would require a far-reaching revamp of the skill-base of mining 
companies more generally. 
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Venturing into these new waters alone could be a risky enterprise. Mining companies 
have chosen to address the multifaceted issues of development by working together 
with specialised organisations. While this is clearly not a new approach in mining, 
most of these associations had so far focussed on environmental and social issues, and 
only recently have they expanded to deal with broader economic development. Most 
notably, QMM has gone as far as to establish a formal partnership with the World 
Bank, among others. Aligning and coordinating the immediate interests of most local 
players with the newly perceived requirements of long term economic growth should 
probably be counted as the fundamental achievement of this story. In particular, key 
players like the World Bank or other multilateral organisations can add greater value 
by adopting a role complementary to that of the private sector. With all the virtues of 
this approach, however, the case of QMM has also pointed out to the risk that once 
agreements are reached, the momentum will dissipate. The experience of Rio Tinto in 
Madagascar shows that it is important that all players remain fully involved 
throughout the life of the project and that they maintain a focus on implementation.   
  
 
7.5. Closing the circle – and the way forward 
 
Large mining enterprises have changed operating practices radically under the so-
called SD model. Admittedly, the case studies in this work have not provided a 
comparison of hard data between companies functioning under the SD model and 
previous models of mining development; the industry has simply changed too much 
from those days, and it is virtually impossible to find large corporations in the 
industry not claiming to operate under SD premises in one way or another. For that 
reason, this work looked into the way in which three mainstream enterprises 
approached different issues related to sustainable economic development at distinct 
stages in the life of a mine. The evidence discussed in this work showed that these 
new practices are more closely aligned with the principles of modern local and 
regional development theory than was evident in previous models. As such, a 
fundamental conclusion from this work is that these enterprises can, in cases, become 
catalysers for economic development at the local and regional level, and can thus help 
trigger processes of long lasting economic development. This conclusion, however, is 
not free of caveats, challenges or controversies. 
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To start with, this conclusion also implies that there are cases in which these 
beneficial effects will not come about. We have seen that new mining practices have 
in cases promoted unattainable economic expectations at the local level, and have set 
blanket targets hastily accredited as part of sustainable development principles. This 
has often responded to a basic misalignment between the fundamental features of 
mining economies and the policy framework that rules these economies. There is a 
strong case to step back and dispassionately consider, in each situation, whether 
efforts to discourage local economic expansion could not be in fact more beneficial. 
For those other cases where mining activities could indeed strengthen local 
economies in a sustainable way, we have discussed in detail examples of recent 
corporate work around local supply development; human capital development; the 
flow and use of tax payments; focussed community investment and further local 
economic initiatives. Yet, this work has also suggested that the most critical 
contribution from these enterprises may arise, in fact, from their managerial 
capability and convening authority, in particular as these features could be applied 
outside of their immediate corporate remit. Some of these companies have reinvented 
themselves as coordinators of broader economic development. They have identified 
an institutional vacuum in the economic milieu of remote and small localities facing 
the prospects of a mineral boom, and some of these enterprises are now moving in to 
fill that void.  
 
Whether this approach is successful would depend less on the mining practices of 
these companies than it would on the characteristics and merits of the development 
programs they put forward (in addition, of course, to all relevant external factors). 
The experience of Rio Tinto has shown that, in some cases, these programs could be 
in line with the key concepts and recommendations embraced by modern 
development theory, particularly those proposed by the Local Economic 
Development movement. To a large extent, the key features of the markets and 
technologies involved in the extraction and processing of minerals have not changed 
dramatically over the past two decades; rather, global sentiments reflecting new social 
expectations for the mining industry galvanised the propositions put forward by this 
new movement. While the economic push from mining activities has remained very 
relevant to these places, the policy focus has been gradually moving towards the 
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longer term re-investment of this capital. In that sense, the key factor of this 
development agenda has been the institutional role that some of these companies now 
dare to play. This also implies, however, that any organisation clear about the merits 
and intricacies of this agenda could, in effect, play a similar role. Apart from the fact 
that mining companies are often the only large players in remote and deprived local 
economies, there is little in this latter approach that should be seen as entirely 
exclusive to mining. 
 
 
7.5.1 Is corporate-driven economic sustainability sustainable? 
 
This work has documented how well intentioned companies have sometimes made 
decisions that were, arguably, not sustainable from an economic point of view. Rio 
Tinto’s policies to support the economic expansion of remote and fragile towns in the 
Pilbara region, or Arandis, in the Namib Desert, are examples of these. This corporate 
stance, in any case, appeared to have been closely aligned with the immediate 
expectations of most local stakeholders, and was in part a reaction to the external 
pressures discussed in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, when the company 
adopted what has been depicted here as the soundest and most innovative approach to 
local economic development, like that in Madagascar, the company met fierce 
resistance. What external audiences expect from large operators may not necessarily 
be the most appropriate policy response from an economic development viewpoint. If 
this new mining agenda has been driven by the immediate expectations of local 
stakeholders, what guarantees can be there that companies will continue to pursue 
what appears to be a rather controversial path? Or, to put is differently, is there a 
strong business rationale behind this approach? 
   
One possible way to look at this is through the lens of potential reductions in capital 
expenditure. This approach helped QMM leverage some financial contribution from 
donors against the cost of a multipurpose port. Relative to the overall project cost, 
however, this was still a very small contribution. Another way to look at this is in the 
light of perceived country risk and overall corporate risk reduction, which may have 
even larger financial implications for companies. The increasing exhaustion of 
mineral deposits in the industrialised world has been redirecting investment to 
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developing countries during the latest commodity boom (Crowson 2003, Humphreys 
2007). This shift in the industry’s centre of gravity will increase its risk profile 
accordingly. If a company’s involvement in economic development could reduce the 
likelihood of certain socioeconomic crises taking place this should conceivably be 
reflected in the discount rate applicable to projects during the financial evaluation 
process, thus effectively improving its economics. There is negligible empirical 
evidence for this link in the literature, however, besides the usual claim that such an 
approach enhances ‘the social licence to operate’. A tangible link between new 
economic development practices and project value would encourage corporations to 
take this embryonic expertise to the next level. Thus, the whole concept of mining 
and sustainable development would benefit greatly from more business-focussed 
investigations into this field.   
 
In due course, the critical lessons coming up from the three case studies covered in 
this research would need to be revisited and confronted over time. In particular, future 
research should investigate whether the innovative approach adopted by QMM during 
its design phase was sustained after construction; whether the non-mining 
stakeholders maintained their involvement during operation, and whether or not the 
promised results materialised in the end. Finally, this research has focussed almost 
exclusively on the economic aspects of mining and sustainable development. This 
field of work has been rather neglected by the literature thus far, as the attention has 
been on other aspects of this agenda, such as the impact of large mines on ecological 
systems, among others. Future work will need to bring all these elements together and 
to advance the notion of net impact on the surroundings of large mines, in recognition 
that a number of trade-offs between positive and negative impacts are de facto taking 
place already.   
 
 
7.6. Final remarks 
 
With the unprecedented surge in the prices of minerals and metals since the early 
2000s, the emphasis of the industry shifted from cost cutting to output maximisation. 
Mainstream mining corporations thus ventured into more risky geographies and 
exploration in developing regions increased dramatically. The ability to successfully 
 303
deliver new projects in more challenging environments became increasingly 
important. At the core of these changes was a drive to facilitate legal access to 
resources and relationships with local governments and communities. While the 
literature had concentrated on the macroeconomic implications of mining – including 
issues of price volatility, government revenue fluctuations, foreign exchange 
movements, trade balance and so on –, the latest commodity cycle brought with it the 
consolidation of the SD movement, and with it a focus on the most localised aspects 
of development. Underpinned by the sharpest commodity boom in records, attention 
then shifted to issues such as the distribution of mineral wealth, local institutional 
capacity, or the availability of local skills (World Bank 2002).   
  
A cautionary note should be introduced here. An increased presence of large mining 
investments in developing regions also meant that some of these projects will 
represent a larger than usual share of GDP – with all the potentials and challenges 
that that entails. One such challenge would be the detrimental effect of a commodity 
crash on these countries. Indeed, as this research came to a conclusion, analysts had 
declared the end of the bull market; commodity prices had sharply fallen off their 
peak, and the financial health of several top mining houses – including Rio Tinto – 
had been deeply affected by the worldwide economic slowdown that followed the 
Global Credit Crunch that started in late 2007. As companies slash expenditure across 
the board once again, it remains to be seen whether and how the end of this cycle will 
change the corporate incentives to respond to the questions addressed in this analysis. 
One possible outcome could be that changing priorities in fragile mining states sways 
attention away from local pressures. This seems unlikely though, as most of the other 
drivers that contributed to the emergence of SD in mining are still in place 
(Covalence 2009). In any case, this too may be the substance of future research.  
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The literature on economic development is flooded with claims that the abundance of 
natural resources retards rather than accelerates growth, and has often concluded that 
mining should be avoided as a development strategy. These claims have not gone 
uncontested though, and the continuous surfacing of new empirical evidence has all 
but brought this debate to a conclusion. Lately, however, a timid consensus has 
started to materialize. This consensus has acknowledged that, rather than being either 
positive or negative, mining has in some circumstances been a constructive force for 
development while in others it has not – and has called for thorough case studies to 
explore this proposition. This repositioning of the debate was facilitated by the 
emergence of a new economic development framework more broadly, epitomised by 
the Endogenous Growth Theory and the consolidation of Institutional Economics as a 
mainstream field of research. More particularly, this work looked at whether the 
lessons from Local Economic Development (LED), a school of thought flowing from 
this theoretical turnaround, could be applied to mining more generally. While mining 
may have been prematurely disregarded as intrinsically incompatible with this new 
thinking, changes in the structure of the industry had in fact started to shape this 
debate long time ago. 
 
Three distinctive stages could be singled out throughout history. In the first one, most 
mineral ventures were relatively small and aimed at satisfying regional demand. 
Equipment was not particularly sophisticated, and thus capital requirements were 
relatively low. In turn, labour inputs were proportionally much higher than today. 
Local beneficiation was supported by high transportation costs, and by the simplicity 
of goods required during the process. Similarly, it made more sense to ship high-
value semi-finished or finished products than ore. Then, the mine not only satisfied 
the need for minerals locally but also became a regional pole of development. 
Overall, economic benefits from mining were assumed to take place naturally. In the 
second stage, transportation costs had fallen drastically, allowing mines to develop far 
from processing plants and final consumers. Mining equipment was now 
sophisticated and specialised and, with lower transportation costs, local suppliers 
could not compete with global manufacturers. These mines were now huge, complex, 
and capital-intensive. Regional infrastructure was exclusively motivated by the needs 
of the mine. Little of the fiscal revenue from mining went back to the regions, which 
bore most of the negative consequences of mining. When problems arose, the 
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response by the industry was to directly compensate those most affected. This model 
was characterised by a paternalistic approach to local communities.    
 
As the increasing regional distress in mineral economies was noted by the 
international community, pressure on corporations started to mount. The deep 
changes in the industry that followed were chiefly triggered by social demand to 
improve operating standards. While public pressure concentrated on the 
environmental and social dimensions first, the focus gradually shifted towards the 
economy. This pressure led to a number of reactions by the industry aimed at 
rectifying this situation and enhancing the visible contributions of mining to affected 
communities, which has since been referred to as the sustainable development (SD) 
model of mining. This model incorporated some key policy lessons from the new 
development movements mentioned above, and proposed governance and operating 
practices in which, for example, negotiations and agreements would include 
communities and regional authorities; the central government would share tax 
revenues with regional administrations; compensations would be negotiated with the 
broader community, and infrastructure development would aim at addressing both the 
requirements of the mine as well as the broader economy. This model shifted the 
policy focus from the national to the local level.  
 
This research has focussed on the economic aspects of this agenda, and to some 
extent accepted man-made capital as a surrogate for natural capital. In particular, it 
has asked whether mining enterprises under SD can help transform finite mineral 
resources into long-term sources of development and catalyse economic growth 
around the mines. In exploring these questions, it has dug into the experience of Rio 
Tinto, one of the largest mining corporations in the world, which has also been 
instrumental in setting the SD agenda for mining more generally. Three case studies 
were developed, covering the most distinctive phases in the life of a mine. The first 
one looked at a uranium operation facing the prospect of early closure in the Erongo 
region, Namibia. The second case explored an expanding network of iron-ore mines 
in the remote Pilbara region of Western Australia, and reviewed the economic 
opportunities associated with a mining cluster.  The final study covered the design 
and inception phase of a mine, and considered the innovative approach adopted by 
Rio Tinto’s ilmenite business in Fort Dauphin, southeast Madagascar.  In all cases, 
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the studies looked at the direct economic contributions from these enterprises but, 
more critically, they also focussed on the interface between the mines and the broader 
economies. The studies unveiled similarities, but also remarkable differences.  
 
One component of this work looked at the streams of cash in-and-out of these 
communities in detail. Consistent with claims by mining and SD advocates, this 
analysis confirms the frequently striking importance of large mining operations to 
local and regional economies. This has been particularly true during the recent 
commodity boom, where extraordinary amounts of cash were poured into these 
places. However, this work has disagreed with the emphasis attributed to each stream 
of benefits. While mining literature has stressed the importance of mining jobs for 
locals, it has often disregarded their potential to increase the productivity of the 
economy more broadly, and underestimated the economic effect of their 
remuneration; while it has focused on the distribution of the mineral rent, it has 
largely overlooked what has been done, or could be done, with these funds. As such, 
this work shifted attention to the local reinvestment of this capital; the economic 
opportunities beyond mining; the management of local resources; and the interaction 
among various economic agents. Similarly, while sustainable development theorists 
have strongly encouraged a drastic move towards local procurement, the evidence 
introduced here concluded that, although important, the ultimate potential for further 
substituting imports with local goods and services has remained marginal for the most 
part.  
 
In the same way, and against claims which pronounce the end of philanthropy in 
mining, this research found that voluntary corporate expenditure continued to be a 
major instrument for community engagement. Limits to the benefits that locals have 
been able to exert directly from mining activities meant that large companies have 
continued to employ discretionary social investment as a means to offset the effect of 
negative economic externalities, including, for instance, the worsening of local 
income distribution, food inflation and further price distortions. Noteworthy, and in 
contrast with previous practice, the three companies analysed have delineated these 
interventions and defined their investment priorities in full consultation with local 
communities and governments. More generally, whether or not these funds could 
successfully respond to the specific challenges emerging at the local level, and 
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thereafter underpin local economic sustainability, it will ultimately depend on the use 
that these cash flows are put to by local economic agents. In this sense, despite many 
of the identified challenges being common to all local mining economies, this work 
has shown that local preconditions have determined socioeconomic outcomes to a 
significant extent.   
 
Contrary to previous paradigm shifts in mining, the SD model did not result from 
changes to the underlying structure of mineral production. Rather, it was the 
industry’s response to the consolidating demands of a changing world for companies 
to adjust outdated operating practices. While being seen as doing the right thing 
certainly played a role, the adaptation undergone by these businesses was driven by a 
legitimate desire to improve their legacy in impacted areas, and as such was reflected 
at every hierarchical level in the organisations. In particular, they have strived to 
secure sustainable economic opportunities for those directly affected by the 
operations, and in doing so they mobilised significant resources. It has been argued, 
however, that the inability to increase local benefits beyond a certain threshold should 
not necessarily be seen as policy failure. This study suggested that new mining 
practices have in cases promoted unattainable economic expectations at the local 
level, and have set blanket targets hastily accredited as part of SD principles. To 
move away from this corner it will be critical to produce dispassionate diagnoses on a 
case specific basis before agreeing on precise action plans with the relevant 
stakeholders. In cases, for instance, the region may be a more appropriate 
geographical target than the local level; in others, the nation may be more appropriate 
than the region.   
  
In other cases, mining companies showed significant potential to catalyse economic 
growth and set off long-term processes of economic development locally. While 
mining has long been ignored as a possible trigger of endogenous growth, this 
research showed that its potential has been notoriously underestimated. On the one 
hand, mining contributed distinctly to local capital accumulation in the cases 
analysed. More critically, on the other hand, large mining enterprises can help sustain 
increases in total factor productivity in the local economy. As such, this research 
finds that there is nothing intrinsic in mining that should prevent mineral income from 
being re-invested in other forms of capital to promote longer term economic 
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development. That said, while the technology, skills and managerial practices of large 
operations will sometimes spill over and be absorbed by the rest of the economy, the 
industry’s propensity to influence the rate of this absorption will largely depend on 
the initial level of technology and skills in the economy, and the local ability to adapt 
to change. Yet, this work showed that mining enterprises can make a remarkable 
contribution to local governance and play a critical part in economic planning and the 
building up of innovative institutional frameworks, which could, in turn, help increase 
the prevailing stock of technological and human capital locally.  
 
This entails a whole new role for mining companies – and this analysis showed how 
some of them have been taking encouraging steps. Conversely, this research also 
highlighted the controversial nature of this new function. In effect, a complete sense 
of balance between key stakeholders concerning this new approach has not yet been 
reached, and it is conceivable that the type of backlash identified in this work may 
eventually lead to companies giving up on these efforts. In due course, revisiting 
these case studies would be necessary to elucidate whether progress has been made in 
this regard. The new course of action discussed here has demanded significant 
resources from companies, these being in money, time or skills. In taking this 
approach to the next level, firms will want to understand what benefits could be 
expected from their involvement. Significant risk reduction has often been promised 
as a reward, although there are no sufficient business analyses rigorous enough to 
establish this link categorically. Further investigations into this field would be 
welcome. Finally, it was noted throughout that this study focussed on economic 
sustainability. Previously, a considerable amount of research had been conducted in 
the ecological and social dimensions of the SD agenda. As the acceptance of ongoing 
trade offs among these dimensions is gaining ground, further work on the concept of 
net positive effect from a mine will constitute another critical area for future 
investigation. 
 
